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Thesis Abstract
Christian Stoicism and Politeness: The Making of the Social Ethics of the
Scottish Enlightenment
Exploring the moral theories that underpinned eighteenth-century Scottish
society has become a key component of Scottish Enlightenment
historiography. Leading figures of the Enlightenment, including Hugh Blair,
William Robertson and Adam Smith, examined human nature, morality and
activity in a distinctive manner. In the course of their studies, these literati
came to view the ethos of the commercial society that was evolving around
them from a unique perspective.
More specifically, numerous historians of the Enlightenment have noted the
important role played by the Moderates of the Church of Scotland in shaping
the 'moral sciences.' Like Smith, the Moderates emphasized the benefits of
commercial activity, not least the refinement of manners, civility and
politeness that came with the 'universal opulence' of developed economies. It
fell to senior Moderates like Blair and Robertson, and their more junior
colleague, John Drysdale, to emphasize Christianity's role in the commercial
world order and to safeguard the Church's position as a moral bulwark
against corruption or luxury.
Historians correctly argue that the Moderates developed a type of 'Christian
Stoicism' to reconcile matters of faith and polite secular ethics. Yet the full
nature of 'Christian Stoicism' has been under-explored. Some historians
suggest that 'Christian Stoicism' was merely a system of practical moralising;
others suggest it was essentially a political tool to encourage loyalty to the
Hanoverian order. These conclusions belie both the depths to which the
Moderates analysed matters of faith and ethics, and the sophistication of their
interest in Stoicism.
This thesis advances our understanding of Enlightenment thought by
examining the role 'Christian Stoicism' played in texts by Blair, Robertson and
Drysdale, texts that have until now received comparatively little scholarly
attention. After examining Calvinist, seventeenth-century Neostoic and early
eighteenth-century moral philosophy in the first three chapters, the thesis
considers the roles played by faith, virtue and order in Blair's Sermons,
Robertson's An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge Which the
Ancients Had of India, and Drysdale's Sermons. It then considers Adam
Smith's influence on these Moderates. This examination shows how the
Moderates blended private and public Christian obligations to define
'Christian Stoicism,' a philosophy that embodied the correct principles for a
commercial society.
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Introduction1
Few societies in Europe have undergone times of such unprecedented economic,
cultural and philosophical ferment as Scotland experienced during the eighteenth
century. Following Scotland's union with England in 1707, the country's
economic fortunes were transformed by gaining wider access to English
commercial markets, as well as to England's European and North American
trading routes. The consequences of this increased prosperity for Scotland's
social and intellectual life were immense. By mid-century, new sources of
wealth in society ushered in an era during which refinement in learning, manners
and civility became the hallmarks of civilised members of Scottish society.
It fell to the intellectual leaders of this era, the Scottish Enlightenment, to define
the social, moral and political ethos of the commercial society evolving in their
midst. As Fania Oz-Salzberger has recently noted, ".. .There was a powerful
motivation to create a feasible philosophy for the new Scotland.. .,"2 that
underscored Scotland's place in the British order, while highlighting its ability to
make distinctive contributions to British social and intellectual life. For our
purposes, the Scots' most notable contribution came in their formulation of 'the
1 I am very grateful to the Earhart Foundation for its generous support ofmy doctoral research
from 1993-97.
2
Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, (ed.) Oz-Salzberger, Fania
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), see Oz-Salzberger's introduction, p. xiii.
1
science ofman', a comprehensive set of social and moral theories through which
the full dynamics of commercial society were explored.
More specifically, as historians and social theorists, the Scots created 'categories'
through which economic, social and moral progress could be explained, justified
and encouraged. David Hume (1711-76), Adam Smith (1723-90), Adam
Ferguson (1723-1816), and Henry Home, Lord Karnes (1696-1782), among
others, defined these 'categories' by investigating the principles of human nature
that affected the way eighteenth-century commercial polities operated. They
explored the roles played by virtue, imagination, sense and reason in daily life.
In so doing, they investigated the nature of society itself, and examined the
responsibilities of individuals in it. The resulting dialogue became a means for
encouraging the evolution of a harmonious polite commercial society,
characterised by tolerance, sociability and eloquence.
• • • T
Since the publication ofRichard B. Sher's pioneering work on the Scottish
literati who were also members of the Moderate Clergy of the Church of
Scotland, Enlightenment scholars have noted the important role the Moderates
played in shaping discussion about the moral dimensions of civil society and
polite social ethics. Like Adam Smith, the Moderates emphasized the benefits of
commercial activity. It fell to senior Moderates such as Hugh Blair (1718-1800)
and William Robertson (1721-93), and to their junior colleague, John Drysdale
3
Sher, Richard B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati
of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985).
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(1718-88), to emphasize Christianity's role in the commercial world order and to
safeguard the Church's position as a moral bulwark against corruption or luxury.
Sher and others have correctly argued that the Moderates developed a type of
Christian Stoicism to reconcile matters of faith and polite secular ethics. This
thesis suggests, however, that the full nature ofChristian Stoicism has been
under-explored. As we will see, some historians reduce Christian Stoicism to a
system of practical moralizing; others suggest it was essentially a political tool to
encourage loyalty to the Hanoverian order. These conclusions are useful, but
they belie both the depths to which the Moderates analyzed matters of faith and
ethics as well as the sophistication of their interest in Stoicism.
The thesis suggests that the system ofmorality described in Christian Stoicism
transcended the mechanical application of polite principles to daily life by
blending private and public virtue for the sake ofmoral, ethical and social
improvement. The blending resulted not only from the absorption of polite
principles inherited from earlier English and Continental discussion about well-
mannered behaviour, but also from the Moderates' profound reflection about the
nature of virtue and the manner in which it could be practically applied in daily
life. The thesis develops these points by examining the role Christian Stoicism
played in texts by Blair, Robertson and Drysdale, tests that until now have
received comparatively little attention from Enlightenment scholars.
Before considering these texts, which will be described below, the thesis opens in
Part I, chapters one and two, with a general review of the Neostoic discourse that
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arose in Protestant Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Chapter one examines the contributions of John Calvin and Justus Lipsius (1547-
1606), who emphasized common themes in Christian teaching and ancient
Stoicism. Chapter two discusses how European debate on Neostoicism widened
and spread in the seventeenth century. It explores the popularity ofNeostoic
themes in England and suggests that the ongoing discourse on Neostoicism was
bound to be well known to Scottish literati in the eighteenth century.
These chapters are followed by chapter three, which considers the manner in
which aspects of Continental discussion about the nature of society and human
activity were translated into Scottish intellectual life by Gerschom Carmichael
and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746). It discusses the unique contributions
Hutcheson made to the study ofmoral philosophy in Scotland, which laid the
foundation for the development of 'the science ofman'.
In chapters two and three, we will also see that from the end of the seventeenth
century, theories derived from the natural law tradition ofHugo Grotius (1583-
1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) formed the context within which Scottish
moral philosophy developed. The influence of Pufendorf s theory of sociability
will be examined, which contributed to his identification of property as a crucial
social institution, a notion that was of central interest to the Enlightenment
literati. Part I, chapter three continues by considering the nature of politeness by
reviewing its antecedents in seventeenth-century French thought as seen through
the work of Jean de la Bruyere. Part I concludes by discussing how the leading
British exponent of politeness, Joseph Addison (1672-1719), conveyed moral
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messages to members ofBritish commercial society through the publication of
the daily journal, The Spectator.
In Part II, chapters four and five, readers are returned to the matter of Moderate
Christian Stoicism by examining the roles played by faith, virtue and order in
Hugh Blair's sermons and William Robertson's An Historical Disquisition
Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had of India (1791). Blair is best
remembered for his work on rhetoric and belles lettres, however his religious
thought as reflected in his sermons offers a clearer picture ofwhat the nature of
his Christian Stoicism was. In chapter four, it is argued that Blair encouraged his
readers to cultivate private virtue, while remaining responsible and obedient
citizens. Robertson's preference for the cultivation ofpublic virtue is discussed
in chapter five, with particular reference to his admiration for the Brahmins in
ancient India.
The fact that various interpretations of Christian Stoic priorities existed among
the Moderates raises questions about its philosophical coherence as a moral force
in society. This matter is taken up in Part III, which investigates the Moderates'
intellectual debts to Adam Smith's system of ethics vis-a-vis Christian Stoicism.
In chapter six, Smith's image of natural theology and revealed religion is
considered. As Smith's moral thought matured, his reliance upon Stoicism to
investigate the spiritual dimensions of human life increased. This reflected the
influence of Hutcheson, whose earlier emphasis of virtue, duty and self-command
influenced Smith while he was Hutcheson's student at Glasgow.
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In Part III, chapter seven, the manner in which John Drysdale promoted the
Christian Stoic agenda through his sermons is reviewed within the context of
Smith's influence upon him. Drysdale's sermons are characteristically didactic in
tone and are distinguished from those of his more eloquent peers by their
forthright style. Drysdale was a pragmatist, who focussed not upon the finer
points of the Enlightenment's wider philosophical debates, but on the practical
application of Christian Stoic virtue and order to the lives of his parishioners.
The section concludes by suggesting that the Moderates did indeed rely upon
Adam Smith's system of ethics to add a philosophical coherence to Christian
Stoicism. Rather than interpreting this reliance as an intellectual weakness in
Christian Stoicism, however, the Moderates viewed it as a vindication of
Christian Stoicism's place within Enlightenment's 'science ofman'.
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Part I
The Rise of Neostoicism and Its influence in Early Modern Scotland
Prologue
The sixteenth century brought significant changes in perceptions of the proper
relationship between religious and secular interests in Europe, which were
manifested clearly in the rapid growth of commercial activity throughout the
continent. The conquest of the New World contributed to a rapid increase of
wealth among the colonial powers and to the expansion of the European market.
These in turn led to the establishment of new centres of financial power; the rise
of the bourgeoisie; the growth of commercial companies; and the demise of
medieval agrarian communities. The foundations ofEurope's economic strength
broadened as new spirits of nationalism grew with trade.
The religious and social consequences of these developments were considerable,
particularly for the leaders of the Reformed churches who faced an immediate
responsibility to define religious opinion toward economic enterprise and
material progress. During the Middle Ages, social theory and matters of
economic doctrine were defined by canon lawyers, including matters of contract
and property law. As the prosperity of individual states increased, matters of
social and economic concern fell under the jurisdiction of the state.
7
Europe's new prosperity posed casuistic problems for Reformed theologians.
How were the new commercial energies in society to be contained so as to
prevent healthy economic action lapsing into greed and avarice? Did economic
prosperity necessarily risk the introduction of greater social or personal
immorality? What was the proper role of the individual in society? Were the
Reformation's leaders gong to respond to these kinds of questions as the
Scholastics did during the Middle Ages by grafting new social forces with their
interpretations ofman's spiritual end? R.H. Tawney pointed to a wider tension
looming over these specific challenges to the Reformers, namely the tension
between the "... triumph of the commercial spirit over the traditional social ethics
of Christendom ..." versus the "... logical connexion between changes in
economic organisation and changes in religious doctrine."4
While tensions between religious and secular interests increased as religion came
under growing pressure from materialism and rationalism, there were avenues of
thought available to those scholars and theologians who wished to foster
constructive dialogue between philosophy and religion. One of the more
productive of these avenues was found in Neostoicism, a school of thought that
amalgamated key themes in ancient Stoicism with Christian principles to promote
virtue among individuals and order in society. Part I provides a general review of
the Neostoic discourse that arose in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth
4
Tawney, R.H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London: Penguin Books, Reprint, 1990), p.
92.
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centuries, and then traces the influence of this school on the Continent and in
Great Britain.
Chapter One
John Calvin and Justus Lipsius: Neostoicism as Christian Stoicism
Introduction
This chapter seeks to provide a review of how two central figures in the sixteenth
century treated matters of morality, conscience and public duty by relying on the
teachings of Christianity and a renewed philosophical interest in ancient
Stoicism: John Calvin (1509-64), the Reformed leader who influenced Scotland
most directly; and, Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), a Flemish humanist who
introduced a Christianized form ofNeostoicism into European intellectual life
that became increasingly popular as a guide to practical and political life.
Calvin and Lipsius focussed on matters ofmorality and social responsibility.
They were educated in a common humanist tradition that sprang from the
Renaissance revival of classicism, yet they came to their tasks of advocating
virtue and obedience in society from different perspectives in terms of their
formal roles. Calvin was a clergyman, whose primary task was the propagation
of the Reformed word ofGod. Lipsius was a scholar and educator, a committed
Christian but one who concerned himselfprimarily with political and social
commentary. They shared, however, a number of common values that are
important to note from the outset.
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Both men paid particular attention to the role conscience played in regulating
human behaviour. Both had a profound belief in the need to maintain social
order and political stability. Both studied the human condition while recognizing
that individuals were exposed to temptation in direct and personal ways. Both
believed that temptation in its various forms had to be resisted to live in
accordance with the moral order ofGod. In the comparatively prosperous world
of sixteenth-century Geneva, where Calvin spent the majority of his adult years,
or the Dutch Republic, where Lipsius lived, this rather general formula for
governing life, a call to resist temptation and an appeal to one's rational nature,
placed considerable pressure on the functioning of individual conscience and
powers of self-command to regulate and maintain moral standards.
This chapter works from the premise that Neostoicism was a key 'philosophical
product' devised in the sixteenth century to reconcile matters of faith and reason,
and to encourage obedience and order in society. In later chapters, the extent to
which Neostoicism was taken up by European intellectuals will be examined.
Here it is important to trace aspects ofNeostoicism in Calvin's and Lipsius'
thought, and to explore their admiration for and problems with certain Stoic
themes.
The chapter will begin by examining Calvin's humanism and the extent to which
he did or did not seek to amalgamate his Christian faith with sympathetic Stoic
principles. It will then explore Calvin's political philosophy that reflected a
wider sympathy with classical republicanism. Attention will then turn to Lipsius'
11
Neostoicism, with a view to understanding how he deliberately blended
Christianity and Stoicism to provide a means for cultivating virtue in Dutch
society in the aftermath of the Republic's turbulent civil wars. The chapter will
conclude by suggesting that some of the concerns about morality and philosophy
raised by Calvin and Lipsius were taken up by Scots in the eighteenth century,
who cared deeply about maintaining ethical standards when social, philosophical
and political conditions were changing and evolving around them.
i
Calvin: Tensions between Faith and Philosophy
Calvin's guidance to his followers on morality should be examined within the
context of his wider social thought, while bearing in mind his personal
commitment to an intensely practical understanding of the role religion played in
society. In his seminal work, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536), the
reformer discussed questions ofmoral interaction in society through an analysis
ofChristian freedom, ecclesiastical power, and political administration. Human
beings, he suggested, lived under a twofold government: the spiritual and the
temporal, or the government ofGod and that of a given civil administration.
Duties and obligations proceeded from both, which when combined formed a set
of universal imperatives that directed the correct course of Christian life.
Calvin, and Calvinism as it evolved as a religious movement, emphasized that
theology had to be 'world-affirming' in order to triumph over the forces of sin
prevalent in daily life. It was through worldly activity that the Christian Church
12
confirmed its involvement in society, and sanctified positive human endeavours.
By tying faith and 'world-affirming' activity, Calvin recast Christianity as a
'committed' religion, underscored by a dedication to apply the truths of the
Gospel to practical daily life. Included in the spirit of this renewed Christianity
was the implication that individual believers assumed active responsibility to live
according to the dictates of Christian morality circumscribed by the Providential
order.5 Faith became a matter of action motivated by pious reflection and
constant awareness of the frailties of human nature.
The imperative to sanctify human experience permeated Calvin's thought, and
extended into private life to include matters of personal morality, not least in
determining how to avoid the temptations brought on by new wealth in society.6
Calvin taught that individual believers, like the Christian Church as a whole, best
addressed moral challenges through engagement with the world rather than
through speculation.
Calvin, like Martin Luther, appealed to the structures of good conscience, what
Max Weber called 'psychological sanctions', to meet the challenges of a new
materialistic age. Both reformers recognised the need to reconstruct doctrine and
ecclesiastical government to reflect changing social mores apparent in early
modern European society. Calvin's unique perspective on all types of social
interaction was that he directly linked the minutiae of daily life with the process
of sanctification, so that, as Alister McGrath has pointed out, "... the entire
5 The points made about the transformation of Christianity into a 'committed' religion are Alister
McGrath's.
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sphere of human existence ..." was brought "... within the scope of divine
sanctification and human dedication."7
John Calvin was born at Noyon in Picardy on 10 July 1509. His father, Gerard
Chauvin (the original form of the family name), served as registrar and notary to
the local bishop. Chauvin intended his son for the clergy, and because of his
ecclesiastical position, the bishop permitted John Calvin to join the cathedral
chaplaincy school at the comparatively young age of twelve. Chauvin's position
in the cathedral's administration also gave his son access to a number of
Picardy's prominent families, in whose company Calvin cultivated a self-assured
refinement in personal manners that set him apart from other boys of his
immediate social rank.
The chronology ofCalvin's movements in early adulthood is debated by scholars,
however, it is sufficient to note that at the urging of his father, Calvin travelled to
Paris between 1521-23 to begin studies in Latin and theology at the College de la
Marche, within the University of Paris. From there he joined the theologically
orthodox College de Montaigu to study philosophy, where the curriculum centred
around Aristotelian natural philosophy. It is also generally suggested that while
at Montaigu, Calvin first came into contact with Lutheranism, the tenets ofwhich
were enthusiastically debated by Parisian intellectuals from about 1519.
6




After taking his licencie in arts degree, Calvin unexpectedly changed the focus of
his scholarly attention. He left Paris between 1526-8 for the University of
Orleans to take up studies in civil law, which were interrupted by the death of his
father. Bernard Reardon suggests that while it is not clear that Calvin showed
any particular allegiance to the Reformation at this stage, his religious sympathies
may have been affected by the liberal atmosphere ofOrleans. What is certain is
that because Orleans was also a recognised centre for humanist scholarship,
Calvin had ample opportunity to continue his extensive reading of classical
o
authors.
In his appreciation of linguistics and rhetoric, Calvin was a humanist in an
Erasmian or Renaissance rather than twentieth-century sense of the term.9 He
followed established norms to analyse texts and literary styles for the purpose of
investigating the development of ideas, rather than the propagation of a particular
humanist ideology. Sixteenth-century humanism did not reflect the secular
tendencies of humanism in the Enlightenment, and its priorities were considered
within the framework ofGod's natural law or order. In following these methods,
Calvin demonstrated a commitment to humanism's respect for man's natural
intelligence and dignity, characteristics that resonated strongly with Stoicism.
This ancient school enjoyed particular favour in humanist circles, much in part
due to the popularity of Cicero's treatment of rhetoric and learning. It was
8 See Reardon, Bernard, Religious Thought in the Reformation (London and New York:
Longmans, 1995), pp. 149-54. The fact that Erasmus studied at Orleans in 1500 helped establish
the university's humanist credentials.
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perhaps for this reason that Calvin followed Erasmus in producing a commentary
on Seneca's De dementia in 1532. While the book was a financial disaster
because Calvin was forced to pay for its publication personally, the project
testified to his interest in Stoicism and probably enhanced his intellectual
credentials among humanist friends.10 Furthermore, as Reardon suggests, it is
likely that Calvin appreciated "... an affinity between the Stoic ethic and
Christianity",11 not least a common reliance on the forces of providence to
provide an ordered structure to the world. Like some Scots in the eighteenth
century, Calvin's primary criticism of Stoicism rested in his objection to its
doctrine of complete indifference to the affairs of the external world, and yet this
indifference often appeared in modified form in the Neostoic tradition.12
The task of exploring Calvin on Stoicism is somewhat complicated by the fact
that he left little formal commentary on it. Rather, sources and references appear
in a variety of texts. There is less on Stoicism in The Institutes than in Calvin's
Commentaries on the Bible. His translation of Seneca does not include many
notes or marginalia. A more coherent impression is gleaned from various sources
9 For a helpful discussion about the nature of the Renaissance and early modern European
humanism, see Mackenney, Richard, Sixteenth Century Europe: Expansion and Conflict
(London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1993), pp. 107-28.
10 See Battles, Ford Lewis, 'The sources of Calvin's Seneca commentary', in Ford Lewis Battles
et al.. John Calvin (Courtenay Studies in Reformation Theology) [Abingdon, 1966], pp. 38-62;
and (eds) Battles, Ford Lewis and Hughes, A.M., Calvin's Commentary on Seneca's 'De
dementia' (Leiden. 1969).
11 Reardon, Bernard, Religious Thought in the Reformation, p. 150.
12 It is interesting to note that at least at this early stage in his career, Calvin did not seem to share
the Stoics' strong emphasis of the need for virtue in life.
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compiled in secondary literature that attest to the fact that Stoicism remained a
constant reference point in Calvin's mind, albeit at times a negative one.13
As a Christian, Calvin reacted against a fatalism in Stoicism that negated the need
for redemption in life, and indeed any anxiety human beings naturally felt about
death and proving worthy of salvation. Calvin believed that anxiety was a
necessary element in human design, for one of the purposes of faith was to
assuage spiritual torment. The sinner who cultivated Stoic indifference, which
implied suspension of anxiety and fear, risked disassociation from the body of
faith that led to salvation:
"For a man to flee and shudder at death" was "a natural disposition that can never
be fully controlled," and "no one willingly hurries toward it." Those indifferent
to death "see the whole earth mixed together in confused variety and its
individual elements, so to speak, tossed hither and yon; and yet, as if they did not
belong to the human race, they imagine they will remain always the same, liable
to no changes."14
Calvin believed that anxiety was the 'mother of prudence', that it encouraged
vigilance against evil and the vicissitudes of life. It was also quite natural that
individuals care about 'worldly affairs', most particularly the events and
circumstances of their own life: indifference, then, was counterproductive.
Bouwsma makes the interesting suggestion that Calvin wished to "reclaim for
Christianity what the Stoics considered the two great obstacles to human
13 In the following paragraphs, quotations are drawn from translations by William J. Bouwsma.
Bouwsma's translations and transcriptions of Calvin were recommended by Dr. David J. Wright,
Dr. John Bolt and Professor Heiko Obermann.
14
Bouwsma, William J., John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), p. 32. The quotes are taken from Calvin's Commentaries (on II Timothy 4:6;
Deuteronomy 32:48; Genesis 50:2; Acts 2:24; Hebrews 2:15).
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happiness: fear and hope."15 Rather than place fear and hope in opposition to
productive life as the Stoics did, Calvin argued for their inclusion:
"but experience shows that hope truly reigns where fear occupies part of the
heart. For hope does not operate in a tranquil mind, nay it is almost dormant.
But it exerts its power where it uplifts a spirit worn down by cares, soothes it
when troubled by grief, and supports it when it is stricken by terror."16
A more positive compatibility between Stoicism and Christian interests is found
in the quest for personal reformation through the right exercise ofwill, which
Calvin contextualizes in comments on the soul:
"There are two primary endowments of the soul. The first is its capacity to
reason, the other to judge and choose. The soul ofman excels first in intelligence
or reason, then in judgment, on which choice and will depend."17
The right use ofwill extends to matters of self-command, which becomes
essential to the restraint ofpassion and temptation that are dangerous both to
Christianity and Stoic tranquility.
"Each of us should watch himself closely, lest we be carried away by violent
feeling," so we may "bridle our affections before they become ungovernable. ...
Ifwe seek to exceed our limits, we manifestly tempt God."18
15 Ibid., p. 44. The point is Bouwsma's.
16 Ibid., p. 44. The quote is taken from Calvin's Commentaries (on Psalm 56:4).
17 Ibid., p. 88. The quote is taken from Calvin's Commentaries (on Ezekiel 11:19-20).
18 Ibid., pp. 88-89. The quotes are taken from Calvin's Commentaries (On Jeremiah 20:14-16;
Calvin's Sermon 51 on Job; Isaiah 6:11).
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Calvin does not bring an explicit notion ofprogress into the process of self-
reflection and self-reformation, but there is an undercurrent of the possibility of
improvement in his tone that we will see also appears in Seneca. There is a
tension between Calvin's portrayal of Stoicism in its most extreme form: one of
complete detachment from the world or apatheia, and a Stoic-like process of
continual self-assessment that is actively encouraged. Despite this, readers are
often returned to the problem of adversity. In adversity:
"God tests his own, he examines them by afflications, he puts them like gold in
the furnace, not only to be purged but also to be known." This was "the
foundation of our philosophy." Further, "True patience is not the stubborn
endurance of adversities (as the Stoics maintain in praising virtue an unyielding
hardness), but willing submission to God because we trust in his grace."19
One area where Calvin seemed at ease with the Stoics, even in his later years,
was in their mutual regard for community. Calvin associated community with
humanity, and the obligations to one's community with wider duties to human
kind. People are:
"bound together by a sacred chain," that "should be embraced in one feeling of
love. ... All the blessings we enjoy have been entrusted to us by the Lord on this
condition, that they should be dispensed for the good of our neighbors. ... Society
consists of groups that are like yokes, in which there is a mutual obligation of
parties." If followed then "that men have been begotten for the sake of their
fellows to share one another's toil, to take counsel together, to share themselves
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and their possessions, insofar as it is for the public good."
19 Ibid., pp. 183-84. The quotes are taken from Calvin's Sermons No. 5 and No. 7 on Job;
Commentaries (on Psalms 46:4, 41:2 and 89:31); and The Institutes. Book III).
20 Ibid., p. 201. The quotes are taken from Commentaries (on Acts 13:36; the Institutes, Book II;
Ephesians, 5:22; Sermon No. 71 on Job).
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Stoicism's emphasis on the dignity of the human being and providential design
resonated strongly with humanists, and in these two aspects Stoicism and
Christianity found a common vocabulary. In any instance where Stoicism lent
itself in a positive way to the propagation of Christian teaching, Calvin followed
other Protestant reformers such as Huldrych Zwingli21 in highlighting useful
resemblances. If Stoicism distorted the lessons of revelation, either directly or by
implication, Calvin rejected it.
ii
The Appeal of Classical Republicanism as a Means to Social Order
IfCalvin's formal commentary on Stoicism was somewhat sporadic, his
understanding of classical republicanism and the framework it provided for a
desirable civil order was more focussed. Calvin made close associations between
civil and religious authority that manifested themselves in the structure of
Genevan civil society when he dominated the political scene there from the
1550s. Calvin made these associations within the context of his examination of
Christian freedom, ecclesiastical power and political administration in the closing
chapter of The Institutes, where he described in detail the twofold government
under which humanity lived.
21
Huldrych Zwingli (1484-1531), the leading figure in Swiss Protestantism, who became a
Reformer independently ofMartin Luther and who predated Calvin on the Genevan scene.
Zwingli was known for his humanist interests. He drew from Erasmus when arguing against
sensory aids in religious observance. Seneca was among Zwingli's favourite classical authors.
The circle that arose around Zwingli formed the core of the radical Reformation.
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This twofold system was predictably divided between the spiritual and temporal
worlds. In the spiritual world matters of salvation and piety were resolved; in the
temporal world, or in civil society, citizens lived within the confines of the
political order determined by the magistrates. Citizens enjoyed degrees of
personal freedom in accordance with the laws of society. While similar
constraints were placed upon believers in the spiritual world in that they had to
follow the laws set by Providence, it was in the spiritual realm that believers
exercised the greatest degree ofChristian freedom, which Calvin suggested was
a:
"... matter of prime necessity, and without a knowledge of it [Christian freedom]
consciences dare undertake almost nothing without faltering; often hesitate and
draw back; constantly waver and are afraid."22
Calvin's political thought was built upon two firm foundations: a doctrine of
obedience to given authorities; and, a division of authority within Reformed
societies between civil and religious powers. Because governments were
instituted by Providence to guarantee social stability and personal security,
Christians were required to obey civil magistrates, or God's 'vice-regents', and to
follow the dictates of their pastors and religious tribunals. While the Church
tended to the spiritual needs of the 'inner man', civil authorities catered for the
requirements of 'outward morality' and civil justice. Magistrates were:
"... vicars ofGod, they should watch with all care, earnestness, and diligence, to
represent themselves to men some image of divine providence, protection,
22 Calvin, John, The Institutes ofChristian Religion. [1536 edition] (ed.) Battles, Ford Lewis, p.
175.
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goodness, benevolence, and justice. And they should perpetually set before
themselves the thought that 'all are cursed who do in deceit the work of God'
[Jer.48:10p.]."23
In order to ensure the greatest possible degree of social harmony, Calvin stated
that a complementary relationship between civil and ecclesiastical institutions
should be devised in Christian society. It was within the framework of civil
society operating through secular and religious authorities that all social action
occurred. In other words, the temporal world contextualized all human
interaction and matters of external morality, while human beings were capable of
transcending worldly concerns in the spiritual world.
Generally Calvin suggested that the Church concerned itself with the promotion
of true doctrine and the provision of sacraments to the faithful, but in practice the
Church's influence extended far beyond strictly spiritual interventions in society.
Calvin also instructed that the state should maintain law and order, but the state
was obliged to safeguard religious principles and assist the Church in promoting
moral discipline:
"Civil government as its appointed end, so long as we live among men, to cherish
and protect the outward worship ofGod, to define sound doctrine and the
condition of the church. ... It also prevents idolatry, sacrilege against God's
name, blasphemies against his truth, and other public offenses against religion
arising and spreading among the people ... In short, it provides that a public
manifestation of religion may exist among Christians, and that humanity be
maintained among men."24
23 Ibid., p. 210.
24 Calvin, John, The Institutes of the Christian Religion. IV, xx, 2f (1559 edition), quoted in
Bernard Reardon, Religious Thought in the Reformation, p. 161.
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While Calvin did not deviate from the complementary model of government he
developed in the earliest editions ofThe Institutes, his political philosophy
evolved as a consequence of his experiences in Geneva. He did not endorse
consistently any particular form of established polity as being most compatible
with Reformed Christianity. Nevertheless the underlying themes ofhis political
thought seemed to remain constant, particularly his respect for liberty and his
dedication to order.
These stemmed from the deep influence of the teachings of classical
republicanism on Calvin's early political thought, with its pervading spirit of
justice and rejection of absolutism. Calvin highlighted the traditionally close
association made by classical republicans between civic and religious duties. He
reflected an acceptance of traditional civic virtues in his advocacy of discipline
and obedience in civil and ecclesiastical matters. A spirit of sobriety and industry
pervaded Genevan society that mirrored the civic virtues of classical
republicanism; however in addressing such virtues, Calvin tended to treat them as
products ofDivine wisdom rather than the results of human action.
Despite his admiration for certain republican virtues, Calvin was suspicious about
the efficiency of republicanism, not least because rivalries frequently arose
between republican leaders. Calvin was well aware of the bitter factional
infighting that often broke out between Geneva's magistrates, even at the height
25 Hopfl, Harro, The Christian Polity of John Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), p. 158. Hopfl notes that unlike the republicanism of seventeenth-century England, the
republicanism of Calvin's day was not a secularizing force per se.
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of his influence in the city. Political divisions were often exacerbated by similar
96
tensions in ecclesiastical bodies. Social disorder was not unknown in Geneva,
and the rivalries that developed between magistrates often extended to their
political allies and families. Despite these things Genevan republicanism usually
fostered an expedient social harmony that was of greater importance in the
Calvinist scheme than specific philosophical objections to the established form of
government. This harmony continued to be the basis for preserving liberty, both
in the strict republican sense of directly electing governors, and in the wider
sense of guaranteeing legal rights.27
Calvin's republicanism manifested itself clearly in his opposition to tyranny:
"When tyranny has lost its concern for justice, there are no limits to its
wickedness; and lamentations do not soften it but aggravate its cruelty. And
flatterers excite it by saying that the shortest way to control subjects and keep
them quiet is so to oppress them that they do no even dare to open their mouths,
and if they complain or murmur that they should be more harshly treated so that
they may be hardened to servitude and, as it were calloused to bondage. Tyrants
therefore do not rest from their injuries ... until the wretched people have
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altogether given up."
The traditional identification ofCalvinism as a religion of resistance stems from
Calvin's anti-absolutist beliefs. The presentation ofGod's sovereignty in the
world remained the focus of religious life, therefore the notion of unlimited
26 Calvin was critical of republics that failed to replicate the harmony Geneva enjoyed between
civil authority and ecclesiastical discipline.
27
Hopfl makes the important point that Calvin did not fully define his conception of liberty. See
Hopfl, Harro, The Christian Polity of John Calvin, p. 159: "It would be entirely in keeping with
the character ofCalvin's political thought to read him as favouring a guided and controlled kind
of popular participation, such as was practiced at Geneva, ... ."
28 Calvin, John, Commentaries. Exodus 5:9 quoted in Bouwsma, William J., John Calvin: A
Sixteenth Century Portrait (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 207-8.
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power resting in the hands of a single individual was untenable. Yet because he
believed that the existing polities of his day were necessarily creations of
Providence, and because he rejected the utility ofpolitical philosophical
speculation, Calvin accepted the legitimacy of the absolutist governments around
him. It was:
"
... an idle pastime,..., for men in private life to dispute over what would be the
best kind of government in the place where they live." Consequently "... if you
fix your eyes not on one city alone, but look around and glance at the world as a
whole, or at least cast your sight upon regions farther off, divine providence has
wisely arranged that various countries should be ruled by various kinds of
government. For as elements cohere only in unequal proportion, so countries are
best held together according to their own particular inequality."29
It is sometimes suggested that Calvin's failure to recommend a particular form of
political polity as being best suited to the principles of the Reformed faith reflects
his greater concern with the nature of ecclesiastical rather than political
government. This would seem reasonable given his ultimate religious priorities,
and it also would explain why Calvin frequently altered his opinions about
desirable forms of civil government. Calvin's ambiguity about political polities
may also explain why the tone of his political philosophy is more reactive than
prescriptive. However difficult it is to pin down what Calvin thought the full
nature of a holy commonwealth ought to be, his commitment to the underlying
principles ofjustice and obedience in society remained constant.
After 1543, Calvin endorsed mixed forms of government, recommending that the
aristocracy assumed key responsibility for directing civil policy, which seemed to
25
detract from the republicanism of the magistrates. This change illustrated his
wider concern with the question of the legitimacy of established governments,
and their ability to faithfully execute their duties regardless of their form.30
Perhaps more importantly, however, was the point that Calvin felt his images of
desirable forms of government had to remain sufficiently malleable in order to
accommodate the rulings of Providence as Divine revelation unfolded.
The forces of Providence operating in Calvin's scheme underscored his firm
conviction that ultimately it was impossible to disassociate civil and political
matters from religious ones, regardless of the institutional structure of any given
Godly commonwealth. Theological and moral considerations remained at the
centre of Calvin's understanding of law, whether civil or natural, and Divine
authority remained the root from which all earthly authority proceeded.
Therefore Providence provided a link between Calvin's moral scheme that
governed the personal conduct of citizens and the regulatory mechanisms in
society that oversaw all types of social transactions.
In an eighteenth-century context, one immediately questions the relationship
between a providentially-based and a historically-based foundation for political
or social authority. This raises an interesting question about Calvin's view of
history and whether his Godly commonwealth was particularly historicist in
nature. It would seem not. Following Erasmus and the humanists, Calvin tied
29
Calvin, John, The Institutes of Christian Religion. Book IV, xx, 8 as quoted in ibid., p. 207.
30 See Hopfl, Harro, The Christian Polity of John Calvin, p. 153: Hopfl concludes that Calvin "...
remained committed to the view that a scripturally determined 'form' of ecclesiastical polity
might and ought to cooperate with whatever form of civil government it happens to find
established."
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the value of secular humane sciences to their usefulness as means for social and
moral instruction. This was particularly true for philosophy, which Calvin held
in greater esteem than history because of its close association with rhetoric. In
his early commentary on Seneca, it is Seneca the philosopher and rhetorician that
occupied Calvin's interest, and Hopfl suggests that "... 'history' was what it
remained to him throughout his life, ..., a useful ancillary to other
preoccupations, and in particular it was histories, the relating of edifying
episodes."31
Secular history was limited by the deficiencies of human experience, custom and
conscience. Like each of these, history had to be enhanced by Biblical teaching
in order to have any transcendent utility. In the Calvinist providential
framework, each historical event was treated in isolation as a function ofGod's
will. History was not a continuous development, nor was it an impetus for
change or thought. If this conclusion accurately reflects Calvin on history, it
suggests a deeply ahistoricist dimension to the reformer's thought that would not
be compatible with the Enlightenment Scots' development of a stadial theory of
history and progress.
31 Ibid., p. 10.
32 The four-stage theory of history was devised during the Scottish Enlightenment to analyze
history and civilisation by examining distinct periods of human development. In his Lectures on
Jurisprudence. Adam Smith divided these periods into the hunting age, the age of shepherds or the
pastoral age, the farming or agriculture age and the age of commerce. (See Smith, Adam,
Lectures on Jurisprudence [eds] Meek, R.L., Raphael, D.D., and Stein, P. [Indianapolis: Liberty
Classics, 1982], pp. 14-17. The organizational structure of society during each stage was
examined carefully, as were its civil and social relationships. As societies developed, notions of
property rights and trading relationships grew. The Scots came to view the four-stage theory of
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Christian Freedom and the Conscience as Regulator of Social Conduct
In The Institutes of Christian Religion. Calvin outlined a rigourous discipline that
underpinned the social and religious activity of the Elect based on his assumption
that the complete rule for life is found in Scripture. From this discipline arose a
system of social ethics broadly built upon the basis of commercial enterprise and
urban industry. These ethics included the suggestion that the economic
motivation behind commercial transactions of the Elect were not necessarily alien
to the religious life, or the life of the spirit. R.H. Tawney has taken the view of
Calvinism that:
"... it is perhaps the first systematic body of religious teaching which can be said
to recognize and applaud the economic virtues. ... Its enemy is not the
accumulation of riches, but their misuse for purposes of self-indulgence or
ostentation. Its ideal is a society which seeks wealth with the sober gravity of
men who are conscious at once ofdisciplining their own characters by patient
labour, and of devoting themselves to a service acceptable to God."33
Calvin consistently recommended that the universal characteristics of
righteousness and piety provided the ultimate guide for human action be it in the
temporal or spiritual realms. He referred to faith continually to find solutions to
practical moral questions in society. The distinctions Calvin made between
religious and practical worlds were never completely resolved, which illustrates a
point made by a number of historians that Calvin's "... ecclesiology constantly
history as a means for interpreting human history as a history ofprogress. These matters will be
discussed at greater length in Part II.
33
Tawney, R.H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, p. 114.
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tried to minimize the problem of the gap between general imperative and specific
conduct."34
Calvin relied heavily on the functioning of individual conscience to underscore
and maintain the discipline he recommended. Conscience was guided by
individual sense of obligation not to exceed the dictates of natural justice and 'the
golden rule.'
The degree of latitude Calvin gave to individual conscience was compatible with
his purpose of creating a sanctified society through personal discipline. However
it posed an immediate problem in terms of a tension that was bound to arise
between what may be right for the individual and what suited the "... external
order of society."35 This problem of the contrast"... between the external order
of society and the moral standards recognised as valid by conscience or reason of
the individual ,.."36 was of similar significance to Hume and the Enlightenment
Scots. Calvin's understanding of conscience was complex, but it played a crucial
role in determining the moral criteria by which individuals lived.
For Calvin the conscience acted as a kind of subjective mode of revelation that
was closely related to a natural instinct or an awareness ofDivinity in the human
mind. This rudimentary instinct served to regulate conduct and to remind human
beings of their essential dependence upon their Creator. Conscience was also a
34
Hopfl, Harro, The Christian Polity of John Calvin, p. 180.
35 Ibid., p. 117.
36 Ibid.
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universal innate sense of God in mankind that accounted for a universality of
religion across human society:
"To man is left no reason why he should seek in himself his righteousness,
power, life, and salvation; for all these are in God only; cut off and separated
from Him by sin, man will find in himself only unhappiness, weakness,
wickedness, death, in short, hell itself. To keep men from being ignorant of these
things, the Lord engraved and, so to speak, stamped the law upon the hearts of
all. But this is nothing but conscience, for us the witness within ofwhat we owe
God; it sets before us good and evil, thus accusing and condemning us, conscious
as we all are within ourselves that we have not discharged our duty, as was
fitting."37
Because conscience was closely related to a sense of divinity, it acted as a kind of
knowledge of God's will within the human heart. Through God's benevolence
and grace, believers knew not only the difference between good and evil, but
understood the correlations between the law of God and the laws of nature under
which human life operated. Furthermore it was through the conscience that
human beings became aware of their obligations to God and to society. Thus the
moral law became a combination of natural laws and conscience engraved in the
heart of each individual:
"It should be clear that the law of God which we call the moral law is nothing
else than a testimony of natural law and of that conscience which God has
engraved upon men's hearts. Consequently, the entire scheme of this equity of
which we are now speaking has been recorded in it. Hence, this equity alone
must be the goal and rule and limit of all laws. Whatever laws shall be framed to
that rule, directed to that goal, bound by that limit, there is no reason why we
should disapprove of them, howsoever they may differ from the Jewish law, or
among themselves."38
37
Calvin, John, The Institutes of Christian Religion. [1536 edition] (ed.) Battles, Ford Lewis, p.
16. Calvin frequently quoted Cicero in support of his conviction that this sense is universal in
mankind.
38 Ibid., p. 216.
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Ultimately, individuals sought knowledge of God through conscience combined
with an appreciation of God's works. Because every human being was capable
of grasping the lessons of the moral law, senses of obligation and moral sanctions
arose throughout society. When conscience lapsed, which like Augustine and the
Stoics Calvin thought was inevitable, the organizations of human society
(especially the Church) and the mechanisms of the state were in place to re¬
establish order and administer punishment:
"We see that some form of organization is necessary in all human society to
foster the common peace and maintain concord. We further see that in human
transactions there is some procedure which has to do with public decency, and
even with humanity itself. This ought especially to be observed in churches,
which are best sustained when all things are under a well-ordered arrangement,
and which without concord become no churches at all."39
Following similar themes in later Roman Stoicism, Calvin believed man was 'a
creature of fellowship', hence society was comprised of the natural groupings of
Church and state. While the Church was concerned with the spiritual health of
the inner man, the state regulated external conduct by guaranteeing
administration of restrictive and distributive justice. The church and the state
maintained complementary agendas, though the laws of God remained supreme
throughout. The state promoted piety. The duty of the magistrate, Calvin
believed, was "... to apply the law of God, implanted on the hearts of all and
clarified in the Scriptures, to the affairs of civil society."40 However in no
39 Ibid., p. 204.
40
Hopfl, Harro, The Christian Polity of John Calvin, p. 9.
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circumstance did the external laws of the Church or the state bind conscience
itself: free will is maintained within Calvin's theology. The external laws of
society imposed moral obligations which the Elect were honour-bound to follow,
but this did not interfere with the functioning of individual free will or
conscience.
The relationship between free will and conscience is better understood by turning
to Calvin's discussion of Christian freedom and the spiritual side of his system of
government. In The Institutes. Calvin was sensitive to the complexity of the
operations of freedom and the conscience, and was well aware of the temptation
to use Christian freedom as a pretext to:
"... shake off obedience toward God and break into unbridled license; partly they
disdain it, thinking such freedom cancels all moderation, order, and choice of
things. What are we, boxed in by such perplexities, to do here? Shall we say
goodbye to Christian freedom, thus cutting off occasion for such dangers? But,
as we have said, unless this freedom be grasped, neither Christ nor the gospel
truth is rightly known. Rather, we must take care that so necessary a part of
doctrine not be suppressed, yet at the same time that those absurd objections
which commonly arise from it be met."41
Calvin instructed that Christian freedom consisted of three parts, some of which
echoed a Stoic call for a certain degree of detachment from worldly
considerations in order to reflect on one's purpose and obligations. The first part
involved freeing oneself from immediate considerations of temporal laws and
works for the purpose of concentrating solely on seeking 'assurances of
justification' by faith alone. By rising above the law, so to speak, human beings
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removed themselves from the more mundane aspects of life that distracted the
conscience. Believers were then free to turn attention from themselves and look
only to Christ as the model of consistent moral goodness:
"The whole life of Christians ought to be a sort of practice of godliness, because
we have been called to sanctifxcation. The function of the law consists in this: by
warning men of their duty, to arouse them to pursue holiness and innocence. But
where consciences are worried how to make God favourable, what to respond and
with what assurances to stand, if called to his judgment-there we are not to
reckon what the law requires, but Christ alone, who surpasses all law-perfection,
must be set forth for righteousness."42
The second part of Christian freedom was contingent upon the first, and consisted
of the conscience naturally obeying the will of God once minds were free of the
restrictions ofworldly considerations. This was crucial for once the conscience
mind operated only to please God, it was more likely that human action and
individual works stemmed from pious rather than self-interested motives. In this
sense, the purpose of Christian freedom was to encourage all to good.
The third element of Christian freedom was found in the fact that in Calvin's
view, true Christians were not bound by any religious obligation to 'outward
things', or to ceremonies that were inconsequential to the promulgation of true
faith. Clearly alluding to what he considered to be the corrupting influences of
the doctrinal rites and ceremonies of the Catholic Church, Calvin meant that
Christians were not bound by any external observances that tended to foster





superstition among the faithful. These external observances simply clouded
judgment and interfered with the conscience:
"For when consciences have once ensnared themselves, they enter a long and
inextricable maze, not easy to get out of. If a man begins to doubt whether he
may use linen for sheets, shirts, handkerchiefs, and napkins, he will afterward be
uncertain also about hemp; and finally, doubt will even arise over tow. ... To sum
up, he will come to the point of considering it wrong to step upon a straw across
his path, as the saying goes. Here begins a weighty controversy, for what is in
debate is whether God, whose will ought to precede all our plans and actions,
wishes us to use these things or those."43
For those troubled by such doubts, Calvin continued, it was essential to
remember that all outward things in life were subject to human freedom: by
God's grace, human beings were masters of external things and they should not
be distracted by them to the extent that this is forgotten. Quoting St. Paul
[Romans 14:14], Calvin suggested that all outward things were "... subjected ...
to our freedom, provided our minds are assured that the basis for such freedom
stands before God."44
The overriding lesson to be learned from the correct exercise ofChristian
freedom was that this freedom and the fruits gained through it were gifts ofGod.
So long as these fruits were used responsibly and for the purposes that God
intended, there was nothing to prevent Christians from enjoying them in the
temporal world. Nevertheless, it was important to remember that Christian
freedom was a spiritual thing, and that any material benefits derived from actions
freely taken reflected God's glory rather than any intrinsic human merit, and here
43 Ibid., p. 179.
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Calvin differed dramatically from the Stoics for there was no equivalent to God's
grace or beneficence in Stoicism.
The limited endorsement ofpersonal gain underscored the comments Calvin
made in The Institutes about acceptable degrees of material comfort in society.
There were very few members of society in positions ofwealth who did not
delight in shows of extravagance and ostentation. However if one used material
wealth 'indifferently', in a modest and generous fashion, it could be considered a
benign if not beneficial part of the Providential order:
"Where the heart is tempered to this soberness they will have a rule for lawful use
of such blessings. But should this moderation be lacking, even base and common
pleasures are too much. It is a true saying that under coarse and rude attire there
often dwells a heart ofpurple, while sometimes under silk and purple is hid a
simple humility. This let every man live in his station, whether slenderly, or
moderately or plentifully, so that all may remember God nourishes them to live,
not to luxuriate. And let them regard this as the law of Christian freedom; to
have learned with Paul, 'in whatever state' they are, to be content; to know how
to be humble and exalted."45
Therefore both essential and nonessential material possessions were to be seen as
gifts from God that had value beyond strict utility. By extension less tangible
gifts were also reflections of God's beneficence. For example, beauty in nature,
form or habit of dress could be considered manifestations of God's blessings. It
was the plan of Providence that some things in the world had value "... apart
from necessity, for comeliness and decency." God endowed silver, ivory and
marble with "... a loveliness that renders them more precious than other metals or
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 181.
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stones. Did he not, in short, render many things attractive to us, apart from their
necessary use?"46
"Let this be our principle: that the use of God's gifts is not wrongly directed
when it is referred to that end to which the Author himself created and destined
them for us, since he created them for our good, not for our ruin. Accordingly,
no one will hold to a straighter path than he who diligently looks to this end." Just
as one was obliged to "... bear abundance moderately," so poverty should be
borne" ... peaceably and patiently." "Therefore," Calvin continued," even though
the freedom of believers in external matters is not to be restricted to a fixed
formula, yet it is surely subject to this law: to indulge oneself as little as possible;
but, on the contrary, with unflagging effort ofmind to insist upon cutting off all
show of superfluous wealth, not to mention licentiousness, and diligently to guard
against turning helps into hindrances."47
Immoderation and greed were prevented by adhering strictly to one's allotted
place in society:
"... they who have narrow and slender resources should know how to go without
things patiently, lest they be troubled by an immoderate desire for them. If they
keep this rule ofmoderation, they will make considerable progress in the Lord's
school."48
A further sanction to appreciate God's blessings appropriately was based on the
premise that come the day of final judgment, all members of the Elect were
accountable to God for the manner in which they used his gifts. This was part of
the process ofjustification and salvation, therefore it was essential to use God's
gifts to promote chastity and purity. Like some later Neostoics, Calvin taught
that good fortune brought an added imperative to contribute to the good of
46 Reference for this paragraph, Calvin, John, The Institutes of the Christian Religion [1536
edition reprint] (trans, and ed.) Battles, Ford Lewis Battles (London: Collins, 1986), p. 721.
47 Ibid., pp. 722-23.
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society given that one had greater means at one's disposal to do so. In other
words, the greater one's personal means and privileges, the broader the range of
his social responsibility became.
Calvin placed various sanctions upon the use of the fruits of Christian freedom
based on the theological foundation of the doctrine of predestination. Before
deciding upon any course of action in life, members of the Elect were called upon
to search their consciences for an indication of God's will in favour or against
that action. Action taken with due reverence for the will of Providence helped
one to avoid excessive ambition, fickleness or other negative forces in life:
"Therefore each individual has his own kind of living assigned to him by the
Lord as a sort of sentry post49 so that he may not heedlessly wander about
throughout life. Now, so necessary is this distinction that all our actions are
judged in his sight by it, often indeed far otherwise than in the judgment of
human and philosophical reason."50
Ultimately, Calvin warned his followers that Christian freedom was granted by
God for the purpose of advancing the quality of life of those in society rather than
for personal gain, and this governing principle extended especially to those who
held positions of wealth and influence in a Christian polity. Like any other
member of the Elect, Calvin's Christian was expected to operate within the
confines of knowledge of Scripture and Church doctrine; individuals were called
upon to engage in worldly activity efficiently and within the framework of civil
48 Ibid., p. 723.
49 Ibid., footnote 9, p. 734: "Cf. Cicero, On Old Age XX. 73: 'Pythagoras forbids us to desert our
fort and station in life unbidden by God, our commander.'"
50 Ibid., p. 724.
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law: efficiency was considered another gift from God that directly contributed to
the promotion of civic duty.
Thus the nexus of the persona of the Calvinist Christian was obedience to God's
law, the natural law, moral law and to the magistrates. The need for constancy in
obedience to civil laws was such that it was a precondition of sanctification.
Again given human imperfection, neither the conscience or any other single
entity acted as a sufficient regulator of human action. Yet the combined restraint
of conscience with the social mechanisms of a Calvinist polity seemed sufficient,
in Calvin's mind, to regulate individual behavior and morality.
Harro Hopfl has suggested that, "Calvinism stood, in short, not only for a new
doctrine of theology and ecclesiastical government, but for a new scale ofmoral
values and a new ideal of social conduct."51 It became the duty of members of
the Elect to attempt to prove worthy of their predestined salvation by "...
insistence on personal responsibility, discipline, and asceticism, and the call to
fashion for the Christian character an objective embodiment in social
institutions."52
These qualities permeated all dimensions of social life and human interaction.
As our discussion has evolved, Calvin seemed to remove himself from specific
associations with formal Stoicism in favour of occasionally identifying broader
51
Hopfl, Harro, The Christian Polity of John Calvin, p. 120.
52 Ibid., p. 121.
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compatibilities between Christianity and the tenets of the ancient school. His
emphasis on duty, constancy, self-reliance and order remains a permanent facet
of his social ethics, but it is ultimately religion upon which his followers must
rely to contextualize the search for truth in life. His admonishment that
Christians conduct their lives with a 'high seriousness" of purpose is a theme that
resonates with philosophical perspectives beyond the Stoic realm.
We know Calvin sought to create a sanctified society through Stoic-like
individual discipline; the challenge was to address the contrast between behavior
determined by the external order of society and individual understanding of
proper moral and ethical standards. At times drawing on positive connections
between Stoicism, natural law, classical republicanism, and Christianity assisted
in this process. Scots in the eighteenth century faced similar challenges as
philosophers and historians developed new theories about the proper relationship
between moral senses, the conscience, religion and reason. The immediate
challenge in their era was to decide what, if anything, was substituted for religion
as the bedrock upon which the moral foundation of commercial society was built.
iv
Lipsius: A Model Neostoic
Calvin's Geneva was the epicentre ofEuropean intellectual life for much of the
sixteenth century, but as Gerhard Oestreich has noted by the end of the century
Geneva's international influence waned as, "The spiritual impulses which
originally emanated from the Confederation, and especially from Geneva,
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gradually ceased." The languages of European political and theological
thought went through a period of transition as the seventeenth century opened,
and Geneva's importance was eclipsed by its northern neighbours, particularly by
the newly independent Dutch Republic.
The Dutch Republic of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century provided
a markedly different example to Geneva of a society struggling to define its
religious character within the framework of a commercial polity. This was
especially true given that the power of religion as a cultural force was mitigated
not only by the divisive experience of the Dutch Revolt (1555-90), but also by the
legacy of an Erasmian tradition of free inquiry that predated the arrival of
Calvinism, or indeed any reformed faith, in the Low Countries. One of the
central challenges confronting the Republic was to define the balance of power
between religion and the new political and intellectual forces that determined the
character of the young Republic.
During the Revolt, the provinces of the Low Countries survived the collapse of
the Habsburg dominion of the area, which brought with it the final victory of
Protestantism over Catholicism. This was accomplished against the backdrop of
deeply antagonistic debates within the Protestant community itself, and a
polarization of regional political priorities based upon religious loyalties. The
Low Countries divided north from south, creating two distinct cultures: in the
north, the Protestant Dutch Republic, or United Provinces, founded as a
53 Oestreich, Gerhard, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), p. 113.
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consequence of the Union of Utrecht (1579); in the south, a cluster of French and
Dutch-speaking provinces retained Catholic identity, and over time aligned
themselves with German states involved in the Counter Reformation.
The character of Dutch society, then was formed through a complex myriad of
republican ideology, religious tensions and great economic prosperity. The
power of the state was paramount in society, which permitted the limitation of
ecclesiastical influence. The consequences of the Republic's prosperity for its
intellectual and cultural life were immense, not least in the advancement of the
arts, the promotion of intellectual and religious toleration, and enhanced support
for institutions of higher learning. During the period of the Revolt, a conscious
effort was made by the Republic's political and intellectual leaders to establish a
new culture within the United Provinces that was based on religious toleration
free of denominational friction. This manifested itself institutionally in the
founding of the University of Leiden in 1575, where future leaders from various
Protestant lands, including Scotland, were trained in humanist studies, theology,
law, medicine, history and mathematics.54
Like other universities in the Netherlands, Leiden was influenced by
Scholasticism and Aristotelianism, but a liberal spirit of free inquiry permeated
the university despite the personal orthodoxy ofmany faculty members. The
university's principal purpose, however, was the inculcation of a new spirit that
54 In highlighting the support given by the Swiss Reformed Church for Dutch independence from
Spain, Oestreich alluded to close relations between Swiss and Dutch educators. See ibid., p. 113:
"Between 1575 and 1700, four hundred and nineteen Swiss matriculated at Leiden alone. At first
they came mainly from Geneva, but later the Bernese became more numerous, .... Citizens of
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provided "... an intellectual bulwark against 'tyranny' and religious
oppression."55 This involved the identification of two ideologies: Dutch
Republicanism, which placed the good of the community above individual
priorities; and a system ofNeostoic ethics, which encouraged social harmony
through the cultivation of virtue and obedience to the established order.
The humanist scholar, Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), introduced a form of
Neostoicism into the Dutch philosophical spectrum that constituted a parallel
discussion to an on-going one about republicanism. Lipsius, professor ofhistory
and law at Leiden from the 1580s, advocated the emulation ofRoman Stoic
virtues to establish a harmonious community composed of two elements:
imperium (government) and commercium (economic and moral life). He
encouraged individual citizens to pursue civic virtue for the mutual benefit of all
members of society.
In essence, Lipsius followed in the tradition of the Renaissance revival of
Stoicism by turning to Stoic moral philosophy to provide a model for a
philosophical refuge from the deep political and religious divisions caused by the
Revolt. He sought to do so by identifying a new moral code through which the
transactions of daily life contributed to the cultivation of virtue in society. His
method for identifying this code, essentially a code of ethics, drew particularly
from the social and moral teachings of Seneca, who taught that it was possible for
ZUrich and Berne who were civic officials, military men or academics are known to have
possessed copies ofworks by Lipsius."
55 Israel, Jonathan, The Dutch Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 198.
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man to achieve degrees of virtue by viewing life as a state of progress towards
wisdom.
Although Lipsius' philosophical genius was acknowledged by his
contemporaries, including his friend Michel de Montaigne, and his key moral
works Two Books on Constancy (1584), Digest of Stoic Philosophy and Physics
of the Stoics (both 1604) remained popular for over a century after his death,
Lipsius' contributions to the development of early modern European ethics has
been overshadowed by those of later philosophers. We seek to redress this matter
by reintroducing Lipsius into Scottish Enlightenment historiographical
discussion.
The general political and religious tensions in Dutch society prompted Lipsius to
develop a system of ethics based on universal truths in nature. The great
challenge to morality within any successful commercial culture was to counter
the problem of ethical indifference in society, which Lipsius used Stoicism to
achieve. The problem of ethical indifference was one of degree: it was essential
to identify a system ofmorals that did not involve philosophical or theological
extremes. In order to accomplish this, Lipsius turned to Seneca, whose own
moral and political essays instructed the Emperor Nero to avoid extremes of
emotion that adversely affected political and moral decision-making. These will
be explored below.
The essence of Lipsius' Neostoicism was a fusion of corresponding themes he
identified between Christian morality and Stoic ethics. Lipsius' purpose in this
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exercise, which involved twenty years of reflection, was to encourage his readers
to use philosophy to broaden their practical understanding of their place in God's
natural order, and to accept the notion that the useful life was one spent in the
pursuit ofwisdom. This progress towards wisdom provided a framework through
which Lipsius re-cast the cultivation ofmorality and virtue as beneficial to the
public order.
v
The Pursuit of Virtue as a Unifying Force in Society
Justus Lipsius (Joest Lips) was born to a Flemish Catholic family near Brussels in
1547. He was formally introduced to philosophy by the Jesuits in Cologne,
where he received his early education. He later studied at the University of
Louvain. As a young man he travelled in Italy and Germany, during which time
he came into contact with the humanist scholar, Marc-Antoine Muret (1526-
85).56 At the relatively young age of twenty-two, Lipsius' first publication,
Mixed Readings (1569), appeared. It was a series of commentaries on a selection
of ancient authors, which displayed an early sympathy for Cicero.
Lipsius' life was characterised by two features that added a personal poignancy to
his search for a system of ethics that encouraged harmony and tranquility: his
career was often disrupted by the wars against the Spanish during the Revolt;
and, he changed his faith on a number of occasions either to accommodate the
prevailing sect of a university which employed him, or on occasion by genuine
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personal choice. In 1572, Spanish troops confiscated Lipsius' property in
Belgium. The philosopher fled to the University of Jena, which offered him a
chair in history and eloquence on the condition that he subscribed to
Lutheranism.
The matter of Lipsius' personal faith has been reconsidered recently by Brian
Copenhaver and Charles Schmitt, who suggest that Lipsius was a Familist, or a
member of the Family of Love, a sect with Anabaptism roots that had strong
pacifist and anti-denominational tendencies. Familists believed in an invisible
true church, and moved from one 'external observance' to another according to
circumstances of a given moment in their lives.
The 1570s remained a period of turbulence for Lipsius. Because of religious
friction within the university faculty, Lipsius was asked to leave Jena
unexpectedly. In the intervening period between Jena and his next appointment
at the Catholic University of Louvain in 1576, Lipsius moved to Cologne. He
took full advantage of having no formal post in Cologne by returning exclusively
to reading and preparing new works on Tacitus. It was in this period, too, that
Lipsius changed his philosophical allegiances from Cicero to Seneca.
It was at Leiden, where he was appointed professor of history in 1579, that
Lipsius produced his best known works, Two Books on Constancy (1584) and
56 Muret was anti-Ciceronian.
57 See Copenhaver, Brian and Charles Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992, p. 264.
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Six Books of Politics or Civil Doctrine (1589). The former text was essentially
a guide to the moral life, using Stoic moral philosophy as its model to emphasize
the need for constancy and virtue in private and public dealings. The latter work
described the key elements of Lipsius' political thought, which was concerned
above all with the re-establishment of order on post-Revolt Dutch civil society.
It has been noted that Lipsius advocated the emulation ofRoman Stoic virtues to
establish a harmonious community or societas composed of two elements:
imperium (government) and commercium (economic and moral life). He
encouraged individual citizens to secure the vita civilis, or civil life, which he
defined as "... that which we leade in the societie ofmen, one with another, to
mutuall commoditie and profit, and common use of all."59 The civil life was
achieved through the pursuit of virtue, prudence and morality, and had to be
sought within the framework of the established political polity. The political
polity was itself contextualized by society. But it was with virtue and prudence
that citizens should ultimately be concerned. Of the two, Lipsius wrote:
'.. .in the first [prudence] I follow the judgement of manie, in the other
particularly mine owne: because I can not be induced to beleeve, anie can
possibly be a good Citizen, except likewise he be an honest man. Without vertue,
such wisdome should rather be subtill craft, and malice, and any other thing
rather than prudence. And albeit, that by the sterne thereof properly, civill life be
governed, yet it is not without the use, and aide, of the other loadstone [virtue].
... All other humane things are not durable; for the glories of beautie, and riches
is fraile, and slightly vadeth away, but vertue ever shineth, and is eternall: which
thing is onely immortall in a mortall man."60
58 The original titles of these books were De Constantia and Politicorum sive civile doctrinae libri
sex respectively.
59
Lipsius, Justus, Sixe Bookes of Politics or Civil Doctrine (London, 1594), [Facsimile of 1594
translation by William Jones of 1589 original, Amsterdam and new York: Da Capo Press,
Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Ltd., 1970], p. 1.
60 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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The focus of Lipsian Neostocism, then, was the state, or the civil government,
which provided the unifying bond among citizens that underscored the
foundation of the vita civilis. In his Six Books. Lipsius frequently quoted
Tacitus, Cicero, Seneca and Livy to illustrate his further assertion that in addition
to forming a basis for civil life, civil government served as its guardian.61 As
such, government, preferably the government of a prince, secured the greater
good through securing the constant obedience of its citizens. However, a prince
also served as the great educator of his people in the noble virtues, and he ruled
for the benefit of citizens. Theoretically his devotion to duty restrained any
ambition to dictatorship.
This preference for princes is indicative of an elitism in Lipsian political theory
that applied across his philosophical spectrum, and reflected a Tacitean
preference for aristocratic oligarchy. Lipsius did not intend his Neostoicism for
the more lowly members ofDutch society, as Jonathan Israel has pointed out:
"... Lipsius forged a recipe for moral survival amidst religious and political
upheaval, a Neostoic system of ethics and politics, which exerted an
extraordinary fascination on a generation of Dutch educators, .... However, he
saw it not as a recipe for the masses but for humanist scholars and the refined,
(\~)
publishing his books, ..., solely in Latin."
61
Lipsius became known as a leading editor of Latin prose texts, and his editions of Tacitus (from
1574) were considered models for his (and subsequent) centuries. Lipsius began his study of
Tacitus on his travels in Italy as a youth, and maintained a lifelong appreciation for the Roman
historian's pointed epigrammatic style. He also respected Tacitus' approach to historiography,
with its warnings against corruption at the courts of absolutist rulers. Several scholars have
described Lipsius' overall style and philosophy as a combination of a Tacitean approach to
politics and a Senecan approach to pragmatic ethics.
62 Israel, Jonathan, The Dutch Republic, p. 566.
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Lipsian Neostoicism sought to consolidate the power of the state by placing the
armed forces at the centre of the promotion of civil order. Though he
acknowledged the power of education to encourage civil obedience, Lipsius
highlighted the self-discipline and devotion to duty instilled by martial life as a
more efficient and tangible example of the positive powers of self-restraint and
order.
Lipsius' endorsement ofmartial virtue and discipline extended into a wider social
framework. Lipsius challenged citizens to appreciate that frugality and diligence
not only contributed to their personal virtuousness, but that the cultivation of self-
discipline enhanced the quality of their contribution to the common weal. In a
sense, Lipsius offered a re-conceptualization of the role individuals played in
society based upon an assumed connection between personal responsibility and
civic duty. This, in turn, contributed to the rise of a Weberian-style work ethic
among the Dutch and other urban European populations throughout the
seventeenth century.
Following Roman Stoicism, Dutch Neostoicism placed greatest weight on the
practical application of its principles to daily living, and the moral fortitude of its
adherents. It was in this vein that Lipsius introduced commercium as companion
to imperium in his social theory, but he did not develop a concept of trade, or a
theory of commerce, beyond his tacit acknowledgement of the benefits Dutch
society enjoyed from its commercial endeavors. His Neostoicism was practical
and rational, but it incorporated pietas (piety) andfortuna (fate/fortune) into its
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ethos.63 These combined with disciplina (discipline) implied that Neostocism did
not rely exclusively on rationality.
Like Erasmus and Hugo Grotius, Lipsius sought to maintain the Christian values
that were essential characteristics ofEuropean identity in the new political
climate of the early modern era. But the Reformation and Revolt proved that
competition between denominations threatened order and political stability. The
best alternative was to secure the position of Christianity within the political
polity: to assure that as a cultural force, Neostoicism worked alongside Calvinism
rather than usurped it. Lipsius described a means for achieving compatibility
between philosophy and religion, then, by defining a kind ofChristian Stoic
theology in his politics that transcended denominational boundaries through
pietas and religio (religion).
Like the Stoics, and like Calvin, Lipsius accepted the supremacy of Divine
Providence over all facets of life except human will. Religion, or religio,
consisted of a continual recognition of Providential order in the world. The
motivation for constant spiritual vigilance stemmed from pietas, or the
knowledge of the Divine within the human being, that fueled one's sense of duty.
Associated with pietas were fatum (fate) and conscientia (conscience), which
guided human will. Man must not, Lipsius argued, remove himself from the
active life to such an extent that personal responsibility was negated by
63 This followed the Stoic definition of ratio, or reason, combined with elements ofpietas and
fortuna.
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resignation to Providence. Conscience prevented such a lapse, while acting as a
touchstone of good and evil:
"Now Conscience ... is another offspring of pietie, and it is evident that she
taketh her beginning from the roote of the worship ofGod. ... And in whose
soule soever there is no religion, nor feare of God, there the seed of a good
conscience is verie finall, and as it were choaked, and oppressed by bad ground.
Now Conscience is a remaine, and sparkle, of right and perfect reason in man,
judging and manifesting good or evill deeds. ... For we commonly say,
Conscience is a pricking and sorowfull rememberance, to have violated the
divine godhead, & not to have worshipped, .... And this feeling (or sense) being
rooted, and fixed in man, lasteth while he liveth, and is not extinguished neither
by force, nor fraud, we have received this conscience of God, which cannot be
taken from us."64
It becomes clear that the political dimensions of Lipsius' Neostoic paradigm
bolstered civil authority by giving it an autonomous historical rooting in
republicanism, which contributed to the legitimization ofmaintaining a
separation between civil and ecclesiastical institutions. Lipsius provided the
Dutch citizen with a structured approach to life that linked an individual's
practical and moral fortunes with God, his neighbour and his country: this
structure accommodated the dual nature of the citizen as individual and as a
member of society. In so doing, Lipsius extended Dutch republican theory
beyond the realm of a strictly defined civitas, or republican civic society, to the
broader realm of a type ofNeostoic societas.
64
Lipsius, Justus, Sixe Bookes of Politics or Civil Doctrine, p. 8-9. (Contrast Lipsius on
conscience with Seneca, who treated conscience purely as right reason. See, for example, Seneca,
'On Favours' in his Moral and Political Essays, (eds) Cooper, John and Procope, J. F.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 291. "Indeed, I will go further, and say that
sometimes a person can be grateful while seeming to be ungrateful, having been misinterpreted
and traduced by people's opinion. Such a man can only follow his conscience. Eclipsed though it
may be, it brings him joy, protesting against reputation and public opinion. Relying on itself for
everything, when it sees a vast crowd on the other side with a verdict contrary to its own, it
refuses to count ballots but carries the day with its own one vote."
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Finally, while Lipsius may have been suggesting that his form ofNeostoicism,
with its Christian undertones, provided a clearer path toward civic virtue than did
the Dutch Reformed Church or other religious sects, Lipsius recognised that the
Church played a useful role as an arbiter ofmoral standards in the state.
Ultimately, Lipsian Neostoicism did not seek to remove the Divine from
society's moral or political equation
In their moral and ethical philosophy, Neostoicism and ancient Stoicism shared
the common purpose to make the personal and political lives of human beings as
orderly as God's universe or the cosmos. The Stoic School was founded by Zeno
of Citium (335-263 BC) in Athens, and his pioneering philosophy was refined
and expanded most notably by Chrysippus of Soli (ca. 280-207 BC). Their
combined teachings formed the core of the first of three Stoic periods: the early,
middle and later Roman eras, the latter ofwhich most directly influenced Lipsius,
and, it will be argued in later chapters, the Moderate Clergy of the Church of
Scotland.
The Early Stoics formally developed the central doctrines of their school and
organized Stoicism into a system of philosophy that included a theory of nature,
logic, ethics, epistemology and politics. Chrysippus, followed by Diogenes of
Babylon (ca. 240-152 BC) and his successor Antipater of Tarsus (d. ca. 137 BC),
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Seneca and the Progress towards Morality in Life
each contributed to the reformulation of ancient Stoicism with the notable result
that over time Stoicism lost some of its originally harsh asceticism.
Panaetius (c. 185-109 BC) of the Middle Stoa was especially important in this
softening process. He was the leading figure of the Stoic movement when its
theories first made significant in-roads in Roman society. Panaetius recognised
that the lives of individuals were deeply affected by the society of which they
were part. He attached greater significance than the Early Stoa had to the
presence of external influences in life. It was also Panaetius who introduced the
notion of gradual moral progress as having value into the Stoic scheme, which
departed from the early Stoic emphasis upon the pure ideal of the 'wise man'.
Despite its multiple revisions, the system of belief that underscored Stoic
morality did not alter radically over the centuries. The Stoics viewed the world
as a community governed by a supreme providence, which was described as a
divine reason, nature, destiny, or even the spirit of the universe, by successive
Stoic authors. It was man's ultimate duty to live in accordance with divine will,
which manifested itself through the laws of nature; secondly, man had to resign
himself completely to his fate as prescribed by providence. Living in accordance
with nature included the development of reason, the possession of which was the
sole distinguishing feature between human beings and beasts. It was only
through living by these rules that human beings could find true happiness.
The Roman Stoics, Epictetus (ca. 55-135 AD), Seneca, and the Emperor Marcus
Aurelius (121-180 AD), continued Panaetius' revisions. By teaching the Romans
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to apply the practical lessons of Stoicism to daily life, the Roman Stoics
developed a more 'sedate' form of their philosophy that recommended devotion
to duty as a source ofpersonal tranquility.
The appeal of Stoicism in early modern European history may be traced to the
Renaissance revival of the ancient school, which had its roots in the publication
ofPetrarch's. On Remedies for Both Kinds of Fortune (1354T Using as his
model a sixth-century piece by Martin ofBraga which took its own form from
Seneca, Petrarch discussed the nature ofwisdom and the character of wise men in
traditionally stoic terms. For Petrarch, as for the Renaissance and Neostoic
philosophers after him, Stoicism lent itself favourably to the study of philosophy
by Christians. In general terms, Stoicism was systematic in structure, morally
rigorous and dependent upon a providential scheme to underscore its essential
philosophical unity.
However Stoicism also posed problems for practising Christians. It placed the
pursuit of virtue at the heart ofmoral life, which usurped the place of God as the
focus of human morality. The imperative to virtue hinted at a determinism within
the Stoic moral equation that challenged the traditional Christian understanding
of Providential power by placing man in ultimate control of his moral life.
Nevertheless, for Petrarch, and indeed for Lipsius, the corresponding themes
between Christianity and Stoicism provided a useful conduit through which
diverse sets of philosophical and theological views could co-exist.
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It was stated above that the appeal of the later Roman Stoics, and of Seneca in
particular, to Lipsius and his contemporaries rested on the fact that the main
philosophical aim of their Stoicism was to lead men toward virtue. By conveying
to human beings an understanding of nature and their place in the world, Seneca
outlined a system of order and belief that enabled people to conduct their daily
lives in accordance with divine will.
Stoic logic and physics provided the foundation for this process in Seneca's view,
but it was Stoic ethics that remained paramount in his system. Further more,
from a Christian point of view, Seneca made an appealing connection between
goodness and wisdom that introduced a kind of benevolent impulse into the
cultivation of virtue. Wisdom was the key to goodness in the sense that the truly
wise man valued only genuinely good characteristics or things. Virtue proceeded
from the blending of goodness and wisdom. Before turning to Lipsius' own
moral philosophy, it is necessary to look in more detail at Seneca's contribution
to the Stoic school.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ca 4 BC-64 AD) was born in Cordoba in Roman Spain
to an imperial procurator, Marcus Annaeus Seneca. Although his father's
position was respectable, the family lived in the far reaches of the empire.
Therefore Seneca had surprisingly few early opportunities to develop contacts in
Rome itself. He was sent to Egypt while still a youth to stay with his aunt,
Marcia, whose husband was the viceroy ofEmperor Tiberius from 16-31 AD.
Here he began to develop the administrative and political skills that served him so
well when he eventually moved to Rome.
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Seneca rose to prominence in Rome quickly through his work as a leading jurist
and politician. He came to attention of the imperial court and became a senior
adviser to numerous members of the imperial household over time. Often, due to
the plotting of rivals, Seneca was sentenced to periods of exile at the hands of the
Emperors Caligula and Claudius. He was eventually permitted to return to
Rome, where he was made praetor in 49 AD. At the same time, the philosopher
was appointed tutor to the child who became the Emperor Nero in 54 AD. For
some eight years, Seneca acted as Nero's principle adviser, but fell from favour
partly as the result of the fact that Nero was jealous of Seneca's popularity.
We know that the aim of Seneca's moral writings, indeed of his Stoic philosophy
as a whole, was to lead people towards virtue by instructing them in virtuous
principles. He emphasized that the exploration of pathways leading to virtue was
equally important as defining the perfected state of apathia, or separation from
the world, that occupied the Early Stoics.
The Early Stoa placed questions of the cosmos and ascetic detachment from the
world at the centre of their attempts to make human lives as orderly as the
universe. Rather than focussing exclusively on the perfection of the Stoic 'wise
man', Seneca encouraged his readers to live a virtuous productive life according
to the will ofGod, the author and guide of a prevailing order in nature that
underpinned creation. Like the Greek and other Roman Stoics, Seneca
acknowledged the use of reason as man's unique faculty to pursue virtue, and he
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advocated the maintenance of self-discipline to ward off temptation in worldly
activity that protected one from the vice.
Seneca wrote, according to John Cooper and J.F. Procope, as an 'inward looking'
moralist, whose political and moral essays display a constant tension between the
ideal and the practical in life. Nevertheless human life retains an essentially
positive character. Human life "... rests upon kindness and concord; bound
together, not by terror but by love reciprocated, it becomes a bond ofmutual
assistance."65
Seneca's essays are comprised of three pieces, 'On Anger', 'On Mercy' and 'On
the Private Life', each ofwhich provides moral guidance in various forms. The
essay, 'On Anger', is essentially concerned with discovering the means through
which one rids oneself of harmful emotions, like anger, that disrupt the normally
composed operations of the mind. The essay, "On Mercy', was prepared for
Nero as a guide to kingship and pointed to qualities of 'leniency' that were the
hallmarks of a wise and virtuous leader. 'On Private Life' recommended that
wise men consider withdrawal from public duties in order to devote more time to
cultural learning and philosophical contemplation. (This was a somewhat
controversial view in that Stoicism had always associated mental activity with
action.)
It is Seneca's discussion ofmercy, however, that is interesting from an ethical
point of view for two reasons. Firstly, the tone of the discussion provides an
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interesting illustration of Seneca's approval of life being interpreted as a progress
towards virtue. Secondly, it was the orthodox Stoic view that the Stoic man
should make moral or ethical choices. Seneca seemed to qualify this in his
recommendations to Nero by suggesting that compassion, indeed a kind of
benevolence, was desirable in a leader, particularly if reason and virtue dictated
it.66 The deeper lesson in the essay seems to be a recommendation against
extremes of behavior on the part of the leader, who must at all times appreciate
the risks of being too indifferent to the consequences of his actions.
The essay is divided into two books: the first discusses the value of leniency in
dealing with adversaries and the utility of acting mercifully towards subjects; the
second discusses the nature ofmercy in greater detail, describing mercy as a
virtue. Seneca opened his discussion by calling mercy the 'royal virtue', which
inspired hope in all people. Mercy should be shown towards the generally
deserving, but also to one's enemies, who may be capable of 'being returned to
innocence' once shown the errors of judgment that led them to act against a ruler.
Ofmercy, Seneca wrote:
"Of all the virtues, in truth, none befits a human being more, since none is more
humane. That is a necessary point of agreement not only among ourselves with
our view that man should be seen as a social animal born for the common good,
but also among those who give man over to pleasure and whose every word and
action looks to their own advantage. For ifman seeks calm and leisure, he
acquires here a virtue which, with its love of peace and restraint on action, suits




Seneca, 'On Anger' in ibid., p. 23.
66 The ties between morality and benevolence were taken up by Francis Hutcheson for the Scots
in the eighteenth century.
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Seneca, 'On Mercy' in his Moral and Political Essays, (eds) Cooper, John and Procope, J.F., pp.
131-32.
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Be that as it may, Seneca reminded Nero that each human being was capable of
acting mercifully, even ifmercy of a king had a higher quality about it because it
affected a greater number of lives than did mercy granted between individuals.
He also suggested that mercy was part of a multitude of virtues that facilitated
human interaction:
"Mercy, as I said, is natural to all human beings. Yet is most becomes emperors,
finding when among them more to save and greater scope for revealing itself.
How tiny is the harm done by the cruelty ofprivate individuals! ..."
Furthermore, "... There is, to be sure, a concord among the virtues. Each of them
is as good and honourable as the other. Yet one may be more suitable to some
people. Greatness ofmind befits any mortal, even the poorest - is anything
greater or braver than to beat back the force of ill fortune? But this greatness of
mind has freer scope in good fortune, and is shown to better effect upon the
magistrate's bench than down on the floor. Mercy, whatever house it enters, will
make it happy and calm."68
Seneca then acknowledged that there are different types ofmercy available in
human life, pointing to the mercy of saving a life as the highest form of the
virtue. The prince who pardoned a man sentenced to execution would surely find
that his subject looked upon him with a renewed sense of loyalty. But it was
important to note that gratitude alone was not the best source of this loyalty,
rather it should stem from the criminal's appreciation for having been given an
opportunity to improve himself:
"Savage, inexorable anger is not becoming to a king. He cannot tower much
above any person on whose level he has placed himselfby growing angry. But if
he grants life and dignity to men who have risked and deserve to lose them, he
68 Ibid., p. 134.
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does what none save a man of power can do. ... to save a life is the prerogative of
high good fortune, never more admirable than when it attains the same power as
the gods, by whose favour we are brought into the light of day, good men and bad
alike. So a prince should adopt as his own the attitude of the gods. Some
citizens, because they are useful and good, he should look upon with pleasure,
others he should leave to make up the number, rejoicing in the existence of some,
enduring that of the others."69
By drawing an analogy between the king's mercy and that dispensed by the gods,
Seneca rather cleverly appealed to Nero's vanity while reminding his pupil that
he too may at some time require the mercy of heaven. The gods themselves were
the best models of virtue and mercy, and Nero "... should wish to be to the
citizens as he would wish the gods to be to him."70
On a more politically expedient level, the king who appreciated the subtle
operations ofmercy on the minds of his subjects provided for his own security.
He did this not only by keeping his enemies close in terms of granting mercy to
those who challenged him, but by understanding the fact that 'frequent
punishment aroused' the anger and resentment of all members of society. Most
importantly, however, the ruler who learned to exercise mercy demonstrated a
mature ability to restrain emotional excesses:
"True mercy, Caesar, is what you have shown. It is not something that starts with
remorse at savagery - it means spotlessness, it means never having to shed a
citizen's blood, it means supreme power exercised with the truest self-control, an
embracing love for the human race as though for oneself, it means not being
corrupted by greed or natural impetuosity or examples set by earlier princes into
testing how far one can go against one's fellow-citizens; it means blunting the
edge of one's imperial power."71
69 Ibid., pp. 134-35.
70
Ibid., pp. 135-36.
71 Ibid., pp. 142-43.
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And finally, the prince who learned how to rule mercifully provided himself with
the best tools for guaranteeing social order:
"A prince will establish good morals in a state and cleanse it of its vices by
patience - which does not mean that he approves of them, but rather that he is
willing, indeed highly distressed, to reach the point of chastisement. Men are
inhibited from doing wrong by the very mercifulness of the ruler. Punishment
seems far more serious, if decreed by a mild man."72
In Book II, Seneca distinguished between the 'definitions and contraries of
mercy'. He expanded his argument that mercy was in essence a form of restraint
or self-control. He went to considerable lengths to distinguish mercy from pity,
which for the Stoics was a weak and 'unmanly' emotion, ill-suited to the more
sober and rational impulses that prompted a leader to act mercifully. Again he
used a religious analogy to illustrate his point:
"In the same way, then, that religion serves to worship the gods while superstition
dishonours them, mercy and gentleness are qualities displayed by all good men,
while pity is something they will avoid. The fault of a petty mind succumbing to
the sight of evils that affect others, it is a feature very familiar to the worse kind
of person. ... Pity looks at the plight, not at the cause of it. Mercy joins in with
reason."73
Ultimately, Seneca provided Nero with an ideal model of virtuous kingship that
was to be distinguished from government by tyranny. A fundamental moral
quality was required of a king in order to dispense justice wisely from the earliest
72 Ibid., p. 154.
73 Ibid., p. 161.
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days of his reign, but this quality was enhanced by time and experience as he
learned to wield his authority within complex political and ethical boundaries. In
other words, kingship involved a progress towards virtue based upon the choices
a ruler made. Mercy, and by extension morality, involved individuals having a
freedom of decision in life.
If one extends Seneca's lessons on kingship into a broader social framework, it
becomes clear that each individual has a certain decision making power that
governs social action and moral behaviour. This decision making power hinted at
a certain state of self-sufficiency in moral thought, but as members of society,
individuals understood that their ideas and actions had consequences beyond their
own lives. If every person had this decision making faculty, then all individuals
were capable of moral progress. Therefore Seneca's notion of a progress towards
virtue was available across political or social divides, and all right-minded people
were capable of degrees of improvement. Seneca's prime directive that virtue
cultivated humanity applied to all. Each person was required to live in
accordance with nature and right reason, and if they did so, moral progress would
follow. Finally, Seneca's notion ofmoral progress was underscored by Stoic
epistemology, which allowed for wisdom to be learned.
vii
Lipsius and Morality in Society
In his moral thought Lipsius acknowledged the Early Stoic model of the wise
man as an ideal, but he fully accepted Seneca's notion that man was in a state of
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progress towards wisdom. Lipsius considered Seneca's social thought a powerful
force for social change, and as such he adopted its central tenets into his political
philosophy within the martial framework described earlier. In so doing, Lipsius
seemed to create a kind of sub-dialogue in Dutch political thought, which was
itself a part of the history of classical virtue.
There were some difficulties in adopting all of Seneca outright. While the tone of
Seneca's moral writings seemed to be on the verge of Christianity, which was
extremely useful for those who later tried to reconcile Stoic themes with
Christian principles, Seneca had little room in his moral system for analysing the
roles emotion and sensibility played in determining one's moral character. He
was less concerned about the truth of certain ethical propositions than with acting
according to right reason. What Seneca did, however, was to make the Stoic man
useful to society. Despite the fact that he realized many people had only a
minimum degree of altruism and that their decision-making processes were
vulnerable,74 Seneca lent his philosophical authority to notions of progress by
encouraging a culture of improvement in civilised societies.
Mark Morford has recently suggested that Lipsius' first formal interest in Seneca
probably resulted from conversations he had with Marc-Antoine Muret during
Lipsius' early travels in Italy.75 Lipsius began preparing his first work on Seneca,
De Vita acScriptis Annaei Senecae, in 1579 although it was not published until
74 It is worth noting that Seneca believed most moral decisions were taken based upon probable
reasoning rather than certainty. It is also useful to bear in mind that by the seventeenth century,
Seneca's reputation was well established as an advocate for sapientia, or moral excellence, taught
through philosophy which was required of good citizens of all ranks.
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1605. By 1580, Morford continues, Lipsius was deeply committed to Stoicism,
and within a year of that time the philosopher had singled out Seneca as a 'special
source of delight':
"Reading is my only comfort - not only for those more pleasant works, but
stronger medicine. Philosophy, I mean - Stoic philosophy - into which I am
digging deeply."76
It was while preparing a draft ofOn Constancy that Lipsius' interest in Stoicism
shifted almost exclusively to ethics.77 As we have seen, Lipsius' purpose in the
text was to identify private means through which the 'inward malladies ofmind'
triggered during the Dutch Revolt could be addressed:
"I have just now fashioned these books for the use ofmy Belgians and as a
consolation for my afflicted homeland." And in dedicating the work to
Antwerp's civic leaders, "I am the first to level and build this road to Wisdom, ...
which alone can lead to Tranquility and Peace." And "From these waters I drink
... that which is useful for my soul. For what use are pedantic points and
observations."78
75 Morford, Mark, Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1991), p. 157.
76 Morford quoting Lipsius in ibid., p. 158. Morford notes that Lipsius was reading Seneca,
Epictetus and Arrian at this time.
77 It should be noted here that in early Greek Stoicism, ethics was one of three components that
formed the Stoics' system or view of the universe. The Stoic system was divided into logic,
physics and ethics, the latter ofwhich guided human behaviour and participation in society. It
was the business of ethics to instruct how one lived according to the natural order, through which
one could achieve the ultimate ancient Stoic goal: to live autonomously or undisturbed by fortune.
The means for achieving this end rested in the cultivation of virtue. Seneca and later Roman
Stoics varied in the degrees to which they recommended a supreme detachment from the world to
cultivate virtue; hence the evolution of the notion of seeing life as a progress towards virtue.
78 Morford quoting Lipsius in Morford, Mark, Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of
Lipsius. pp. 159-60. See also note 92 in the same, p. 160: Of the last sentence, Morford suggests,
"In the context Lipsius was excusing his avoidance of theological exactness, but his strictures
applied equally to philological pedantry."
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Following Seneca and the Stoics, Lipsius suggested that the only cures for such
maladies of mind were wisdom and constancy: the former resulted from the
latter, and the latter was itself a product of right reason used in consonance with
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the laws of nature. Evil in the world posed a continual threat to constancy, and
passions tended to be the most disruptive form ofevil both in private and public
life. Public affliction, e.g., war, pillaging, etc., was of greater consequence given
that it affected a larger number of people in society. Interestingly, one of the
primary sources ofpublic evil was an 'intemperate love' of a country or a
particular polity. As Copenhaver and Schmitt point out by quoting Lipsius,
citizens should focus their minds on a 'higher country':
" '... ifwe respect the whole nature ofman, all these earthlie countries are vaine
... except only in respect of the body, and not of the minde or soule, ... but
heaven is our true or rightfull countrey.' Furthermore,'... if there bee a God,
there is also a Providence, ... [and thus] a decree and order of thinges, and of that
followeth a firme and sure necessitie of events ...; with what axe will you cut off
this chaine?' "80
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Lipsius' views on constancy appear to have been influenced by Seneca's letter no. 107, which
Lipsius had admired. In the letter Seneca discussed the nature of constancy and moral fortitude.
See Seneca, Letters from a Stoic (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), pp. 197-99: "Where's that
moral insight of yours? Where's that acuteness of perception? ... Does something as trivial as
that upset you? .. .One has to accept life on the same terms as public baths, or crowds, or travel.
Things will get thrown down at you and things will hit you. Life's no soft affair. It's a long road
you've started on: you can't but expect to have slips and knocks and falls, and get tired, and
openly wish - a lie - for death. ... Let the personality be made ready to face everything; let it be
made to realize that it has come to terrain on which thunder and lightning play, .... Everyone
faces up more bravely to a thing for which he has long prepared himself, sufferings even, being
withstood if they have been trained for in advance. ... And since it is invariably unfamiliarity that
makes a thing more formidable than it really is, this habit of continual reflection will ensure that
no form of adversity finds you a complete beginner. There are conditions of our existence which
we cannot change. What we can do is adopt a noble spirit, such a spirit as befits a good man, so
that we may bear up bravely under all that fortune sends us and bring our will into tune with
nature's; reversals, after all, are the means by which nature regulates this visible realm of hers: ...
after the calm comes the storm; ... day succeeds night; while part of the heavens is in the
ascendant, another is sinking. It is by means of opposites that eternity endures. ... One can do
nothing better than endure what cannot be cured and attend uncomplainingly the God at whose
instance all things come about."
80
Lipsius, Justus, Two Bookes ofConstancie. originally translated by Sir John Stradling, (eds)
Kirk, Rudolf and Hall, C.M. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1939) quoted in
Copenhaver, Brian and Schmitt, Charles, Renaissance Philosophy, p. 265.
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Lipsius' personal belief in a Providential order provided a further area of
compatibility between himself and the Stoics, although this compatibility relied
upon making certain philosophical alterations or concessions for the sake of
emphasizing a common providential foundation for moral life. For example,
rather than fate governing the Stoic providential order, Christians had to place
God at the head of this system. It was also necessary to secure the position of
free will within the providential order, and to allow for a certain contingency to
exist between causes and events by God's design. Lipsius address these matters
within the traditional framework of dividing motives for action in the world
between the realms of first and second causes: first causes were determined by
destiny and Providence; freedom and moral decision-making occurred within the
o 1
realm of second causes.
While Lipsius was criticized for his lack of experience as a theologian by
churchmen suspicious of his sympathy with a pagan philosophy, and of the
ultimate motives of his Neostoicism, Lipsius reaffirmed his belief in piety, which
was in turn linked directly to his understanding of virtue:
"Divide vertue into two branches, Pietie and goodness, Pietie is a right beleefe
concerning God, and the true worship of him: For of these two Pietie consisteth,
and without the either of them she is lame, and unperfect. We ought then before
all things to labour (as much as in us lyeth) to attaine to the knowledge of this
supreme godhead, & when we understand what it is, to worship and adore it
religiously, and purely. The true light of both is to be seene in holy Scriptures,
albeit certaine sparkles, lye scattered here and there in prophane authors, which I
81 These points are made by Copenhaver and Schmitt.
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will gather together; concerning beleefe these which follow; And this beleefe is
most necessary, for to deeme well of God is the beginning ofPietie."82
By dealing with the nature of virtue, morality and religion in such measured, and
admittedly broad terms, Lipsius was setting the tone of his Neostoicism for his
readers. This was consistent with his primary purpose to identify a system of
morals that had no philosophical or theological extremes. Lipsius continued in
this vein throughout On Constancy, with particularly interesting results in the
passages that investigated key distinctions between Stoicism and Christianity. In
the process of explaining the differences between the respective doctrines of
these systems of belief, Lipsius seemed to highlight indirectly the common
themes they shared.
Again reading with Morford, Lipsius opened his discussion about the
distinguishing features of Christianity with Stoicism by focussing on Providence,
fate and necessity, all ofwhich when combined formed the bedrock for
constancy. Constancy blended with obedience to Providence formed true liberty.
For Lipsius:
"Providence is the directing intelligence of God, ..., and it is the origin of all
human experience. Since it is the attribute ofGod, man must be like a soldier
who had taken an oath to obey his commander. Obedience to God, Lipsius
concludes, is true liberty: Dio parere libertas est... . The power of providence is
shown in necessity, which must lead to the decay and destruction of all temporal
things .... Fate ... follows inexorably from providence and necessity."83
82
Lipsius, Justus, Sixe Bookes of Politics or Civil Doctrine, p. 2.
83 Morford, Mark, Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius. p. 164.
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Because the Stoics divided fate into categories, Lipsius then clarified the type of
fate with which he was concerned through the voice of his narrator, Langius:
"For I define true Fate either ... as the series and order of causes depending on
divine wisdom, or ... as the immovable decree of providence fixed in movable
things, that sets each thing firmly in its own order, place and time. ... They [the
Stoics] subject God to Fate ... but we [Christians] subject Fate to God ... God
o4
leads on all human affairs by the force of Fate."
It is through a consideration of the problem of free will that Lipsius tied the
various strands of compatibility between his preferred philosophical school and
his Christian faith:
"What then, of free will? It exists: God knows what man will choose to do; he
has seen it but has not compelled it; he knows it but has not ordered it; he has
foretold it but has not foreordained it... . Thus Stoic doctrine and Christian
belief can be reconciled, and the proper relationship of God, fate, and free will is
established ..." Furthermore, "... These abstract doctrines are illustrated by
concrete similes. Human beings are passengers on the Ship of Fate; they may
move upon the decks of the ship, but they cannot impede its course. The
'supreme will' holds the reins and guides the chariot (of fate) wherever he
wishes."85
By 1600 Lipsius concerned himself almost exclusively with developing his
Christian Stoic system of belief. These efforts culminated in the publication of
Lipsius' handbooks on Stoicism in 1604: Manuductio, or Digest of Stoic
Philosophy, and Physiologia, or Physics of the Stoics. These texts worked from
the premise that Stoicism was the best philosophical system to accommodate
Christianity for two reasons: Stoicism did not owe philosophical allegiance to any
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one particular thinker; and, Stoicism consisted of an eclectic set of principles,
which lent themselves to various interpretations without diluting their essential
moral value.
In the Physiologia particularly, Lipsius furthered his analysis of compatibility
between Christianity and Stoicism by reconsidering the value of studying Stoic
ethics within the framework of Stoic physics. His purpose was to re-cast
Neostoicism as a type of'Christianized' natural philosophy by examining further
the relationship between fate and Providence. To have delved too deeply into
other realms of the Stoic system would have caused him problems as a Christian,
particularly given the pantheistic dimensions of the Stoic's original concept of a
divine force in the cosmos.
As we know, Stoic physics was the second of three elements into which the Stoic
philosophical system was divided. Stoic logic (logos), the first of these elements,
laid the foundation for understanding the rules through which the universe
operated and truth could be determined. Stoic physics displayed the order and
structure of the cosmos. Stoic ethics, in turn, guided behaviour within the cosmic
order.
The Stoics' view of natural bodies contributed to their understanding of the
nature of the cosmos. Following ancient materialist principles, the Stoics
believed that everything that was real was a stable material body. Following
Aristotle, they also believed in the reality of form. The properties of all bodies
were understood through an analysis of their nature as a whole, be the body a
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rock, a tree, etc. Since form was real, it was also a body. They associated form
with pneuma, a very fine breath or wind, a body, that moved between particles of
matter keeping them in their assigned position.
When understood at its most complex level, pneuma also provided an explanation
for behaviour in nature: the growth of living plants and animals, the manner in
which human beings exercised their rational faculties, because reason, and indeed
the soul, were manifestations ofpneuma. The complex relationship between
form and body came to be viewed like those of a large rational animal, whose
various parts acted in unison to define and serve the whole being.
This model extended into the Stoic view of the world and the cosmic order, both
of which were thought of intelligent animals with rational souls of their own.
Souls were also identified with pneuma with the result that material, rational and
more ethereal parts of identity, the world and the universe were united through
the connective forces ofpneuma. Finally, pneuma also played a teleological role
in that bodies and form resulted from intelligent design inherent in pneuma. This
in turn hinted at a designing force within nature and the cosmic order rather than
one acting from outside it. In one sense, the process through which pneuma
operated in the world assumed divine characteristics, however the Stoics also
recognised personal gods.
In Seneca's world-view, Stoic physics and theology were combined. He
followed the traditional view of the cosmos with the earth at its center. The
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world, nature and human reason were connected through pneuma. The Stoic
god, the pre-eminent deity Zeus, was physical substance, a 'world-animal',
composed of a body and mind that were completely rational. Zeus determined
the nature of the universe and all causes and effects at play in life.
In order to avoid sources of philosophical tension that would have detracted from
Lipsius' agenda to reinforce connections between Stoicism and Christianity,
Lipsius again, in the Physiologia, simply focussed on the Stoic interpretation of
God as the divine rational intelligence, whose providential spirit pervades all
manner of order and existence. This reaffirmation of the role of Providence, and
his continued treatment of fate and reason provided Lipsius' best example of how
Christianity and Stoicism. As Morford concludes:
"Fate is the Reason {ratio) that governs individual events and entities in the
world, descending from and loosely involved in providence. It is the child
(proles) ofprovidence, the divine Law, as the Stoics defined it. Fate can also be
said to be in accordance with nature, to be necessity, yet God's providence is not
subject to fate, for it sets fate in motion. Thus the Stoic ideal of fate is
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compatible with Christian belief, and Lipsius quotes Augustine in support.
Whether or not Lipsius provided a completely accurate or sound reconciliation of
Christianity and Stoicism in the Physiologia, the book served Lipsius' purpose to
86 See Seneca, Dialogues and Letters, (ed.) Costa, C.D.N. (London: Penguin Classics, 1997), pp.
8-9. In his 'Consolation ofHevia", Seneca brought cosmological elements into a discussion of
change and the human mind: "Look at the planets which light up the world: not one is at rest. The
sun glides constantly, moving on from place to place, and although it revolves with the universe
its motion is nevertheless opposite to that of the firmament itself: ... its motion is everlasting as it
journeys from one point to another. All the planets forever move round and pass by: as the
constraining law of nature has ordained they are borne from point to point. When through the
fixed periods of years they have completed their courses they will start again upon their former
circuits. How silly then to imagine that the human mind, which is formed of the same elements as
divine beings, objects to movement and change of abode, ... ."
87 Morford, Mark, Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius. p. 170.
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encourage his readers to use philosophy to explore and understand the
complexities of their political, moral and religious worlds, and to stress that from
among the ancient schools, Roman Stoicism provided the Dutch with the best
model of moral virtuous citizenship. Furthermore, regardless of religious or
philosophical affiliation, all human beings shared an imperative to improve their
self-knowledge and their understanding of the world in order to grow in wisdom.
Conclusion
In his concluding comments on Calvin, William Bouwsma quotes Michel de
Montaigne who wrote the following of the human condition.
"In view of the natural instability of our conduct and opinions, it has often
seemed to me that even good authors are wrong to insist on fashioning a
consistent and solid fabric out of us. They choose one general characteristic and
go and arrange and interpret all of a man's actions to fit their picture; and if they
cannot twist them enough, they go and set them down to dissimulation."88
Bouwsma suggested that Montaigne's appreciation of the 'inconstancy and
unpredictability' of individuals, which will be discussed further in chapter two,
was particularly significant in the sixteenth century but the problems posed by
these tendencies resonated throughout later times. The search for the best
available means to gather elements of knowledge and experience into a coherent
but not restrictive form was one of the central purposes of the Neostoicism under
discussion.
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While it is not claimed that Calvin was a Neostoic in the mould of Lipsius, there
are a sufficient number of remnants of Stoic thought in Calvin's mature work to
suggest that he saw a need to reply to, and on occasion agree with, the spirit of
this ancient school, particularly when it could underscore the practical application
of faith in society. When Stoicism enhanced Calvin's point that certain forms of
worldly activity promoted the general welfare of God's Elect in positive ways,
Stoicism was especially useful. Positive worldly activity undertaken in a proper
spirit of Christian discipline helped members of the Elect to prove themselves
worthy of the sanctification faith offered them. These were ideas that filtered into
Scottish society, and profoundly influenced its pre-Enlightenment moral thought.
The Dutch Republic provided a different model of polity to that of Calvin's
Geneva. At first the divisive nature of the wars of the Dutch Revolt threatened
the stability of the Republic, and it struggled to determine its religious character
within the framework of its Republican and commercial identities. As time
passed, the Republic's intellectual and political leaders defined a balance of
power between religion and the new political and social order that mitigated
religion's formal influence in society. The Dutch incorporated their religious
preferences with the spirit ofErasmus' legacy of free inquiry to underscore the
fundamentally tolerant character of their national identity. Ultimately common
commitments to the republican order and commercial success overtook religion
as the primary cohesive forces in society.
88
Bouwsma, William, J., John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait, p. 230 [Montaigne, Michel
de, "De L'inconstance de nos actions," Essays. Book III, pp. 1-2: quote trans. Donald Frame.]
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It remained, however, for Dutch intellectuals to define the moral ethos of their
society. Leading figures like Grotius, whose contributions are examined in the
next chapter, addressed this problem within the context of exploring the political
ideologies and concepts of natural law that formed the intellectual core ofDutch
republicanism. Grotius' close contemporary, Justus Lipsius, contributed to the
intellectual discussion by articulating a form ofNeostoicism that advocated the
cultivation ofRoman Stoic virtues to promote national unity and social harmony.
Lipsius turned to Stoic moral philosophy as his guide to form a code of ethics
best suited to the new commercial order, drawing particularly from the work of
Seneca.
Seneca's appeal rested mainly in the fact that he developed the notion within
Stoicism that life should be seen as a progress towards virtue, that the cultivation
of virtue was as significant in human life as its actual attainment. Seneca
developed a system of ethics based upon inward tranquility and social duty that
let itself perfectly to Lipsius' Neostoic paradigm. Furthermore, in its belief in
forces of providence governing the world, Senecan Stoicism lent itselfmore
easily to Christian principles than did other ancient schools of philosophy.
Ultimately Lipsian Neostoicism sought to identify a kind ofChristian natural
philosophy, which this chapter calls Christian Stoicism, to define the character of
the citizenry. This Christian Stoicism was tolerant of various religious sects, and
encouraged intellectual freedom, but it demanded obedience from all citizens to
the established political order. Like the Stoics, Lipsius believed that virtue
carried commitments that implied that citizens had to live decent moral lives in
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society. Civic duties and moral imperatives were combined for the public good.
While Lipsius cannot be credited with having a direct influence on the moral
philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, it seems that some of the
Enlightenment literati came into contact with his work. Copies of Lipsius'
translations and commentaries on Seneca were held at the Faculty of Advocates
Library in Edinburgh, and they could also be found in some of the literati's
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personal libraries. Lipsius' reliance upon the Stoics, and indeed his
endorsement of life being seen as a progress towards virtue, emphasized the
practical value of philosophy which found favour in Enlightenment Scotland. As
Adam Smith wrote:
"The Stoics in general seem to have admitted that there might be a degree of
proficiency in those who had not advanced to perfect virtue and happiness. They
distributed those proficients into difference classes, according to the degree of
their advancement; and they called the imperfect virtues which they supposed
them capable ..., proprieties, fitness, decent and becoming actions, for which a
plausible or probably reason could be assigned, what Cicero expresses by the
Latin word officio, and Seneca, I think more exactly, by that of convenientia.
The doctrine of those imperfect, but attainable virtues, seems to have constituted
what we may call the practical morality of the Stoics."90
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Lipsius' edition of Seneca, Phil. Opera (Antwerp, 1652) appears in the sales catalogue of Hugh
Blair's library. The Advocates Library in Edinburgh also held a number of Lipsius editions,
including a French edition of his, Six livres des politique ou doctrine civile (Rochelle, 1590); and
his editions of Seneca. [See A Catalogue of the Library of the Faculty of Advocates. Edinburgh,
Vol. I. (Edinburgh: Printed by Thomas, Walter, and Thomas Ruddiman, 1742), pp. 340-41.]
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Aspects ofNeostocism in the Seventeenth Century
Introduction
During the Middle Ages, the influence of the Stoic doctrines was restricted to a
large degree to debates of social and political significance. The rediscovery of
Greek and Roman antiquity during the Renaissance provided a basis for
exploring Stoic epistemology, logic and metaphysics. In chapter one it was noted
that during the sixteenth century intellectual interest in Stoicism broadened to
include deeper analysis of its compatibility with Christian principles. The
Protestant Reformation view of Stoicism as illustrated in the works of John
Calvin was deeply complex, but he retained a belief in the fundamental utility of
the tenets of the ancient school despite challenges it posed to his faith.
It was also argued that Justus Lipsius was among the first early modern
Continental philosophers who successfully articulated a form ofNeostoicism, or
Christian Stoicism, that amalgamated Stoic ethics and moral philosophy with
Christianity. In so doing, Lipsius provided his readers with a formula for
encouraging virtue, order and harmony in society. This formula was sorely
needed to assuage feelings of deep insecurity in the aftermath of the Dutch
Republic's religious wars, and to bolster failing confidence in established
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institutions to provide a viable ideological framework for the re-establishment of
order in Dutch society. In short, Lipsius sought to recast Stoicism for his era, and
to the extent that he inspired contemporaries and later generations of scholars to
examine Stoic philosophy anew, he may be credited with paving the way for the
dissemination of a Neostoicism that reconciled matters of faith, duty and civil
obedience effectively.
During the seventeenth century, the debate on Neostoicism widened and spread
throughout European intellectual circles. Exploration of Stoicism occurred
against a backdrop of growing interest in modern science and the rediscovery of
scepticism. Stoicism continued to invite careful analysis as a range of thinkers on
the Continent and in Great Britain expanded investigation into the relationship
between the separate branches of Greek and Roman philosophy, science and the
Christian religion. The authority which Lipsius believed ancient Stoicism lent
his deliberations was challenged by followers of the Cartesian revolution that
derived its spirit from another philosophical source, Pyrrhonian scepticism.
Philosophers who stood at a junction between the Christian and secular worlds,
thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626),
endorsed the advancement of scientific methods in that they strengthened man's
inductive capacities. However the power of reason had its limitations, and at
times for some the boundary continued to be drawn where matters of personal
faith began. One might also contrast Montaigne and Bacon with Pierre Gassendi
(1592-1655), who revived Epicureanism and attempted to reconcile Christian
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belief in free will and an infinite God with atomism, or mechanistic explorations
of nature.
It was, then, a complicated society that emerged in Europe after 1600, and its
philosophical scene was dominated by tensions between sceptics, Stoics and
Epicureans, as well as by discussion over the appropriate degrees to which one
should rely on reason, faith or both. This chapter seeks to provide a general view
of an ongoing discourse on Neostoicism that was part of the broad spectrum of
seventeenth-century intellectual life. It seeks to do so by examining materials
from selected individuals who were traditionally favourable to Neostoicism, as
well as some whose legacy though influential may be more ambiguous.
The chapter opens by recalling that neither Calvin nor Lipsius conducted their
deliberations on Stoicism in isolation. Lipsius and Montaigne were
contemporaries and their colleague, Guillaume du Vair (1556-1621), made
singular contributions to the dissemination ofNeostoicism in France. Du Vair's
protege, Fran?ois de Malherbe (1550-1628), and his student, Francois Maynard
(1582/3-1646), fostered further interest in Neostoicism among the French literary
classes. From among their ranks arose the Moralistes,91 who adopted Neostoic
treatments of virtue and morality and whose works were cited by Adam Smith
and his fellow Scottish literati.
91 General references to Moralistes in this chapter will be followed by a more detailed discussion
of their influence on the Scots in chapter 3, with special reference to work of Jean de La Bruyere
(1639-96).
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The chapter then considers Neostoic discourse in Great Britain as it appeared in
the thought of the dramatist, Ben Jonson (1572-1637), whose Neostoicism was
rooted in an abiding interest in Seneca and Lipsius. Neostoicism also filtered into
thriving debates about natural law, the rise of absolutism, and interpretations of
duty and rights that were of particular concern to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), whose works were widely read in
eighteenth-century Scotland, reworked theories of natural law to explore the
nature of authority, the relationship between autonomy and responsibility, and the
intellect and morality. They followed Lipsian Neostoicism in emphasizing the
need to teach individuals tenets of virtuous citizenship by invoking themes of
constancy and self-discipline underscored by Christian duty.
The chapter closes by suggesting that the Neostoic discourse it describes was
widely known; that eighteenth-century Scottish intellectuals were (or were bound
to be) well aware of it; and, that this discourse anticipated many of the Scots'
questions about ethics, virtue and human action.
i
An Ambiguous Legacy: Michel de Montaigne
Like Lipsius, Michel de Montaigne followed in the Renaissance humanist
tradition. He was trained in Latin, Greek and law, and he developed a reverence
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for the writings of Seneca, Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch early in life. In his
92 Part ofMontaigne's early education was at the College de Guyenne in Bordeaux. While there,
Montaigne was a pupil ofGeorge Buchanan (1506-82), the prominent Scottish humanist and man
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moral thought, Montaigne questioned what people could learn about how to live
decently. He asked the question deliberately; he sought specific answers
resulting from rational thought processes. He used an innovative new form, the
essay, to describe the conclusions he reached. His writings laid an important
foundation for subsequent debate among moral theorists about the extent to
which individuals were genuinely capable of governing their actions.
For our purposes, it is Montaigne as a transitional figure between the Renaissance
humanism of the sixteenth century and the rational/scientific era of the
seventeenth century that is of interest. Specifically, the brief interpretation of
Montaigne that follows seeks to highlight dualities in his thought that foreshadow
philosophical tensions confronted by later generations of European thinkers,
including Scots in the eighteenth century. He was at various stages of his career
a Stoic, a supreme sceptic, and an Epicurean. He criticized religion harshly, yet
he remained a Catholic who followed Church doctrine in matters of personal
Q"1 f t t #
faith. As an essayist, Montaigne's contribution to a burgeoning French literary
tradition increasingly preoccupied with the moral nature ofman is also
significant. His essays were accessible and provocative.
of letters, who promoted the cause of the Reformation and classical education in Scotland.
Buchanan was noted for his translations into Latin of Euripides' Medea and Alcestis, and for his
original dramas such as Baptistes (1534) attacking tyranny. Buchanan returned to Scotland in
1561 and became involved in intellectual and political life. Although he initially supported Mary,
Queen of Scots, he later denounced her (primarily on religious grounds), and he assisted in the
preparation of the case against Mary that led to her execution. Buchanan served as tutor to
Mary's son, King James VI and I. His most important political tract, Dejure regni apudScotos
(1579), defended the principle of limited monarchy.
93 In this assessment, I follow J.B. Schneewind.
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Despite the fact that this scepticism overtook earlier Stoic sympathies,
Montaigne's knowledge of Stoic themes contributed to ongoing debate about
character, behaviour and knowledge. In a sense, Montaigne broadened the
context in which Neostoicism was understood by highlighting the categories into
which the ideas of his time were divided. Throughout his intellectual
development, Montaigne remained preoccupied by inconstancies in human life.
He seemed to find permanent solace in a Stoic-like acceptance of, or resignation
to, the limitations of humanity.
Montaigne's Essays were first published in two books in 1580 (a final Book III
was completed in 1588), and the author made frequent revisions to his work. The
Essays chronicle Montaigne's "evolution" from Stoic to sceptic to Epicurean.
They ask how we should live and what individuals should live for. Scholars are
divided as to whether or not this evolution is indicative of genuine changes in
Montaigne's thought. Some suggest that the "evolution" may have been a
rhetorical device to challenge his readers.94 Other suggest it is ultimately
impossible to categorize this French thinker.95
Whether or not Montaigne hid his true philosophical identity from his readers, he
seemed content to tolerate dualities or perceived contradictions in his thought. It
may be that these dualities were necessary results of continually reassessing his
philosophical beliefs. What does seem evident is that these dualities testified to
94 Schaefer, D.L. "Montaigne's intention and his rhetoric," Interpretation: a Journal ofPolitical
Philosophy 5 (1975), pp. 57-90.
95
Mackenney, Richard, Sixteenth Century Europe: Expansion and Conflict (London: Macmillan
Press, 1993), p. 119.
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the elusivity of a unifying philosophical theory to encompass all the concerns of
the early modern age.96 Some of the more dramatic illustrations of these dualities
appear in his essays, the "Apology for Raymond Sebond" and "OfRepentance."
In the "Apology for Raymond Sebond," which was published in Book Two of the
Essays, Montaigne appeared to be going through a sceptical crisis. He argued
against the attainability of certain knowledge; he refuted Stoicism; he
acknowledged the logical (reasonable) nature ofPyrrhonian scepticism.
"Finally, there is no existence that is constant, either of our being or of that of
objects. And we, and our judgment, and all mortal things go on flowing and
rolling unceasingly. Thus nothing certain can be established about one thing by
another, both the judging and the judged being in continual change and motion.
We have no communication with being, because every human nature is always
midway between birth and death, offering only a dim semblance and shadow of
itself, and an uncertain and feeble opinion."97
The one certain entity, Montaigne continued, is God. He supported his
conclusion with a reference to Seneca on a similar theme, but the reference itself
was tempered by criticism of Seneca's paganism.
"Thus, all things being subject to pass from one change to another, reason,
seeking a real stability in them, is baffled, being unable to apprehend anything
stable and permanent; ... we must conclude that God alone is - not at all
according to any measure of time, but according to an eternity immutable and
immobile, not measured by time or subject to any decline; before whom there is
nothing, nor will there be after, no is there anything more new or more recent; but
one who really is - who by one single now fills ever, and there is nothing that
really is but he alone - nor can we say 'He has been,' or 'He will be' - without
beginning and without end. To this most religious conclusion of a pagan981 want
to add only this remark of a witness of the same condition, for an ending to this
96 In their own day eighteenth-century Scots grappled with similarly vexing challenges, and they
looked to their seventeenth-century (and ancient) predecessors for guidance.
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from Montaigne to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 44.
98 Seneca.
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long and boring discourse, which would give me material without end: 'O what a
vile and abject this is man,' he says, 'if he does not raise himself above
humanity!' That is a good statement and a useful desire, but equally absurd."
Man cannot
"... raise himself above himself and humanity; for he can see only with his own
eyes, and seize only with his own grasp. He will rise, ifGod by exception lends
him a hand; he will rise by abandoning and renouncing his own means, and
letting himself be raised and uplifted by purely celestial means. It is for our
Christian faith, not for his Stoical virtue, to aspire to that divine and miraculous
metamorphosis."99
In his scepticism, Montaigne stated the case for how much human nature can
accomplish without God. If he truly remained a Catholic in his private mind, it is
not clear how he reconciled his faith with his scepticism except to assume that for
himself, he did not associate philosophical preferences with spiritual needs. He
was tolerant of the vicissitudes of human nature and thought, and it may be that
this toleration extended to an obvious disconnect between mind and spirit (heart).
By the time Book III of the Essays appeared ten years after the first two, the
direction ofMontaigne's thought seemed to alter again. He displayed un-
Pyrrhonic views by appealing to experience 'when reason fails us.' An
overriding imperative to search for truth now seemed to transcend philosophical
preference.
The essay, "OfRepentance," was included in Book III. It provides a vivid
illustration of the difficulty of processing and revising thought on a continual
basis:
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"I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and staggering, with a
natural drunkenness. I take it in this condition, just as it is at the moment I gave
my attention to it. ... My history needs to be adapted to the moment. I may
presently change, not only by chance, but also by intention. This is a record of
various and changeable occurrences, and of irresolute and, when it so befalls,
contradictory ideas: ... ."10°
In sceptical fashion, he then distinguishes between truth as he understands it and
truth as it is:
"So, all in all, I may indeed contradict myselfnow and then; but truth, as
Demades said, I do not contradict. Ifmy mind could gain a firm footing, I would
not make essays, I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and
on trial. I set forth a humble and inglorious life; that does not matter. You can
tie up all moral philosophy and with a common and private life just as well as
with a life of richer stuff. Each man bears the entire form of a man's estate."101
Ultimately Montaigne referred to his own experience as his sole reliable guide to
reflection and knowledge. He excuses himself for the 'immodesty' of the habit:
"Let me here excuse what I often say, that I rarely repent and that my conscience
is content with itself - not the conscience of an angel or a horse, but as the
conscience of a man; always adding this refrain, not perfunctorily but in sincere
and complete submission: that I speak as an ignorant inquirer, referring the
decision purely and simply to the common and authorized beliefs. I do not teach,
I tell."102
Montaigne then comments on virtue and vice, the offensive nature of malice, and
the fact that both virtues (recommended by the ancients) and vices (recognised
for their destructiveness) are comprehended by reason, nature and public opinion.
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He puts little store in opinion in that it is easily swayed by corruption or
ignorance. However he points out that if opinion is 'authorized by laws and
customs', its influence on human conduct is powerful. The most reliable guide to
conduct is to develop a degree of constancy in thought that forms the standard by
which behavior is judged, and here we find hints of Stoicism reflected in the tone
of the essay:
"Those of us especially who live a private life that is on display only to ourselves
must have a pattern established within us by which to test our actions, and
according to this pattern, now pat ourselves on the back, now punish ourselves. I
have my own laws and court to judge me, and I address myself to them more than
anywhere else. To be sure, I restrain my actions according to others, but I extend
them only according to myself. ... You must use your own judgment.... With
regard to virtues and vices, your own conscience has great weight: take that
away, and everything falls [Cicero]."103
Montaigne points further to the value of the soul, and to the difficult but
ultimately desirable task ofmaintaining Stoic-like discipline as individuals
attempt to correct imperfections in thought and deed:
"The value of the soul consists not in flying high, but in an orderly pace. Its
greatness is exercised not in greatness, but in mediocrity. As those who judge
and touch us inwardly make little account of the brilliance of our public acts, and
see that these are only thin streams and jets ofwater spurting from a bottom
otherwise muddy and thick; so likewise those who judge us by this brave outward
appearance draw similar conclusions about our inner constitution, and cannot
associate common faculties."104
There are distinct features ofMontaigne's thought that separate him from Lipsius
and the formal Neostoic tradition, most obviously Montaigne's scepticism. Yet
102 Ibid., p. 46.
103 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
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the appeal to individual responsibility and self-discipline that forms a steady
undercurrent in Montaigne's thought mirrors the Neostoic concern for order
within the self and society. If one of the over-riding impressions of Montaigne's
thought is one of flux, the need to define certain permanent features ofmind even
at the most basic level becomes important in assessing Montaigne's legacy. For
this, we turn to a final essay, "Of Experience," that appeared at the end of Book
III.
In this essay Montaigne writes ofGod, religion and philosophy, and continues to
reflect, if unintentionally, positive Stoic themes:
"As for me, then, I love life and cultivate it just as God has been pleased to grant
it to us. The wise man is the keenest searcher for natural treasures [Seneca]. ... I
accept with all my heart and gratitude what nature has done for me, and I am
pleased with myself and proud ofmyself that I do. We wrong that great and all-
powerful Giver by refusing his gifts. ... Himself all good, he has made all things
good. ... Ofopinions of philosophy I most gladly embrace those that are most
solid, that is to say most human and most our own; my opinions, in conformity
with my conduct, are low and humble. ... It is an absolute perfection and
virtually divine to know how to enjoy our being rightfully. The most beautiful
lives, to my mind, are those that conform to the common human pattern, with
order, but without miracle and without eccentricity."105
There are elements in Montaigne that set him apart from Lipsius. His scepticism
called for a complete reliance on the powers of reason, which in turn, led to the
fundamental and difficult epistemological question of how humans can know
how to act morally. For Lipsius, compliance with order and duty included a
moral imperative that did not alter over time. Montaigne's insistence on a
104 Ibid., p. 49.
105 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
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continual reassessment of the human condition was indicative of the sceptical
notion that perhaps truth may never be found.
"Since a wise man can be mistaken, and a hundred men, and many nations, yes,
and human nature according to us is mistaken for many centuries about this or
that, what assurance have we that sometimes it stops being mistaken, and that in
this century it is not making a mistake."106
Montaigne's criticism of Stoicism often seemed to rest in the fact that it
encouraged the possibility of attaining an unattainable ideal: perfect virtue,
supreme constancy, resolute self-command. There may have been moments
when Stoic cosmology or theology seemed alarmingly irrational, and bridges
could not be built between aspects of Stoic thought and seventeenth-century
science. And yet Montaigne never renounced the positive aspects of Stoicism
that encouraged self-reliance and intellectual reflection.
Following Socrates, Montaigne believed that human beings had the capacity
within themselves to develop orderly lives free of outside assistance, and by
extension establish the decent society all individuals sought. At a time when
Calvin and other Protestant thinkers offered low estimate of human abilities,
Montaigne and his peers pressed the boundaries of received moral and
philosophical thinking. In so doing, he set in play a search for truth that
transcended philosophical preferences and customs that had profound influences
in the seventeenth century.
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ii
Guillaume Du Vair: A Model French Neostoic
The religious and political tensions that preoccupied Lipsius during the 1580s and
1590s in Flanders were shared by his contemporary, Guillaume du Vair, who
became the leading exponent ofNeostoicism in France during the same era.
While Spaniards, Englishmen, Flemish and French battled in the Netherlands, du
Vair was deeply troubled by profound religious, political and social strife that
plagued France during its civil wars between Catholics and Huguenots. Like
Lipsius, du Vair found a remedy for social division in an appeal to Christianized
Neostoicism that promised a return to order in French society, if not national
harmony.
Little is known about du Vair's youth, though he appears to have received a
classical education and he toured Italy before establishing a successful law
practice in Aix-en-Provence. Du Vair rose to prominence in the provincial
government and throughout his life held various positions at the court ofHenry
IV. He was created a bishop in 1603.
In his first published work, Sainte philosophic (1584), du Vair reflected on the
nature of life and identity. He combined Stoic and Christian themes, appealing
for a restoration of order and civility across society in a language that was
familiar to and popular with his readers. Du Vair next translated The Manual, or
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Encheiridion, ofEpictetus, which was followed by the publication of du Vair's
own restatement ofEpictetus' thought under the title Philosophie morale des
Stoiques (The Moral Philosophy of the Stoics), and in 1593 by a treatise De la
Constance et consolation es calamites publiques.107 Of these works. The Moral
Philosophy of the Stoics appears to have been the most widely read by those who
would take up Neostoicism in the seventeenth century, particularly Francois de
Malherbe and members of the Moraliste school.
Given his focus on Epictetus, it is not surprising that the spirit of du Vair's
Neostocism drew almost completely from this Stoic father. There is little
evidence to suggest that du Vair ever found a need to test Epictetan thought
against other forms of Stoicism or scepticism. Du Vair urged his readers as
Epictetus did to follow nature, to concern themselves only with those matters
directly under their control in daily life, and to live according to the dictates of
reason. Du Vair accepted the Stoic notion that reason is the highest facet of
human identity, and that its successful employment in daily life led to the
propagation of virtue.
Twentieth-century moral philosophers such as J.B. Schneewind have noted that
du Vair was not generally interested in providing rigourous philosophical
analysis of the Stoic principles he admired. In this he anticipated a similar
tendency among the Moralistes, and among some eighteenth-century Scots,
whose fundamental interest in Stoicism rested in the ease with which it could be
107 The latter text was translated into English by A. Buckler under the title Against Adversitie in
1622.
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applied to practical Christian life rather than in proving its validity through
formal argumentation. Those interested in the Christian Stoicism of Lipsius and
du Vair asked how their ideas could be used to teach individuals to act virtuously,
thereby assuring decency and order in society. This question was expanded
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to ask how individual citizens,
members of society, could become responsible moral agents.
In The Moral Philosophy of the Stoics, du Vair concerned himself with the
identification of the character of the model Neostoic person. Like Montaigne,
due Vair began with the fundamental question: what should men do with the
gifts bestowed them by nature? What are the purposes and ends of life? He
wrote:
"What then ought man to do, whom nature, have endowed with sense," and "hath
given the benefit of discourse and reason, to be able to discern and choose the
best things of all things which present themselves unto his consideration, and that
which is most fit and proper to his use? May we not safely conclude that man
also has his end, as well as all other creatures; which is set before him as the
furthermost mark and butt, whereto all his actions should be directed: and since
the happiness of all things in their perfection, ... shall not the happiness and
felicity ofman consist in the full obtaining and attaining unto that which is
proposed unto him, and whereunto all his actions are to be referred?"108
If the purpose of life is to attain happiness through a disciplined ethical life, the
end was to attain 'good':
"Now the end ofman and of all his thoughts and meditations is good. And truly,
there is not one among many, so diverse in nature and condition of life which
108 Du Vair, Guillaume, The Moral Philosophy of the Stoics, in J.B. Schneewind, Moral
Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, p. 202.
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desireth not that which is good, and escheweth not that which is evil: and being
demanded wherefore he does this or that, answereth not, but that he doth it or
thinks that he doth it for his good and welfare. And albeit in our actions a man
may find a great many more bad than good; yet the general intention whereby we
are directed and guided is to come unto that which is good."109
The attainment of good was by no means straightforward, du Vair warned.
Nature is riddled with temptation and any virtuous impulses that help one identify
a righteous path had to be strengthened through constancy:
"Good ... is not so placed that all the world may see and perceive it; nature has
sowed and scattered here beneath amongst us certain weak and feeble sparklings
of that heat, which notwithstanding being rightly applied unto our minds, are able
to kindle a pure light in them, and cause us to see good as it is and not as it
seems. So then, we must seek it, and we shall find it; and having found it, we
must acknowledge it; acknowledging it, we cannot choose but love it; and loving
it, we shall fasten all our desires thereunto, .... For even as truth presenting itself
unto our understanding is there entertained with great joy and contentedness:
even so good offering itself unto our will, is received by her with great pleasure,
as being her natural object."110
Virtue lay at the heart of du Vair's Neostoicism, as it did for Lipsius and the
Roman Stoics. Virtue sprang from and rested upon a foundation of reason, which
was itself sustained by constancy and respect for nature.
"Now by the rules of nature, man should be so composed and fashioned that that
which is most excellent in him should bear rule and command, and that reason
should use all that which is presented unto her as best beseemeth her, and shall
most serve for her purpose. Well then, the good and happiness ofman consists in
the right use of reason, and what is that but virtue, which is nothing else but a
constant disposition ofwill to follow that which is honest and convenient. There
is no man, as I suppose, but will avow this to be good: but yet for all that there
will be a great many found out which will affirm that herein only consisteth not
man's good and happiness, but that he must have a sound and well disposed
109 Ibid., pp. 202-3.
110 Ibid., p. 203.
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body, and a hundred more commodities, without the which it is not possible for
man's life to be, much less to be happy and fortunate."111
Du Vair's comments on commodities are interesting in their implications. If the
end of everything a man does is his good, and good his end, du Vair argues that
one may 'justly say' that health, wealth and property are positive things for they
facilitate the attainment of non-material good in society. Taken further, material
possessions do no necessarily detract attention from more profound concerns, but
enhance one's ability to be a productive member of society. For those who do
not enjoy material wealth, the lack thereof can also contribute to the attainment of
virtue:
"For virtue, which we have proved before to be the true good, is of such a nature
that she can make benefit indifferently of things contrary in nature; she profits
and helps her self as well by poverty as by riches, by sickness as by health. For
we do as much commend him that can patiently endure his poverty, and
constantly bear his griefs of disease, as we do him that liberally bestoweth his
goods, and being in health, honestly laboureth in his vocation. Wherefore, let all
these things remain indifferent, as being made good or evil by the mind ofman
which knoweth how to use them rightly, which if he want, yet will he not want
the means of attaining unto his end, which is to be fashioned and framed rightly
according unto reason, and to make use and benefit of all things which shall
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happen what soever, and consequently to purchase his chief good and felicity."
This positive assessment of ties between the cultivation of virtue and material
possession is one eighteenth-century Scots would have welcomed as they
defended the possibility of virtue existing in commercial society.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p. 204.
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Numerous other parallels appear in de Vair's text that mirror Neostoic themes
that filtered into subsequent English and later Scottish treatments ofmorality and
ethics. Du Vair recommended purging passions, maintaining patience in times of
trial, to understand that philosophy teaches the right use of wisdom but not the
essence of truth, which has its origins in the Divine. Du Vair discussed the role
of human will in the attainment of good, that human beings must actively seek
good without over-reaching their natural talents. Crossing a boundary between
his Stoic impulses and Christianity, however, du Vair warned readers to assert
'positive will' in their search for virtue, to make a conscious choice to follow a
virtuous path rather than follow the dictates of fortune. To follow fortune, du
Vair wrote, demeaned the power of the Divine:
"Will (as we say) is that which seeketh after our good: now a ruled and well
governed will never coveteth (as indeed it ought not to ) but that which she may,
and which it is in her power to procure. ... Will you then rather choose to run into
Fortune, and wait at her deceitful hands for that good which you may give
yourself if you will? For this is a divine and inviolable law, which hath been
made since the beginning of the world, that ifwe will have any good, we must
purchase and get it our selves, by our own good labour and industry. For nature
hath provided a rich storehouse of all good things, and inclosed it in our minds:
let us then but stretch forth the hands of our will. For if the will ofman be well
guided and ordered, it will turn all things to her good."113
The final element of du Vair's Neostoicism that seems particularly relevant in
terms of later Scottish discussion of Christian Stoicism concerns the notion of
progress. Following Seneca, du Vair and Lipsius acknowledged the benefits of
viewing life as a progress toward virtue, and they affirmed that it was possible to
achieve degrees of virtue even if an idealized form of classical aristocratic virtue
113 Ibid., p. 205.
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was essentially out of reach. The achievement of the Stoic ideal consisted in the
perfection of individual human nature, and the 'fashioning ofwill' toward this
end. Du Vair argued that a disposition toward virtue was "wholly in our power,
and consequently our good and evil."114
Although less widely known than Justus Lipsius, we begin to see that du Vair's
own brand of Christian Stoicism or Neostoicism was identical in spirit and
intention to that of his Flemish colleague. Their mutual assumption that Christian
morality could find support in the writings of Stoic philosophers, and in the
minds of reasonable men in their own era, provided a basis for articulating a
philosophy that permitted reconciliation after times ofwar and individual
improvement.
iii
A Brief Sketch of French Classicism:
Francis de Malherbe and his Followers
Francis de Malherbe is traditionally known in the history of French literature as
the father of French classicism, whose works reflected the preferences of a new
generation of poets and dramatists, who reinterpreted the meaning and purposes
of their craft to emphasize clear and accessible language over stylized forms of
writing favoured by the Renaissance tradition. Like their counterparts interested
in politics or philosophy, seventeenth-century French literary figures were seeped
in the legacy of humanism. They grappled as Montaigne did with defining the
114 Ibid., p. 209.
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meaning of life. They were deeply aware of the power of the written word to
convey political or moral messages. They questioned received notions on matters
of literary style, grammatical form and the utility of rhetoric.
Like Montaigne, Malherbe stood at a junction in French literary history. He was
a theoretician, who insisted on the strict use of form and purity of diction in his
writing. He sought refinement in literature, but not at the expense of clarity. The
most interesting examples of his prose writings consist of translations of
Seneca115 and Livy, as well as extensive correspondence.
French Renaissance literature was characterised by traditional poetic forms such
as the ballade, courtly song or comedy. The introduction of the essay by
Montaigne was accompanied by popularization of other literary genres, including
the writing of historical treatises, cultural commentaries and religious tracts. Jean
Bodin's Methodus ad Facilem Historiarum Cognitionem (1566; Method for the
Easy Comprehension History) explored historical method and criticism. More
significantly, Bodin emphasized the reading ofhistory over its writing, shifting
the classical notion of historical writing as an essentially aesthetic exercise to a
more utilitarian one.
Malherbe shared this interest in the pragmatic. Although his first poem, "Les
Larmes de Saint Pierre" (1587), followed in the Renaissance courtly fashion, his
subsequent works showed a growing interest in defining a new genre of
115 See Seneca, Les oevvres (A Paris, Chez Charles Chappellain, M.DC.XXXI) traduction de
monsieur Franfois de Malherbe.
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accessible poetry that was free from overly elaborate language or style. It is
suggested that this preference for the orderly and practical was rooted in
Malherbe's early exposure to Neostoic themes at the hands of his friend and
mentor, Guillaume du Vair.
After completing studies at the universities of Basel (1571) and Heidelberg
(1573), Malherbe moved to Provence in 1577 to serve as secretary to the local
governor in Aix, where du Vair practised law. A firm friendship seems to have
been established for by 1605, du Vair (and a Cardinal Duperron) arranged for
Malherbe to travel to Paris in hopes of gaining a position as court poet to Henry
IV. Their optimism for success was bolstered by the fact that an ode Malherbe
had published in 1600 to Henry's new queen, Marie de Medicis, was very well
received. Malherbe was given his appointment.
With some security established, Malherbe's reputation grew among a select
group of followers, ofwhom Francis Maynard is best known. Maynard was
appointed to the household of Marguerite de Valois in 1605, and from there
specialized in writing pastoral poems. He was occasionally a civil servant at the
court ofAurillac between 1611 and 1628, and was appointed to the Academie
Fran?aise in 1634. Maynard shared Malherbe's concern for clarity in language,
and he endorsed Malherbe's call for the production of a standard grammar to be
used across France.
While neither Malherbe or Maynard published widely, their mutual efforts to
convey simple concepts about life and duty to their readers became a hallmark of
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French literature. We will see in chapter three that la Bruyere and the Moralistes
followed Malherbe and his school in their view of literature as the voice of
universal truths that sustain individuals during times ofjoy or personal trial. The
call for a universal grammar reflected recognition that language was a unifying
force in society that transcended social divisions or regional loyalties.
Furthermore, the kind of exemplary writing that Malherbe and his followers were
involved in fostered pride in a national literary tradition that affirmed new moral
and political opinion. The perpetuation of this national pride became the focal
point of the Academie's efforts, and provided a cultural model that
Enlightenment Scots may have wished to emulate.
iv
Neostoicism and Ben Jonson
Traditionally the theatre provided particularly fertile ground for the dissemination
of ideas in both France and England, as it had in the ancient world. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, theatres in England provided an efficient
forum for social and political commentary, as well as a means for propagating
loyalty to established political orders and the person of the monarch. The
playwrights and poets of the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, including
William Shakespeare (1564-93), Ben Jonson (1572-1637) and John "Resolute"
Ford116 (1586-ca. 1640), constitute a golden age in literature. They were
116 For a thorough discussion of John Ford's contribution to Neostoicism in seventeenth-century
England, see Barbour, Reid, English Epicures and Stoics: Ancient Legacies in Early Stuart
Culture (Amherst, Massachusetts: University ofMassachusetts Press, 1998), pp. 112-144.
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particularly adept at testing the strength of received moral and ethical principles,
and demand for their works increased from the 1570s as urban populations grew.
Shakespeare tends to overshadow his contemporaries in the modern mind.
However Ben Jonson is generally regarded as the second most important poet and
playwright of his time. His major plays, Every Man in His Humour (1598);
Seianus (1603); Volpone (1606); The Alchemist (1610); and Bartholomew Fair
(1614), were well known to theatre-goers of all ranks in society. He wrote
several masques before 1625, when his sometimes patron, King James VI and I,
died. He was an actor and a critic, who enjoyed a wide following in the theatre
world and whose followers came to be known as "the tribe," "the sons of Ben,"
or more formally, the Cavalier poets.
Little is known about Jonson's earliest years. His father appears to have been a
property owner of modest rank, who lost his estates during the reign ofQueen
Mary I. The elder Jonson was imprisoned and died two months before Ben was
born. Jonson's mother remarried a bricklayer, but the generosity of an unknown
benefactor enabled the boy to attend the prestigious Westminster School.
Although Jonson did not complete the full course of studies at Westminster, the
combination of some years of high quality education and exposure to the scions
of prominent families fostered Jonson's admiration for Stoic notions of virtuous
kingship and duty, as well as a keen sense of political power and social position.
It is likely that Jonson's life-long admiration of Seneca dated from this period,
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which underscored a fundamental belief in an orderly society sustained by public-
spirited aristocrats.117
Jonson followed his step-father briefly into the brick trade, but he left for a period
of service with English forces in the Netherlands. By 1597 Jonson had returned
to England and was writing plays for a prominent producer, Philip Henslowe.
When the Lord Chamberlain's theatre company accepted Every Man in His
Humour for a performance with Shakespeare in the cast in 1598, Jonson started
to find the wider recognition he sought. While it is not necessary to dwell further
on the minutiae of Jonson's personal life, it is important to note that his successes
were tainted by personal tragedies that may have contributed to a deeper need to
find peace in a Stoic-like resignation to fate and the foibles of his own character.
In 1598 he killed a fellow dramatist in a duel, for which he was given a prison
sentence and was branded. Two of Jonson's sons died in childhood.
Immediately before writing Sejanus, which chronicled the relationship between a
• • • 118
patron and client who assist in the destruction of each other's enemies, Jonson
abandoned his family in order to accept a position with a new patron in the north
of England. The picture that emerges of Jonson is one of a complex and
sometimes morose character, who was as ambitious as he was a learned observer
of the human scene. He remained productive despite misfortune, and he appears
117 See Riggs, David, Ben Jonson: A Life (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Press, 1989), pp. 9-22.
118 Daniel Boughner has noted that Sejanus is Jonson's play that relies most directly on Tacitus,
and indeed on Lipsius, in its tone and style. See Boughner, "Jonson's Use of Lipsius in Sejanus,"
Modern Language Notes 73 (1958), pp. 247-55.
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to have inspired a considerable degree of affection from a widespread
acquaintance despite occasional brutish behaviour.119
However difficult a character Jonson may have been, his intellectual interests
remained strongly informed by ideals of inner self-constancy, respect for
authority and patronage, and a civilised reasonableness, much ofwhich derived
from Seneca. Jonson was a didactic poet, who ultimately believed in the power
of a benevolent prince to secure social harmony. He believed, despite his
personal failings, that a good poet should be a good man, and that poetic verse
should propagate responsibility in society. That Jonson's works are permeated
with allusions to Tacitus, Suetonius, Pliny, Juvenal and Seneca testifies to his
reverence for classical sources. However the most telling evidence of Jonson's
direct interest in Neostoicism rather than the ancients comes in the form of
markings and marginalia he made in his personal copy of Lipsius' Six Books of
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Politics ofCivil Doctrine, which has been explored thoroughly in a recent
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study by Robert C. Evans. Evans notes that the influence of Lipsius on Ben
119 One of Jonson's circle, William Drummond of Hawthornden (1585-1649), was the first
notable Scottish poet to write deliberately in English. Drummond succeeded his father as laird of
Hawthornden in 1610, and Jonson paid a three-week visit to Drummond's estate during a walking
tour of Scotland in 1618. Jonson was already well known north of the border. A 1616 edition of
his Works was available in Scotland, and the fact that King James awarded him a royal pension
enhanced Jonson's status outside ofEngland. During the same visit, the Edinburgh Town Council
appointed Jonson as honorary burgess and guild brother in the city. It has not been possible to
trace a particularly Neostoic element in Drummond's surviving writings. However Drummond's
exchanges with Jonson may have contributed to a wider familiarity with Jonson's Neostoic
preferences among the Scottish intelligentsia of the day.
120 Jonson's copy of Lipsius' Politics is included in an eight-volume set of Lipsius' writings that
the poet once owned. The set is now housed in the library of Emmanuel College, Cambridge
University.
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Evans, Robert C., Jonson. Lipsius and The Politics of Renaissance Stoicism (Durango, CO:
Longwood Academic and Hollowbrook Publishers, 1992). I am grateful to Professor Evans for
discussing further his work on Jonson and Lipsius with me and for providing citations for earlier
treatments of the connections between these two figures.
99
199
Jonson's work has been acknowledged for some time. Although Jonson shared
Lipsius' concerns about ethics and morality, the evidence in the surviving copy of
Jonson's edition of Lipsius suggests that it was ultimately with Lipsius' political
thought that Jonson was concerned.
Reading with Evans, it becomes clear that Jonson's markings are more extensive
in the first two and the fourth books of the Politics, where Lipsius' emphasis on
morality is especially pronounced. In Book I Jonson underlined and marked with
arrows passages where Lipsius instructed that effective princes must be virtuous
men, and that princely power should be employed strictly for the common good:
"Doth he leade us the way to vertue? We followe. To vice? We encline thither.
Liueth he an honest, and blessed life? We flourish. Is he vnfortuante? We
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decline, or runne to ruine with him."
Jonson seemed especially interested in passages that described the character and
utility of virtue, and the requirement to advance the common good.
"I define Ciuill life, to be THAT WHICH WE LEADE IN THE SOCIETIE OF
MEN, ONE WITH ANOTHER, TO MUTUALL COMMODITIE AND PROFIT,
AND COMMON VSE OF ALL. I assigne vnto it two guides, Prudence, and
Vertue:" ... "because I can not be induced to beleeue, anie can possibly be a good
Citizen, except likewise he be an honest man. Without vertue, such wisdome
should rather be a subtill craft, and malice, and any other thing rather than
prudence. And albeit, that by the sterne thereof properly, ciuill life be gouerned,
122 See Trimpi, Wesley, Ben Jonson's Poems: A Study of the Plain Style (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1962), pp. 60-66; Croll, Morris W., Style. Rhetoric, and Rhythm, (ed.) Patrick,
J. Max et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 176; Williamson, George, The
Senecan Amble (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 121-49.
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Evans, Robert, C., Jonson. Lipsius and The Politics of Renaissance Stoicism (Durango, CO:
Longwood Academic and Hollowbrook Publishers, 1992), p. 29.
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yet it is not without the vse, and aide, of the other loadstone." ... "for the glorie
of beautie, and riches is fraile, ... but vertue euer shineth, and is eternall." 24
The passages that appeared to be of special interest to Jonson in Book II of the
Politics concern justice, clemency on the part of rulers, and faith. Jonson
underlined Lipsius' definition of clemency and highlighted passages where
Lipsius confirmed Seneca's notion that the wise ruler used clemency to enhance
virtuous character and wisdom:
"I present now vnto our Prince Clemencie, that other light, which is as I may call
it, the Moone ofEmpires. This goddesse, is mild and gracious, who doth
mollifie, and temper matters, taketh away the hurtfull, rayseth vp them that fall,
and runneth to preserue those, that throw themselves headlong into daunger. I
know not how I should describe it in other wordes, then TO BE A VERTUE OF
THE MIND, WHICH WITH JUDGEMENT, ENCLINETH FROM
PUNISHMENT, OR REUENGE, TO LENITIE. This, of all other vertues is
19 S
most fit for man, because it agreeth best with his nature."
Jonson also noted Lipsius' description lesser virtues that should 'adorn' a prince:
"I come now to those which I termed lesser lights, these are vertues, not in equall
measure so excellent and necessarie to the prince, as the former I recited, yet they
are very profitable: which as starres I will plant, and fasten, in the heauen of this
supreme head. ... Be thou BOUNTIFULL, for there is nothing that fitteth better
with the nature ofman, then liberalitie: Loue CHASTITIE: For there can be no
honest thine remayne in a mind corrupt with lust. Refraine from ANGER: either
be thou not angrie at all, or do not hide it: for it is more honourable for a Prince to
offend, then to hate. Make small account of SLAUNDEROUS SPEECHES: ...,
Yet have care of thy GOOD NAME & remember that the counsels of good men
tend to consider, what is profitable for their owne particular: But the state of
Princes is farre different, whose cheefest care in all their actions, ought to be, to
I
haue a good report."






On religion, Jonson noted Lipsius' commendation of faith as the 'stay of
mankind':
"You haue alreadie two lights, from whose brightnesse, and reuebertation as it
were, two other are inflamed, Faith and Modestie. Of the which faith, is so near a
neighbor vnto Justice, that you may truly affirme, the one taketh her beginning
from the other. Neither doth it greatly import, from which each other proceedeth.
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For, ... Faith is the ground-worke and foundation of Justice."
In Book IV Jonson noted passages where Lipsius commented on prudence,
suggesting that it belonged 'peculiarly' to a prince for the faithful execution of
prudential behaviour and depended on an unwavering nature available only to the
most virtuous ofmen. Jonson underscored passages where Lipsius drew
connections between prudence, self-command and the need for both in dealing
with the uncertainties of the world:
"We giue best credit to that which we know of his owne nature is not subject to
change. And surely it is impossible for any man to reduce that which is
vncertaine, to certaine and strict limits ofprecepts, lastly, it is Obscure, because
the affaires and successe ofworldly matters, are couered with a thicke mist. For
God doth hide their beginnings from vs, under diuerse forms. And as Lucretius
sayeth: A certaine hidden force doth continually trample vnder foot the affaires of
this world, and spurneth at the glorious Scepters, and princely ornaments, and
seemeth to make a scorne of them."128
Evans concluded that Jonson's markings of his copy of the Politics attest to the
poet's strong interest in Lipsius' ideas and in the political lessons Lipsius drew
from ancient sources. While this can only be speculation, it would have been
127 Ibid., p. 227.
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unusual for Jonson to pay such close attention to Lipsius' book unless he found it
particularly worthwhile. Further evidence of Jonson's admiration for the Flemish
thinker is found in Jonson's Discoveries, a compilation of Jonson's personal
reflections written over a decade between the mid-1620s and the mid-1630s that
was his most significant prose piece. The Discoveries treat matters such as the
need for wise counsellors in public life; the benefits ofhumility and virtue; and a
prince's obligation to advance learning in society. Evans provides a convincing
analysis of specific passages that have direct parallels to the Politics both in spirit
and specific content.
In sum, Evans correctly noted, Jonson and Lipsius shared a world view that
heartily endorsed the notion that Christian morality combined with classical
virtue provided the best means for securing personal well-being and social order.
Like the Scottish literati in the 18th century, they endorsed moderation, and
examined politics in its broadest sense to include matters of religion, private
morality, economics, and public ethics. Ultimately Lipsian Neostoicism provided
a guide for all manner of social conduct to which Jonson seemed to subscribe.
Jonson's prominent place in English literary life placed him at an advantage to
foster awareness ofNeostoic themes. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume
that Jonson's contribution to awareness ofNeostoic themes in his own day, and
in later years, was considerable.
128 Ibid., p. 243.
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V
The Natural Law Tradition: Grotius and Pufendorf
If philosophy and literature form two of the major conduits for the dissemination
ofNeostoic themes in early modern European intellectual life, politics and the
natural law tradition form the third. The chapter now turns to a discussion of
two dominant figures of the natural law tradition who shared a distrust of
absolute monarchy, and advocated consultative forms of government deriving
from the republicanism that manifested itself in Geneva and the Dutch Republic
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The 1590s ushered in a period of relative harmony to the Dutch Republic
following the religious strife we know Lipsius attempted to ease. A decade of
territorial expansion and economic growth began that was astonishing given the
turmoil of the Republic's immediate past. The Republic's prosperity stemmed
initially from its gradual dominance ofNorth Sea trading routes, combined with
its merchants' skillful cultivation of the market in basic staples across Europe.
The practical manifestations of the Republic's political and economic power were
underscored by the development of political ideologies that explored the nature of
republicanism and citizenship. While Lipsius' contribution to political thought
has been acknowledged, it was Lipsius' near contemporary, Hugo Grotius, who
developed the defining model for Dutch republicanism that modern day
historians recognise. Grotius formally articulated a political ideology that
strengthened the legitimacy of the republican status quo by rooting it in a
historical framework.
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Grotius was a child prodigy, who showed considerable promise as a humanist
scholar when he matriculated at the University of Leiden in 1594 at the
comparatively young age of eleven. His father served as curator to the
University, and his extended family included lawyers and professionals who
strongly supported republicanism. IfGrotius inherited a proclivity for
republicanism, it was most likely compounded by his experiences at Leiden.
Despite being founded by Prince William of Orange, the Leiden of Grotius' day
was a centre of opposition to the Prince's successors, who challenged the
Republic's autonomy with threats ofmilitary force. The University was also a
focal point for anti-Calvinist Arminianism,129 which influenced Grotius' political
thought in that he adopted the Arminians' advocacy of religious toleration. He
also emphasized in later religious writings that it was more important for
Christians of all denominations to focus their attention on the central truths of
their faith rather than be distracted by infighting between denominations.130
In his De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae (1610) and in an unpublished essay,
De Republica Emendanda (ca. 1600-10), Grotius praised the republican character
of the Dutch constitution, emphasizing that the Republic's liberty and prosperity
129 Jacob Arminius (1560-1609), the Dutch Protestant theologian, who developed the doctrine that
Christ died for all people rather than solely for the Elect, was appointed one of three professors of
theology at Leiden in 1603.
130 For references and further discussion of the Arminian, Dutch Collegiant and Remonstrant
traditions, see Fix, Andrew, Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early
Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); on Grotius' biographical details, see
Liggio, Leonard P., preface editorial to Veatch, Henry B., "Natural Law: Dead or Alive", in
Literature ofLiberty, October/December 1978.
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were best protected by an oligarchy. He endorsed the benefits of the
Republic's order and increasing stability. He argued that the overthrow of
Spanish tyranny provided essential proof of Dutch republican credentials,
emulating the example of Holland's ancient ancestors, the Batavians, who had
revolted against Roman occupation centuries earlier.132
Grotius sought to prove that the focal point of Batavian, and indeed
contemporary, political power was the state. All civil and ecclesiastical authority
emanated from the state, and citizens owed first allegiance to civil rather than to
• • ... 1 TT •
religious institutions. Grotius also endorsed the aristocratic character of the
Batavian and later Dutch polities, underlining his acceptance of a system of
privilege that secured the power of the oligarchy, and by extension the liberty of
individual citizens. Perhaps most importantly from a commercial point of view
was Grotius' belief that liberty was a necessary precondition and guarantor of
prosperity. Through prosperity the Republic secured itself against any threat of
political or economic dependency. And it may have been particularly due to a
wish to protect the Republic's prosperity that Grotius endorsed Dutch imperial
ambitions in his Annates et historiae (1657, published posthumously).
131 Richard Tuck points out that in taking this position, Grotius was arguing against the idea of
mixed constitutions. For various discussions of this point see Tuck, Richard, Natural Rights
Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and his Philosophy and Government.
1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
132 See Tuck, Richard, Philosophy and Government. 1572-1651. pp. 160-63; and Leeb, Leonard,
The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).
133 For example, Grotius and Jan van Oldenbarnevelt, the leading statesman of the United
Provinces of the day, attempted to prevent in-fighting between orthodox Calvinists and Arminians
within the Dutch Reformed Church by elevating the power of the state over religious institutions.
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It remained, however, for Dutch intellectuals to define the moral ethos of Dutch
commercial culture. Leading figures like Grotius addressed this problem within
the context of exploring the political ideologies and concepts of natural law that
formed the intellectual core of Dutch republicanism. Eighteenth-century Scots
were very familiar with Grotius' work, particularly at the University of Glasgow,
where as we will see in chapter three, Francis Hutcheson did much to incorporate
the natural law scholars into the curriculum. However, even more influential
than Grotius was Samuel Pufendorf.
Samuel Pufendorfwas born to a Lutheran minister in Saxony in 1632. He was
educated at the Universities of Leipzig and Jena, where he took courses in
mathematics and first came into contact with the works of Grotius and Thomas
Hobbes. During the late 1650s, Pufendorfwas tutor to a Swedish family, who
took the young scholar to their native country. His stay there was disrupted by a
war between Sweden and Denmark, during the course ofwhich Pufendorfwas
arrested and imprisoned. He returned to Germany in 1660 to take up the first
professorship in natural law at the University of Heidelberg, where he stayed
until 1667. He then moved to the University of Lund, where he wrote On the
Law ofNature and ofNations (1672), the condensed version ofwhich was
published as On the Duty ofMan and Citizen. In 1686 Pufendorfwas appointed
court historian to the Great Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William of Prussia,
in whose service Pufendorf stayed until his death in 1694.
On the Duty ofMan and Citizen became the seminal text for the study of natural
law soon after it was published. Its success prompted Pufendorf to claim that he
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was the successor to Grotius as the leading exponent of natural law theory in
Europe. While he was apparently criticized by some of arrogance in making this
claim, the significance of his work was quickly recognised.
As J.B. Schneewind has noted, in On Duty Pufendorf operated from the premise
that the study of natural law was not contingent upon studying religion or
theology. Natural law was an autonomous discipline, which ought to be
considered with reference to the laws of nature through which human beings
interacted.134 Pufendorf based his assertion on his interpretation ofMartin
Luther's notion that a 'moral gulf existed between God and man, and by analogy
between theology and science or reason. The middle ground between these two
provided a place within which natural law could be examined free of
philosophical extremes. Knud Haakonssen clarifies this point:
"In Germany, Pufendorf was part of the Lutheran reaction to Grotius, .... The
German debate principally concerned the relationship between natural law and
moral theology, with most orthodox Lutherans insisting that the former was
based on the latter. ... Allowing for a great many variations, it is this theme of the
dependence of natural law upon revealed religion which is one of Pufendorf s
main targets. ... Pufendorf took as his stand against the Lutherans of his day by
insisting on Luther's own assertion of the rational and moral gulf between God
and man. However, whereas the reformer was led from this to a suspicion and
neglect of natural law, the natural lawyer saw the possibility of developing it as a
complete 'science ofmorals', sharply separate from moral theology and
analogous to the new deductive science."135
134 Scheewind, J.B., Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: An Anthology. Vol. I
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 157.
135 Haakonssen, Knud, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), pp. 36-37.
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In his own introductory notes to On Duty, Pufendorf summarized the points he
wished to make concerning duty and natural law. These were then developed at
considerable length. Pufendorf began his introductory remarks by drawing the
reader's attention to the fact that the Tight of reason' showed that knowledge of
duty and the performance of duty are generally considered morally good.
Knowledge of duty arose from three possible sources, in life: the Tight of
reason'; civil authority; and, divine law. From this knowledge arose distinctions
between kinds of duty in society and classifications into which the study of law
was divided.
"From the first [the light of reason] flow the commonest duties ofman, especially
those which make him sociable with other men; from the second [civil authority],
the duties ofman in so far as he lives subject to a particular and definite State;
from the third [divine law], the duties ofman who is a Christian. From these
three separate duties arise, the first of which is the natural law, common to all
nations; the second, the civil law of the single individual States, into which the
human race departed. The third is called moral theology in contradistinction to
that part of theology which explains what is to be believed [that is, dogmatic
theology]."136
Each form of law operated under the sanction of the authority presiding over it.
That is to say, natural laws were obeyed because right reason dictated so in
accordance with sociable principles. Civil laws were followed at the express
command of a magistrate or lawgiver. Moral theologians followed the
commands of Scripture as prescribed by God himself. It was particularly
important to distinguish moral theology from natural law, and for Pufendorf s
136 Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, in Schneewind, J.B., Moral Philosophy
from Montaigne to Kant: An Anthology. Vol. I, p. 158.
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readers to appreciate that natural law was concerned only with the affairs of the
present world:
"that is by far the most important distinction whereby the end and aim of the
natural law is included only in the circuit of this life, and therefore it moulds man
accordingly as he ought to lead this life in society with others. But moral
theology moulds man as a Christian, who should not only have the purpose of
passing honorably through this life, but who especially hopes of the fruit of piety
after this life, .... Hence the decrees of the natural law are adapted only to the
human forum. ... From this also it follows that, ... the human forum is busied
with only the external actions ofman, ... ,"137
In Chapter II of Book I ofOn Duty, Pufendorf explained his general theory of
obligation from which he developed his understanding of sociability. Human
action, he began, was triggered by the will, and human will was never consistent
or regular. To establish some remnant of order in life, it was essential that human
beings subscribe to certain norms and standards of behaviour across society.
These norms formed a code or law by which people lived, and this law was
usually decreed by one of the above mentioned authorities.
This need for a set of norms brought with it a set of corresponding obligations,
which assured the regular conduct of all members of society. Obligation was
defined as, "... a legal bond, by which we are of necessity bound to perform
something."138 One's sense of obligation restrained the will; if it failed to do so
in any given circumstance, an additional sanction to act in accordance with
obligations came from the just threat of punishment by the relevant lawgiver.
However Pufendorf emphasized the fact that human beings had a measure of
137 Ibid., p. 159.
110
control over will in life, and that they were as likely to consent to fulfil their
obligations as they were to be tempted against it.
In chapter III, Pufendorf turned his attention to sociability. His discussion
opened by comparing and contrasting the behaviour of human beings and
animals, who display different levels of need for their fellow kind. At some point
in life, Pufendorf argued, both men and beasts derive benefits from interaction
with their fellow kind. It was impossible to imagine, he suggested, that man
could reach adulthood without receiving aid or assistance from another person in
society. In fact:
"... whatever advantages now attend human life have flowed entirely from the
mutual help ofmen. It follows that, after God, there is nothing in this world from
which greater advantage can come to man than from man himself."139
Human beings were clearly capable of acting from malevolent impulses against
their fellow members of society, particularly if one's life or livelihood was
threatened. But generally a person relied upon law and regular conduct in society
to protect their life and interests. Therefore, Pufendorf continued, people were:
"... highly adapted to promote mutual interests; but on the other hand no less
malicious, insolent, and easily provoked, also as able as he is prone to inflict
injury upon another. Whence it follows that, in order to be safe, he must be
sociable, that is, must be united with men like himself, and so conduct himself
toward them that they may have no good cause to injure him, bur rather may be
ready to maintain and promote his interests."140
138 Ibid., p. 160.
139 Ibid., p. 162.
140 Ibid., p, 163.
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The laws of sociability that regulated conduct are natural laws.
"So much settled, it is clear that the fundamental natural law is this: that every
man must cherish and maintain sociability, so far as in him lies."141
And finally, the authority of natural law was underscored by utility and Divine
sanction.
"Again, although those precepts [natural law] have manifest utility, if they are to
have the force of law, it is necessary to presuppose God exists, and by His
providence rules all things; also that He has enjoined upon the human race that
they observe those dictates of reason, as laws promulgated by Himself by means
of our natural light. ... But that God is the author of the natural law, is proved by
the natural reason, ... ."142
It is from Pufendorf s theory of obligation and sociability that duties proceeded.
Again duties were divided into three categories: duties owed to God; duties owed
to oneself; and, duties owed to one's fellow man. Duties to other members of
society clearly proceeded from the general rules of sociability. Given the
interrelated nature of the relationship between natural law and God, duties to God
were indirectly derived from sociability as well. Duties to oneself, however, came
from religion and sociability 'conjointly':
"For the reason why he cannot determine certain acts concerning himself in
accordance with his own free will, is partly that he may be a fit worshipper of the
Deity, and partly that he may be a good and useful member of human society."143
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., p. 165.
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Pufendorf made one final distinction between mutual duties, or those one person
owed another: absolute and conditional duties. The former were those duties that
sprang from a 'common obligation' set by God, duties of 'anyone to anyone' that
bound all members of society. It was an absolute duty not to kill another person.
The latter were duties 'introduced or received by men' that involved certain
individuals. When combined these two types of duties governed the complete
range of human behaviour.
Pufendorf s multi-layered theory of sociability was built upon a number of
assumptions about human nature. Like a wild animal, a person's first concern
was with self preservation. But it soon became evident to a rational intelligent
person that it was impossible to guarantee personal security without reference to
other members of society. As people became increasingly aware of their mutual
dependence in society, levels of sociability increased. Over time in history, a
system of obligation and duty arose as understanding of sociability became more
sophisticated. The natural laws that governed society were underscored by
certain moral principles, but as Haakonssen reminds readers, Pufendorf separated
the moral and physical worlds in his system:
"The moral and physical world are two self-contained spheres, which is to say
there is no moral quality or purpose inherent in the physical world. Values are
not among the natural qualities. ... In order for things or events in nature to
acquire value, they have to be related to a norm, and this can be done only by
beings who can understand norms as prescriptions and will thereby do either right
,,144
or wrong.
144 Haakonssen, Knud, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, p. 38.
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It is necessary to recall that Pufendorf developed his theory of sociability,
locating it within his system of natural law, for the ultimate purpose of
reconstructing European political theory. The natural duties and obligations
described above took on political dimensions as they were translated into the
civic realm. This was particularly true concerning the preservation of property,
which became an essential duty for the maintenance of public order.
The relationship of the citizen to the state also depended upon questions of
security and self-preservation. States were established by human beings for the
express purpose of protecting life and property. When people became members
of a state, they owed first allegiance to it and were obliged to place the good of
civil society above their personal needs. The performance of civic or political
duties underscored the security of the state and the preservation of order, which
in turn promoted sociability. As James Tully has explained:
"Since the preservation of this political order is the indispensable means to
sociality, and since the obligation to promote sociality entails the obligation to
promote the means to it, it follows that men are obliged by God and natural law
to perform their political duties. Furthermore, since the performance of political
and social duties sustains the order in which individual security and the benefits
of society can be attained, it is a matter of one's rational utility to obey."145
Despite the well-balanced and finely tuned structure of Pufendorf s theory of
society, he was aware that human beings were by nature capable of ignoring both
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the sanctions of natural law and the dictates of conscience when deciding to act in
a given way. If conscience failed, if a citizen failed to appreciate the benefits
derived from acting within the boundaries of sociability, it then fell to the state to
control behaviour or restrict passions by enforcing civil laws. In this sense, as
Tully rightly pointed out, Pufendorf s 'system of sociality' is incomplete.
Nevertheless, what was particularly interesting about Pufendorf s system of
natural law was his re-introduction of the Divine into the social, political and
moral order. By doing this Pufendorfdeparted from Grotius, who argued with
the rationalists that natural law need not be contingent upon God to operate fully.
By underscoring the power of sanctions to regulate behaviour, and by reiterating
that fear of Divine punishment was the ultimate sanction, Pufendorf pointed to
God as the ultimate authority over human action. Nevertheless, he maintained
that natural law and natural theology were necessarily separate systems. And
finally, Pufendorf made a permanent association between civil and Christian
duties.
.. Moral theology does more effectively encourage a good quality of civil life,
since the Christian virtues too do as much as anything to dispose men's minds to
sociality. And, vice versa, if you see anyone engaged in sedition and disrupting
civil life, you may safely infer that the Christian religion may be on his lips but
has never penetrated to his heart."146
145 Pufendorf, Samuel, On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law (ed.) James
Tully, (trans.) Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See
introduction by Tully, p. xxx.
146 Pufendorf quoted in Moore, James and Silverthorne Michael, 'Protestant Theologies, Limited
Sovereignties: Natural Law and Conditions ofUnion in the German Empire, The Netherlands and
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Conclusion
The rise of rationalism, and subsequent debates over the nature of power and
understanding of human identity, changed fundamentally the way in which
European intellectuals explored the questions: how should one live, and what
constituted a moral life? Received teachings from Renaissance humanism that
had previously set the perimeters for reflecting on politics, literature, philosophy
and ethics were challenged in a new era infused with the spirit of scientific
inquiry.
Seventeenth-century intellectuals confronted the task of reconciling the powers of
reason, which many admired, with other fundamental elements of human life
including faith, ethics, duty and responsibility. Part of the foundation upon which
they constructed answers were laid by thinkers at the end of the sixteenth century,
men such as Lipsius, Montaigne, du Vair and Jonson, whose lives and work
spanned a time of transition between the Renaissance and the seventeenth
century. These thinkers were bound not only by their individual interests in the
lessons of ancient Stoicism or scepticism, but by a commitment to guaranteeing
order and opportunity in society. The stability that was the fruit of order
provided much desired security for self and country, but it also ensured that one
might pursue philosophical interests in uninterrupted peace.
Great Britain', in Robertson, John (ed.), A Union for Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), p. 174.
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The chapter has argued that a multifaceted revival of Stoic ideals took place in
the seventeenth century that had its roots in the pioneering work of Justus
Lipsius, whose predilection for the more accessible Stoicism of Seneca gained in
popularity across academic disciplines. Neostoicism was not universally popular,
nor was it taken entirely seriously by the most sceptical of thinkers. However, to
the extent that it constituted an avenue of intellectual thought that encouraged the
promotion of virtue in practical ways, Neostoicism was a substantive rather than
merely formal philosophical school. By connecting Stoicism with Christian
principles, Neostoicism equated faith with the development of human nature that
was positive, perhaps even progressive.
If one considers the diversity of intellectual figures discussed in this chapter, and
the various disciplines in which they were involved, it becomes clear that the
discourse on Neostoicism described here permeated European intellectual life
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is suggested that this was a
discourse with which eighteenth-century Scots were bound to be familiar.
Furthermore, it was a discourse that anticipated many of the Scots' questions
about ethics, virtue and human action.
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Chapter 3
Morality, Neostoicism and Politeness as Ethical Foundations of Commercial
Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland
Introduction
"The greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, how independent they may be
supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to
commerce; and as private men receive greater security, in the possession of their trade
and riches, from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to
the opulence and extensive commerce of private men."147
"The spirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds ofmen, being once roused from
their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themselves on all sides, and carry
improvements into every art and science. Profound ignorance is totally banished, and
men enjoy the pleasure of rational creature, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the
pleasure of the mind as well as those of the body. The more these refined arts advance,
the more sociable men become. ... They flock into the cities; love to receive and
communicate knowledge; to show their wit or their breeding; their taste in conversation
or living, in clothes or furniture. Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and
pleasure both. ... Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an
indissoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as reason, to be peculiar to the
more polished, and, what are commonly denominated, the more luxurious ages."148
When David Hume (1711-76) published the passages above in a collection of
essays in 1751, the commercial society to which they referred was established in
Scotland. The country's general economic fortunes improved dramatically as a
result of the Treaty of Union with England (1707), which greatly increased
Scotland's access to valuable English markets and commercial trading routes.
147
Hume, David, 'OfCommerce', in his Essays Moral, Political and Literary, (ed.) Eugene F.
Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), p. 255.
148
Hume, David, 'Of Refinement in the Arts', in ibid., p. 271.
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The comparative prosperity that followed in the decades immediately after union
ushered in an era during which the fabric of Scottish society was altered by the
emergence of newly strengthened merchant and professional classes. The
members of these middling ranks of society sought to cultivate a more refined
sense ofmanners and taste that accompanied greater degrees ofwealth in
civilised societies.
The refinement of Scottish society was essential in Hume's and the
Enlightenment literati's view to define their country's place within the new
Hanoverian order in Great Britain. While some Scots objected to the
surrendering ofpolitical supremacy to the Parliament at Westminster, an
overwhelming majority of Scotland's political, intellectual and social leaders
supported union. The growth in Scotland's commercial activity brought with it
the challenge to address how to avoid greed or self-interest becoming the
dominant characteristics of Scotland's emerging commercial culture.
It fell to Hume and his Enlightenment colleagues to investigate these matters and
they did so by examining the principles of human nature that affected the way
eighteenth-century society functioned. They examined the roles played by virtue,
imagination, sense and reason in determining the ethos of commercial culture.
The Enlightenment literati made these efforts within the framework of the
intellectual legacy inherited from seventeenth-century European discussion about
Neostoicism, moral philosophy and natural law. This discussion was transported
into Scottish intellectual life during the early decades of the eighteenth century by
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academics influenced by the natural law tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf.
Scottish scholars were concerned with defining the proper relationship between
philosophy and theology, morality and religion, and natural and revealed religion.
They also appreciated that as a result of the philosophical and theological
controversies from the Renaissance through the seventeenth century, the
emphasis upon the forces of reason and science in society threatened the
traditional role organized religion played as the primary arbiter ofmoral conduct
in Christian societies.
Early Scottish moral philosophy attempted to find a rational basis for moral belief
within the context of investigating human nature. As in the seventeenth century,
the Scots' discussions about the nature ofmorality and moral knowledge fell
between two philosophical extremes: the first suggested that moral laws could
only be identified through revelation from God; the second suggested that
morality was the product of the innermost workings of human nature. While
scholars addressed the nature ofmorality differently, particularly regarding the
religious dimensions ofmoral decision-making, they shared a common purpose
in their inquiries: to identify a moral order in behaviour and human identity, and
to ask if this order sprang from external influences or from a natural sense within
the human mind and heart. This order was required of all people in society, and
underscored the fundamental structure of civilised societies.
We have seen that Grotius and Pufendorf addressed matters of ethics and
morality within the context of society and sociability. Pufendorf followed
Grotius in developing a political theory based on natural law, which outlined a set
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of natural duties and rights that secured liberty and property. These rights and
duties were then used to define moral standards affecting all manner of social
interaction. Essentially, Grotius and Pufendorf argued that man was by nature a
social animal and that the social world was defined by a complex network of
authority and mutual obligation through which rights and duties were exercised.
When united all of these elements served to form a systematic view of society,
which was itself underscored by the laws of nature and Divine Providence.
This natural jurisprudential tradition became the basis for studying moral
philosophy in Scotland from the 1690s, when a new generation of professors,
loyal to King William III and Queen Mary and accepting of the doctrines of the
newly re-established Church of Scotland, set about restructuring elements of the
curricula at Scottish universities. The crucial figure to emerge during this process
was Gerschom Carmichael, a young relative of the Earl ofHyndford, who was
appointed the first Professor ofMoral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in
1727. Carmichael had taught philosophy at the University since 1694, and he
was deeply influenced by Pufendorf s theories on law and society. Carmichael's
own annotated translation of Pufendorf s On the Duty ofMan and the Citizen
According to the Natural Law. Two Books (1673) was published in 1727, which
Carmichael used as the set text for his course.
Carmichael was succeeded as Professor ofMoral Philosophy by Francis
Hutcheson (1694-1746), an Irish-born clergyman who became the pre-eminent
moral theorist of his generation and the philosophical forefather ofDavid Hume
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and Adam Smith.149 Hutcheson shifted the direction in which Scottish moral
philosophy evolved by developing a theory of the moral sense, a God-given
faculty that permitted human beings to distinguish between good and evil, or
between morally correct or incorrect behaviour. This theory was taken up by
Hume and Smith, although they altered it according to the priorities of their own
philosophical arguments.
As Christopher Berry has recently noted, the study ofmoral philosophy in
eighteenth-century Scotland owed much of its dynamism to the social forces
active in Scottish society as the eighteenth century opened.150 Intellectual
debates occurred against the backdrop of dramatic changes in Scotland's
political, economic and social landscape. As the century continued, the Scots
became increasingly interested in the civilizing powers of commerce in society,
forces that emanated from combining positive ethical values with new material
resources to promote the common good. Taken to their best extreme, these
civilizing powers served to encourage politeness, a refinement in manners, taste
and passions that became the hallmark of civilised members of society.151
149 The young Hume sought Hutcheson's advice while drafting A Treatise on Human Nature
(1739-40). For Smith, Hutcheson was the 'never-to-be-forgotten' professor of his undergraduate
days.
150
Berry, Christopher, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1997), see esp. chapter 7.
151 For the relationship between commerce and politeness, see Pocock, J.G.A., 'Cambridge
Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers', in Hont, Istvan and Michael Ignatieff (eds), Wealth and
Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), p. 241). Pocock wrote ofEurope generally, "There had been - it began to
be said - a fanaticism of virtue no less than of religion; just as the enthusiast flung himself into
fantasies of faith for lack of taste and polite discrimination, so - declared Montesquieu - Lycurgus
and Plato promulgated harsh disciplines and rigorous metaphysics to the inhabitants of a
restrictive and under-specialized antique economy. With the growth of trade and more complex
exchange of relationships, manners began to be softened and passions refined, le doux commerce
made its appearance, and 'conversation', 'intercourse' and 'commerce' could be used
synonymously to denote economic, cultural or sexual transaction. Commerce was the parent of
politeness, ... ."
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Politeness had its antecedents in seventeenth-century French treatments of
morality and literature. As Peter France has noted politeness was something
more than civility in social interaction.152 At its best, politeness contained a
moral dimension that involved a constant consideration of others, which in turn
fostered a kind of altruism in society. In its more overly-refined or exaggerated
form, politeness was an artificial construct that defined standards of taste and
well-mannered behaviour among the prosperous ranks of French society.
As translations of French essays on politeness appeared in Britain, the tenets of
polite behaviour were adopted by the middling ranks in London and other urban
areas. Joseph Addison (1672-1719), an English essayist, became one of the
capital's leading exponents of politeness. Addison founded the leading polite
journal, The Spectator, with Sir Richard Steele (1672-1729) in 1711. This daily
London journal was intended for audiences of comfortable means who formed
the professional and merchant classes, and it encouraged discerning individuals to
contemplate human nature with a view towards self-improvement through the
acquisition ofmanners.
It is a well established methodology in Scottish Enlightenment historiography to
examine developments in Scottish moral philosophy within the context of these
natural jurisprudential and polite paradigms. This chapter attempts to summarize
152 See France, Peter, Politeness and its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992), p. 57.
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key features of both approaches that influenced the Enlightenment literati's
understanding of connections between morality, virtue and commercial activity.
With the contributions of Grotius and Pufendorf discussed in chapter two, this
chapter opens by noting the manner in which Pufendorf s theory of society was
transmitted into Scottish moral philosophical debate by Carmichael. The chapter
then discusses Francis Hutcheson's pioneering development of a theory of the
moral sense operating in society that was a cornerstone of his ethical theory.
Hutcheson's moral philosophy as it pertained to virtue and benevolence will be
examined at greater length in Part III within the context of his interest in
Stoicism.
While Hutcheson embodied many of the virtuous and polite principles that his
Enlightenment successors found so appealing, he was not a philosopher of
politeness as such. It was not until David Hume was writing his own essays on
sociability, taste and manners that politeness took firm hold in determining the
criteria of civilised behaviour in Scottish commercial culture.
In order to understand more clearly the nature of the polite behavior Hume
advocated, the chapter continues by examining the work of the French Moralist,
Jean de La Bruyere, whose book of maxims on politeness became the first
popular treatment of the subject widely read in Britain. Joseph Addison's own
treatment of politeness will then be reviewed, paying particular attention to
Addison's interest in religion and Stoicism that underpinned the moral
dimensions of his thought. Like Hutcheson, Addison was influenced by English
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Latitudinarian theology, and Addison adopted Latitudinarian ideals that led to his
formulation ofwhat Margaret Jacob has called 'godly capitalism'. The chapter
will conclude by commenting on what the nature of 'godly capitalism' was, and
how through this 'godly capitalism' Addison connected politeness, faith and
society in ways that anticipated connections made by the Enlightenment literati.
i
Carmichael's Objection to Pufendorf Concerning Natural Theology
While Gerschom Carmichael is more accurately considered a pre-Enlightenment
rather than Enlightenment figure in Scottish intellectual history, his ties to the
Enlightenment are strong given his introduction of the natural law tradition into
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Scottish universities. However in Francis Hutcheson's view, Carmichael's
greatest contributions to the study ofmoral philosophy were found in his own
work, most notably in the notes Carmichael prepared that were appended to his
translation of Pufendorf s On the Duty ofMan and Citizen.154
While Carmichael was deeply appreciative of Pufendorf s rational and systematic
approach to natural law, his admiration for Pufendorfwas not unqualified. He
appreciated the fact that Pufendorf s system of natural law re-introduced the
Divine into the social, political and moral order. He had concerns about
153 See Hutcheson's Preface to Hutcheson, Francis, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
(Glasgow, R. & A. Foulis, 1755). The book was originally published in 1747.
154 For Carmichael's notes see Carmichael, Gerschom, Gerschom Carmichael on Samuel
Pufendorf s De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Lesem Naturalem Libri Duo [compiled] John
Lenhart [trans.] Charles H. Reeves (Published privately, 1985. Printed by Cleveland: Case
Western Reserve University, 1985). For a description of Carmichael's teaching and his
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Pufendorf s understanding of the nature of the relationship between natural
theology, revealed religion and natural law. Carmichael argued against
Pufendorfby explaining that there was a necessary connection between natural
theology and natural law:
"I have asserted more than once, ... that a genuine philosophy ofmorals must be
built upon natural theology as its foundation, as it were, and that every well
founded distinction of good and evil in our actions ... must be deduced from the
perceived relation of those actions to God, that is, to our knowledge of the
existence, perfections and providence of the supreme being."155
Carmichael insisted that natural theology was the foundation of natural
jurisprudence. He did not, however, insist on a tie between Christianity or
revealed religion and natural jurisprudence per se. Carmichael based his
conclusions upon his belief that divine scripture did not provide direct guidance
relevant to the development of political systems or civil law. It was preferable to
rely upon human experience as relayed by 'natural theologians and natural
jurists'.
As Moore and Silverthorne pointed out, Carmichael's natural theology stemmed
from three sources. Firstly, Carmichael investigated arguments from design
deriving from 'experimental theology', which enhanced understanding of the
natural world order determined by providence. The knowledge derived from this
favourable contemporary reputation, see Wodrow, Robert, Analecta: Or Materials for a History of
Remarkable Providences (Edinburgh, 1842-43, Vol. 4, pp. 95-96.
155 Carmichael, Gerschom, Synopsis Theologiae Naturalis, sive Notitiae, De Exitentia, Attributis
et Operationibus, Summi Nummis, ex ipsa rerum Natura, Studiosae Jeventutis usibus
accommodata (Edinburgh, 1729), p. 9, quoted in Moore, James and Silverstone, Michael,
'Gerschom Carmichael and natural jurisprudence', in Hont, Istvan and Ignatieff, Michael (eds),
Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, p. 78.
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ever-increasing understanding confirmed the presence of an All Wise Creator.
However Carmichael was more interested in arguments from design that referred
to the moral and political than physical worlds. Therefore secondly, Carmichael
followed Malebranche in believing that the human mind was capable of uniting
itself:
".. .with the perceptible world and with the minds of other men by the instinctive
tendency to imitate and sympathize with the feelings of others. Since the ability
ofmen to live in society and in peace with others depends so much upon natural
instincts and feelings of this kind which human beings could never have invented
for themselves, we must conclude that our instinctive propensities for social life
are better traced to the providence of the supreme being."156
Thirdly, Moore and Silverthorne continue, Carmichael found evidence of natural
theology in his investigation into the nature ofmatter. Matter was by definition
imperfect in form and motion. Therefore matter existed solely by virtue of being
formed and guided by a Supreme Intelligence. Correspondingly, the most
illustrious and virtuous dimensions of human nature also proceeded from God.
Throughout life human beings strove to transcend their physical and material
limitations, particularly in their 'aspiration to think' deeply about the most
profound elements of existence. Carmichael suggested that this aspiration, this
longing, further confirmed knowledge of a Supreme Being.
. he [man] arrives by long chains of reasoning at knowledge of the most
abstract and recondite truths, not only of things past but of infinite vistas of
possible things; thought ascends in its medications beyond the bounds of earth to
contemplate the idea of a perfect being, it aspires to beatic enjoyment of this
vision of a perfect being ,.."157
156 Ibid., p. 79.
157 Carmichael, Gerschom, Synopsis Theologiae Naturalis, p. 20 quoted in Ibid., p. 79.
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It is crucial to take special note of the importance Carmichael assigned to these
'aspirations', for in this longing for complete knowledge the ultimate end of
natural law was reflected. Just as man sought complete knowledge, so he longed
for complete fulfillment in life and in the afterlife. Therefore the purpose of
natural law was to discover how to act in order to prove worthy of salvation. By
extension, the 'inspiration for moral conduct' flowed from a pious love of the
Author ofNature.
By tracing connections between arguments from design, man's 'instinctive
propensities' for social life and a more metaphysically-based proof of God's
existence, Carmichael set the perimeters within which Hutcheson and the later
Enlightenment literati considered the relationships between natural religion,
revealed religion and the laws of sociability. His influence extended beyond the
realm of moral philosophy. He developed theories of property and contracts
based on Pufendorf and John Locke; he entered into fierce political debate by
declaring himself against slavery; and, he also addressed the nature of familial
relationships in society. This diversity of interests suggests that Carmichael
sought a comprehensive treatment of social and political questions within the
framework of his natural law theory, as well as a kind of reconciliation of




Hutcheson and Good and Evil and his Theory of the Moral Sense
As a practical moralist, Hutcheson followed in the Ciceronian tradition by
encouraging his students and readers to exercise their moral abilities through
pursuit of the vita activa. Hutcheson's advocacy of civic virtue was the defining
element of his understanding of the political and moral order, and he was eager to
combine his advocacy of virtue with the practical application of Christian faith in
daily life. He endorsed the notion that life should be seen as a progress towards
virtue, and that individuals are capable of self-improvement. This endorsement
of progress in moral life mirrored that of the Roman Stoics, whom Hutcheson
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admired greatly. Hutcheson's concept of progress also suggested that the
philosopher placed a higher estimate on human potential than Calvin and other
earlier thinkers had. The best means of achieving progress consisted of following
the discipline of duty and virtue and the lessons of experience.159
158 It should also be noted that in addition to being influences by the works ofEpictetus and
Marcus Aurelius, whose Meditations he translated, Hutcheson was familiar from an early age
with the works of Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), John Locke (1632-1704) and the 3rd Earl of
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671-1713). Clarke was an Anglican Latitudinarian
theologian, who ranked with Locke and Newton as one of the leading English thinkers of the
seventeenth century. Clarke followed Malebranche in excluding sentiment from his system of
morals, relying instead of reason to determine the existence of God and focussed on the attributes
of the Divine. Ultimately, Clarke produced a systematic Christian rationalist paradigm, which
Hume later attacked. See main text for references to some influences of Shaftesbury and Locke
on Hutcheson's theory.
159
Despite this, it was not Hutcheson's view that the average person could appreciate or be served
by the complex details of philosophical reasoning. See Hutcheson, Francis, A System ofMoral
Philosophy (Glasgow: R. & A. Foulis, 1755), Preface, p. v: "He not only thought that these kind
of arguments were not adapted to the capacity of the bulk ofmankind, but even they could afford
no solid and permanent conviction to the learned themselves, ft was his opinion in this early part
of his life, and he never saw cause to alter it, that some subjects from their nature are capable of a
demonstrative evidence, so others admit only of a probable one; and that to seek demonstration
where probability can only be obtained is almost as unreasonable as to demand to see sounds or
hear colours."
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Hutcheson sought not to promote the received legacy of natural jurisprudence for
its own sake, but to use theories of society and morality for the betterment of
individual and civil life. He did so primarily by constructing a theory ofmorality
and the moral sense that showed the inadequacies of the egoistic philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes by drawing clear distinctions between benevolent and selfish
passions as motivations of human action. Furthermore, he proposed using the
tools of natural science to cultivate a Christian science ofman within which his
theory ofmorality operated. Hutcheson believed that the key to moral goodness
was not divine grace alone, but was found by fostering the happiness of others in
society.
The chief aim of Hutchesonian moral philosophy was to eradicate the notion that
principles of self-interest were sufficient to explain the nature and purposes of
morality. He acknowledged that human behaviour was often motivated by self-
love, but this did not imply that all social action derived from selfish motives.
This provided Hutcheson with a basis for his theory of the moral sense that relied
upon benevolence rather than self-interest as the primary motivation ofmoral
action. He also challenged the Calvinist definition of a moral sense contingent
upon knowledge of God. This, in turn, led Hutcheson to promote the cultivation
of virtue on society to secure the greatest possible degree of civic responsibility,
personal integrity and social tranquility among the citizenry.
Although he was charged with heresy for it, Hutcheson contended that the true
scheme ofmorals "... we are conscious of in our own bosom, and which must be
acknowledged to operate in some degree in the whole human species ..." was the
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product of observation and experience, rather than morality contingent on God or
artificial speculation.160 He believed, like Bishop Joseph Butler, in using
probable reasoning when dealing with the application of religion to practical life.
Attempts to prove conclusively that God existed, or indeed to try to determine the
nature of the Divine beyond what might be probable, would have had, "... very
dangerous consequences to the interest of truth and religion ...", as they "...
leave the mind in such a state of doubt and uncertainty as leads to absolute
scepticism ... ."'6I Hutcheson was exonerated of the charges of heresy, but he
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maintained his belief in the "original dignity of human nature" as a sufficient
basis from which to judge morally good and evil behaviour.
The basis for Hutcheson's argument against egoistic systems was his belief that
self-interest failed to provide a sufficient or complete explanation ofmorality.
He acknowledged that human action was often motivated by self-love, but self-
love existed within the context of a previously existing set ofmoral rules that
determined the nature of correct moral conduct. These rules, like benevolence
itself, were simply part of the nature of human life, therefore theories of virtue or
morality had to be constructed from them. Hutcheson clarified the origins of his
theory of the moral sense in his An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil
(1725).
Hutcheson opened the work by defining 'moral goodness' as "... our idea of
some quality apprehended in actions, which procures approbation, attended with
160 Ibid., p. xiv.
161 Ibid., p. v.
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a desire of the agent's happiness."163 Moral evil, on the other hand, triggered the
condemnation of those around one. He then proceeded to investigate "... what
general foundation there is in nature for this difference of actions, as morally
good or evil."164 He located this foundation in the moral sense:
"That some actions have to men an immediate goodness; or, that by a superior
sense, which I call a moral one, we approve the actions of others, and perceive
them to be their perfection and dignity, and are determined to love the agent; a
like perception we have in reflecting on such actions of our own, without any
view of natural advantage from them.165
The moral sense was designed to regulate human powers, and the dignity from
which its authority sprang was manifested in virtue. Virtue:
"... does not lye in the mere sentiment of approbation of certain affections and
actions, but in acting agreeably to it," consequently, "... the soul ofman, ... bears
a resemblance of Divine Intelligence in its rational faculties, but also of the
Divine disinterested benignity in its social and public affections: and thus too our
internal constitution."166
Virtue in turn, was sought for its own sake in society, arising from the belief that
the products of the moral sense were ideas that stemmed from benevolent actions
based upon original perceptions. The ties between virtue, benevolence and
perceptions were intended by God. And because the moral sense was universal,
162 Ibid., p. xiii.
163
Hutcheson, Francis, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, printed
from the 4th edition of 1738, Treatise I, Introduction in Brodie, Alexander (ed.), The Scottish
Enlightenment: An Anthology (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 1997), p. 119.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., p. 121.
166 Hutcheson, Francis, A System ofMoral Philosophy (Glasgow: R. & A. Foulis, 1755), Preface,
p. xix.
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virtue was universally attainable. Nevertheless, Hutcheson acknowledged that
deficiencies arose with the operations of the moral sense.
From the sense ofmorality, then, came notions of virtue, ethics, actions and
rights. The moral sense distinguished between obligation and constraint:
obligations were those sanctions, or duties, that were known to be in accordance
with the moral sense; constraints were the opposite. The moral sense governed
all individual action, while ethics regulated action in society. Both morality and
ethics, and obligations and constraints, functioned under the jurisdiction of
Divine benevolence rather than within a determinist framework of any kind.
This suggests that at the heart ofHutcheson's system was a world governed
through charity rather than strict utility.
Hutcheson's discussion of the moral sense reflected the influence of Locke and
Shaftesbury. Hutcheson's emphasis of sentiment and experience seemed to
mirror Locke's two sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection.167 Hutcheson
first had access to Shaftesbury's writings while training for the ministry during
the 1720s, during which time Hutcheson was also a member of Molesworth's
circle. Although Shaftesbury's Notebooks (written 1698) remained unpublished
during Hutcheson's life, they illustrate to the modern reader themes that
permeated Shaftesbury's other works: virtue, harmony, beauty and the
relationships between them. The Notebooks, like Marcus Aurelius' Meditations,
were kept by their author as notes on the private reflection that assisted him in the
167 See Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding on the absence of innate ideas in human
beings.
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reconciliation of philosophical interest with social duty. This division of the self
between private interest and public duty had its roots in Roman Stoicism.
Shaftesbury, like Aurelius, tried to find a means of achieving a balance between
individual autonomy and social responsibility; and, the balance between the will
and choice in the human mind.168
Shaftesbury withdrew from the realm of historical traditional religion, and
believed in a universal benevolent force operating in the world. He understood
the relationship between religion and morals to be interdependent; this
interdependence embodied Shaftesbury's natural religion. It was essentially a
non-historical theology that focussed on nature holding the keys to human
identity and behaviour. The highest goal within Shaftesbury's system was to
attain virtue, and then act continually with reference to it, a notion ofwhich
Hutcheson approved.
In his Inquiry Concerning Virtue. Shaftesbury presented an ethical system that
incorporated the moral sense, moral beauty and benevolence. Man was treated as
an individual system within himself, and as a member of a wider social system.
The essential element underscoring the harmonious and efficient operation of the
individual and society was reason tempered by sympathy, or polite sociability.169
168 See Klein, Lawrence, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994). Klein treats the subject of Shaftesbury and the Stoics throughout his
book.
169 See Shaftesbury's Inquiry quoted in Fowler, Thomas, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (London:
Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1882), p. 64: " Thus, men who have the liveliest
sense, and are the easiest affected with pain or pleasure, have need of the strongest influence or
force of other affections, such as Tenderness, Love, Sociableness, Compassion, in order to
preserve a right Balance within, and to maintain them in their duty, and in the just performance of
their part; whilst others, who are of cooler blood, or lower key, need not the same ally or
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In examining the deep influences of Stoicism on Shaftesbury, Lawrence Klein
alluded to the value found in "... inner discourse leading to self-construction."170
This inner discourse contributed to improving morals because it assisted in the
process of cultivating virtue, as did external forms of human action and
sociability itself. However, Shaftesbury's natural religion seemed to provide a
final guarantee of the connections between all these elements. Of Shaftesbury's
religions sociability:
"Like morals themselves, human religiosity had it foundations in natural
affection. While the capacity to feel relation to whatever was outside the self
exercised itself first in one's closest human relationships, it extended ultimately
to the cosmic and divine framework of all existence. Affective sociability made
it possible for humans to grasp and appreciate the cosmological framework in
which they were located. Thus, religion was a manifestation of intrinsic human
sociability."171
It is important to note, however, that Shaftesbury posed as many problems for
Hutcheson as he offered areas of philosophical compatibility. Shaftesbury was a
Deist, whose system of religion de-coupled Christianity from natural religion in
moral decision-making. For this reason alone, Hutcheson would, at some point,
have had to reject Shaftesbury's system ofmorality. Nevertheless, in their
mutual identification of an autonomous moral sense governing individual human
counterpart, nor are made by nature to feel those tender and endearing affections in so exquisite
degree."" [Reference: Inquiry, Book II, Part 2, section 1.]
170 Klein, Lawrence, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness, p. 89.
171 Ibid., p. 158.
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action, both philosophers prepared the ground for further discussion ofmorality
• 179
independent of faith during the Enlightenment.
iii
Understanding Politeness: the Legacy of La Bruyere
and the French Moralists
Continuing the discussion in chapter two about philosophical preferences in
French literary circles, we have seen that in reaction to absolutism dominating
terms ofpolitical discourse in seventeenth-century France, a generation of
intellectuals arose whose writings formed a dialogue about the persona ofmodern
man and the values the contributed to social harmony. These intellectuals, the
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French Moralists (or French Neo-Stoics ), included among others La Bruyere,
Charron, Pascal and La Rochefoucauld. Within the limitations of nature and
reason, they examined types and purposes of social discussion, the origins of
knowledge and language, and the functioning of reason. Their work combined
with that Condillac, l'Abbe Trublet, Marivaut, Turgot and Marmontel
significantly contributed to British exploration of the same fields.
/
For our purposes, one of the more interesting elements of the Moralists' legacy
was the examination of motivations for moral behaviour. They highlighted the
tension that existed since St. Augustine's time over the distinctions between
172
They also seemed to anticipate the autonomous regulatory power of Adam Smith's Impartial
Spectator.
173 Some scholars argue for the use of the term Neostoics rather than Moralists in this context.
See Levi, Anthony, French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions. 1585-1649 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1964).
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genuine virtuousness, altruism and egoism. The Moralists identified a
comprehensive new standard by which individual personal integrity and the
nature of social interaction were measured, a standard ofpolitesse or
politeness.174 The precise nature of politeness was a matter of some controversy.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Peter France has suggested that
French politeness was, essentially, 'a constant consideration of others' at every
level of existence. While the Moralists agreed upon this basic characteristic, it
belies the complexity of politeness as it operated in society and within the human
mind. France also suggested that French moral debate was 'constantly
intertwined' with literature. Among the cultural sensitivities encouraged by
politeness was a distinct awareness of the effect one's words had upon others,
the Moralists appreciated the power of language as an efficient social tool, and
they tilled fresh intellectual soil as they attempted to answer the question ofjust
how language came to enjoy such influence. Although not a philosopher, La
Bruyere became noted for his adeptness at conveying polite moral messages
• 17S
through his elegant use ofprose.
174 Definitions ofpoliteness varied throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although
it is not clear who the precise author of the article was, the term politesse was described at length
in the Encvclopedie. See Diderot, Denis and Alembert, Jean le Rond d\ Encvclonedie. tome
douzieme (Neufchatel: Samuel Faulche & Compagnie, Libraires & Imprimeurs, 1765), p. 916:
"To discover the origin of politeness, it must be ... well defined and this not easily done. It is
almost always confused with civility (la civilite) and flattery, ofwhich the first is good, but less
excellent and less rare than politeness; the second a poor representation that carries none of
politeness' charm (or embellishments). Everyone is capable of learning civility, which only
consists of certain terms and arbitrary ceremonies, ...; but politeness cannot be learned unless one
has a natural predisposition, and even that, in truth, must be perfected through learning and
through social interaction or customs." (IM translation of the original French).
175 See Smith, Adam, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (ed.) Bryce, J.C. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1985), pp. 80-82.
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Jean de La Bruyere was born in Dourdan in 1639. Although little is known about
his early years, it seems certain that his life as a man of letters began with his
appointment as tutor in history to Duke Louis de Bourbon, grandson of the Prince
of Conde. After coming of age, the Duke settled a life-long pension upon his
tutor, which enabled La Bruyere to pursue his literary interests freely. His most
celebrated work, Caracteres ou les Moeurs de ce Siecle. a volume ofpolite
maxims offering moral guidance, was published in 1687. He was inducted into
the Academie Fran9aise in 1693, and died three years later at his apartments in
the Hotel de-Conde in Versailles.
The publication ofCaracteres established La Bruyere's literary reputation across
Europe. Abel Boyer's English translation and excerpation of the work was
published under the title Characters of the Virtues and Vices of the Age in 1695.
It was the first full treatment of politeness widely read in Britain. It addressed the
positive improvements gained through a polite disposition, particularly the
refinement ofmanners176 in society. Readers were cautioned about varying
perceptions of refinement and manners. An overly cerebral understanding of
what politeness ought to be could lead to a superficial appreciation of its benefits.
Politeness, according to La Bruyere, affected the inner being as much as its
conventions governed external appearances. He wrote:
"La politesse ... does not always inspire goodness, equality, complacency,
gratitude; but at least it gives the appearances, and makes man seem from the
176
Improvement ofmanners was not necessarily tied to intellectual rigour in La Bruyere's view.
He suggested that very little depth was required to improve manners; however great depth was
needed to 'polish the mind'.
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outside what he should be on the inside."177 Politeness "suited ... received
usages and customs; it is attached to the times, the place, the people."178 It
consisted of "a certain attention to making others contented with us and with
themselves through our words and manners ...; ofmutual pleasing."179
Odette de Mourgues has suggested that it is possible to interpret La Bruyere as
suggesting that politeness operated in historical isolation. If so, La Bruyere
illustrated an important dimension ofMoralist thought: while they discussed
universal aspects of human nature, they did so within closely controlled
boundaries for the purposes of instruction (instruire).180 This historic vacuum
was formulated "... so that the contemporary aspects of their society merged into
a more permanent and universal picture."181 Permanence underscored the
dominance of the prevailing autocracy in French political life. However La
Bruyere sought to transcend the limitations placed on society by the political and
social status quo.
He felt"... the need to escape from the closed world of the moralist and to create
patterns of perfection ..."182 reflecting timeless dimensions of human character,
especially those traditionally associated with the heart. The heart was the
177 La Bruyere quoted in Laursen, John C., 'Selected Politics in Hume and Kant: Letters on
Philosophy and the Language of Politics' (Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1985), p. 108.
178 Ibid., pp. 163-64.
179
Ibid., p. 164. An older translation of the relevant full passage from La Bruyere includes the
following: "We may define the spirit of politeness though we cannot determine its practice.
...Wit alone cannot attain it, but it may be gained by imitation, and practice prefers it. There are
certain temperaments which are impressible through politeness, and there are others which can
only be reached by talent or solid virtue. It is true that a polished manner sets off merit and makes
it more agreeable, and that it is necessary to have very eminent qualifications to be bearable
without it." See La BruySre, Jean de, The Characters in The Morals and Manners of the
Seventeenth Century. Being the Characters of La Bruvere (trans.) Helen Stott (London: David
Stott, 1890), p. 75.
180 See Mourgues, Odette de, The French Moralists La Rochefoucauld & La Bruvere (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 170. It is important here to bear in mind the distinction
between politeness and civility, the less refined form of considerate behavior that facilitated social
interaction but did not necessarily enhance character.
181 Ibid., p. 129.
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storehouse of an innate natural virtue, compassion and an appreciation of
essential human weakness (faiblesse), each ofwhich contributed to man's
sensibility (sensibilite). Sensibility seemed to resemble a politesse du coeur, an
inward politeness that rejects egoism, combined with apolitesse de I 'esprit, an
informed refined state ofmind in tune with intellectual inquiry. The heart's
characteristic delicacy reflected sensibility's subtlety:
"What provokes the reactions of our sensibility in the world around us may be
something as intangible as the perception of a presence ... ,"184
Though sensibility involved the deepest elements of character and identity, it was
tempered by reason. La Bruyere encouraged his readers to look to the world for a
full understanding of sensibility.
"... the search is directed outwards, no longer towards the core of our sensibility
i or
but towards the many facets of its manifestations."
Among these manifestations were emotions and moods, contrasted with passions
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and sentimentality, that could create imbalance in heart and mind. The threat
of imbalance was a poignant reminder that while sensibility deepened individual
182 Ibid., p. 107.
183 This innate virtue was enjoyed by all human beings irrespective of social rank, distinguishing
La Bruyere from La Rochefoucauld and others who attributed virtuous motivation only to the
highborn.
184 La Bruyere on 'Of the Heart' in Caracteres quoted in Mourgues, Odette de, The French
Moralists La Rochefoucauld & La Bruvere, p. 115.
185 Ibid., p. 114.
186 See La Bruyere, Jean de, The Characters in The Morals and Manners of the Seventeenth
Century. Being the Characters of La Bruvere (trans.) Helen Stott, p. 65: "All our passions are
deceitful; we conceal them as much as possible from the eyes of others, and even try to disguise
them to ourselves; there is no vice which has not some spurious resemblance to virtue, and takes
advantage of this."
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consciousness of the world and society, its contribution to personal improvement
was limited by inherent human weakness:
"There are certain losses for which our hearts ought to contain inexhaustible
sources of grief. It is seldom through either moral excellence (virtue) or strength
ofmind (that) a great sorrow (affliction) is overcome. We weep bitterly and are
sorely (noticeably) touched, but at last either we are so weak or so fickle (feeble)
that we are comforted."187
Anticipating Hutcheson, Hume and Smith, La Bruyere's sensibility permitted one
to define the balance between the workings of reason and politeness that built
tolerance and personal distinction in society. He introduced the faculty of
sympathy through which human beings developed a sociable fellow-feeling,
which determined the acceptability of actions and manners. Imagination helped
identify that desirable balance between the inner self and one's external persona.
This balance encouraged calmness and creativity. As De Mourgues suggested, if
man was genuinely capable of overcoming his inherent limitations, it was
through creative processes that he did so. Therefore aesthetics became crucial in
La Bruyere's polite paradigm and matters of taste (gout) entered into his
discussion. Aesthetically speaking, great beauty in language and discourse




Ibid., p. 60. (IM modifications of Stott's translation appear in parentheses based on original
French text quoted in de Montaigne, p. 118).
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Mourgues, Odette de, The French Moralists La Rouchefoucauld & La Bruvere. p. 134:
"Language is vulnerable and there is in La Bruyere the suspicion that beauty and fragility go
together, that the spoken word, so ephemeral ... is often more subtle, more satisfactory than the
written word: 'II me semble que l'on dit les choses encore plus finement qu'on ne peut les ecrire'.
(La Bruyere, in section 'De la Societe', 78)."
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Furthermore, unlike La Rochefoucauld but like Joseph Addison, La Bruyere was
a Christian believer. This introduced another level ofmotivation to instruct his
readers in morality for their own improvement. La Bruyere's faith underscored a
degree of personal humility that contrasted sharply with the more artificial forms
of politeness that often fueled excessive pride and vanity. Humility contributed
to La Bruyere's limited expectations of human improvement, but he retained a
degree of optimism about human nature that distinguished him from French
sceptics.
iv
Joseph Addison: Trade, Faith, Virtue and the Civilising
Powers of Commerce
The world of French Moralists focussed upon universal aspects of human nature
that operated within the boundaries of a strictly defined set of social, moral and
aesthetic norms. The daily life of refined members of society involved
conforming to these established parameters. Yet a number of processes were
available to individuals through which the universal aspects of their character
transcended established social patterns and modes of behaviour. By exercising
imagination or exploring matters of faith, for example, man used his innate
faculties to explore profound truths and aspects of humanity that extended
beyond social constructs to form the core of human identity.
These processes enabled human beings to distinguish between right and wrong in
terms ofmoral decision-making, as well as to understand the distinctions made in
142
society between polite and impolite behaviour. Ultimately politeness served
multifaceted ends. An inward politeness of the mind enhanced individual
speculation that improved one's intellectual and aesthetic discernment as well as
moral prowess. Politeness in society governed external behaviour that set the
tone for relations with one's peers. This more public form of politeness also
encouraged an outward respect for rank and hierarchy that has led some to
interpret politeness as an "instrument for non-violent social control."189
The politeness of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele applied the French model to
British society in distinctly practical ways as the two men sought to provide the
clearest possible moral guidance to members of the British merchant and
professional classes. The task was as complex as commercial society was itself.
Polite Britons had to appreciate the intricate web of obligations and duties
through which a multifaceted trading society operated. Individual desires or free
will would at times have to be denied for the sake of the public good. The polite
citizen had to be on guard against overly artificial interpretations of refined
behaviour that distracted one from genuine moral or ethical considerations. And
the polite person had to distinguish insofar as possible between propriety in
action and the search for genuine virtue in society.190
189 Peter France paraphrasing Norbet Elias in France, Peter, Politeness and its Discontents, p. 63.
See Elias' treatment of the history ofmanners in Elias, Norbet, The Civilizing Process: The
History ofManner and State Formation and Civilization, (trans.) Jephcott, E. (Oxford:
Blackwell's Ltd., 1994). Elias does not bring Addison into his discussion; Elias' conclusion
about politeness follows Rousseau, who associated politeness with social oppression.
190
Questions of propriety and virtue were taken up more comprehensively by Adam Smith in his
The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (1789). Nicholas Phillipson has pointed out that Addison has
been criticized for not distinguishing sufficiently between propriety and various forms of virtue.
Phillipson also reminded readers that Hume considered Addison's essays "trifling" for their lack
of philosophical sophistication and the absence of any formal development of a moral or social
theory in Addison's thought. See Phillipson, Nicholas T., 'Adam Smith as civic moralist' in
Hont, Istvan and Ignatieff, Michael (eds), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy
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The social bonds of family and friendship that formed the fabric of society
depended upon the smooth operation of this interconnected web of obligations.
The British, like their French counterparts, learned to accept that these
obligations brought necessary constraints on individual behaviour that
underscored social harmony. As Nicholas Phllipson pointed out:
"In Mr Spectator's world, sociability was a skill to be cultivated and valued for
the sake of the ease and sense of ego it could provide. In a commercial age men's
appetites were constantly aroused by the bewildering variety of objects that were
placed before them. They were constantly in danger of becoming prisoners of
fashion and prejudice, creatures of fantasy rather than reason. Mr Spectator
taught the absurdity of trying to escape from this world by adopting an austere
life of stoic virtue. That was advice fit only for the saint, hero and eccentric; it
was of no practical help to the ordinary citizen. He showed that in a commercial
society men could only live virtuously by constructing a social world which lay
outside the family and away from the world of fashion and affairs."191
Like La Bruyere, Addisonian politeness encouraged discerning individuals to
consider the lessons of life and human experience for the purpose of cultivating
self-improvement through the acquisition ofmanners. They key to success rested
in the channeling ofpassion into intellectual energies, producing a generally
moderate tenor of social behavior conducive to cultural harmony. These
processes occurred within the context of the commercial society in which
Addison and Steele's readers found themselves. Addison's belief that trade and
commerce provided Britain with the best means of improving the nation's quality
of life and security becomes apparent by reading The Spectator. However his
in the Scottish Enlightenment, p. 189. (Phillipson's reference for the Hume quote comes from
Hume's letter to William Strahan, 7 February 1772, in Greig, J.Y.T., Letters of David Hume. Vol.
II, p. 257.)
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more detailed considerations about the specific advantages of trade and financial
dealings are found in his political essays published in The Freeholder, a
prominent journal for promoting the Whig interests in which Addison was
1 Q<}
personally committed.
In The Freeholder No. XLII ofMay 14, 1716, Addison extolled the advantages
of trade in general which he described as "... absolutely necessary and essential
to the Safety, Strength, and Prosperity .. ."193 of the British nation. As an island
nation, Britain was entirely dependent upon the judicious use of its maritime
capabilities to promote its commercial interests throughout Europe and the
colonies. The country's ports were naturally suited to this purpose, and the skills
required to operate a commercial fleet contributed by extension to the
maintenance of a formidable naval force:
"... as an Island, we are accessible on every Side, and exposed to perpetual
Invasions; against which it is impossible to fortify ourselves sufficiently without
such a Power at Sea, as is not to be kept up, but by a People who flourish in
Commerce. To which we must add, that our inland Towns being destitute of
Fortifications, it is our indispensable Concern to preserve this our Naval Strength,
which is as a general Bulwark to the British Nation."194
Trade also suited the 'Nature of our Country' because Britain had at its disposal
sufficient natural resources to supply neighboring countries with staple
191 Ibid., pp. 188-89.
192 For a full account of the rise of the Whig and Tory Parties as well as other political groups
from the reigns ofKing William III to Queen Anne, see Dickinson, H.T., Liberty and Property:
Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. University
Paperback, 1979), chapters 3 and 4. The author includes references to Addison's political
activities in defence ofWhiggism, see esp. pp. 100 and 145.
193 Addison, Joseph, The Freeholder No. XLII in his The Freeholder (ed.) Leheny, James
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 224.
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manufactured products on a regular basis. This was particularly true in the case
ofweaving and cloth production, which at the time provided Great Britain with
sufficient profits not only to purchase luxury goods from abroad, but to maintain
a favourable balance of trade. Addison then defended the regulation of trade on
the grounds that it secured this balance of trade advantage. However trade was
also desirable for the manner in which it exposed people to other cultures. This
encouraged a deeper understanding of foreign societies, which in turn promoted a
broader and more sophisticated appreciation in Britain of the civilizing forces of
commerce:
"... We are not a little obliged to Trade, as it has been a great means of civilizing
our Nation, and banishing out of it all the Remains of its ancient Barbarity. There
are many bitter Sayings against Islanders in general, representing them as fierce,
treacherous and inhospitable. Those who live on the Continent have such
Opportunities of a frequent Intercourse with Men of different Religions and
Languages, and who live under different Laws and Governments, that they
become more kind, benevolent, and open-hearted to their Fellow-Creatures, than
those who are the Inhabitants of an Island, that hath not such Conversations with
the rest of the Species. Caesar's Observations upon our Fore-fathers is very
much to our present Purpose; who remarks, That those of them who lived upon
the Coast, or in Sea-Port Towns, were much more Civilized, than those who had
their Dwellings in the Inland Country, by reason of frequent Communications
with their Neighbours on the Continent."195
Addison ended this essay by explaining that trade, with its interconnected
network of support industries, was necessary for employment. Without the jobs
created by supplying raw materials, manufacturing and distributing of goods, the
bulk of the skilled work force in Britain would have suffered massive





made it impossible for traders, merchants and financiers, who made a living
through commercial transactions rather than off the land, to prosper196:
"In the last Place. Trade is absolutely necessary for us, as our Country is very
populous. It employs Multitudes of Hands both by Sea and Land, and furnishes
the poorest of our Fellow-Subjects with the Opportunities of gaining an honest
Livelihood. The Skilful of Industrious find their Account in it: And many, who
have no fixed Property in the Soil of our Country, can make themselves Masters
of considerable Estates, as those who have the greatest Portions of the Land
descending to them by Inheritance. If what has been often charged upon us by
our Neighbours has any Truth in it, That we are prone to Sedition and delight in
Change, there is no cure more proper for this Evil than Trade, which thus
supplies Business to the Active, and Wealth to the Indigent."197
The economic security and political stability that flowed from a smoothly
operating commercial society provided Addison's readers with the opportunities
required to cultivate the ease and worldliness essential for the acquisition of
manners. When manners were combined with an awareness of correct Christian
principles and virtue, The Spectator began to hint at what the full character of the
polite citizen ought to be: a dutiful and worldly member of society, whose actions
reflected the teachings of Christian conscience.
However there was a contradiction in Addisonian politeness between
encouraging readers towards sociability, an ability to interact with one's peers for
the sake of personal improvement and the welfare of society, and the need for
each individual to embody what Peter France has called 'the Spectator ideal'.
Sociability was essential for the regular operation of civilization; yet, the ideal Mr
196 See ibid., note 5. Leheny remarks that Addison was replying here to a Tory concern that the
"Money'd Interest', the traders, etc., earned a living off 'transient or imaginary property'. The
Tories objected to the fact that these businessmen paid less tax than landowners.
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Spectator was advised to remain sufficiently detached from society to protect
himself from being tainted by the negative effects of commerce, i.e., greed,
excessive luxury, pomposity or social rivalry.
The proper balance between sociability and individual improvement led to the
identification of the ideal English Gentleman, who personified the active sober
type of Ciceronian civic virtue that became the model for all to follow. This ideal
polite citizen felt an equal commitment to self and social improvement, and
reconciled any tensions between public and private interests by cultivating a type
of Stoic detachment from the world. This detachment did not distract him from
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the regular performance of his duty.
In The Spectator No. 2, Richard Steele introduced the fictional character of Sir
Andrew Freeport to his readers, a rising Whig merchant who embodied many of
the virtues The Spectator promoted. Sir Andrew was:
"... a Merchant of great Eminence in the City of London: A Person of
indefatigable Industry, strong Reason, and great Experience. His Notions of
Trade are noble and generous, and ... he calls the Sea the British Common. He is
acquainted with Commerce in all of its Parts, and will tell you that it is a stupid
and barbarous Way to extend Dominion by Arms; for true Power is to be got by
Arts and Industry. He will often argue, that if this Part of our Trade were well
cultivated, we should gain from one Nation; and if another, from another. I have
heard him prove, that Diligence makes more lasting Acquisitions than Valour,
and that Sloth has ruin'd more Nations than the Sword. He abounds in several
frugal Maxims, among which the greatest Favourite is, 'A Penny saved is a
Penny got.' A General Trader of good Sense, is pleasanter Company than a
general Scholar, and Sir ANDREW having a natural unaffected Eloquence, the
197
Ibid., pp. 225-26.
198 For references to these points, see The Spectator, Nos. 1, 10, 12, 94 and 246 in Addison,
Joseph and Steele, Richard, The Spectator. Vols. I-V, (ed.) Bond, D.F. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965).
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Perspicuity of his Discourse gives the same Pleasure that Wit would in another
Man. ,.."199
Here is Steele's model 'commercial man', a sensible, frugal and well spoken
person, who dealt with the world in practical terms. He lived by received codes
of Christian conscience and morality, and was expected to strive for genuine
virtue. Following the traditional Stoic formula that also appeared in Lipsius,
however, the deepest manifestations of virtue were attainable only by a limited
number of citizens. The path to genuine virtue involved degrees of self-denial,
the absence of ambition and contributions to the public good that the ordinary
person found difficult to achieve:
"... But those Men only are truly great, who place their Ambition rather in
acquiring to themselves the Conscience of worthy Enterprizes, than in the
Prospect ofGlory which attends them. These exalted Spirits would rather be
secretly the Authors of Events which are serviceable to Mankind, than without
being such, to have the publick Fame of it. .. ."20°
By raising matters of conscience, morality and virtue, Steele alluded to the deeper
foundations upon which politeness was built. This returns readers to a
consideration of the more profound motivations Addison shared with La Bruyere
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to underscore polite morality with the authority of Christianity. Addison
199 Steele, Richard, The Spectator, No. 2 in ibid., Vol. I, p. 10.
200 Steele, Richard, The Spectator, No. 172 in ibid., Vol. II, p. 180.
201 Steele seemed to agree that some form of Divine constraint was necessary to encourage purer
forms of correct behavior. See The Spectator, no. 202, in ibid., Vol. ii. p. 292: "It is not only
paying Wages, and giving commands, that Constitutes a Master of a Family; but Prudence, equal
Behaviour, with readiness to Protect and Cherish them, is what entitles a Man to that Character in
their very Hearts and Sentiments. ... A Man will have his Servant just, diligent, sober, and chaste,
for no other Reasons but the Terrour of losing his Master's Favour; when all the Laws Divine and
Humane cannot keep him whom he serves within Bounds with Relation to any one of those
Virtues. But both in great and ordinary Affairs, all Superiority which is not founded on merit and
Virtue, is supported only by Artifice and Stratagem."
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believed that through the powers of Divine grace, human beings were capable of
overcoming innate weakness to restore or raise themselves to higher levels of
morality after times of trial.
The entire process of cultivating politeness depended on God's power to
encourage humanity to good, and each human being's personal faculties of self-
improvement. Addison believed that despite the Fall of Adam, human beings
were never "... so sunk in vice and ignorance ..." as to be abandoned by God.
Therefore, "... there [were] still some hidden seeds of goodness and knowledge
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in him." These seeds required constant attention to develop, which came in the
form of objective, humble and pious self-assessment.
This process of self-assessment fueled "... wholesome moral growth."203
Reverence for the Divine encouraged individuals to recognise their personal role
in the Providential order, which in turn fostered a sense of affiliation among
human beings across society. Consequently the 'whole man', in Addisonian
terms, was incapable of disassociating his private interests from his public
obligations. The connections between private and public interests were now
underscored by social, moral and religious imperatives.204 Edward and Lillian
Bloom neatly summarized the significance of connections Addison made
202 Addison, Joseph, The Spectator, No. 262, quoted in Bloom, Edward A. and Lillian D., Joseph
Addison's Sociable Animal in the market place, on the Hustings, in the pulpit (Providence: Brown
University Press, 1971), p. 4.
203 Ibid.
204 The Blooms make the important point that Addison's belief in man as a sociable animal was
not entirely positive. Ultimately man was sociable because he was fundamentally 'incapable of
self-sufficiency.'
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between the private and public worlds and between earthly and Divine
considerations:
"Addison would not - indeed, could not - compartmentalize his views of the
world in which in lived. His standards of behaviour are grounded in convictions
that adjust a Calvinist-like mortality to Augustan common sense, reason, and
pragmatic need. His ethic is directed to the literate whole .... Animating his
ethic is a spirit of calculated, necessity-driven benevolence. And it is this spirit
as much as anything else that unifies his concern with the diversities of
politeness, economic law, Whiggism, and rational piety."205
Addison attempted to treat the deepest elements of commercial culture, while
highlighting a continued role for grace in life and rational speculation that
contributed to the cultivation of progress in society. Unlike Hume, whose world
view left modern man dependent on sentiments and passions, and frequently
disturbed by self-doubt, Addison wrote reassuringly of contemplation leading to
"... a Discovery of the secret and amazing Steps of Providence, from the
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Beginning to the End of time." If one considered the enlarged future state of
heaven, the value of contemplating life in its broadest and fullest scope became
clear. In other words, it was important that the contemplation and continual self-
assessment referred to above was conducted with a view towards eternal
salvation. However, "The Business ofMankind in this Life," Addison suggested,
as "to act" ... rather ... "than to know."207
205 Bloom, Edward A. and Lillian D., Joseph Addison's Sociable Animal in the market place, on
the Hustings, in the pulpit, p. 7.
206 Addison, Joseph, The Spectator, No. 237 in Addison, Joseph, and Steele, Richard, The
Spectator, (ed.) Bond. D.F., Vol. II, p. 420.
207 Ibid., p. 421.
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V
Addison on Problems of Philosophy, Religion and Speculation
To the extent that philosophy promoted speculation which characterised the
examined life, Addison wished to bring philosophy into the polite social domain
through conversation in the coffee houses and salons of Britain. The transition of
philosophy from the academy to the social sphere immediately focussed attention
on philosophy's utility in promoting politeness. This utility gave philosophy a
practical value that ordinary citizens could appreciate.
However Addison also expressed concerns about 'the promiscuous distribution of
good and evil' in speculation. The benefits of reflection depended on the
process of speculation serving useful ends in life. It was important to avoid an
overly cerebral form of speculation that put philosophy and reflection beyond the
grasp ofmost ordinary members of commercial society. It was also important for
Addison's readers to appreciate the Stoic rule that useful lessons in life often
proceeded from painful experiences, which strengthened character.
To illustrate this point Addison referred to Seneca, who "... takes Pains, after the
Doctrine of the Stoicks, to shew, that Adversity is not in itself an Evil; and
mentions a noble Saying ofDemetrius, That nothing wou'd be more Unhappy
than a Man who had never known Affliction,"209 To clarify the relationship
between speculation, action and the struggle for virtue, Addison compared
208
Ibid., p. 420.
209 Ibid., p. 422.
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prosperity with the mother of an indulgent child and pain as a Divine father, who
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taught fortitude through trial and labour. Addison's use of Stoic examples to
illustrate his points was effective, but one should remain sensitive to the precise
form of Stoicism Addison recommended to cultivate morality.
According to The Spectator, there was a danger of pedantry in Stoicism, a
"Pedantry of Virtue,"211 by which Addison referred to the overly cerebral form of
Stoicism that was too detached from common life to be useful to the polite
citizen. Lost in a world of endless contemplation, the pedantic Stoic rendered
himself incapable ofmaking practical contributions to society, thereby becoming
'a very indifferent companion'.212 In Addison's view, the Greek Stoic definition
of excellence in virtue resting in a perfectly detached state of non-emotion was
contrary to human improvement because man, by definition, was incapable of
complete perfection. A pedantic Stoicism made one unsociable. However, the
quest for virtue, the striving for perfection in the image of one's Maker, was not
futile. Laudable species of virtue like devotion, temperance, faith and abstinence
served society less well than justice and charity, but these inferior forms of virtue
were useful and deserved recognition. The 'two great ornaments of virtue, good
nature and cheerfulness' arose from the nexus of all forms of virtue present in
society.
Richard Steele took up the notion of the pedantic Stoic in Spectator No. 274, but
referred positively in No. 312 to Stoicism's discourse on pain, particularly the
210 Ibid., p. 422.
211 Addison, Joseph, The Spectator No. 243 in ibid., p. 444.
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notion that pain was not evil. Steele's great objection to Stoicism was its lack of
compassion. Compassion, like grace, civilised human nature and stifled
indifference in society. The indolence exhibited by the pedantic Stoic ran
contrary to the "... pleasing anguish and generous sympathy ..." that united all
human beings.213
Steele, like Addison, resented the arrogance of Greek Stoicism's perfected form
of virtue, with its implicit suggestion of the possibility of a human
metamorphosis into divine entity. Again the notion that man could reach such
lofty heights offended The Spectator's sensibilities, invoking an almost
Augustinian degree of hostility to the idea. Insofar as imitation of God fueled
improvement, The Spectator encouraged imitation though it was naturally
constrained by man's inferior capabilities, and, perhaps more importantly, by his
limited ability to form an image of God. Furthermore, the Stoic over-restraint of
passions led to their extinction, which was tantamount to "... putting out the
Light of the Soul ... ."214
In The Spectator's representation ofMarcus Aurelius readers found a man who
embodied a warmer, practical, balanced Stoicism that was conducive to
refinement and social intercourse. Aurelius was an active man and a philosopher,
cognizant of his limitations but at ease with himself. Through a modest and pious
212 See The Spectator No. 105.
213
Steele, Richard, The Spectator No. 397 in Bond, D.F., The Spectator. Vol. Ill, p. 486. Steele
continued concerning poetry: "Those who have laid down the Rules for Rhetorick or Poetry,
advise the Writer to work himself up, if possible, to the pitch of Sorrow which he endeavours to
produce in others. ... Grief has a natural Eloquence belonging to it, and breaks out in more
moving Sentiments than can be supplied by the finest Imagination. Nature on this occasion
dictates a thousand Passionate things which cannot be supplied by Art."
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imitation of the gods and an economy of desires, Aurelius promoted an eminently
desirable balance of temper emblematic of the kind of Stoicism polite citizens
9 1 S
should emulate.
Like the French Moralists, Addison made connections between imagination,
sense, reason and faith to form a comprehensive understanding ofpoliteness.
Addison drew parallels between moral and aesthetic beauty, and the manner in
which different forms of beauty were recognised by the senses. Beauty in its
different moral or aesthetic forms triggered the imagination into action. Through
imagining and reasoning, the beauty or truth of particular polite ideas or values
was confirmed. Great degrees of pleasure were derived from recognizing truths
in this way, just as one enjoyed an aesthetically pleasing work of art.
Concerning imagination and pleasure, Addison stated that human beings could
not:
"... assign the necessary cause of this pleasure, because we know neither the
nature of an idea, nor the substance of a human soul, ... therefore, for want of
such a light, all we can do in speculations of this kind, is to reflect on those
operations of the soul that are more agreeable, ... and ..., what is pleasing or
displeasing to the mind."216
214 See The Spectator No. 408 in ibid., p. 526.
215 Tickell, The Spectator No. 634 in Bond, D.F., The Spectator. Vol. V, p. 168: "Marcus Aurelius
being afterwards asked to explain himself, declares, That, by imitating the Gods, he endeavours to
imitate them in the Use of his Understanding, and of all other Faculties, and, in particular, That it
was always his Study to have as few Wants as possible in himself, and to do all the Good he could
to others. ... Among the many Methods by which Revealed Religion has advanced Morality, this
is one, That it has given us a more just and perfect Idea of that Being who every reasonable
Creature ought to imitate."
216
Addison, Joseph, The Spectator, No. 413 quoted in Bond, D.F., Critical Essays from The
Spectator, p. 181.
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Addison suggested that because the Supreme Author formed the soul for human
happiness, and that contemplation of God was a primary component of human
happiness, contemplation of the great and boundless in art was tantamount to an
act ofpraising God. Addison drew the historian into his discussion by saying that
the talent of the historian was to . lead us step by step into the several actions
917
and events of history. This process was gradual as with all types of
refinement.
Addison limited the perimeters of imagination. It was a finite attribute; the
human capability for understanding, on the other hand, was not necessarily
limited because humans tried to comprehend the infinite through an innumerable
quantity of mental exercises in life. Imagination was restricted by the brain's
finite capacity for retain impressions: as ideas and impressions faded with the
passing of time, human tended to lose frames of reference. It was because of this
limited scope of imagination that people were unable to form a picture ofGod in
their minds, or achieve the levels of perfection the ancient Stoics suggested.
Addison concluded, then, that while human beings were theoretically capable of
understanding the infinite nature of god and the universe, and by extension the
intricate ties between knowledge, behaviour and action in polite society, the
limitations on human imagination prevented human beings from ever completing
this task. To ease any frustrations that might arise from man's inability to
achieve perfection, Addison referred his readers to the blessings already granted
by the Creator:
217 Addison, Joseph, The Spectator, No. 420, in ibid., p. 202.
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"... what an infinite advantage this faculty [imagination] gives an Almighty
Being over the soul ofman, and how great a measure of happiness or misery we
are capable of receiving from the imagination only."218
Humanity was ultimately obliged to view life as Seneca recommended: a
continual progress towards achieving degrees of virtue according to one's
individual merit. It was sufficient and desirable in Addison's mind to think of
politeness as contributing to this progress.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have considered the manner in which aspects of Continental
discussion about the nature of society and human activity were translated into
Scottish intellectual life by Gerschom Carmichael and Francis Hutcheson. The
unique contributions Hutcheson made to incorporating Neostoicism into the study
ofmoral philosophy in Scotland.
We have also seen that from the end of the seventeenth century, theories derived
from the natural law tradition formed the context within which Scottish moral
philosophy developed. The natural law tradition, Neostoicism and politeness,
when taken together, constituted the foundation for eighteenth-century Scottish
discussion of ethics and morality.
218 Addison, Joseph, The Spectator, No. 421, in ibid., p. 207. If imagination was limited, then the
tools that conveyed its fruits must be limited. The consequence of this will be discussed further in
chapter 4 in relation to Addison's influence on Hugh Blair.
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Part II
Stoic Themes in the Works of the Moderate Clergy
of the Church of Scotland
Prologue
9 1Q
Building upon John Pocock and Caroline Robbins's assertions that aspects of
the intellectual history of Scottish Enlightenment be explored within a civic
humanist paradigm, we have seen that it is part of the received tradition in current
Scottish Enlightenment historiography that the natural jurisprudential legacy
rooted in the work of Grotius and Pufendorf offers a rich and precise vantage
point from which to understand elements of Scottish social thought. Knud
990
Haakonssen, John Robertson and Nicholas Phillipson among others have
clarified how deeply Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, David Hume and their
peers were influenced by the natural law traditions emanating from seventeenth-
century Protestant legal thought.
219 Pocock, J.G.A., The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). See chapters 13-14; see
also Pocock, J.G.A., Virtue. Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History,
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Robbins,
Caroline, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1959), chapter 6.
220 Haakonssen, Knud, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, see the introduction and chapters 1
and 2; Robertson, John, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh: John
Donald, 1985); Phillipson, Nicholas, 'Adam Smith as civic moralist' in Hont, Istvan and Ignatieff,
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A general consequence of these developments is the broad acceptance among
Enlightenment historians that Enlightenment literati examined the nature of
humanity and civilisation in historical and social terms. The civic republican and
• 991
natural jurisprudential paradigms, added to that of scientism , opened numerous
avenues for exploration of the philosophical and moral theories that underpinned
eighteenth-century Scottish culture. However, the Scots, particularly ministers of
the Church of Scotland222 who counted among the literati, faced significant
challenges in defining the practical application of philosophical theory to daily
99T
life. The historians, Richard Sher and John Dwyer, have shown how the Scots
confronted these difficulties through social or practical moralising, as
Haakonssen has described it. According to Sher, this moralising is embodied in a
type of enlightened Christian Stoicism, which he defines as the 'private virtue'
that guides the human conscience and social action.224 Among the Moderate
clergy, the Rev. Hugh Blair was its greatest exponent.
The appeal of Stoicism to the Moderate clergy, and Enlightenment literati
generally, is an area of increasing interest to British historians, particularly those
investigating how Stoic themes contributed to the identification of a
Michael (eds), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish
Enlightenment, pp. 179-202.
221 See particularly Emerson, Robert, 'Science and the origins and concerns of the Scottish
Enlightenment', History ofScience, 26 (1988); and Emerson, Roger, 'Natural philosophy and the
problem of the Scottish Enlightenment', Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 242
(1986).
222 Members of the Moderate Clergy of the Church of Scotland including William Robertson,
Hugh Blair, John Home (1722-1808), John Drysdale, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) and Alexander
Carlyle (1722-1805).
223
Dwyer, John, Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century
Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987); and Dwyer, John, 'Clio and ethics: Practical morality
in enlightened Scotland', The Eighteenth Century, 30 (1989).
224 Sher, Richard B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati
of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), chapter 5.
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comprehensive Enlightenment understanding of human identity and activity.
M.A. Stewart225 has traced Stoic influences upon the 'early Enlightenment'
• • • • 99 f\
focussing on the writings of Francis Hutcheson and George Turnbull. Their
search reflected the Stoic quest for harmonious unity in action and identity.
By the 1750s the Edinburgh literati's attempts to define the moral life of
commercial society were permeated with references to Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus
and Marcus Aurelius, as were their political, economic, and scientific works. The
accumulation ofwealth became acceptable in Scottish society to an
unprecedented degree, and the social refinement that accompanied it became a
hallmark of the modern age. Blair, William Robertson, Adam Smith, John Millar
and numerous others relied upon a Stoic vocabulary both to define moral life
within this context and to explore the social institutions that safeguarded it. It fell
to ministers like Blair and Robertson to assert Christianity's role in the
commercial world order, and to define how the Church of Scotland provided a
moral bulwark against corruption or licentiousness in commercial society.
225 See Stewart, M.A., 'The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish Enlightenment', in Osier, Margaret
(ed.), Atoms, pneuma. and tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
226 See Part III for discussion ofFrancis Hutcheson's interest in Stoicism and its relationship to
his interest in Samuel Clarke's exploration of the practical applications of theological inquiry to
daily life. In chapter 3, we saw that in Hutcheson's view, the average person could neither
appreciate nor be served by the complex details of philosophical reasoning. Therefore Hutcheson
proposed using the tools of natural science to cultivate a Christian science ofman through
exploration of a system ofmorals. Through this process, Hutcheson developed a theory of a
moral sense, and moral distinctions arising from a moral sense, that were the foundation for the
possibility of knowledge of good and evil non-contingent on knowledge ofGod. Blair seems to
have accepted Hutcheson's belief that divine grace combined with the pursuit of the happiness of
others was the key to moral goodness. In Hutcheson's system, virtue is sought for its own sake,
arising from the belief that the products of the moral sense are ideas that stem from benevolent
actions based on original perceptions. The ties between virtue, benevolence and perceptions are
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This defence ofChristianity and of the established Church occurred on a number
of levels. It was crucial for the clergy to defend the positive benefits enjoyed
through an enhanced commercial life because they highlighted the fruits of union
between Scotland and England. In solidifying the moral base of commercial
society, the Church played a key role not only in securing support for the Union
of 1707, but in securing its own position within the young British nation. As
Sher has argued, it was important to strengthen loyalty and obedience to the
established order by drawing the individual citizen, or believer, into social and
political discussion. By incorporating traditional Christian values with the polite
ethics of commercial culture, the clergy outlined how private and public Christian
obligations mingled. They also demonstrated how such a mingling contributed
both to individual prosperity and to the good of civil society. Their
encouragement of self-discipline, temperance and social responsibility assisted
them in conveying their multiple, moral messages.
The purpose of this section is to explore how this mingling occurred by
examining Stoic themes appearing in the sermons of Hugh Blair and in William
Robertson's An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients
had of India. The section will highlight Blair's emphasis of individual virtue, as
well as Robertson's great interest in the virtues of the Brahmin caste in India and
the role Providence plays in history.
intended by God. Because the moral sense is universal, virtue is universally attainable, but
Hutcheson acknowledged that deficiencies may arise within sense.
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Chapter 4
Blair's Christian Stoic or Virtue Personified
Introduction
Despite the fact that he is best remembered as a literary critic and the first Regius
Professor ofRhetoric and Belles Lettres at the University of Edinburgh,227 Hugh
Blair enjoyed unparalleled success as the Moderate clergy's leading proponent of
Christian Stoicism after Francis Hutcheson.
Blair was born in Edinburgh on 7 April 1718, a scion of the Blairs of Blair. His
father, also Hugh and once Merchant Burgess ofEdinburgh and Dean of Guild,
served in excise after losing his fortune through misguided investment. The
young Blair's extended relations included numerous men of the church. His
great-grandfather, Robert Blair, was a leading Covenanter. His uncle, James
Bannatyne, was a Presbyterian minister of Trinity Church, Edinburgh, and Robert
Blair the younger, was a published poet and Presbyterian cleric. It was at the
instigation of Bannatyne, who approved of its classical curriculum, that Blair
enrolled at the High School of Edinburgh with a view to entering university and
taking the cloth.
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Blair graduated MA from Edinburgh University on 23 February 1739, after the
successful submission of a thesis on natural law.228 According to his biographer,
John Hill, Blair came under the particular influence of Professor John Stevenson
in his fourth year at university, whose logic course Blair followed assiduously.229
This would have included lectures on the relationship between natural law and
religion. Stevenson also read frequently from The Spectator, which he used as a
preferred model of literary eloquence.
Blair's MA thesis, De Fundamentis & Obligatione Legis Naturae, "... exposed
the sullen system ofHobbes ..." and demonstrated "... the first dawnings of that
virtuous sensibility" that characterised his later sermons. The thesis described
how duty to God combined with benevolence formed the core of natural law.
Following Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Blair argued that natural law understood
in these terms formed an essential, and perhaps self-sufficient, method for living
virtuously, leaving the question of Christianity's superiority over the natural law
open. However, in the conclusion to his thesis, Blair stated that Christianity
played a similar role to natural law in the promotion of duty and benevolence,
227 The Edinburgh Town Council approved the Royal Commission's nomination of Blair as
Regius Professor on 27 April 1762. Blair began lecturing at the University of Edinburgh in
composition in 1759 and was promoted to professor of rhetoric in 1760.
228 See Hill, John, An Account of the Life and Writings of Hugh Blair. P.P. F.R.S.E. (Edinburgh:
Printed by J. Bannatyne & Co. for T. Cadell and W. Davies, Strand, London. William Creech,
and Manners and Miller, Edinburgh, 1807), pp. 14-16.
229 Robertson, Carlyle and John Witherspoon also attended Stevenson's lectures, and although
Carlyle later commented that Stevenson "had no pretensions to superiority in point of learning or
genius, ..." he was "the most popular of all the professors on account of his civility and ...
kindness." [See Carlyle, Alexander, Autobiography, (ed.) Burton, John Hill (Bristol: Thoemmes
Antiquarian Books, Ltd., 1990), p. 47.]
230 See Hill, John, An Account of the Life and Writings of Hugh Blair. P.P. F.R.S.E.. pp. 15-16.
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and enjoyed a unique advantage over natural law in guaranteeing the virtuous a
TT 1
place in the hereafter.
Blair was licensed as a minister of the church on 21 October 1741 by the
Presbytery of Edinburgh. He secured his first parish at Collessie in Fife through
the good offices of Lady Leven, whose husband Lord Leven was a local
landowner. Though he recognised the significance of the Leven patronage, a
country living did not suit Blair's ambitions and he actively sought translation to
an Edinburgh parish. He succeeded in being called to the Canongate Church by
mid-summer 1743. From this vantage point, Blair carefully advanced his career
culminating in his appointment to St. Giles, the High Kirk, in 175 8.232
The considerable success Blair enjoyed in the church, and indeed as professor,
apparently owned nothing to his skills of oratory. Yet the substance of Blair's
works tended to be well received in polite society, particularly the sermons he
preached from the High Church pulpit. The pulpit was the most effective place
from which to encourage private virtue, and the most effective means of
dispensing moral guidance rested in the jeremiad-style of preaching traditionally
associated with the Calvinist church and the Scottish Presbyterian church of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively. As Sher points out, the
jeremiad was a didactic style of preaching that relied heavily on threat of divine
retribution for personal licentiousness or social corruption. Any decline in public
231 See Blair, Hugh, De Fundamentis & Obligations Legis Naturae (Edinburgh University thesis,
1739), p. 11: "... doctrinam vero Christianam, hanc legem cum illustrare, turn certiore spe, nos
ad earn colendam allicere, hominis erit Christianam Religionem minime spernentis, Naturaeque
Legen suis laudibus amplijicantis, oratio."
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or private morality resulted in God's punishment, which was particularly harsh
• • • 9TT
when administered to those covenanted to Him. And as Sher indicates, the
power of the jeremiad stemmed from its Calvinist rooting in a Providentially-
9T4
based interpretation of life and history.
The jeremiad was often used to explain national disasters by placing them in a
providential context. Sher discusses, for example, how the jeremiad was used by
Blair and other among the Scottish clergy to address the divisive legacy of the
Battle ofCulloden (1745). The horrors of death and division inflicted upon the
Scots as Jacobite fought Hanoverian were the punishments of an angry God. Yet
in true Calvinist fashion, God's will remained supreme, and useful lessons
learned through suffering focussed upon acceptance ofhis will.235 The fact that
Blair, and many other Moderate ministers, depended heavily upon a Stoic
vocabulary to convey their moral messages is the matter of immediate interest
here.
9-3/r # t
Throughout his Sermons, Blair provided clear and concise guidance about the
practical matters of daily living, remaining aware of the inevitable temptations
awaiting mankind in its fallen state. The benefits found in acceptance of a
232 See Schmidtz, Robert Morrel, Hugh Blair (Morningside Heights, NY: King's Crown Press,
1948), chapters 1-3, for supplementary references to the biographical paragraphs above.
233 Sher, Richard B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati
ofEdinburgh, p. 43.
234 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
235 See Hugh Blair's sermon, 'The Wrath ofMan Praising God. A Sermon Preached in the High
Church ofEdinburgh, May 18, 1746', (Edinburgh, 1746).
236 The first edition of Blair's Sermons was published by Creech, Strahan and Cadell, appearing in
Edinburgh and London on 8 February and 15 April 1777 respectively. Because published
sermons were often financial failures, Blair initially hesitated to publish an edition. He agreed
after considerable prompting from Lord Karnes. To Blair's delight, his Sermons were received
enthusiastically by King George III, Queen Charlotte, and Dr. Jonson, (see Schmidtz, pp. 82-83)
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Providentially-inspired world order and the cultivation of personal virtue are
complimentary, and underscore a constancy of action that is the mainstay of
conscience in Blair's estimation. However the full value of these benefits is only
found when they are completed by Christian faith. As Sher has pointed out,
Blair "... defined Christianity chiefly in terms of virtue or benevolence grounded
in a faith in Christ."237
In offering his listeners these perspectives, Blair made no attempt to redress the
charges made by critics who attacked the Moderate clergy for their lack of
theological sophistication. As has been admirably demonstrated in the work of
Ian D.L. Clark, and more recently by Sher, J. Mcintosh and Steven Fratt,238 the
Moderates' lack of interest in theological expressions made them vulnerable in
the eyes of orthodox clergy. The Moderates remained loyal to the Westminster
Confession of Faith while altering the ecclesiastical priorities of the Church of
Scotland. Their encouragement of personal morality and responsibility within the
framework of Christian Stoicism subsumed the Covenanting orthodoxy of a
century earlier.
However ifwe view the Moderate clergy as moral instructors whose commitment
to Christianity, at least in Blair's case, cannot be doubted, we will see that their
237 Sher, Richard B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati
of Edinburgh, p. 182.
238 See Clark, I.D.L., Moderatism and the Moderate Party in the Church of Scotland. 1752-1805.
(PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1964); Fratt, Steven D., Scottish Theological Trends in the
18'h-Centurv. Tensions between 'Head' and 'Heart'. (PhD thesis, University of California-Santa
Barbara, 1988); Mcintosh, J.R., The Popular Party in the Church of Scotland. 1740-1800. (PhD
thesis, University of Glasgow, 1989).
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influence as spiritual guides remained uncompromised by their lack of interest in
doctrine. Evidence of this is found in the immense popularity of Blair's sermons.
By adopting the Senecan notion that the progress toward virtue was as valuable
as its attainment, Blair and his Moderate colleagues acknowledged the permanent
tension existing between the real and the ideal not only in practical but in
religious life. The key challenge was to avoid the moral complacency that the
Moderates' critics claimed would inevitably flow from such heterodoxical or
even heretical interpretations of the nature of Christian life.
Through his Christian Stoic vocabulary, we will see how Blair illustrated and
recommended the most significant attributes the virtuous Christian cultivated in
order to live a Godly life. Providence remains at the centre of Blair's
deliberations, particularly because it underpins a certain cosmic order in nature
that provides a degree of harmony to an otherwise disordered world.240 Virtue
acts simultaneously as the moral repository of human kind and the sum of duties
owed to other individuals and society. These duties, including patience,
temperance and self-discipline, form the secondary level of virtue subsumed by
the first. It is through the cultivation of these virtues, combined with those of
239 The Moderates' subscription to the Westminster Confession would seem to make them safely
orthodox, particularly given the belief that religious truth had already received its full expression
in the Westminster Confession. Nevertheless this did not satisfy critics.
240 It is important to note that Blair adhered to the definition of Providence given in the
Westminster Confession of Faith throughout his career. According to the Confession, within the
realm of First Causes, God officiates through the fore-knowledge of time and history, providing a
general thrust to causes and events. Christ as mediator operates in the domain of Second Causes.
He recognises that we never overcome our fundamental fallibility in the earthly process of
improvement, but offers a higher improvement through redemption. The dual plains upon which
providence operates suit God's pleasure. Our inability to comprehend their mystery in its entirety
does not suggest a triumph of weakness or evil. It simply proves the inseparable relationship
between the world and providential authority, while underscoring the generosity of redemption.
See Carruthers, S.W. (ed.), The Westminster Confession of Faith (Glasgow: Free Presbyterian
Publications, 1978). Reprint of 1646 edition by Cornelius Burges. See chapter V, p. 7.
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piety, charity and constancy, that Blair's Christians find deepest fulfillment as
individuals and members of society.
Therefore we turn first to a discussion of the role virtue plays in the life of the
individual Christian as Blair sees it, and explore the greater significance he gives
to the cultivation of order in mind and society. We will then ask how virtue and
order are complementary by constancy in faith and action, and where conscience
fits into Blair's Christian Stoic paradigm. Blair often refers to the Old Testament
Patriarch, Joseph, as an ideal model of the virtuous believer, so we will examine
which characteristics Blair most prizes in Joseph. The chapter will continue with
a discussion of how the virtues of charity and grace illustrate the uniquely
Christian elements of Blair's Christian Stoicism. The concluding section will
focus on Blair's use of sermons as social tools to persuade listeners of moral
values, and the role he assigns to taste in processing moral messages. It is hoped
that this avenue will permit further speculation about the precise nature of Blair's,
and the Moderate's, twin commitment to Christian morality on the one hand and
virtuous ethics on the other.
i
Virtue and Order in Christian Life
Virtue plays a wide and varied role in Blair's sermons. Above all, as indicated, it
is the moral repository of the mind and heart common to all human beings.
"Genuine virtue", wrote Blair, "has a language that speaks to every heart
throughout the world. It is a language which is understood by all. In every
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region, every clime, the homage paid to it is the same. In no one sentiment were
ever mankind more generally agreed."241
Virtue is also the key component in leading a dutiful Christian life; the essential
element in containing the temptation of the world; and, the guardian of civil order
and responsible civic action. These broad responsibilities which Blair assigns
virtue depend upon the exercise ofmore specific virtues or duties in daily life,
namely the traditional Christian virtues of patience, kindness, temperance,
candour, fortitude, self-control and charity. Blair claims that religion:
"... adds to all the moral virtues a venerable and authoritative dignity. It renders
the virtuous character more august. To the decorations of a palace it joins the
majesty of a temple. He who divides religion from virtue, understands neither the
one nor the other. It is the union of the two, which consummates the human
character and state."242
Armed with appreciation if virtue's benefits on the one hand, and faith on the
other, Blair's Christian is best equipped to weather the trials of the present world
while fulfilling his or her moral and social obligations to God and humanity.
However, Blair has no illusions about the complexity of the human character,
hence his development of the theme that a disciplined progress towards personal
virtuousness is the most realistic option in life. Blair returns time and again to
the tension between this complexity of character and the Scots' constant search
for unity of human thought, action and history.
241 Blair, Hugh, 'On the True Honour ofMan', in his Sermons. Vol. II, p. 123. (London: T.
Cadell and W. Davies, 1819).
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Like Marcus Aurelius and Seneca, Blair urges his readers towards balance in
perspective and action. Worldly endeavour must be balanced by contemplation,
"IfUninterrupted intercourse with the world wear out a man of pleasure, it no
less oppresses the man of business and ambition."243 For Blair, the 'bustle of the
world' is 'perpetual warfare', neither ofwhich are conducive to the calm state of
the heart that provides strength in adversity and the maintenance of order in mind
and society. Like the Stoics Blair places ultimate value in order, be it the highest
order of Providence itself or order in the poor man's home. For this reason, it is
particularly important that in cultivating the most complete form of virtue, that
complimented by piety, we avoid passions that lead to inner turmoil or disorder:
"While we thus maintain a due dependence on God, let us also exert ourselves
with care in acting our own part. ..., the happiness of every man depends more
upon the state of his own mind, than upon any one external circumstance; nay,
more than upon all external things put together. We have seen, that inordinate
passions are the great disturbers of life; and that, unless we possess a good
conscience, and a well-governed mind, discontent will blast every enjoyment,
.... Fix then this conclusion in your minds, that the destruction of your virtue is
the destruction of your peace."24
The deeper significances of order and its relation to the cultivation of virtue are
examined in the lengthy sermon, 'On the Importance of Order in Conduct'.
Taking as his theme a quotation from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, "Let all
things be done - in order" (I Corinthians xiv. 40.), Blair opens with the theme of
order in religion. Religion is a "regular and well-conducted system, ... composed
242 Ibid., p. 125.
243 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Motives to Constancy in Virtue', in his Sermons. Vol. I, p. 143.
244 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Disorders of the Passions', in his Sermons. Vol. I, pp. 118-119.
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of a variety of parts; each ofwhich possesses its separate importance, and
contributes to the perfection of the whole."245 The variety of its parts falls into
two groups, a first-tier level of grace essential to religion, and a second-tier level
ofmoral duties that facilitate daily implementation of grace. The love of God,
faith, repentance and the love of our fellow human being rank among the graces;
regularity, method and order are the "other dispositions and habits, which though
they hold not so high a rank, ... are necessary to the introduction and support
.. ."246 of the graces. Blair intends to persuade his listeners both of the value of
order, and of the moral duty to maintain order in life.
Blair's audience are polite men and women of the world, well acquainted with
the temptations of affluence or luxury. The moral confusion, or disorder, that
arises in daily life is only cleared through the methodical re-establishment of
regularity in thought. For Blair, as for much of his audience, religion is the
opposite of moral disorder. Therefore it is, in Blair's estimation, fair to say that
"... order is friendly to religion.". The neglect of order "... coincides with vice,
so the preservation of it must assist virtue. By the appointment of Providence, it
is indispensably requisite to world prosperity. Thence arises a presumption, that
it is connected also with spiritual improvement."247
Ifwe see a friend's life in complete disorder, we fear for that person's harm or
demise. It is reasonable to suspect that disorder in temporal affairs spills over
into moral considerations, and it is here that the way to licentiousness opens. The
245 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Importance of Order in Conduct', in his Sermons. Vol. I, p. 282.
246 Ibid.
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Apostle Paul taught 'that God is not the author of confusion', and in this
Christians find primary evidence of the value of order. Therefore Blair suggests,
"Allow me to recommend to you, order in the conduct of your affairs; order in
the distribution of your time; order in the management of your fortune; order in
the regulation of your amusements; order in the arrangement of your society."248
Blair proceeds to outline the manner in which the need for order permeates the
functioning of civilised societies. Order in life includes acceptance of the various
ranks into which society is divided. The greater the level of responsibility a
member of society has in their public and private endeavors, the greater is their
need of order to fulfil their obligations. There is a direct corollary between the
eminence of a person's station in life, and the amount of order that should be
cultivated within that station. However, in fulfillment of duty which is requisite
to a life of action, one must not lose sight of first duties owed to Providence.
Temporal duties and order in life stem from Providential design, and it is only
through Providence that the entire system of life and belief are completed. Thus
order is simultaneously the foundation and guarantor of social and personal
stability.
"He who conducts his affairs with method and regularity, meets every duty in its
proper place, and assigns it its due rank. But where there is no order in conduct,
there can be no uniformity in character."249
247 Ibid., pp. 282-283 for references for both quotations in this paragraph.
248 Ibid., p. 283.
249 Ibid., p. 285.
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This uniformity is of particular significance in Blair's scheme, for it is only from
a unity ofmind that conscience fully operates. In the throes of life, especially
when religious discipline lapses, "The authority of conscience may occasionally
operate, when our situation affords it room for exertion. But in other
circumstances of equal importance, every moral sentiment will be overpowered
by the tumultuous bustle ofworldly affairs."250
The focus of Blair's attention then shifts to a discussion of the specific ways in
which disorder affects material life. He stresses the necessity of effective time
management, thrift and economy in the home, and a disciplined approach to all
financial affairs. These provide a bulwark against a loss of property or material
security, chief sources of personal and social disharmony. It is the cultivation of
a 'firmness ofmind', another virtue, that sustains the ordered management of
material concerns.
With Blair's listener now aware of the value of order and the integral framework
it provides for the pursuit of virtue, we begin to see how important this Stoic-like
language of religion is to Blair's Christian Stoic scheme. Order permits the
fullest realisation of Christian duty both in the public and private domains, and
through it the Providentially ordained structure of society is maintained. In
avoiding idleness, a balanced pace of life is sustained by the individual members
of society. Order underscores the uniformity that is the key component of a just
society, and a peaceful mind. Ofuniformity:
250 Ibid., p. 286.
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"It is the parent of steadiness of conduct. It forms consistency of character. It is
the ground of all the confidence we repose in one another. ... Order is the source
of peace; and peace is the highest of all temporal blessings. ... Such as live
according to order, may be compared to the celestial bodies, which move in
regular courses, and by stated laws; whose influence is beneficent; whose
• 1
operations are quiet and tranquil."
Ultimately order "is the foundation of union. It allows every man to carry on his
own affairs without disturbing his neighbor. It is the golden chain, which holds
together the societies ofmen in friendship and peace. In fine, the man of order is
connected with all the higher powers and principles in the universe. He is the
follower of God. He walks with him, and acts upon his plan."252 And it is by
contrasting Christianity, which Blair refers to as the 'great discipline of order',
with the disorder of evil, or Satan, that Blair offers his audience final proof of the
fruits found in virtuous order.
By emphasizing the multifaceted role order plays in mind, heart and society,
Blair reminds his listener of the analogous and contingent relationship that exists
between the individual and society, and between private and public interest. In
recommending the pursuit of a higher spiritual self-discipline and constant self-
examination to his listeners, Blair places simultaneous demands upon them to act
virtuously in private and public life while observing the dictates of Providence.
He underscores the Enlightenment literati's belief that man's nature is essentially
social, but that his soul remains ultimately dependent upon religion.
251 Ibid., pp. 296-297.
252 Ibid., p. 297.
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Order is the key to the successful cultivation of virtue in individual life: by
extension that action personifies the efficient operation of society. Precisely how
the benefits of personal virtue flow into society and vice versa remains somewhat
unclear. There is something intangible in this sermon about the relationship
between order and religion. This is perhaps to be expected given the spiritual
purposes of Blair's sermons for it is ultimately on the highest plains ofmorality
that they instruct. However, Blair addresses further how the more spiritual
connections between religion and order are translated into the regular systems of
life in his sermon, "On Candour". In it he stresses that government and religion
form a combined foundation for religion in society.
"Religion and Government are the two great foundations of order and comfort
among mankind. Government restrains the outrages ... which would be
subversive of society, secures the property, and defends the lives, of its subjects.
But the defect of government is, that human laws can extend no farther than to
the actions ofmen."253
Thus it is on the two foundations of religion and government that Blair bases
personal and civic order: religion provides government for the soul and
government administers the distributive justice without which society falters. We
rightfully expect just treatment in our commercial and social transactions, indeed
it is the most we can expect from our fellow human beings. Justice is best
administered with candour and charity both on private and public levels. The
virtues of candour and charity are held in great estimation by St. Paul, from
whom Blair again takes inspiration for this sermon. Therefore a Christian looks
to the virtues of candour and charity as essential elements in the even distribution
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of justice. If Mandevillean suspicion or malice replace candour and charity in
social transactions, we may expect the worst. Of a person who deals from
suspicious motives, Blair warns:
"... As a companion, he will be severe and satirical; as a friend, captious and
dangerous; in his domestic sphere, harsh, jealous, and irascible; in his civil
capacity, seditious and turbulent, .... The contrary of all this may be expected
from a candid temper. Whatever is amiable in manners, or useful in society,
naturally and easily ingrafts itselfupon it. ... It is the chief ground ofmutual
confidence and union among men. ... In the magistrate, it tempers justice and
lenity. Among subjects, it promotes good order and submission. It connects
humanity with piety."254
The primary focus of the discussion thus far has involved the virtues of this
world, those Blair places on a secondary level to his definition of virtue as the
moral repository of the human being. The ground upon which Blair bases his
justification for the pursuit of virtue is tied directly to his understanding of the
afterlife, and how Christians must ultimately concern themselves with proving
worthy of salvation.
This departs from a strict parallelism with Stoic themes, although Blair's
references to death reflect a Stoic-like submission to nature's and Providence's
design for each person. In his advocacy of pursuing virtue in this world, Blair
distances himself from Presbyterian notions of predestination in that virtue is
accessible to all, just as Christianity is. We have seen that Blair's entire
discussion of achieving a completed form of virtue, at the individual level or in
society, depends upon faith. Blair ends his sermon on constancy in virtue with a
253
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discussion about the afterlife, and we must examine this, combined with sections
of his sermon on the imperfect knowledge of a future state, to understand the full
implications of having Christianity complete earthly virtue.
From the earliest stages of human development, according to Blair, religion
complemented nature by tying humanity's historical development to spiritual
progress. Providence placed a sense of a future life in the human heart, which
sustains us in adversity and fuels attempts to prove worthy of final reward. This
is the impetus for achieving the deepest possible levels of virtuousness while
combining action and spiritual reflection:
"Consider the nature and circumstances ofman. Introduced into the world in an
indigent condition, he is supported at first by the care of others; and, as soon as
he begins to act for himself, finds labour and industry to be necessary for
sustaining his life, and supplying his wants. Mutual defence and interest gives
rise to society; and society, when formed, requires distinctions of property,
diversity of conditions, subordinations of ranks, and a multiplicity of occupations,
in order to advance the general good."255
It is the unavoidable consequence of living with life's trials, Blair points out in
the sermon on constancy, that frustration arises when sustained virtuous activity
brings no noticeable reward in daily life. This is equally true in spiritual life.
Blair replies with the familiar theme from St. Paul's letter to the Galatians 6:9,
"In due season you shall reap, if you faint no. ... As this great principle of faith is
254 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
255 Blair, Hugh, 'On Our Imperfect Knowledge of a Future State', in his Sermons. Vol. I, p. 55.
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so essential to our present argument, and is indeed the foundation of all religion,
it will be proper that we now take a view of the grounds on which it rests."256
The first evidence of a higher reward found in afterlife stems from the fact that
despite the advantages of virtue, human happiness is usually left incomplete in
life. Those conscientious members of society, who have a right to happiness,
often 'suffer for the sake of virtue' without attaining the reward they deserve.
'Vicious' members of society, who act selfishly with little or no regard for their
neighbors, often 'possess advantages' in the world: they scheme, connive and
manipulate their way toward a given end. This should not, in Blair's view,
distract virtuous persons from doing good. It was imperative that people
maintain high standards of behaviour, which, in turn, testified to their sound
moral character:
"... it cannot be denied, that the happiness of good men is often left incomplete.
The vicious possess advantages, to which they have no right; while the
conscientious suffer for the sake of virtue; and groan under distresses which they
have not merited .... Indeed, were the distribution of good and evil, in this life,
altogether promiscuous; could it be said with truth, that the moral condition of
men had no influence whatever upon their happiness or misery; I admit, that from
such a state of things, no presumption would arise of any future retribution being
intended. They who delight to aggravate the miseries of life, and the distresses of
virtue, do no service to the argument in behalf of Providence."257
However unequal distributions of good and evil in life do not go unnoticed by
Providence, and Christianity explains them as preparations for future reward.




Because of this good and evil proportioned as they are in the world are part of a
deeper Providential order:
"If he who rules the universe, entirely neglects virtue here, the probability must
be very small of his rewarding it hereafter. But this is far from being the true
state of the fact. What human life presents to the view of an impartial observer,
is by no means a scene of entire confusion; but a state of order, begun and carried
on a certain length. Virtue so far from being neglected by the Governour of the
world, that from many evident marks it appears to be a chief object of his
care."258 Furthermore, "In the constitution of human nature, a foundation is laid,
for comfort to the righteous, and for internal punishment of the wicked.
Throughout the course of divine government, tendencies toward the happiness of
the one, and the misery of the other, constantly appear. They are so conspicuous,
as not to have escaped the notice of the rudest nations. Over the whole earth they
have diffused the belief, that Providence is propitious to virtue, and averse to
guilt. Yet these tendencies are, sometimes, disappointed of their effect, and that
which Providence visibly favours, is left, at present, without an adequate
reward."259
In a word, Providence's business in this world is unfinished, Blair suggests to his
listeners. It is very virtuous Christian's duty to persevere:
"Man, fallen from his primaeval felicity, is now undergoing probation and
discipline for his final state. Divine justice remains, for a season, concealed; and
allows men to act their parts with freedom on this theatre, that their characters
may be formed and ascertained. Amidst discouragements and afflictions, the
righteous give proof of their fidelity, and acquire the habits of virtue. But if you
suppose the events of this life to have no reference to another, the whole state of
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man becomes not only inexplicable, but contradictory and inconsistent."
Blair's second method of proving that a future state exists draws from his belief
that anticipations of it are naturally rooted in human sentiments. In that these are
258 Ibid., p. 273.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid., pp. 274-75.
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common to all human beings, all nations share a feeling or presentment that a just
Deity will reward earthly virtuousness and obedience:
"Throughout all ages, and among all nations, the persuasion of a future life has
prevailed. It springs' not from the refinements of science, or the speculations of
philosophy; but from a deeper and stronger root, the natural sentiments of the
human heart. Hence it is common to the philosopher and the savage; and is
found in the most barbarous, as well as in the most civilised regions. Even the
belief of the being of a God, is not more general on the earth than the belief in
immortality."261
Blair concludes the sermon with an optimistic emphasis of the virtue of hope
suggesting:
"The virtuous are supported by hope, the guilty tormented with the dread, of what
is to take place after death. As death approaches, the hopes of the one, and the
fears of the other, are found to redouble. The soul, when issuing hence, seems
more clearly to discern its future abode. All the operations of conscience proceed
upon the belief of immortality. The whole moral conduct ofmen refers to it. All
legislators have supposed it. All religions are built upon it. It is so essential to
the order of society, that, were it erased, human laws would prove ineffectual
restraints from evil, and a deluge of crimes and miseries would overflow the
earth."262
The ultimate foundation for maintaining hope, which is the essence of
Christianity as Blair presents it, is the resurrection of Christ. Blair concludes this
sermon by arguing for the future life based upon Gospel evidence of the tie
between Christ's resurrection and a future life. The lesson ends, "Thus, upon the
whole, whether you consult your reason, or listen to the discoveries of revelation,
you behold our argument confirmed; you behold a life of piety and virtue issuing
261 Ibid., p. 276.
262 Ibid., p. 277.
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in
in immortal felicity." The cultivation of virtue and piety, therefore, assure a
solid integrity, which is sustained by a constancy in action and faith.
ii
Joseph as Blair's Virtuous Hero
In his embodiment of the virtues of constancy, self-reliance and adherence to
duty, Blair recommends the Old Testament patriarch, Joseph, to his listeners. In
several sermons, Joseph is presented as a unique historical and religious figure,
whose fidelity, integrity and prudence permit him to look "... beyond all second
causes; and recognises, in the wonderful events of his life, the hand of the
Almighty.—No human character exhibited in the records of Scripture, is more
remarkable and instructive than that of this patriarch."264
It is Joseph's complete trust in and obedience to Providence that enhances his
virtuousness. For the Stoics and Blair, as we have seen, the virtuous person is
one who learns to accept his or her inability to control the greatest issues of
existence that play themselves out at the highest level of divine consciousness,
and Joseph falls perfectly into this paradigm. In a manner of speaking, this level
of predestination mirrors first causes. The circumstances over which one must
triumph on a daily basis, for the Stoics those ofwhich we become free by
realising their insignificance, seem to parallel second causes. Within the realm of
first causes, the Stoics and Blair agree that humanity is unequipped to alter the
263 Ibid., pp. 279-80.
264 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Character of Joseph', in his Sermons. Vol. II, p. 21.
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course of nature or the Divine plan. Second causes permit us to exercise free will
within a circumscribed framework. In both systems, destiny prevails: destiny
determined by God as a consequence of his love for his children, or by nature
through her beneficence.
Despite a seemingly limitless catalogue ofmisfortunes befalling Joseph, from
being sold into slavery in Egypt by his brothers to fielding attacks from courtiers
as Pharaoh's protege, the patriarch never swerves from his faith in God's
deliverance. He accepts his destiny with a calmness of spirit that Blair admires
greatly. In concentrating on the realm of first causes over second ones, that is to
say detaching himself from worldly concerns and submitting to Providential
design, Joseph not only respects God's will, but finds it possible to forgive his
brothers' treachery.
How does Blair explain Joseph's heroic obedience? In Joseph's forgiveness of
his brothers, Blair suggests we find a perfect manifestation of the blendings of
piety and action to which Christians must aspire. The grace Joseph receives
through his faith marks him out as a child of Providence, and grace sustains the
devoutness that remains with Joseph throughout his life:
"Contemplating the hand of God in all that had befallen him, he effaced the
remembrance of those evil deeds which had produced his adversity; and for his
prosperity he affected no praise to himself, but ascribed it entirely to the will of
Heaven. Let us take notice that this is not the reflection of a private retired man,
whose situation might be supposed to favour such devout meditations: it is the
reflection of one, who was leading a busy ... life, in the midst of a court; the
favourite of the greatest monarch who was then known to the world. Yet him
you behold, amidst the submission and adulation which was paid to him,
preserving the moderation and simplicity of a virtuous mind; and amidst the
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idolatry and false philosophy of the Egyptians, maintaining the principles of true
religion,...."265
It is from Joseph's mingling of piety with his essential humanity that Blair's
moral instruction from the sermon on Joseph's character comes:
.. a devout regard to the hand ofGod in the various events of life, tends to
promote good dispositions and affections towards men. It will be found by those
who attend to the workings of human nature; that a great proportion of those
malignant passions which break out in the intercourse ofmen, arises from
confining their attention wholly to second causes, and overlooking the first cause
of all."266
Turning to Blair's sermon, "On the Power of Conscience", we find further
evidence of Joseph's virtuousness although it becomes somewhat flawed vis-a-
vis the functioning of conscience. The sermon focusses on the relationship
between guilt and conscience with particular reference to Joseph's brothers after
they sold the Patriarch into slavery. Unusually Blair opens the sermon by listing
the crucial lessons from the story of Jacob's sons:
"I. That a sense of right and wrong in conduct, or ofmoral good and evil,
belongs to human nature.
II. That it produces an apprehension ofmerited punishment, when we have
committed evil.
III. That although this inward sentiment be stifled during the season of
prosperity, yet in adversity it will revive. And,
IV. That when it revives, it determines us to consider every distress which we
suffer, from what cause soever it has arisen, as an actual infliction of punishment
by Heaven."267
265 Ibid., p. 33.
266 Ibid.
267 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Power of Conscience', in his Sermons. Vol. I, p. 227.
183
This leaves the listener several avenues to explore. Blair explains in passages
immediately following this introduction that conscience is a 'faculty', and that it
is a 'sense ofmoral good and evil' stemming from a Taw written in our hearts'
inspired by God.268 In order to function at its full capacity conscience requires
divine assistance. This becomes particularly clear after the time ofChrist's
appearance when the full weight of revelation is measured. Joseph and his
siblings lived in an age, "... when the law was not yet given, when no external
revelation of the Divine will subsisted, except what had been handed down
among the patriarchs ... ." This formed an ancient law written in human hearts
that had considerable value as a "... foundation of the mutual trust which the
transactions of life require; ...", but "Such sentiments are coeval with human
0f\Q
nature." They are incomplete.
Like Calvin, Blair is suggesting that conscience, devoid of the full guidance of
revelation, is not a sufficient power to regulate life on the deepest levels. Despite
his considerable virtues and his heroic obedience to Providence, Joseph is
morally limited by his 'corrupted state' as are his brothers. This is the level of
conscience found in natural religion and "... is both too general to afford ... full
268 Blair's understanding of the moral sense is essentially Hutchesonian, and Blair clearly follows
Hutcheson's proposal to use the tools of natural science to cultivate a Christian science ofman
through exploration of a system ofmorals. Through this process, Hutcheson developed his theory
of the moral sense, and moral distinctions arising from a moral sense, that were the foundation for
the possibility of knowledge of good and evil non-contingent on knowledge of God. Blair seems
to have accepted Hutcheson's belief that divine grace combined with the pursuit of the happiness
was the key to moral goodness, however her questioned Hutcheson's notion that the happiness of
others took precedence over personal happiness. (See Blair's review of Francis Hutcheson's
System ofMoral Philosophy. Edinburgh Review, Vol. I, 1755, pp. 15-16.) In Hutcheson's
system, virtue is sought for its own sake, arising from the belief that the products of the moral
sense are ideas that stem from benevolent actions based on original perceptions. The ties among
virtue, benevolence and perceptions are intended by God. Because the moral sense is universal as
we saw in chapter 3, virtue is universally attainable, but Hutcheson acknowledged that
deficiencies may arise within sense.
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direction in conduct, and too feeble to withstand contrary principles in ... nature.
It is often perverted by ignorance and superstition; it is too easily overcome by
passion and desire. Hence the importance of that divine revelation, which
communicates both light and strength; ... ."270 Through revelation humanity is
placed in a 'higher station' than that where the 'mere light ofNature' places
them.
However just as revelation completes our natural sense of good and evil, we must
have this sense in order to receive revelation. If human beings were devoid of
this sense, we would be 'incapable' of receiving the message of revelation:
"... Nay, unless men were endowed by nature with some sense of duty or of
moral obligation, they could reap no benefit from revelation; they would remain
incapable of all religion whatever."271
Therefore conscience is operating on a number of levels in Blair's scheme. It is
described as a faculty and a sense. It is limited in its regulatory scope by the fact
that conscience as it is operating in the Old Testament is not yet completed by
revelation. Yet is serves a crucial function in paving the way for human beings to
receive revelation and regulates behaviour within the realm of second causes.
Senses of duty, gratitude and allegiance, all ofwhich stem from conscience as it
is operating in Joseph's time, preclude receipt of revelation:
269 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Power ofConscience', in his Sermons. Vol. I, pp. 227-28.
270 Ibid., p. 228 for references for this paragraph.
271 Ibid., p. 229.
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"They who, from a mistaken zeal for the honour of Divine revelation, either deny
the existence, or vilify the authority of natural religion, are not aware, that by
disallowing the sense of obligation, they undermine the foundation on which
revelation builds its power of commanding the heart."272
The effects of conscience are the same within natural and revealed religion. The
'great tool of conscience', remorse, works away on the minds of those who
commit injustice. And it is in describing the guilt that prompted Joseph's
brothers to admit their treachery that Blair gives the final lessons of this sermon.
For all of its complexity, conscience remains constant in life and in the world just
as constancy in action is the mainstay of conscience.
Conscience functions evenly regardless of degrees of prosperity or adversity.
Blair tells his listeners:
"By prosperity, God gives scope to our passions, and makes trial of our
dispositions. By adversity, he revives the serious principle within. Neither the
one, nor the other, could be borne entire and unmixed." 73
Revelation verifies conscience, and all conscious action occurs within a
Providential framework:
"Natural and revealed religion proceed from the same Author; and of course, are
analogous and consistent. They are part of the same plan of Providence. They
are connected measures of the same system of government."274
273 Ibid., p. 236.
274 Ibid., p. 244.
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iii
The Problem of Grace
Grace and charity remain the fundamental areas of theological difficulty which
the Moderate clergy faced in their advocacy of private virtue or Christian
Stoicism. Neither grace nor charity fit comfortably into the vocabulary of
Stoicism, although on occasion the Stoics recommended acts ofmercy or the
granting of favours. We know that the Stoic seeks the perfected use of reason
in all transactions of life, removed from the influence of external matters or
entities. Grace understood as divine inspiration that fuels faith was alien to Stoic
cosmology. It is with the incorporation of grace into Blair's Christian Stoic
paradigm that tensions arise between its constituent elements.
Because Blair's understanding of grace proceeds from the Westminster
Confession, which in turn adopted the spirit of Calvin's definition of grace as its
guide, we must recall briefly the role grace plays in Calvin's theology. From the
Augustinian tradition, Calvin inherited the theological challenge of defining how
believers could be assured of God's mercy or grace. For Augustine grace was
essentially a gift of the Holy Spirit, an infusion of God's love into the soul of the
believer that directed actions of the will. Grace tempered selfishness and
malicious action of fallen humanity; helped to bridge the gap between God and
fallen humanity; fuelled love ofGod and neighbor; and, allowed a believer to
275 See Seneca, 'On Mercy' and 'On Favours' in Seneca, Moral and Political Essays, (eds)
Cooper, John and Procopd, J.F.
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appreciate more fully the beneficence of his Creator. Grace provided the ultimate
source of hope for salvation.
Calvin embraced the Augustinian understanding of grace, as meaning essentially
the work God undertakes for humankind through the death of Christ.276
Justification by faith in Christ became the means through which Calvin
emphasises the importance of sanctification. Through sanctification a believer
confirms prior assurance of divine mercy but he must not permit that
confirmation to become the bedrock of his belief. Randall Zachman has recently
argued that changing definitions of grace had profound theological effects in
Reformed societies in that conscience superseded the will as the primary means
through which grace operated. This immediately places the exercise of
conscience at the heart ofChristian life, and anticipates the significance of
conscience in a Moderate perspective. Conscience acts simultaneously as our
advocate before a heavenly tribunal and as regulator of daily life. It is only
through Christ's grace rather than through any particular action on the part of a
believer that the conscience may be freed from its constant preoccupation with
977
justification.
As Ian Clarke has pointed out, theological debates over the precise definitions of
key doctrine, like the doctrine of grace, were taken up by the Calvinist Church in
Scotland in the seventeenth century, resulting in the formation of a systematic set
276 For further recent discussion of grace and justification by faith in Reformed theology see
Zachman, Randall, The Assurance of Faith Conscience in the Theology ofMartin Luther and
John Calvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).
277 See the earlier discussion in Calvin of conscience and faith in chapter 1.
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of creeds that superseded the authority of the Bible in daily worship. Eighteen-
century Scottish theologians sought to restore the authority of the Bible and
incorporate a more inductive method of theological learning into overall religious
speculation. The Moderates clearly followed this trend, however they did so
without compromising an essential acceptance of fundamental doctrines outlined
in the Westminster Confession. In accepting of the authority of the Westminster
Confession, the Moderates clearly committed themselves to orthodoxy and to the
established church's standard articulation of the doctrine after 1690. They also
followed the example of earlier eighteenth-century Scottish divines whose
experiments with rational religion resulted in the introduction of reason into
Scottish theological discussion. This permitted joint roles for reason and
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revelation in determining religious priorities.
Blair is fully aware of the challenges prosperity and commercial culture pose to
the regular functioning of conscience, hence the development of a language of
religion that permits a certain co-existence of religious and secular priorities. We
have seen that Blair is attentive to the dangers that materialism will decrease
reliance upon Providence in the realm of second causes, and to the risk of too
intellectual an approach to faith threatening piety. In encouraging his listeners
towards piety and fidelity, he entreats them to recognise the weakness of human
will and the contingency of conscience upon Christ's righteousness. In the end,
278
Clearly Hutcheson was the most eminent member of this group. However William Wishart (d.
1753), his brother George (1703-85), and Robert Wallace (1696-1771) explored the theological
implications of faith accommodating reason. Although his identification as an early Moderate is
questionable because he supported the Popular Party over patronage, William Wishart encouraged
notions of divine benevolence being the key to understanding God's nature in his lectures at
Edinburgh University. He especially promoted the view of God as universal governor of a
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the duality of religious and rational priorities cannot be solved; therefore, Blair
cultivates the practical advantages of their co-existence for the betterment of self
and society while remembering that a Christian's ultimate concern rests in
nurturing faith through piety enhanced by grace. In examining Christ's role as
intercessor on behalf ofChristians, Blair writes:
.. By such view of the Divine nature, Christian faith lays the foundation for a
worship which shall be at once rational and affectionate; a worship, in which the
light of the understanding shall concur with the devotion of the heart, ....
Christian faith is not a system of speculative truths. It is not a lesson ofmoral
instruction only. By a train of high discoveries which it reveals by a succession
of interesting objects which it places in our view, it is calculated to elevate the
mind, to purify the affections, and by the assistance of devotion, to confirm and
encourage virtue."279
Because the virtuous person recognises God, "... the spirit of grace from whose
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inspiration his piety and charity flow ...", he accepts that devotion to God and
giving charity to others must not be divided from each other:
"Their union forms the consistent, the graceful, the respectable character of the
real Christian, the man of true worth. ... For, by dividing its parts from one
another, you never fail to expose it to the censure of the world: And perhaps, by
this sort of partial and divided goodness, religion has suffered more in the esteem
ofmankind, than by open profligacy."281
And in defending the ultimate superiority of religious priorities over secular ones,
Blair assumes the tone of a Christian apologist, while relying completely on his
Christian Stoic vocabulary.
rational system of existence. (See Sefton, Henry, The Early Development ofModeration in the
Church of Scotland. PhD thesis, University ofGlasgow, 1962).
279 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Death of Christ', in his Sermons. Vol. I, pp. 85-86.
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"All the principles which religion teaches, and all the habits which it forms, are
favourable to strength ofmind. It will be found, that whatever purifies, fortifies
also the heart. In the course of living righteously, soberly, and godly, a good man
acquires a steady and well-governed spirit. Trained, by Divine grace, to enjoy
with moderation the advantages of the world, ... , he meets the changes in his lot
without unmanly dejection. ... He has learned firmness and self-command. He is
accustomed to look up to that Supreme Providence, which disposes of human
affairs, not with reverence only, but with trust and hope."282
iv
The Sermon as Social Tool
In his use of sermons to promote his message of Christian virtue, Blair selected
an efficient means through which he underscores the efficiency ofChristian
Stoicism, and by extension of the commercial society the Moderates endorsed.
By cultivating a society of virtuous Christians, the Moderates defined how the
practical application of philosophical or religious ideals to daily life could be
achieved. In so doing, they enjoyed a degree of success in proving that the
established Church in Scotland played as significant a role in maintaining a stable
social order as political or legal entities.
Questions come immediately to mind concerning the use of sermons for political
or social ends beyond the realm ofmoral instruction. Given his parallel careers
as clergyman, professor and literary critic, there can be little doubt that Blair
anticipated the potentially wide-ranging effects of his sermons. His adroit use of
280 Blair, Hugh, 'On the Union of Piety and Morality', in his Sermons. Vol. I, p. 13.
281 Ibid., p. 10.
282
Blair, Hugh, 'On the Influence of Religion upon Adversity', in his Sermons. Vol. I, p. 20.
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sermons to chastise the rebellious of Culloden suggests that he appreciated the
full value ofpulpit oratory from the earliest stages ofhis career.283 In this
concluding section, we will suggest that Blair's use of sermons to propagate
Christian Stoicism, which for him forms a kind ofModerate theology, parallels
William Robertson's use of history to prove numerous Moderate priorities, not
least by extension loyalty to the Whig-Hanoverian order. In so doing, he used the
sermon as a public tool, rather as others used legal argument or academic
lectures, to persuade listeners of the validity of the case at hand.
Blair's justification for using sermons in this manner is found in lecture xxix of
his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. The lecture concerns the 'Eloquence
of the Pulpit', and describes pulpit oratory as the third great type ofpublic
speaking after the 'Eloquence of Popular Assemblies' and the 'Eloquence of the
Bar'. The distinct advantages of preaching as a form of public speech rest in the
unique dignity and gravity ofBiblical subject matter. It is "... such as ought to
interest every one, and can be brought home to every man's heart; and such as
admit, at the same time, both the highest embellishment in describing, and the
greatest vehemence and warmth in enforcing them."284 According to Blair, a
minister has the advantage over lawyers in that his captive audience tends to be
larger in number than that of the courtroom. A minister does not, however, have
the sword of state at his disposal to enforce Biblical lessons. The clergyman is
283 Sher suggests that Blair continued in the formal jeremiad tradition of preaching established in
the seventeenth century, which seems somewhat questionable. While Blair followed the
traditional Calvinist priority to convey stern moral messages through sermons, it seems the tone
and style of the polite sermons the Moderates favoured should be contrasted with those of the
earlier jeremiad.
284
Blair, Hugh, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (London: T. Cadell, 1825, 14th edition), p.
373.
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also free to choose his theme or topic at random, allowing maximum time for
reflection and preparation of text.
The disadvantages of pulpit oratory mirror its advantages. While lack of
interruption promotes the smooth delivery of a sermon thereby strengthening the
force with which a moral message is conveyed,"... Debate and Contention
enliven genius, and procure attention. The Pulpit Orator is, perhaps, in too quiet
possession of his field." For all the nobility of Gospel writings or Old
Testament testimony, the lessons flowing from them are extremely familiar to the
majority of any Christian audience: "They have for ages employed so many
speakers and so many pens; the public ear is so much accustomed to them, that it
requires more than an ordinary power of genius to fix attention. Nothing within
the reach of art is more difficult, than to bestow on what is common, the grace of
novelty."286
The challenge of effective sermon-giving is further complicated by the abstract
nature ofmuch Biblical material. Clergy return time and again to descriptions of
evil and vice, while admonishing their listeners not to hate the criminal who
commits vicious or evil acts. The logic and clarity of the legal brief cannot
286 Ibid. In illustrating the differences between pulpit and courtroom oratory and the tedium of
thematic repetition, Blair refers at length to La Bruyere's discussion of the same in La Bruyere's
Les Caracteres, oil Mosur cie Siecle: "L'Eloquence de la chaire, en ce qui y entre d'humain, & du
talent de l'orateur, est cachee, connue de peu de personnes, & d'une difficile execution. II faut
marcher par des chemins battus, dire ce qui a ete dit, & ce qui I'on prevoit que vous allez dire: les
matieres sont grandes, mais usees & triviales; les principes surs, mail don't les auditeurs penetrent
les conclusions d'une seule vue: il y entre de sujets qui sont sublimes, mais qui peut traiter le
sublime? - Le Predicateur n'est point soutenu comme l'avocat par des fait toujours nouveaux, par
de differens evenements, par des avantures inouies, ... ."
193
always be duplicated in the pulpit; for this reason Blair suggests there are few
genuinely eloquent ministers in the Church.
To critics who insist that preaching is incapable of generating eloquence, Blair
replies that this depends entirely on one's definition of eloquence in speech. If
one defines eloquence as the calculated artificial study ofwords and grammar,
Blair acknowledges that pulpit oratory could be limited in claims to eloquence.
However:
"True Eloquence is the art of placing truth in the most advantageous light for
conviction and persuasion. This is what every good man who preaches the
Gospel not only may, but ought to have at heart."287
The ultimate purpose of preaching, Blair continues, is to persuade people of the
truths of life that promote virtue and obedience. Therefore every sermon must be
TOO
a .. persuasive Oration, ... , to be founded on conviction." Sermons must be
delivered in a manner and style accessible to all members of a congregation,
regardless of individual origin or levels of education. Above all the minister
must leave his listeners a Tasting impression' of the validity and worth of his
message which can be absorbed into daily life. Sermons are not the place for
philosophical review ofmetaphysical truths. A sermon must"... give ... at once,
clear views, and persuasive impressions of religious truth. The Eloquence of the
Pulpit, then, must be Popular Eloquence."289 Popular not in the sense of
agreement with accepted norms, but popular in the sense of "..., calculated to
287
Blair, Hugh, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. p. 375.
288 Ibid.
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make an impression on the people; to strike and to seize their hearts."290 Deepest
impressions are formed when the words of the preacher act upon the imagination
of the hearer. (The wider significance of imagination will be explored
momentarily vis-a-vis Addisonian influences on Blair.)
It is a prerequisite of effective preaching that a minister speak from personal
conviction, which enhances the dignity of practical moralising. Speaking from
conviction encourages a naturally graceful presentation ofmoral lessons that is
superior to "arts of studied Eloquence."291 It also prevents the clergyman from
lapsing into an overly artificial style ofmoralising that would be inaccessible to
his listeners:
"A spirit of true piety would prove the most effectual guard against those errors
which Preachers are apt to commit. It would make their discourses solid, cogent,
and useful; ... ."292
Yet it is difficult for preachers to attain, "... that pitch of habitual piety and
goodness, which the perfection of Pulpit Eloquence would require, and of uniting
it with that thorough knowledge of the world, and those other talents which are
requisite for excellency in the Pulpit... ." The solution is found in a balance
of style between 'dull uniform solemnity' and 'theatrical light', or the graceful
representation of the dignity of Biblical truth combined with the 'warmth' of its
present day application. The ultimate value of a sermon rests in its utility and
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.




tasteful presentation: "Usefulness and true Eloquence always go together; and no
man can long be reputed a good Preacher who is not acknowledged to be a useful
one."294
v
The Matter of Taste
In contextualising the use of sermons within a comparative framework to other
forms of public speech, Blair suggests that religious oratory plays a key role in
addressing all manner of personal, social and cultural questions. This is
consistent with Blair the literary commentator who offers a practical
consideration of language as decipherer of cultural questions in another edition of
his Essays on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.
Blair examines writing styles, authors, and the system ofmanners by which
works are judged, to determine literature's effect on society. Historical writing,
for Blair, must be "a record of truth, for the instruction ofmankind."295
Coherence in historical writing is essential, as are appropriate references to
knowledge ofpolitics and human nature in analysing events. "A sound morality
should also be characteristic of a perfect historian. He should perpetually show
himself upon the side of virtue. It is not, however, his province to preach; and his
morality should not occupy too large a proportion of his work."296 Blair credits
294 Ibid., p. 377.
295
Blair, Hugh, Essays on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Abridged Chiefly from Dr. Blair's
Lectures on that Science with Additions and Improvements (London: J. Murray, 1785), 2nd
edition, p. 369.
296 Ibid., p. 374.
196
Voltaire and Robertson with realising the significance of "illustrating manners as
well as facts" in historical writing.297 Manners inextricably weave the teaching of
morality into the tapestry of history, enriching clear patterns of thought.
Because poetry is intimately tied to the progress of society, Blair's discussion of
it is helpful. "It is in the progress of society that poems assume different forms.
Time separates into classes the different kinds ofpoetic composition. A peculiar
merit, and certain rules, are assigned to each. The ode and the elegy, the epic
poem, and dramatic compositions, are all reduced to regulations, and exercise of
908
acuteness of criticism." It is sufficient that pastoral poetry reflects life rather
than giving an accurate historical perspective of it. The appeal of pastoral poetry
transcends cultural and social boundaries as, "... human passions are much the
same in every situation and rank of life."299 Hebrew narrative and allegory
illustrate an eastern preference for truths conveyed through mysterious tales. In
Scripture the prophet, or hero like Joseph, assured effective dissemination of
messages. "The figure ... which elevates beyond all others the poetical style of
the Scriptures ... is personification."300 Similarly, the epic hero personifies the
qualities or valour of an age, proving the virtue of his era. A form of poetic
license common to all genre is limited use of familiar religious tenets or
superstitions to enhance a story's credibility.
297 Ibid., p. 377.
298 Ibid., p. 389.
299 Ibid., p. 401.
300 Ibid., p. 427.
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Poetry illustrates human nature and habit contributing to wider appreciation of
the role of taste and imagination in the world. Taste embodies the power to enjoy
pleasure or suffer pain through beauty or ugliness in nature and art. "It is a
faculty common in some degree to all mankind. Throughout the circle of human
nature nothing is more universal than the relish ofBeauty, of one kind or other;
ofwhat is orderly, proportioned, grand ... ."301 Blair confirms that taste is as
crucial to humanity as reason, showing again the significance of taste in Scottish
thought as appreciative of the full role of the senses and sentiment.
Through education, taste is one of the most refineable attributes. Delicacy and
correctness are its principle elements, and nature teaches human beings not to use
them arbitrarily. The universal degree of taste all human beings enjoy guarantees
the process's reliability. That taste is the measure of all art has clear cultural
significance. That language, as employed in poetry, literature or speech, acts as
the crucial tool in the dissemination of cultural ideas is accepted. Blair tells us
that we come to comprehend these ideas through imagination.
From the first principles of taste with which we are endowed proceeds "the strong
impression" ... that... "the powers of Taste and Imagination are calculated to
give us of the benevolence of our Creator. By these endowments, he hath widely
enlarged the sphere of the pleasures of human life; and those, too, of a kind the
most pure and innocent."302 Our senses of fear or the sublime, then, must be
deeply tied to taste and imagination, perhaps finding their roots in the same soil
301 Ibid., p. 9.
302 Ibid., p. 24.
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as morality.303 Yet there seems to be no evidence to suggest that for Blair
religion becomes a matter of taste. The emphasis shifts from critical examination
to the process of creation based on imagination. We are also returned to
Hutcheson's and Joseph Addison's304 notion of taste as a faculty of the soul.
Addison's influence upon Blair, and indeed upon Blair's colleagues among the
literati, was great not only within the realm of literature but in his advocacy of
virtue and the merits of religion:
"Mr. Addison is, beyond doubt, in the English language, the most perfect
example: and, therefore, though not without some faults, he is, on the whole, the
safest model for imitation, .... Perspicuous and pure he is in the highest degree;
.... There is not the least affectation in his manner: we see no marks of labour;
...; but great elegance joined with great ease and Simplicity. He is, ...,
distinguished by a character ofmodesty, and of politeness, which appears in all
his writings. No author has a more popular and insinuating manner; and the great
regard with which he everywhere shews for virtue and religion, recommends him
highly."305
As we saw in chapter 3, Addison stated that concerning imagination and pleasure,
humans cannot... "assign the necessary cause of this pleasure, because we know
neither the nature of an idea, nor the substance of a human soul, ... therefore, for
want of such a light, all we can do in speculations of this kind, is to reflect on
those operations of the soul that are more agreeable, ... and ..., what is pleasing
303 The precise relationship in Blair's mind between taste and reason is somewhat unclear. If
specific ties exist between taste and reason, they may exist through the imagination assisting one
in the process of rational moral decision-making.
304 Blair's Christian Stoicism overwhelmingly assumed Addison's polite characterisation of
religion and 'godly capitalism' through the system ofmanners, taste and tolerance described in
chapter 3.
305 Blair, Hugh, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, p. 246-47.
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iaz:
or displeasing to the mind. Addison suggested that because the Supreme
Author formed the soul for human happiness, contemplation of the great and
boundless in art is tantamount to an act of praising God.
We also know that Addison limited his perimeters of imagination. It is a finite
attribute; our capability for understanding, on the other hand, is not necessarily
limited as we can try to comprehend the infinite through infinite exercises.
Imagination is restricted by the brain's finite capacity to retain impressions: with
the passing of time, humans lose grounds of reference. This seems logical given
the imperfections of human nature and reason. Addison's conclusion returns the
reader to the Creator, "... what an infinite advantage this faculty gives the
Almighty Being over the soul ofman, and how great a measure if happiness or
•^07
misery we are capable of receiving from the imagination only."
If imagination is limited, then the tools that convey its fruits must be limited.
Language falls into this category, but the implications of language as finite do not
diminish its effectiveness in relaying cultural improvement. Language remains
capable of transcending complex cultural boundaries, as do artistic creations. By
placing the intellectual fruits proceeding from them into a context dependent
upon God for ultimate truth and meaning, Addison perhaps suggests that the most
sublime creations are manifestations of grace.
306 Addison, Joseph, The Spectator No. 413 quoted in Bond, D.F., Critical Essays from The
Spectator, p. 181.
307 Addison, Joseph, The Spectator No. 421, quoted in ibid., p. 207.
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We have also seen that Addison's religious commentary was motivated by his
commitment to Christianity and the Church ofEngland while remaining sensitive
to the challenges of reason and natural religion. Again, Blair and the Moderates
assumed these priorities in their commitment to Christian principles and in their
dedication to protecting the role of the Presbyterian Church in eighteenth-century
Scottish society.
Blair was further influenced by Addison's belief that natural and revealed
religion are best appreciated as complementary rather than mutually exclusive in
society. Blair agreed that both types of religion promote improvement, but find
strength for each other in a duality of roles. Like Addison, Blair seems to believe
that the ultimate purpose of natural and revealed religion is to encourage proper
duties devoid of the superstition and enthusiasm, that in turn, highlighted the
presence of the Divine in the world order. Proper duties lead to a reasonable
devotion that promotes the greater good of civil society. Blair, again like
Addison, left his audience with the soul directly linked with all that defined the
identity and integrity of human beings.
Conclusion
Fania Oz-Salzberger argues in her introduction to Adam Ferguson's Essays on
Civil Society that"... traditional republican discourse had no answers for the new
respectability of wealth and social refinement, which eighteenth-century Scots
came to associate with the modern age." Hugh Blair and his colleagues among
the Enlightenment literati faced a number of challenges in defining the
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intellectual, moral and ethical foundation of the commercial culture evolving in
their midst. Oz-Salzberger continues, either "... the civic value had to be
radically adjusted to the new ethics of sociability, commerce and freedom under
the law; or else new proofwas required for their relevance to the modern
state." Moderates like Blair attempted to adjust key civic virtues found in
classical republicanism to create a scheme of social ethics for the modern age;
Ferguson, on the other hand, sought to prove the inherent relevance of civic
virtues without significantly altering their character. Classical republican and
Stoic themes and vocabularies lent themselves to both approaches.
It has been argued here that Hugh Blair's contribution to these dialogues rested in
his employment of a language of religion, Christian Stoicism, that accommodated
Christian morality and virtuous ethics, both ofwhich were essential to the orderly
functioning of a civilised society. Blair defined this language of religion in
distinctly personal terms by encouraging his listeners to cultivate virtuous
characteristics that enhanced their own development and facilitated social
interaction. Blair concerned himself with the consistent application ofmoral
principles to daily life, reflecting less upon the theological implications of
blending Christianity with Stoic themes.
In Blair's interpretation of Stoicism, its intensely practical nature provided a
useful method of addressing tensions between reason and sense; doctrine and
religious practise; metaphysical deliberation and a life of action; and, public and
308
Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on Civil Society, (ed.) Oz-Salzberger, Fania (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. xvi.
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private interest. In his role as a moral instructor, the overriding purpose of
Blair's Christian Stoicism was to encourage the greatest possible degree ofunity
and order in society by creating ethical priorities out of Christian Stoic virtue. A
prudent fear ofGod combined with just action and beneficence produced
happiness and tranquility. And Blair relied on the twin foundations of
government and religion to underscore order, thus identifying the essential role
for the Presbyterian Church in early British civil society.
In chapter 2, it was argued that elements of seventeenth-century Dutch Neostoic
thought lend themselves to an eighteenth-century Scottish context for Blair's
Christian Stoicism in terms of addressing the role of religion in commercial
culture. In Lipsian Neostoicism, we found that traditional tensions between
reason and sentiment, between 'head' and 'heart', were reconcilable to a limited
degree. Lipsius resorted to Neostoicism to emphasise the utility of system where
co-existence of ethical priorities was not only possible but desirable.
Lipsian Neostoicism operated on the principle that the state provided the unifying
bond in society, and Lipsius placed the military at the heart of protecting civil
society. For Blair and his colleagues, government and the individual citizen
assume this role. Blair incorporates traditional Neostoic emphasis on self-
discipline and devotion to duty in his Christian Stoicism. Like earlier Neostoics,
he suggests that the benefits secured through self-command contribute to a high
quality of life for the commonweal.309 The practical application of Christian
309
Although we know that surviving evidence does not point to Lipsius having any direct
influence on Blair, a copy of Lipsius' edition of Seneca, Phil. Opera (Antwerp, 1652) appears in
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Stoic values encourages the moral fortitude required to withstand Mandevillean-
style temptations inherent in the commercial order.
In exploring the pre-eminent virtues Blair recommends to his listeners,
constancy, order, and obedience to Providence, he highlights the useful aspects of
the complementary relationship between natural and revealed religion. This, in
turn, reflects the considerable influences Hutcheson and Addison had upon
Blair's thought. It also reminds the reader of the need to place consideration of
Blair's sermons within the context of his literary and academic treatment of
religious writing.
Despite identifying a structure for moral decision making that protected the status
quo while cultivating a notion of progress and improvement in society, Blair
suggests that there are limits upon Christian Stoicism just as there are limits upon
human knowledge. He suggests that "the measure according to which knowledge
is dispensed to man, affords conspicuous proofs of divine wisdom."310 Complete
knowledge would "raise men to levels incompatible with his 'present powers'.
-511
Man is left in a state of conjecture and this is most useful to his improvement."
God provides sufficient information to behave virtuously in society ... "without
• "3 1 O
disturbing the operations of His mind."
the sales catalogue of Blair's library. The Advocates Library also held a number of Lipsius
editions, including a French edition of his, Six livres des politique ou doctrine civile (Rochelle,
1590); and his editions of Seneca. [See A Catalogue of the Library of the Faculty of Advocates.
Edinburgh, Vol. I. (Edinburgh: Printed by Thomas, Walter, and Thomas Ruddiman, 1742), pp.
340-41.]
310 Blair, Hugh, Sermons. Vol. I, p. 122.
3,1 Ibid.
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By definition, conjecture leaves an imaginative door ajar, granting a degree of
speculative freedom necessary tolerant of the mind's limitations. Blair's
language of religion occurs within the ordered interdependent web ofmoral
happiness and pain. The language's inevitably mysterious elements are products
of nature's or God's broader eminence. Blair suggests we often fail to
understand incidents that give unintended benefit or pain to those around us. The
consequences of this Divinely ordered structure (or externally ordered structure)
in
generally lead to personal or social improvement.
We have seen that for Blair our conduct is directed by moral principles which
constitute a law "written in our hearts."314 This law is key to Blair's belief in the
fundamental principle of all religion, "That there is in human nature, an
approving or condemning sense of conduct by means ofwhich, they who have
1|C
not the law, are a law unto themselves." Our natural sense ofmorality turned
upon ourselves becomes conscience. Conscience assumes the existence of a
judge exerting influence on our decision making. "Every law supposes a rightful
313 The similarity between Blair's understanding of the unintended benefits or pain in life and the
unintended consequences of the operation of the Invisible Hand in Adam Smith's theory seems
evident. It is not entirely clear how deeply Blair delved into Smith's The Theory ofMoral
Sentiments, but he was familiar with the text, and he praised Smith for the quality of The Wealth
ofNations. Blair's reliance on the draft of Smith's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres to
write his own lectures on the subject is well known. This raises questions about the depths to
which Blair relied generally on Smith's intellectual arguments. See note 1 to Blair's letter to
Smith on The Wealth ofNations. 2 April 1776, in Smith, Adam, Correspondence, (eds) Mossner,
E.C. and Ross, I.S. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), p. 187-88: "... Blair followed Smith
and Robert Watson in lecturing on rhetoric at Edinburgh. He was shown by Smith 'part of a
manuscript treatise on rhetoric', presumably a version of the later LRBL, and he incorporated
ideas from it in his own lectures. Also, he is reported as making use of Smith's ideas on
jurisprudence in his sermons, but Smith did not complain, remarking: 'He is very welcome.
There is enough left' (Rae 33, quoting indirectly Henry Mackenzie)." The Moderates' reliance
upon Smithian moral theory will be discussed at length in Part III.
314 Blair, Hugh, Sermons. Vol. I, p. 228. (Blair may have taken his phrase from exactly similar
wording found in Chapter IV of the Westminster Confession of Faith, 1646.)
315 Ibid., p. 229.
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superior: And, therefore, when conscience threatens punishment to secret crimes,
it manifestly recognises a Supreme Governor, from whom nothing is hidden
01/
t
... ." Therefore, God is necessarily the source of our conscience. God is also
the source ofmoral obligation, giving rise to our sense of duty. Duty operating in
nature is essential to comprehending revelation. Without duty humanity is
incapable of religion.
We return again to the complementary relationship between natural and revealed
religion. Blair confirms that "natural and revealed religion proceed from the
same Author; and ... are analogous and contingent. They are part of the same
plan of Providence. They are connected measures of the same system of
TIT
government." The former prepares us for the reception of the latter. By
extension, a similar relationship must exist between moral philosophy and
theology. A question comes to mind as to whether, for Blair, a true child of
Providence is analogous to the Stoic model ofman? In this context, could it then
be suggested that Blair and the literati recast the image of a follower of natural
religion, restoring the senses to a level co-equal with reason in determining
identity. This approach replies in a more sophisticated manner to Bishop Butler's
precept that natural religion is the primitive faith of Genesis.
Although Blair is generally noted for his literary and academic pursuits, it is
argued here that he should be remembered equally for the depths to which he
considered questions ofmorality, virtue and faith in society. In his use of
3.6 Ibid.
3.7 Ibid., pp. 244-45.
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sermons for moral instruction, Blair focusses the attention of his listeners upon
their personal private and public conduct. His interpretation of the Stoic model
offered less dogmatic access to virtuous lifestyles than orthodox Calvinism,
which set the tone for how Moderate Christian Stoic tenets were practised in
society. In this sense, for Blair, perhaps Stoicism's great appeal rested in its




Robertson's Christian Stoicism and the Public Face ofVirtue
Introduction
William Robertson (1721-93) shared Hugh Blair's passion for investigating the
nature ofmorality, yet these two Moderate friends and colleagues explored it
from very different perspectives. While we have seen that Blair approached
morality from an essentially aesthetic point of view, Robertson, as a historian,
investigated morality within the framework of exploring the general laws of civil
society. More specifically, he followed in the tradition ofMontesquieu, David
Hume and Adam Smith by concerning himself with the social and historical laws
that regulate civic life. He also shared their deep commitment to exploring the
manners that characterised human behaviour.
Robertson's methodology reflected the priorities of the Scottish conjectural
11 Q
school of history, and highlighted the virtuous themes of the humanist tradition
in which he received his early education at the University of Edinburgh. In
agreeing with the premise ofHume and Smith that civil society was transformed
318 From among numerous discussions of conjectural history or the four-stage theory of history,
see Hopfl, Harro, 'From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment',
Journal ofBritish Studies, 17, (1978), pp. 19-40; Wood, P.B., 'The Natural History ofMan in the
Scottish Enlightenment', History ofScience, 28 (1989), pp. 89-123.
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by the commercial successes of the modern era, Robertson acknowledged the
positive effects material progress had on patterns of social improvement.
Robertson accepted the general proposition of conjectural historiography that
commercial political society formed the final and most advanced stage of history,
the end results ofwhich were civil order and social harmony. Robertson joined
Smith in encouraging the pursuit of virtue as a mainstay of social harmony. Both
men looked to providence in one form or another to underpin the general laws.
While interpretations vary as to Smith's precise understanding of providence,
there is no doubt that in Robertson's mind the integral force of divine providence
underscored the general laws of society and by extension the forces of history
itself.
As a clergyman and as a leader of the Church of Scotland from 1762-80,
Robertson played a pivotal role in promoting unity and discipline within the
Church. Under his skilful leadership, the Moderate clergy secured their control
of the General Assembly in the latter half of the eighteenth century and
consolidated the Scottish Church's position within the British state.
The current resurgence ofRobertsonian studies in Scottish Enlightenment
historiography has greatly enhanced our knowledge of Robertson the intellectual
and politician. However, as Nicholas Phillipson points out, our knowledge of
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Robertson's religious thought remains under-explored.319 Richard Sher's portrait
of Robertson as staunch defender of 'public virtue' or 'Whig-Presbyterian
conservatism' remains most helpful when investigating Robertson's management
of ecclesiastical affairs.320 Colin Kidd describes Robertson as "... an unashamed
i
modern" , who embraced the challenge to redefine Presbyterianism for an
advanced commercial age. In a rare exploration ofRobertson's theological
preferences, Jeffrey Smitten argues that Robertson was strongly influenced by
continental Arminianism322, particularly in his acceptance of sceptical
epistemology and a "... synergetic view of the relationship between human action
and divine providence ...".
These are all useful fixed points for analysing Robertson's religious character yet
the diversity of these interpretations illustrates the complexity of the task, not
least when addressing his interest in stoicism. This interest is now widely
acknowledged by Enlightenment historians but it remains something of a
mystery. Unlike High Blair, Robertson left little direct evidence to assist one in
analysing how he reconciled stoic values with his Christian principles.324 His use
319 See Phillipson, Nicholas, 'Providence and progress: an introduction to the historical thought of
William Robertson', in Brown, Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the expansion of empire
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 3, pp. 55-73.
320 See Sher, Richard B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1985), pp. 187-212.
321 Kidd, Colin, 'The ideological significance of the History of Scotland', in Brown, Stewart J.
(ed.), William Robertson and the expansion of empire, chapter 6, p. 135.
322
Formally defined as the teachings of the Dutch Protestant theologian, Jacobus Arminius (1560-
1609), who stated that predestination was conditional. He suggested that Christ died for all rather
than for the Elect. This pitted free will against grace in questions of salvation and broke with
traditional Calvinist interpretations of the Doctrine of the Elect. (See also references to
Arminianism in chapter 2.)
323 Smitten, Jeffrey, 'The Shaping ofModeration: William Robertson and Arminianism', in
Studies ofEighteenth-Century Culture, Vol. 22 (1992), p. 282.
324 The strongest surviving evidence ofRobertson's interest in stoicism is the manuscript of
Robertson's translation ofMarcus Aurelius' The Meditations, which will be discussed in
following sections.
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of stoic themes and vocabulary simply suggests that Robertson adopted a civic
humanist language of virtue as it evolved in an Enlightenment context. Yet,
given the subtlety of Robertson's mind and historical thought, it seems
unreasonable to suggest that there is no further story to tell about Robertson on
stoicism. Indeed, he seems to challenge his audience to read between the lines of
surviving texts to explore why he found the world-view ofEpictetus, Zeno and
Marcus Aurelius so appealing.
Robertson used stoic-like characters to infer lessons in history, and embedded
criteria for virtuous behavior in his narrative. In his historical writing and in his
published sermon , Robertson meticulously illustrated how fulfillment of public
and private duties improved individuals and societies throughout the ages.
Robertson shared Blair's commitment to incorporating Christian virtues into the
polite social ethics of commercial culture. This chapter suggests that Robertson
was a Moderate Christian Stoic; however, it is not altogether clear that his brand
of Christian Stoicism matched Hugh Blair's. Robertson's grand view of the role
of providence in history underscores his interest in the cultivation of virtue in
society. The pursuit of virtue, order and tranquility seem to be the three stoic
themes that Robertson found most useful in his histories. But Robertson's
treatment of virtue is ambiguous.
325 Robertson, William, 'The Situation of the World at the Time ofChrist's Appearance, and its
Connection with the Success ofhis Religion, considered. A Sermon, Preached Before the Society
in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, ... Monday January 6. 1755' (Edinburgh:
Elphingston Balfour, 1791), facsimile reprint of 6th edition, in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The
Collected Works ofWilliam Robertson. Vol. XI (London: Routledge/Thoemmes, 1996).
326 1 am very grateful for discussions with Neil Hargraves about these matters.
211
He favours the cultivation of public virtue, working for the good of the whole,
over private virtue, a matter more of self-improvement, which he views as
inconsistent and unreliable. In The History of Scotland (1759) and The History
ofAmerica (1778), for example, one witnesses the collapse of societies due to
increasing disorder or civil strife. The aftermath of this collapse in the case of
America is characterised by a certain tranquility, a period of inactivity in society,
that provides a resting point from which society renews itself and a new system
ofpublic virtue acts as both the means of social rejuvenation and its end, and the
security derived from a well-ordered society offers the ideal atmosphere within
which public virtue operates. Once public virtue is restored in society, it provides
the foundation for the pursuit of private virtue. It is constancy in public virtue,
however, that provides the mainstay of social development and progress.
This chapter will investigate Robertson's interest in stoicism with a view to
furthering understanding of his religious thought. At times the exercise will
involve asking the right questions as much as suggesting answers, and at times
the evidence gathered remains inconclusive. Because Robertson's interest in
stoicism must be examined within the context ofModerate advocacy of civil
society and his treatment of natural and revealed religion, the chapter will open
with a discussion of both. Robertson's early interest in stoicism will be
highlighted as will the intellectual context in which the Moderates developed
their understanding of civil society.
This will be followed by a discussion of Robertson's endorsement of public
virtue in his final published work, An Historical Disquisition Concerning the
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Knowledge the Ancients had of India (179 IT The Disquisition highlights public
virtue as a powerful guarantor of social harmony. It prominently displays the
role of the Brahmin caste at the head of India's social system. The virtues of the
Brahmins will be explored, particularly those Robertson compares favourably
with the ancient Stoics. The chapter will end by reconsidering points raised by
Smitten about Robertson's religious preferences. It is hoped that this process will
permit a reply to the question: what was the nature ofRobertson's Christian
Stoicism?
i
A Moderate Understanding of Civil Society
When investigating Robertson on civil society, one is confronted by an
immediate question: what did Robertson mean by civil society? Despite
numerous references to the term appearing throughout his histories, Robertson
seems not to have defined it in his own words. Therefore a definition must be
drawn from an examination of the contexts within which he understood civil
society both in terms of Scotland's historical tradition that married civic duty
with moral responsibility, and the contemporary Moderate perspective of
Robertson's day.
In Virtue. Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment, David Allan argues
persuasively that it was a priority of Scottish intellectual life before the
Enlightenment to nurture existing ties between the moral and spiritual in public
life. Following the examples of sixteenth-century Calvinism and Renaissance
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humanism, personal piety became inextricably linked to the exercise of public
virtue. This linking formed the nexus between civil and religious interests that
continued to permeate society throughout the eighteenth century.
Pre-enlightenment historians came to investigate the nature ofmorality through
political life, and a quest for truly virtuous social leaders lay at the heart of their
historiography. George Buchanan, Bishop John Lesley and Alexander Ross, for
example, developed a line of historical thought intent on transmitting the benefits
of civic patriotism to their audiences. Calvinist priorities ofmoral self-discipline
and godliness converged with patriotism to form the core of a Ciceronian style
public-spiritedness evoked in the civic republicanism ofAndrew Fletcher of
Saltoun and others. For our purposes it is particularly important to note that the
•597
language convergence often employed stoic vocabulary. Allan reminds the
reader that from the point of view of appreciating a long standing Scottish
discussion about the nature ofprivate behaviour and public life, "... association
of virtue with a committed pursuit of the public interest..." was prevalent
from Knox's time forward.
Enlightenment theorists were often ambiguous in their acknowledgement of an
intellectual debt to their predecessors. From among Moderate ranks Robertson
was selective in his praise for sixteenth and seventeenth-century historians, while
Adam Ferguson actively criticised them on ideological grounds. As men of
327
Allan, David, Virtue. Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment, part 1 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1993).
3J8 Ibid., p. 97.329
Ferguson criticised them for being determinist. He also favoured the idea that history, and the
study of history, should be open ended, a notion not favoured by sixteenth and seventeenth-
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faith, they obviously recognised the influence of the strict Calvinist
providentialism that reinfused Scottish historiography with the re-establishment
of Presbyterianism in 1689. However the providentialism of that moment failed
to provide a comprehensive blueprint for analysing the challenges ofNewtonian
science and natural philosophy, the legacy of the natural law school, or indeed the
moral dilemmas of commercial luxury.
Enlightenment historiography as it evolved within theories of conjectural history
provided a framework for investigating each of the above mentioned elements.
After Hume pointed to experience as a valuable historical resource in A Treatise
ofHuman Nature (1739-40), the door opened for Smith, Robertson, Lord Karnes
and John Millar to apply the tools of speculative scientific reasoning to social and
moral matters. Hume laid the philosophical foundation for the Enlightenment
literati to reconstruct their understanding of social development while justifying
the economic success and social benefits proceeding from the Union of 1707.
For his part, Robertson combined speculation with a parallel interest in probable
reasoning, more about which will be said at a later stage, to form a legitimate
method of historical analysis supportive of the Hanoverian order.
Departing further from earlier Scottish historiography, Hume introduced the
notion that scholars must examine history and society within the context of the
culture of a particular era. This became the hallmark of conjectural history. In
century historians in his view. For a useful discussion of Ferguson's interest in history, see the
introduction in Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, (ed.) Oz-Salzberger,
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his essay, OfNational Characters, Hume insisted that it is first to moral causes
that the theorist or historian must turn to examine the nature of a civilisation:
"Different reasons are assigned for these national characters', while some
account for them from moral, others from physical causes. By moral causes, I
mean all circumstances, which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or
reason, and which render a peculiar set ofmanners habitual to us. Of this kind
are, the nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty of
penury in which people live, ..., and such like circumstances. ... That the
character of a nation will much depend on moral causes, must be evident to the
most superficial observer; since a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals,
and the manners of individuals are frequently determined by these causes."
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence.331 Smith applied Hume's principle to matters of
justice and politics, whereby the history of civil society was linked to the division
of property ownership and to the customs and manners of a culture. Mankind
evolved through four unique but contingent historical stages that brought it into
the commercial world where the literati found themselves: the barbarous state
devoid of a notion of property rights; a nomadic stage in which property received
some recognition; an agricultural stage followed by the commercial stage.
The significance of conjectural history within the Enlightenment canon has been
acknowledged in earlier passages, as has the intellectual debt owed to the natural
jurisprudential school ofGrotius and Pufendorf by all of the Scots in defining
civil society.333 As we have seen, the particular legacy of Pufendorf s emphasis
Fania, pp. xv-xxv.
330
Hume, David, Essays Moral. Political and Literary, (ed.) Miller, E.F., p. 198.
331 Given at the University of Glasgow, 1752-63.
332 See Phillipson, Nicholas, 'Providence and progress: an introduction to the historical thought of
William Robertson', in Brown, Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire,
chapter 3, pp. 58-9.
333 See chapter 3.
216
on property as the essential social institution underscoring economic progress
greatly influenced Smith, and it is from Pufendorf s development of a stadial
theory of social progress that Smith took models for his scheme. The debt of
Grotius and Pufendorf, combined with the translation of classical republican
virtues into a kind of Scottish civic humanism by Hutcheson and others, provide
two of the three key elements which constitute the bedrock of Moderate
understanding of civil society. The third party to whom much is owned is
Montesquieu. Adam Ferguson's particular enthusiasm for the philosopher is
notable:
"When I recollect what the President Montesquieu has written I am at a loss to
tell, why I should treat of human affairs; but I too am instigated by my
reflections, and my sentiments; and I may utter them more to the comprehension
of ordinary capacities, because I am more on the level of ordinary men."334
In Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Lois (1748), the Scots found a positive case made
for the establishment of a modern polity based upon broad political freedom, and
economic progress operating through fixed institutions. Montesquieu legitimised
the historical study of law and government, and he proposed that true political
freedom rested upon the rule of law, a firm constitution, and economic progress.
The legal and political institutions that safeguarded society formed the new
dimensions within which citizens lived. By expanding the context of political
identity into an institutional framework, Montesquieu transcended the more
334
Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (ed.) Oz-Salzberger, Fania, p. 66.
It is important to note that while Flume criticised Ferguson's Essay, both Robertson and Blair
approved of its general argument and themes, particularly Ferguson's emphasis on public virtue.
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narrowly defined republican understanding of active citizenship embodied by the
virtuous citizen-warrior.
For Robertson, perhaps Montesquieu's greatest appeal was found in his
recognition that historical principles affected the laws and customs of society.
However, as Nicholas Phillipson points out, the Scots did not take up
Montesquieu in his entirety. Hume objected to Montesquieu's emphasis of
physical influences upon culture in that they did not "... explain the astonishing
variety ofmanners, laws, and religions ..." prevalent in Europe.335
In embracing Montesquieu's institutional framework, the Scots found the latitude
they needed to redefine citizenship for the modern commercial era. Because
commerce became "... the great object of nations, and the principle study of
•3-3/- # # #
mankind ...", it was crucial to place the new citizen at the heart of commercial
civil society. The virtues of classical citizenship, duty, honour and a commitment
to the greater good, were combined with benevolence within the confines of
polite ethics to justify the pursuit of self-interest. Ultimately the Moderates, like
all of the Scots, relied upon a continuing link between the public and private
personae to maintain social order and tranquility. Again Ferguson reminds his
reader:
"Man is, by nature, the member of a community; and when considered in this
capacity, the individual appears to be no longer made for himself. He must
335 See Phillipson, Nicholas, 'Providence and progress: an introduction to the historical thought of
William Robertson', in Brown, Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire,
pp. 58-9.
j36
Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (ed.) Oz-Salzberger, Fania, p. 58.
218
forego his happiness and his freedom, where these interfere with the good of
society. He is only part of a whole; and the praise we think due to his virtue, is
but a branch of that more general commendation we bestow on the member of a
body, .... If this follow from the relation of a part to its whole, and if the public
good be the principal object with individuals, it is likewise true, that the
happiness of individuals is the great end of civil society. ... The interests of
• • • -2-37
society, however, and of its members, are easily reconciled."
Despite being irrevocably linked, the public duties of citizenship take precedence
over private ones in Ferguson's mind, as they did for Robertson. This linkage
extends to the realm ofmorality in that it becomes a matter of personal moral
obligation to accept the social order and to contribute to the public good.
Given that Robertson, Blair and a number of other Moderate clergy approved of
the Essay's general arguments and themes, it seems reasonable to suggest that
Ferguson's understanding of civil society may be used as a broad basis for a
Moderate understanding of the same.338 Therefore civil society is defined here as
the established political, economic and social order that fostered law and
harmony among citizens, and encouraged what Ferguson called 'refinements of
civil life' and commercial progress.
Providence's redemptive powers also provided the ultimate sanction of earthly
progress and empire, and the tie between public and private virtue reflected the
immutable bond between God and his people. Taken in these terms, the
combination of values and ideas lying at the heart of Moderate civil society fit
337 Ibid., p. 59.
338 As indicated Ferguson's articulation of the strengths of public virtue was appealing to the
Moderates' polite sensibilities, although some objected to Ferguson's particularly civic republican
rather than polite tone.
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together neatly. But from their critics' point of view this neatness was deceptive
in its lack of specificity. The very fact that the Moderates had to rely on a pagan
stoic vocabulary to best describe their civic ideals fed suspicion about their
religious discipline and piety.
ii
Robertson's Early Interest in Stoicism and General Treatment ofReligion
William Robertson was born to Eleanor Pitcairn and William Robertson, a
minister of the Church of Scotland, at Borthwick near Edinburgh on 19
September 1721. His father, also William, fostered Robertson's early interest in
scholarly pursuits and oversaw his primary education at the Borthwick parish
school and in Dalkeith. Robertson's mother, Eleanor, seems to have been the
disciplinarian, ruling the Robertson household with the rigour characteristic of a
pious Presbyterian family. In 1733 the elder Robertson was appointed to an
Edinburgh parish and the family left Borthwick for the capital. Soon thereafter
young William began studies at the University of Edinburgh. By April 1744 he
joined the ministry, and succeeded his uncle as minister at Gladsmuir, which was
under the patronage of the Earl ofHopetoun. From this point he embarked on a
career in the Church of Scotland that saw him appointed one of His Majesty's
Chaplains, elected as Moderator of the General Assembly and acknowledged as
the leader of the Moderate Party.
339 Robertson's adeptness at cultivating political patronage was fully evident by his 30's and early
40's. His surviving correspondence contains numerous letters about securing church and
university appointments for both himself and his Moderate friends. See, for example, Robertson
to Gilbert Elliot, 25 June 1761, discussing the recently vacated Deanery of the Chapel Royal
(NLS MS 11009). He was, however, acutely aware of the price of political involvements,
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While an undergraduate Robertson had displayed his first serious interest in
exploring the nature of civil society and developing the tools he used throughout
his career as a historian and churchman. Like Blair, Robertson later
acknowledged the particular benefit ofDr. Stevenson's lectures at university not
least in their emphasis on Locke, Addison and stoic themes. In an early essay on
assent to historical evidence, Robertson displayed signs of his acceptance of
probable reasoning as a desirable means of intellectual analysis.340 He followed
Locke and Butler in believing that the full nature of truth was known only to
God. Therefore an epistemological method of weighing historical evidence was
required that operated within the limited confines of the human mind. By
logically determining the probability of a certain proposition, the mind arrived by
degrees at a consensus suggesting a particular conclusion. The probable method
mirrored the Stoic weighing of the good of the whole over the individual member
or part.
Most likely as a result of Stevenson's lectures in the history of philosophy, and
under the influence of the course books, Thomas Stanley's History of Philosophy
particularly the amount of time they detracted from scholarly work. He wrote to Elliot on an
earlier occasion, "... 1 have, however, made several additions to my work, & many corrections.
[The History of Scotland] And I grow every day more confirmed in the resolution of keeping my
hands clean of all the dirty work which in this country goes by the name of politics. I see nothing
a Clergyman can gain, but much that he ... necessarily lose by meddling with them." (See
Robertson to Gilbert Elliot, 24 June 1758, NLS MS 11009, f. 58).
340 In weighing the value of moral evidence through probable reasoning, Robertson commented,
"... it is an established fact that fair administration ofjustice, the defence of public liberty and
safety, and indeed the conservation of political order and rule look to this evidence especially;
besides, the greatest and most useful part of our learning and knowledge, the truth about what has
been done, and whatever can be comprehended under the name of history, even including faith in
our most holy Christian religion, depends on and is sustained by testimony of this sort, ... ." See
Robertson's 'Essay on Historical Probability', in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The Collected Works of
William Robertson. Vol. XII, p. 8.
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and Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Philosophers, Robertson started a translation
ofMarcus Aurelius's Meditations341 in 1742. Though the work was not
completed or printed, probably due to the publication of a full translation of The
Meditations by Francis Hutcheson later that year, Robertson's choice ofAurelius
offers the strongest available evidence of his early commitment to stoic ideals.
In addition to its ethical appeal, Smitten points out that Robertson's choice of The
Meditations had linguistic significance. Robertson was acutely aware of the need
to develop an elegant literary style. He used essays and translations to perfect his
written prose, while practising the oratorical skills crucial for a successful career
in the pulpit. Smitten suggests that the balanced quality ofRobertson's prose in
the translation shows an advanced sensitivity to the power of speech that "...
embodies ... the relationship among things and events ..." that became "... his
means of expressing his historical vision."342 Robertson may also have shared
Hutcheson's opinion that the stylised prose of earlier English translations failed
to convey the elegant simplicity of the book so appealing to the Stoics.343
341 See the manuscript of Robertson's translation ofMarcus Aurelius, Meditations dated 21
January 1742, (NLS MS 3955). Unfortunately the MS offers few clues about why Robertson
chose the Emperor's book to translate. There are no notes in the margins, and a surprisingly
limited number of corrections.
342 See Smitten's introduction in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The Collected Works ofWilliam
Robertson. Vol. XII, p. xvii.
343 In the introduction to Hutcheson's edition, it is stated that the purpose of the translation is to
make The Meditations "... as plain as the subjects would admit..." and "... to affect the hearts of
those who have any sense of goodness, and warm them with the noblest emotions, of piety,
gratitude, and resignation to GOD; ... ." Hutcheson wished to emphasise the virtuous character
of the Emperor, and warned against 'silly prejudices' distracting readers from the useful lessons
of ancient authors. See Aurelius Antoninus, Marcus, Meditations, with notes and accounts of his
life: the First two books translated by James Moor, the rest by Francis Hutcheson (Glasgow,
1742), pp. 1-2 and 42-3.
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There is no evidence to suggest that Robertson's appetite for moral philosophical
speculation at university came into conflict with his early faith. Robertson would
have received a traditional religious education at the hands of parish teachers and
his father. However John Erskine, Robertson's colleague at Greyfriars, attested
to Robertson's father having a 'liberality ofmind' that influenced the selection of
authors present in the family library. The elder Robertson was familiar with
Dutch and further continental theological discussion, not least with the
Arminianism of Jean Le Clerc, Philip Limborch and Samuel Werenfels. The
young Robertson, according to Erskine, placed the Arminians in 'early and high
esteem', though he only admired those parts of their works concordant with the
Westminster Confession.344
The Scottish clergy's interest in continental theology during the early decades of
the eighteenth century proceeded from earlier seventeenth-century discussion
about the ramifications of the Synod ofDort and the theological controversies in
the Low Countries referred to in chapter two. And the presence ofArminian
texts in the Robertson family library simply suggests that the elder Robertson
involved himself in intellectual debates that were revived after the arrival of
William III in Britain.345 While we will return to further consideration of ties
between Robertson's Arminian influences and stoicism at the end of the chapter,
344 Erskine, John, 'The Agency of God in Human Greatness: Appendix', in Erskine, John,
Discourses Preached on Several Occasions, (ed.) Wellwood, Sr. H.M., 2 Vols. (Edinburgh, 1818),
Vol. I, p. 253.
345 The sources for the information about Arminian texts in the Robertson family library are
Erskine and Smitten, neither ofwhom indicate specific titles ofArminian texts. It has not been
possible to trace a catalogue of the elder Robertson's library. Some of the texts that may have
been in the collection given their popularity in Arminian circles were: Limbroch, Philip, A
Compleat System of Body ofDivinity, 2 Vols. (London: 1713); and, Werenfels, Samuel, Three
Discourses (London. 1718).
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it is significant to note for the moment that seeds sown in Robertson's childhood
fuelled his lifelong commitment to a disciplined, scholarly and tolerant attitude
towards religion. Stoicism underscored the balance of such an approach, and its
themes of universality, virtue, order and subservience to the greater good lent
themselves easily to Robertson's understanding ofwhat was desirable in civil
society.
By the time The History of Scotland was published in 1759, Robertson's
commitment to the progress ofChristianity and his certainty of its civilising
influences were established.346 It is accepted that as a Moderate, Robertson
supported toleration and refinement in religion. He was dedicated to the
eradication of superstition and enthusiasm in all religions, but from Christianity
particularly. He was keenly interested in the development of natural religion
among primitive peoples, and inferences drawn from its study for sophisticated
societies. This was particularly true in the case of India, where Robertson
admired the tolerance existing between monotheistic and polytheistic faiths.
Robertson does not question religion's significance or the need for faith, but
perhaps he exemplified Dugald Stewart's later description of Adam Smith's
purpose, "to illustrate the provisions made by nature in the principles of the
human mind, and in the circumstances ofman's external situation."347
346 See Phillipson, Nicholas, 'Providence and progress: an introduction to the historical thought of
William Robertson', in Brown, Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the expansion of empire,
chap. 3, pp. 55-73.
347
Stewart, Dugald, Biographical Memoir of Adam Smith [Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and
Co. and London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co., 1858, in The Adam Smith Library, Reprints of
Economic Classics (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966)], p. 60. [Smith's terms were in this
case applied to economics concerning the acquisition ofwealth, but it illustrates Smith's wider
point that the greatest liberty lies in following the order set out by nature (read Providence for the
clerics).]
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Stoicism and natural religion share numerous elements of vocabulary ifwe can
define a Moderate interpretation of natural religion as the "derivation of
theological conclusions from premises accepted by all rational human beings."
Both refer to a prevailing order in nature guided by an energy or an Architect of
the Universe; both acknowledge the significance of reason as man's unique
faculty enabling the pursuit of virtue, and both advocate the restraint of passion to
distinguish human beings from irrational creatures.
In A History of the Progress of Society in Europe (1769),349 Robertson criticised
the vulnerability of primitive Christianity to corrupting influences, particularly
during the Dark Ages when the precepts and institutions clearly described in
scripture fell into 'an illiberal superstition' under the Jesuits and the Pope.
Robertson calls the canon law of the Dark Ages, "... the tool of corrupt priests ...
one of the most formidable engines ever formed against the happiness of civil
society."350 Rather than encouraging followers to strive for virtue and sanctity,
"... which alone can render men acceptable to the Great Author of order and
excellence, .. ."351 Rome's emphasis on the observation of external ceremony
brought disgrace to reason, and dangerously compromised individual character.
348
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349 Published as a prelude to The History of Charles V.
350
Robertson, William, A History of the Progress of Society in Europe, p. 63, in Robertson,
William. The History and Reign of the Emperor Charles V (Glasgow: Chapman and Lang, 1800),
10th edition in 4 Vols.
351 Ibid. p. 22.
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Robertson's published sermon, delivered to the Society in Scotland for
Propagating Christian knowledge (SPCK) on 6 January 1755, is curious in its
lack of theological emphasis. The sermon, The Situation ofthe World at the Time
ofChrist's Appearance, argues that God chose the most opportune historical
moment to reveal the Gospel during the era ofAugustus, as Rome enjoyed the
fruits and confronted the obligations of its expanding empire. Just as the Roman
Empire destroyed political and cultural impediments to the progress of
Christianity through its commercial and civic power, so Britain might do the
same. Roman order, combined with the monotheistic and messianic influences of
the Jewish Diaspora, paved the way for revelation. The negative influences of
Rome's superstition and enthusiasm, and the superstition of extreme Jewish sects,
compounded the need for God's steadying revelation at precisely the time Christ
appeared.
Beyond this historical justification for revelation, theology is not formally
addressed. Robertson points out that Christianity "... not only sanctifies our soul,
but refines and adorns the present." With an eye on the proselytising nature of
the SPCK, and his own wish to awaken others to the truths of the Protestant faith,
he concludes with a reminder of European hegemony in enlightened scientific
and cultural inquiry.
Discussion of religion in Robertson's History ofAmerica (1777) includes
examination of the polytheism of Peruvian and Mexican tribes, as well as the
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religion of the more primitive Amerindian peoples. While examining Mexican
religious habits, Robertson criticises the acceptance of belief on instruction rather
than through rational inquiry. The Mexicans have "... neither the leisure nor
capacity for entering into the path of refined and intricate speculation which
conducts to the knowledge of the principles of natural religion."354 The
spectacular natural phenomena that form the basis for supernatural superstition
ore
are perceived through the mind, or reason, augmented by imagination. Unity
of belief and greater degrees of social progress allow, "... more just and adequate
conceptions of the power that presides in nature."
The authority of Incan sovereigns and divines was absolute. Royal decrees were
tantamount to divine commands, therefore, "Obedience becomes a duty of
•5 C*7
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religion." This serves to promote "... simple manners and unsuspicious
ICO
faith." The homage paid to the sun as life's ultimate source of creation and
fertility, dominating a system incorporating the moon and stars, seems to
resemble Robertson's admiration for the evolution of the theory of the Godhead
among the Brahmins in India. Within the Inca system, a harmonious unity
underscores social bonds not felt among Mexicans. Harmony encourages
352 Robertson, William, 'The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ's Appearance ..., a
Sermon given to the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge' (Edinburgh: E.
Balfour, 1791), pp. 48-49.
353 Discussion of the Amerindian religion appears in book four of The History ofAmerica.
354
Robertson, William, The History of America (London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell, 1777), Vol. I,
p. 380.
355 Ibid., p. 382: imagination is described as "... a more forward and ardent faculty of the mind
»>
356 Ibid., p. 384.
357 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 308.
358 Ibid., p. 309.
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virtuous social attachments, promoting a sense of honourable community and
love of country.359
Ultimately Robertson retains a comparative advantage over his audience
concerning his complete understanding of religion. He finds it useful to
emphasise how natural religion legitimised central authority and the values
proceeding from it. When considered rationally, it becomes clear that the Gospel
offers grace and supreme salvation; yet in daily life, as we will see in his
commentary on India, Christians seem to be weaker than their Hindu counterparts
in terms of their susceptibility to prejudice and intolerance.
Both natural and revealed religion, and indeed stoicism, attempted to address
universal values that transcend the political confines of the polis or society, and it
is here that one begins to touch on the true utility of religion for Robertson. His
quest for universal truths overshadowed theological speculation, and became
more urgent as the effects of the diversification of commercial society became
apparent with the growth of empire. Diversification brought with it hard moral
choices for governments and individual citizens. As Polybius the Stoic had
warned centuries before, the wealthier a commonwealth became, the more
difficult it was to maintain its virtue and order. Yet Robertson was determined to
do so. Ultimately Christianity triumphed over natural religion, but natural
religion provided useful information about how religion operated in society and
how universal values served the wider purposes of humanity. A language of
359 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 411.
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convergence between revealed truths, natural religion and civic virtue was still
required and stoicism filled that need.
iii
The Appealing Order and Tranquility of Indian Society
Robertson's An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients
Had of India is difficult to place within the historian's canon. The Disquisition
was published in 1791, two years before Robertson died, and shows marked
differences in structure, tone and style from earlier books. It is a programmatic
rather than a narrative history, offering a lengthy consideration of Indian religion
and society through study of the caste system and civil authority proceeding from
divine origins. Although he acknowledged its fundamental inequality, Robertson
seemed particularly taken with the caste system's effectiveness in maintaining
established order despite its foundation in superstition.
Geoffrey Carnall reminds readers that the Disquisition was inspired by
Robertson's reading of James Rennell's Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan (1788).
Robertson extended Rennell's history to include a broad review and analysis of
• 360
commercial transactions between Europe and the Indian subcontinent. Carnall
360 Robertson was a firm advocate of the civilising powers of commerce. A.O. Hirschman has
argued persuasively that Robertson followed in the tradition ofMontesquieu as an influential
exponent of doux commerce, that gradual 'gentle' form of commercial action that extended across
civilised societies, encouraging refinement and cultivation ofmanners as prosperity increased. In
a draft of The History of the Reign of Charles V. Robertson wrote, "... Commerce tends to wear
off those prejudices which maintain distinction and animosity between nations. It softens and
polishes the manners ofmen. It unites them, by one of the strongest ties, the desire of supplying
their mutual wants. It disposes them to peace, by establishing in every state an order of citizens,
bound by their interest to be the guardians of publick tranquillity. As soon as the commercial
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also suggests that Robertson "... appeared more strongly engaged by the
materials collected in the appendix on 'the genius, the manners, and institutions
i/r i
of the people of India' ..." than in the main body of its history. Robertson
explained this preference when addressing the true motivating force driving
European commerce with India, that of appreciating:
"... the superior improvement of its inhabitants. Many facts have been
transmitted to us, which, if they are examined with proper attention, clearly
demonstrate, that the natives of India were not only more early civilised, but had
made greater progress in civilisation than any other people."3 2
Indian society enjoyed the hallmarks of progress in the arts and sciences that
were prerequisites for attaining the 'wisdom of the East', and inclusion among
the ranks of civilised societies. This was primarily due to the 'spreading of
refinement' and the distinction of social classes imposed by the caste system,
which was "... one of the most undoubted proofs of a society considerably
advanced in its progress." The caste system prescribed the social role played
by each citizen from birth. The permanency of the system underscored its
spirit begins to acquire vigor, its wars, and its negociations. Conspicuous proofs of this occur in
the history of the Italian state, of the Hanseatick league, and the cities of the Netherlands during
the period under review. In proportion as commerce made its way into the different countries of
Europe, they successively turned their attention to those objects, and adapted those manners,
which occupy and distinguish polished nations." (See Robertson, William, The History of the
Reign of Charles V. NLS NE.526.e. 16, quoted in Hirschman, A.O., The Passions and the Interests
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 60-62.
361 Carnall, Geoffrey, 'Robertson and contemporary images of India', in Brown, Stewart J. (ed.),
William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire, chapter 10, pp. 210-11.
362 Robertson, William, An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had
of India (2nd edition, 1794), facsimile reprint in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The Collected Works of
William Robertson. Vol. X, p. 229.
363 Ibid., p. 230. Robertson adheres to Smith's division of labour thesis through the Appendix.
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stabilising influence upon Indian society.364 By extension, it also defined the
scope within which public virtue operated.
The Brahmin caste, Robertson reminded his readers, lay at the heart of this
system. Its members were "... deemed the most sacred, ..." and "... had it for
their province, to study the principles of religion; to perform its functions; and to
cultivate the sciences. They were the priests, the instructors, and philosophers of
the nation." They provided society with the holy men, who personified a
profound mixture of religion and civil authority. Only on occasion did the more
pious of the rajahs embody these ties to the same extent.
Because the caste system was enforced by civil law and ordained by religious
order, the authority of the Brahmins was immutable. The lower orders served
useful purposes within the confines of their designated stations. Robertson
acknowledged that the regulations of caste policy "... must necessarily, at some
times, check genius in its career, and confine to the functions of an inferior cast,
or/:
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talents fitted to shine in an higher sphere." Yet the Indian's ready acceptance
of his station in life allowed him to concentrate form the earliest possible moment
on the development of skills that provided his livelihood. Robertson explained
this process:
364 The division of caste were as follows: 1) Brahmin; 2) Ruler & Magistrates; 3) Husbandman &
Merchants; and 4) Artisans, Labourers & Servants.
365 Robertson, William, An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had
of India. (2nd edition, 1794), facsimile reprint in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The Collected Works of
William Robertson. Vol. X, p. 231.
366 Ibid., p. 233.
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"The human mind bends to the law of necessity, and is accustomed, not only to
accommodate itself to the restraints which the condition of its nature, or the
institutions of its country, impose, but to acquiesce in them."
While Westerners may recoil at the notion of so rigidly structured a social
system, particularly one that restrains individual inventiveness, Robertson
suggests that it is in the organisation of the classes that India's wealth and
prosperity rested. Each of the four castes fulfilled established duties of
production or administration, guaranteeing a regular flow of staple goods and
service throughout society. From this enviable vantage point, Robertson
continued, India could turn its attention to trading with the outside world.
Perhaps more important, the fixed nature of the caste system sustained the
institutions of Indian society and the manners of its people. Neither foreign
invasion nor foreign domination had altered the fundamental fabric of Indian
society. Since the emergence of the caste system, this was due to the constancy
of its social, economic and political institutions, all of which were influenced, if
not defined, by Hinduism and the clear divisions of civil society. The production
of goods, the supply ofwants, were unaffected by domestic political events. This
stability reassured India's trading partners, and enhanced the appeal of Indian
commerce.
For all of its efficiency, Robertson believed, the caste system also had significant
deficiencies that were concentrated primarily in the caste system's failure to
protect the rights of citizens 'in a social state'. However, according to the
367 ibid., p. 234.
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Brahmins, the interests of individuals were guarded by adhering to the system
itself. Citizens were shielded from the excesses of princely power by the fact
that monarchs were nearly always members of the second caste, therefore
subservient to the Brahmins. In the discussion Robertson gives of the
relationship between the sovereigns and the Brahmins, the full scope of their
power becomes clear.
As 'ministers of religion' and 'teachers of wisdom', Brahmins were deemed
sacred by the members of all other castes. Their persons were inviolate and
exempt from capital punishment under any circumstances. They were to be
models of virtue, who enjoyed the right to be consulted on all matters ofpolitical,
social or religious significance. They were free to reprimand unruly princes and
other civil rulers, although these civil leaders guarded their own privileges and
jurisdictions jealously. Robertson gives the impression that the divisions of
responsibility (and labour) among the upper ranks of Indian society were as
fortuitous as those of the lower ones. Order was served best by clarity of duty
and responsibility at every level.
While Brahmins enjoyed superior status, and standards of superior virtue were
expected of them, virtuous behaviour was not limited to their rank. Benevolent
princes occasionally appeared on the scene. Junior level administrators, who
took responsibility over time for the administration of vast remote provinces,
often governed 'with moderation and equity'. Princes were frequently, and
correctly, viewed as patriarchs:
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"A Hindoo Rajah, ..resembles more a father presiding in a numerous family of
his own children, than a sovereign ruling over inferiors, .... He endeavours to
secure their happiness with vigilant solicitude; .... We can hardly conceive men
to be placed in any state more favourable to their acquiring all the advantages
derived from social union."368
Robertson admired the ease and security that India's paternalistic social system
fostered. The caste system served to free the citizen's mind from commonplace
concerns and permitted them to contemplate the level of progress achieved in
their country. It is only among people "... in the most improved state of society,
... that we discover institutions similar to those ..." of India.369 Many civilised
nations failed to match India's level of social harmony and effective government.
A civilisation's progress is measured by its 'political constitution' and by the
'spirit of laws' that protect society. Despite the fact that India relied upon its own
common law that evolved over centuries rather than upon positive statutes in a
European sense, "... justice was dispensed among them with great accuracy, and
... crimes were most severely punished.
In short, Robertson spends considerable time in the opening of the Appendix
making the case that Indian society derived significant benefits from its long
history of social unity. Though this unity was imposed through a hierarchy of
ranks dating from primitive times, the fruits of Indian civilisation far outweighed
problems of inequality or uneven distribution of riches. In the end, Indians were
368
Ibid., p. 244.
369 Ibid., p. 246-7.
370 Ibid. p. 248. Robertson's English readers would have appreciated the appeal to common law.
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"... an enlightened commercial people ..." whose society, though pagan,
offered the Scots a useful model for achieving opulence and unity through
material and social diversity.
iv
Indian Religion and Nature of the Brahmins' Public Virtue
Robertson's analysis of India's social structure sets the stage for his examination
of the religion and manners of the Indian people. Robertson continued to
catalogue the accomplishments of Indian society, focussing on progress in
architecture and in the 'mechanical arts' of linen manufacturing, the dying of
T79
cloth, precious metal work and the engraving of gems. However the most
convincing evidence of the refinement of Indian culture came in the mastery of
literature, drama and fine arts.
In addition to their role as guardians of public order, the Brahmins were
responsible for safeguarding intellectual life and culture. Indeed, for Robertson,
this seems to be their most crucial role; it adds a cultural dimension to the
essentially political form of public virtue discussed earlier. The Brahmins
conducted learning experiments and recorded all matters of scientific and artistic
interest. Because their books were written in Sanskrit, and the Brahmins
prevented foreigners from learning that language for centuries, only in recent
371 Robertson, William, An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had
of India. (2nd edition, 1794), facsimile reprint in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The Collected Works of
William Robertson. Vol. X, p. 253.
372 Robertson praised the accomplishments of the Aztec civilisation in similar terms.
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memory did Westerners gain access to relevant texts. This permitted a new
appreciation of the elegance of Indian literature, particularly exemplified in The
Maharabat, an epic poem that Robertson admired and that touched upon a variety
ofmoral, philosophical and spiritual themes.
To prevent tensions arising from matters of faith and methods of rational inquiry,
the Brahmins distinguished between science and religion in their intellectual
deliberations. They, like the Greeks after them, divided science into logic, ethics
and physics (nature). They developed a sophisticated understanding of the
'distinction between matter and spirit' illustrating that Hinduism's deeply rooted
superstition did not compromise the richness of its spiritual dimensions. There is,
wrote Robertson, "no description of the human soul ... more suited to the dignity
of its nature than that given by the author of the Mahabarat."374 But the
Brahmins necessarily distinguished the soul from ethics.
"This science, which has for its object, to ascertain what distinguishes virtue from
vice, to investigate what motives should prompt men to act, and to prescribe rules
for the conduct of life, as it is of all others the most interesting ... ,"375
Among the Brahmins decisions concerning ethical matters varied. In views
which seemed similar to those of the Stoics, Brahmins agreed that man was
373 This analysis makes the Brahmins sound like people Robertson thought the Moderates should
have resembled. To the extent that Robertson was impressed by the sophistication of the
Brahmin's intellectual endeavours, this is a reasonable suggestion.
374 Robertson, William, An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had
of India. (2nd edition, 1794), facsimile reprint in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The Collected Works of
William Robertson. Vol. X, p. 282: "'Some,' says he, 'regard the soul as a wonder, others hear of
it with astonishment, but no one knoweth it. The weapon divideth it not; the fire burneth it not;
the water corrupteth it not; the wind drieth it not way; for it is indivisible, inconsumable,
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created for and defined by action, with the greatest satisfaction in life derived
from work towards the common good. Individuals need not concern themselves
with the consequences of actions, nor were people permitted to act in ways
contrary to their fundamental nature to serve civil society. In obeying nature,
people contributed to the maintenance of social harmony. The challenge for each
person involved overcoming passions that interfered with personal and social
tranquility. It was essential to concentrate on the means of life and action rather
than the ends. These rules for life were given to the Maharabat teaching:
"... that the distinguishing doctrines of the Stoic school were taught in India
many ages before the birth of Zeno, and inculcated with a persuasive earnestness
nearly resembling that of Epictetus; and it is not without astonishment that we
find the tenets of this manly active philosophy, ..., prescribed as the rule of
conduct to a race of people more eminent... for the gentleness of their
disposition than for the elevation of their minds."376
Following further praise for the sophistication of the Brahmins' exploration of
physics and astronomy, Robertson put it to his readers that the British had a
unique opportunity to enhance communication with the Brahmins as their cultural
'Kin • •
capital, Benares, was under British dominion. Direct contact with the
Brahmins was therefore feasible, and he suggested that the government appoint
an appropriate person, skilled in Sanskrit and science, to devote himself to the
task.
incorruptible; it is eternal, universal, permanent, immovable; it is invisible, inconceivable, and
unalterable'."
375 Ibid., p. 285.
376 Ibid., p. 287.
,77 Robertson referred to Benares as the 'Athens of India'.
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Robertson shifts focus rather suddenly to a consideration of Indian superstition in
section VI of the Appendix. He stated that superstition was:
"... strengthened and upheld by every thing which can excite the reverence and
secure the attachment of the people. ... The rites and ceremonies of their worship
are pompous and splendid, and the performance of them not only mingles in all
the more momentous transactions of common life, but constitutes an essential
part of them."378
The Brahmins (and rajahs) enjoyed complete dominion over the minds of their
people through the exercise of these rites, illustrating further their awareness of
the depths of their power. Robertson leaves aside a detailed account of the Hindu
system of gods as this might detract from the more significant point of divinely-
imparted historical authority, etc.; but, he wishes to sketch, 'the history and
progress of superstition and false religion' with a view to how similar
developments occur elsewhere.
The sketch opens with a discussion of true religion versus superstition, saying
that in the earliest stages of societies, systems of superstitious faiths are founded
T7Q ...
upon inherited mythologies. Primitive societies had very limited capacities
with which to comprehend rational religion, a synonym for true religion in this
case. Early man had no need for abstract reasoning or scientific inquiry in daily
life: these had no bearing on his natural condition or habits. It was unnecessary
to question the motives of a Creator of the Universe within primitive cultures, let
378 Ibid., p. 301.
379 Ibid., p. 303. Robertson explains: "True religion is as different from superstition in its origin,
as in its nature. The former is the offspring of reason cherished by science, and attains to its
highest perfection in ages of light and improvement. Ignorance and fear give birth to the latter,
and it is always in the darkest periods that it acquires the greatest vigour."
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alone for early man to attempt to form an idea of that Creator's nature. Only as
minds are broadened in society, through experience and refinement, do these
kinds of questions evolve.380
• Ml
But like Blair, Robertson argues the human mind is "formed for religion" and
•JOT
is capable of improvement through the "reception of ideas." Hence the
evolution of the polite commercial citizen. The larger point parallels Hume's
Natural History of Religion in that events unfold according to nature's plan
regardless ofman's intercession: it is his happy lot to prosper from nature's
beneficence. Imagination moves one beyond the rudimentary stages of history.
Through imagination early man conceived "... an idea of one superintending
mind, capable of arranging and directing all the various operations of nature...
TOT
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." His mind searched for the causes and effects of action, like storms occurring
or fire burning. Primitives then ascribed the powers associated with actions and
causes to the separate powers ofmultiple deities. Therefore, like Hume,
Robertson directly correlates the number of deities with societal advancement.
A primary benefit of true religion is that it is devoid of superstition and
ceremony, giving men "... a standard of perfect excellence, which they should
have always in their eye, and endeavour to resemble, it may be said to bring
down virtue from heaven to earth, and to form the human mind after a divine
380
Ibid., p. 304. Robertson writes: "The idea of creation is so familiar, wherever the mind is
enlarged by science, and illuminated by revelation, that we seldom reflect how profound and
abstruse the idea is, or consider what progress man must have made in observation and research,
before he could arrive at any distinct knowledge of this elementary principle in religion."
381 Ibid., p. 304.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid., p. 306.
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model."384 In false religions, the developmental process is reversed. Men define
divine abilities and identities within the context of the single reference available
to them, their own self-images.
Robertson then returns to the Brahmins. For all of the sophistication of their
caste, the Brahmins were not entirely virtuous as individuals. As the servants
of superstition, they were capable of licentiousness. This tended to manifest
itself in certain religions rites which fell prey to sensual influences. The
seclusion of the pagoda led to practices that were not always chaste. But
Robertson moderated his criticism by observing that, "In our reasonings
concerning religious opinions and practices which differ widely from our own,
-io/-
we are extremely apt to err." He reminded the reader that ancient Greeks and
Romans succumbed to similar temptations that exaggerated ritual but often
expressed a genuine religious zeal among a people.
Robertson next discussed scientific influences in Hinduism, pointing to
TR7
speculation as "... always favourable to truth, but fatal to error." The value of
scientific inquiry comes in refining religion, and by extension, society.
Robertson writes of the benefits gained through philosophers "of enlarged views,
384 Ibid., p. 308.
385 It should be noted that Robertson does not clearly identify the precise type of virtue Hinduism
recommended. Generally Robertson emphasises those characteristics in members ofHindu
society that promote public virtue, and he is critical of the private virtue of the Brahmins vis-a-vis
their acceptance of superstition and their corruptible moral decision-making powers. It is virtue
as obedience to the established order in Hinduism that seems to appeal to Robertson most. It is
also unclear from Robertson's discussion about how a rather static form of public virtue in the
form of obedience to the status quo encourages progress in society.
386 Robertson, William, An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had
of India (2nd edition, 1794), facsimile reprint in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.), The Collected Works of
William Robertson. Vol. X, p. 313.
387 Ibid., pp. 315-16.
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sensible of the impiety of the popular superstition," forming "... ideas concerning
the perfections of one Supreme Being, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, as
just and rational as have ever been attained by the unassisted powers of the
human mind."388 Among the Brahmins, inquiry had led to an appreciation of the
harmony of the natural order and of the omnipotence of its supreme Author,
culminating in a profession of belief in the unity of the Godhead.
The Appendix closes with an examination of incarnation and the Hindu belief in
the Godhead as an all-pervading soul in nature. This defining spirit provided the
common source for all life, which Robertson later points out parallels aspects of
Stoic thought. The Pundits, translators ofHindu legal codes, wrote:
"... that it was the Supreme Being, who, by his power formed all creatures of the
animal, vegetable, and material world, from the four elements of fire, water, air,
and earth, to be an ornament to the magazine of creation; and whose
comprehensive benevolence selected man, the center of knowledge, to have
dominion and authority over the rest; and, having bestowed upon this favourite
object judgement and understanding, gave him supremacy over the corners of the
world."389
From their ability to appreciate the unity of the Godhead through rational
processes came the best indication that the Brahmins deserved special esteem
among primitive peoples. It also hints at the notion that the best among them
must have recognised the fallibilities of superstition.
"To men capable of forming such ideas of Deity, the public service in the






must have seen that it was only by sanctity of heart, and purity ofmanners, men
could hope to gain the approbation of a Being perfect in goodness. This truth
Veias labours to inculcate in the Mahabarat, but with prudent reserve, and artful
precautions, natural to a Brahmin, studious neither to offend his countrymen, nor
to diminish the influence of his own order."390
Robertson indicated, however, that in these theological matters both the Stoics
and the Hindus make incorrect basic assumptions due to their lack of Christian
-3Q1 #
Revelation. Without Divine revelation, all people suffered certain degrees of
ignorance. The fact that the ancient Brahmins were ignorant of the Gospel could
not be held against them. However, they could be faulted for the manner in
which they preserved their power and influence by deliberately manipulating the
amount of knowledge disseminated to lesser castes. Robertson's underlying
point seems to be that by determining levels of knowledge in society, all
authorities regulate conduct to a greater or lesser degree through superstition.
Judging from the tone of the relevant passages, this is distasteful in Robertson's
mind, but he shrinks from saying that such manipulation can never be considered
virtuous.
Science liberates but in India objective inquiry was manipulated by religious
leaders for illiberal ends. In the absence of the highest form of virtue that
prevents the abuse ofpolitical authority, the Brahmins simply secured their
390 Ibid., pp. 323-24.
391 He wrote, "These doctrines of the Brahmins, concerning the Deity, as the soul which pervades
all nature, giving activity and vigour to every part of it, as well as the final reunion of all
intelligent creatures to the primaeval source, coincide perfectly with the tenets of the Stoic
School, it is remarkable, that after having observed a near resemblance in the most sublime
sentiments of their moral doctrine, we should likewise discover such a similarity in the errors of
their theological speculations." (See the Appendix pp. 326-27). It is interesting for our purposes
to note that Robertson's note for this passage seems to come from Lipsius, "Lipsij. Physiol.
Stoicor.ib.i.dissert, vii. xxi. Seneca, Antoninus, Epictetus, passim."
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power based through the generations, corrupting the tenets of true faith in the
392
process.
Robertson's interest in Hinduism is never directly explained, although he
suggested that his observations may prove useful in encouraging a justified
appreciation of Indian civilisation among Europeans. Despite his commitment to
empire, he seemed alarmed by feelings ofEuropean superiority over inhabitants
of conquered lands, and he wished to foster respect for the natural rights of those
in advanced civilisations.393 Be that as it may, Indian society was fundamentally
flawed in its moral dependency upon a superstitious system of religion. Hindu
manners were static. Progress as the Scots understood it was not encouraged in
the caste system, nor was it considered beneficial. The virtue of the Brahmins
was a by-product of a received mythology and social structure formed in the
infancy of Indian history that perpetuated order, but restrained the impetus to
improvement essential to Enlightened virtue. Because the highest form ofpublic
virtue must include an element of providential revelation, the Brahmins' public
virtue remained admirable but deficient.
The Appendix's overarching themes emphasises religion's utility as an essential
part of any established polity. Its utility gives religion historical validity
regardless of the different theological preference that prevailed in different
societies at different times. Avenues proceeding from scientific inquiry, rather
392 Yet Robertson also noted that the Brahmins preserved the social order. The problem in Indian
society was one of balance between liberty and order; progress and continuity.
393 Stewart J. Brown had recently suggested that in his disapproval of European feelings of
superiority over conquered peoples, Robertson may have been responding to the excesses of
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than formal theological ones, are Robertson's chosen means for determining
religion's role in civil society. The practical utility of the Brahmins' cultural
authority outweighs criticisms of their excesses despite the fact that their system
runs contrary to notions of progress favoured by the literati ofWestern Europe.
Robertson's continual reference to pious behavior linked with political obedience
calls to mind his concern with Presbyterian authority in Scotland, and solidifying
loyalty to the Whig-Hanoverian succession. Despite an acknowledgement of the
superiority of a complete public virtue, there are hints of a delicate equilibrium in
Robertson's mind between classical political public virtue and a broader
culturally-based public virtue that exemplifies the spirit ofModerate Christian
stoicism. This supports Richard Sher's placement of civic humanism at the
centre of Robertson's Moderatism, while suggesting that in Robertson's mind
tensions need not exist between the two. The picture Robertson paints of an ideal
form of public virtue in India seems to reach beyond civic virtue in a political
sense; in this sense it seems to be progressive rather than static in character. It is
rooted in faith, enhanced by experience, strengthened by speculation and
supportive of a broad disciplined world view.
Spain in America. See the introduction to Brown, Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the
Expansion ofEmpire, pp. 5-6.
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V
A Discussion of Jeffrey Smitten on
Robertson's Universal World View: Avoiding Sharp 'Angles of System'
Robertson realized that The History of India would be his last published work,
and he openly expressed his hope that the book would recommend his tolerant
universal views to a wider European audience.394 Perhaps, then, the manner in
which he discussed religion in India has added significance in that it conveyed a
deeper historical message embodying the core ofModeratism. In his emphasis
on universal truths and tolerant themes, Robertson avoided making final
judgements about the intrinsic value of Indian culture. Though he praised the
usefulness ofpublic virtue as it was manifested within the caste structure, he
warned against the sort of religious absolutism practised by the Brahmins. The
more abstract notions of universalism that underscored the commercial spirit
Robertson wished to engender never detracted from the practical considerations
ofdaily life, nor did the challenges ofpractical life dissuade him of his universal
values.
His history intends to provoke discussion about the substance of religion,
commerce and culture rather than to promote theocracy of any kind. The lack of
394 See Robertson quoted by Dugald Stewart in Stewart, Dugald, Account of the Life and Writings
ofWilliam Robertson. P.P. See p. 167: Robertson speaking publicly, "1 own, however, that I
have all along kept in view an object more interesting, as well as of greater importance; and
entertain hopes, that if the account which 1 have given ... of India, ..., shall be received as just
and well established, it may have some influence upon the behaviour of Europeans toward the
people. ... If I might presume to hope, that the description I have given of the manners and
institutions of the people of India could contribute in the smallest degree, ..., to render their
character more respectable, ..., I should close my literary labours with the satisfaction of thinking
that I have not lived or written in vain."
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an evangelical or proselytising tone in the main body of the History or in the
Appendix is not coincidental. Place these priorities within and eighteenth-
century Scottish context, and one immediately recognises the Moderate agenda to
promote unity within their own ranks, in the Church, and in society as a whole,
by diminishing all sources of ideological and social controversy. Essential to the
undertaking is the maintenance of a balanced method of persuasion that charts a
middle ground between scepticism and blind faith; philosophy and theology; self-
interest and the public good. The History of India confirms Robertson's life-long
preference for stoicism as the 'language of convergence' among these parts; yet
readers are still left with a rather general intimation about the mingling of
Christian and stoic principles. This is entirely compatible with the Moderates'
insistence upon reducing areas of potential conflict, but what are the implications
of failing to address the specific relationship between Christianity and stoicism?
Was Moderate Christian Stoicism weakened from the outset by its lack of
specificity?
Robertson would argue no. Christian stoicism accommodated the central tenets
of the Gospel, as well as the business of speculation and improvement essential in
civilised commercial society. As we know the intellectual scepticism that fuelled
rational inquiry brought them dangerously close to the edge of heresy in orthodox
eyes. The Moderates were deeply sensitive to accusations of heterodoxy insofar
as such charges carried an implied challenge to the Church established, not least
to charges ofArminianism. Doctrinally, however, the fact that they stopped short
of encouraging Humean scepticism in matters of faith seems to have satisfied any
unease they may have felt privately about theological problems. If Jeffrey
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Smitten is correct in maintaining that Robertson was deeply influenced by
continental Arminianism, then Robertson must have reflected upon theology even
if it were not his priority.
Smitten develops his arguments against a backdrop of diverse opinion among
Enlightenment historians about the degree to which the Moderates were affected
by seventeenth-century continental (Dutch) theology. Hugh Trevor-Roper argued
that under Moderate influence, the Church of Scotland was 'de-Calvinized' as a
result of'repudiating ideological orthodoxy' of the seventeenth century.395 More
recently Henry Sefton maintained that the Moderates were not indebted to
continental theology at all, but refrained categorically from taking any side in
tq/t
doctrinal matters. Smitten rejects both interpretations, and places the question
of Arminian influence in a socio-political context by stressing Robertson's
acceptance of sceptical epistemology and a "... synergetic view of the
« t • « • « TQ7
relationship between human action and divine providence ...".
Reviewed broadly, the intellectual appeal ofAminianism rested it its denial of the
doctrine ofElection, and in its extension of the possibility of salvation to all the
faithful. Arminianism affirmed a far greater scope for the exercise of individual
free will than did orthodox Calvinism, and it thus provided the philosophical
395
Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 'The Religious Origins of the Enlightenment', in Trevor-Roper, Hugh,
The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation, and Social Change (New York:
Harper, 1968), 205, as quoted in Smitten, Jeffrey, 'The Shaping ofModeration: William
Robertson and Arminianism', in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, Vol. 22 (1992), pp. 281 -
82.
396 Sefton, Henry, "'Neu-lights and Preachers Legall': Some Observations on the Beginnings of
Moderatism in the Church of Scotland," in Church. Politics and Society: Scotland 1408-1929.
(ed.) MacDougall, N. (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983).
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foundation for greater human agency in society and history. Their emphasis on
free will also underscored the Arminians' advocacy of a qualified religious
toleration. They encouraged toleration among dissenting traditions in terms of
the exercise of rites and ceremonies, although this toleration did not flow beyond
Christian ranks.
The Arminian context Smitten describes offers fertile ground in which to root
Robertson's epistemological priorities, with their emphasis on the limitations of
reason and need for balanced inquiry. He makes the point persuasively that
Arminianism provided Robertson with the means of 'obscuring' theological
controversy to achieve immediate social goals. In its plea for toleration, it could
also be argued that Arminianism may have facilitated the Moderate attack on the
divisive tenets ofparticularism inherent in the legacy of seventeenth-century
covenanting Calvinism. Particularism's separation of Scottish society into a
multiplicity of reformed versus unreformed, and Presbyterian versus Episcopal,
groupings, splintered the nation to an unacceptable degree. Furthermore it shifted
attention away from real problems of economic rejuvenation and the re-
establishment ofpolitical stability.
The Arminian paradigm facilitates the promulgation ofRobertson's principles, it
analyses parts ofRobertson's intellectual methodology, but it falls short of
addressing comprehensively the universal quality of Robertson's faith and world-
view. For this a parallel paradigm seems necessary, one that lends itself to
397 Smitten, Jeffrey, 'The Shaping of Moderation: William Robertson and Arminianism', in
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, Vol. 22 (1992), p. 282.
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broader spiritual dimensions while accommodating matters of human reason,
will, agency and experience. It may be that Augustine's weaving together of
elements of stoic ethics and Christian revelation with the Neo-Platonic position
that philosophy was a preparatory tool for faith provides another avenue of
1QO .... .
exploration. The constant juxtaposition of faith and understanding highlighted
the tensions and apparent contradiction between assent and blind faith that so
troubled Enlightenment figures.
Augustine's defence of the human mind's capability of discerning truth, and his
location of the moral sense in the soul inextricably tied the functioning of reason
to reflecting God's omnipresence in the cosmological order. Nature, by
extension, was a manifestation of that order. Faith transcended the boundaries of
rationality, ultimately regulating human identity and endeavour. The association,
therefore, between the mind and soul testified to the guidance of Providence in
intellectual, empirical and spiritual matters, and anticipates the central role
Reformed theologians, and the Moderates, assigned to Providence.
Smitten suggests that Robertson's histories should be viewed as 'enactments of
Moderatism', characterised by balanced judgements and the constant
recommendation of toleration for other cultures and forms of human
experience.399 In indirect support of Smitten's point, John Dwyer argues that
398 It is useful to bear in mind that Augustinian influences permeated Scottish intellectual life
since Carmichael and Hutcheson's day.
399 These characteristics also reflect Robertson's strong sympathy with stoicism.
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Robertson played a key role in shifting the Moderates' "conceptual anchor"400
from revelation to 'social community'. This implied a disassociation of
Moderate notions of 'social community', or civil society, from religion that is
problematic from our point of view. But the wider point that Robertson defended
his ideals within the context of Arminianism's intellectual legacy is useful. In
terms of historical writing and subtle polemics, the Moderates had no finger
exponent. Smitten concludes that while some of Robertson's contemporary
readers objected to his Arminian tone, they none the less appreciated his
persuasive rhetorical style, for:
"... when Robertson, who because he 'rather inclined to the Arminian side ...
would have been less acceptable to the body of the people,' handled 'the peculiar
doctrines ofChristianity,' he worked to keep clear of the 'angles of system, by
which means such as disliked his politics, were often delighted' as well as
'instructed by his discourses'."401
It is precisely in this ground, the avoidance of 'angles of system', that the appeal
of stoicism is embedded. As a "lover ofmankind" and in expressing his "love of
the human species",402 and indeed as a Christian, anything less than the
identification of a language of universal truths was unacceptable to Robertson.
400
Dwyer, John, 'The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Moderate Divines', in Dwyer,
John (ed.), New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland (Edinburgh:
John Donald, 1982), p. 298.
401 NLS MS 1636, ff. 220-222 quoted in Smitten, Jeffrey, 'The Shaping ofModeration: William
Robertson and Arminianism', in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, Vol. 22 (1992), p. 293.
402 From letters from Robertson to W. Strahan quoted by Dugald Stewart in Stewart, Dugald,
Account of the Life and Writings ofWilliam Robertson. P.P.. pp. 160-61.
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Conclusion
William Robertson shared Hugh Blair's interest in morality, yet both men
explored it from very different perspectives. Robertson concentrated on the
operating laws of civil society that fostered order and tranquility, and the public
virtue proceeding from them. Blair, by contrast, encouraged the cultivation of
virtuous characteristics that enhanced personal development, and eased potential
social conflict. Blair did so by using a language of religion, Christian Stoicism,
that accommodated a stoic ethic of virtue and method, but remained equally
committed to the translation of essential classical civic virtues into a body of
polite social ethics for the commercial era.403
Robertson's Christian Stoicism seems to function in a more abstract fashion than
Blair's. Seen through the operation of public virtue in India, it is less tangible
though equally powerful. Robertson's Christian Stoicism is not a language of
religion so much as a pragmatic spirit of order, tolerance and obligation,
completed by faith, that he wished to see accepted throughout Europe.404
Consequently Robertson's Christian Stoic, ifwe may call the British citizen of
his day such, recognised that civic duties were pre-eminent and retained a strong
religious and moral dimension. The matter of virtue now extended beyond
leaders to all people who played a part in the new commercial order. Robertson's
limited discussion of theological issues leaves readers to assess for themselves
403 Given that he referred to Epictetus and Zeno more frequently, it is reasonable to suggest that
Robertson's stoicism was more Epictetan than Aurelian in spirit. An Epictetan inspired stoicism
should be contrasted with the stoic spirit permeating Blair's sermons. That spirit of stoicism
seemed more Senecan in its appreciation for gradual personal and societal improvement.
404 This description of Robersonian Christian Stoicism is not unlike humanism.
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the degrees to which he reconciled stoic and Christian principles. Nevertheless, it
is argued here that he made deep connections between the two. These
connections bridge moral and epistemological divides proceeding from tensions
between philosophy and religion, scepticism and faith.
In Part I and in the concluding comments on Blair, it was argued that aspects of
seventeenth-century Dutch Neostoic thought lend themselves to an eighteenth-
century Scottish context for Christian Stoicism in terms of addressing the
function of religion in commercial society. As we saw, Lipsian Neostoicism
addressed tensions between scepticism and faith by suggesting that problems
between reason and sentiment were reconcilable to a certain degree. Lipsius, it
will be recalled, emphasised the need to identify a co-existence of ethical
priorities that underscored the state's role as providing the unifying bond in
society. Further, he placed the military at the heart of protecting civil society.
While Robertson ultimately assigned that role to the constitutional government,
he none the less continued the Neostoic discussion about this convergence of
ethical priorities in his investigations of providence, government and the rule of
law, not least in his History of India.
If taken as a defence of commerce and empire, the History of India fills a unique
place among the Moderate literati's works. Robertson was perhaps their most
eloquent apologist, and like his friends, firmly defended the material benefits
proceeding from commercial culture. Indeed the positive effects of commerce
were discussed between Robertson and Blair:
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"... You can best judge whether there be foundation for any general observation
of this kind. On Governments I should think the freer and more general
intercourse occasioned by Commerce must have tended to lessen the severe
despotism which pervaded in the Middle Ages. It certainly had the effect to raise
Cities, & ... Citizens, into more consequences; and by diffusing wealth more
equally to break & lessen the power ofAristocracy. If it did not alter the political
form of any Government, yet by its gradual effects on manners, it tempered the
Spirit ofGovernment. Perhaps there might be ground for the same observations
of this kind, in favour of the Connexion between extended trade & Liberty."405
It is in its universal tone and encouragement of toleration that the History of India
is most useful to an investigation ofRobertson's interest in Stoicism. At the heart
of Robertson's endorsement of universal values is his wish to erode cultural
ignorance and religious superstition, which threatened not only European
understanding of world cultures, but the sober, balanced, active Christian life he
recommended for readers. Charles Camic reminds readers that Robertson
insisted that a "human being, as he comes originally from the hand of nature, is
everywhere the same,"406 and that contrary to received Calvinist dogma, all are
capable of attaining happiness.407 Robertson's religious and secular careers
embodied this truth, and formed the core of his Christian Stoicism.
405 Blair to Robertson, 24 May 1790, NLS MS 3944, f. 20 (Robertson-MacDonald papers).
406 From History ofAmerica quoted in Camic, Charles, Experience and Enlightenment:
Socialization for Cultural Change in Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 66-7.
407 It should be noted that theological Calvinists applied the doctrine of Election only to the next
world, not to happiness or success in the present world.
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Part III
Searching for 'Principle of Connection': the Moderates' Intellectual Debts
to Adam Smith with Reference to Christian Stoicism
Introduction
The close association between religion and morality has been a characteristic
element ofChristian civilisation for two thousand years, but as Christopher Berry
reminds readers in his primer on the Scottish Enlightenment, the link between the
two has always been 'close without being precise'.408 We have seen that one of
the more enduring challenges to religion and morality came from the rise of
commerce in the early modern period, which sparked Enlightenment debate about
the degrees to which temptations ofmaterialism could be contained through
personal virtue.
From Calvin's time forward, the classic challenge commerce posed to morality
revolved around the question: was it possible for an individual to retain his or her
moral integrity when dealing in economic and social transactions motivated by
self-interest? If so, how did one prevent such activity from degenerating into
envy or avarice? Did Christianity have at its disposal a sufficiently sophisticated
408
Berry, Christopher, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1977), p. 166.
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set of replies to this problem to safeguard its place in the new intellectual order,
and more importantly, could the Christian Church define a kind of economy of
salvation, or a path towards righteousness, that operated unhindered within the
constraints of a profit economy?
We have seen that the Scots chose to reply to this challenge within the context of
moral philosophy by investigating the relationship between moral and social
theory. The nexus of this relationship was the development of a theory of social
values that underscored the empiricists' rejection ofpurely rational analyses of
the motives for moral action. Following David Hume and Adam Smith, the
Scottish literati relied upon knowledge based on experience to determine the
extent to which one could know what constituted a morally correct action.
In adopting this empirical model, the Moderates acknowledged the validity of the
central tenets of Smith's ethical theory as presented in his The Theory ofMoral
Sentiments (TMS). The work was in circulation from 1759, i.e., throughout much
of the high Moderate period when Blair and Robertson were most active in
Edinburgh. Blair and Robertson know of and referred to Smith's work. Their
admiration for Smith's moral theory was shared by lesser known members of the
Moderate clergy, not least John Drysdale (1718-88), a friend of Smith's since
boyhood who became Robertson's protege in the 1760s.
The acceptance of Smith's theories served as a means of placing religion at the
centre of the process to define the ethics of commercial society. However it also
posed a fundamental challenge: how were the Moderates to respond to Smith's
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emphasis on self-interest as a force in society, and how did Smith's rather
different understanding of benevolence square with the Moderates' Christian
interpretation of the same? It is argued that in their Christian Stoicism, the
Moderates replied to the problem of self-interest through their strict advocacy of
virtue. Smith placed similar importance on virtue as a means for improving
character and promoting order. However it is well established in Enlightenment
historiography that this common commitment to virtue did not necessarily spring
from a mutual dedication to established Christianity.
This returns one to a question of fundamental importance to the Moderates.
Namely, in accepting the tenets of Smith's ethics, what, if any, were the
theological dimensions of Smith's moral theory? While the Moderates may have
considered this matter privately, neither Blair, Robertson nor Drysdale left
evidence discussing it. We know that Smith raised the question of natural
theology during his moral philosophy lectures at Glasgow in the early 1750s, but
there are no surviving lecture notes on the subject.409 Smith's texts do not
provide formal answers, therefore any clarifications can only be contextual.
In Part III suggestions will be made about the Moderates' intellectual debts to
Smith vis-a-vis Christian Stoicism within the context of his interest in stoicism
and by tracing theological dimensions in Smith's moral philosophy. It seeks to
do so by introducing another source into current historiographical discussion,
409 Se John Millar's account of Smith's moral philosophy lectures in Steward, Dugald, Account of
the Life and Writings of Adam Smith. LL.D. (1793) in The Adam Smith Library, Biographical
Memoir of Adam Smith (New York: Reprints of Economic Classics, A.M. Kelley Publishers,
1966), pp. 11-13.
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albeit an oblique one, in the form of John Drysdale's Sermons. The Sermons are
of interest for three reasons: they reflect Drysdale's adoption ofmany of the
themes Smith and John Millar propound concerning the division of social ranks
in society; the sermons suggest that Drysdale was influenced by Smith's theory
of the impartial spectator; and, they demonstrate that Drysdale shared Smith's
passionate dedication to Stoic principles. After discussing corresponding themes
in Smith's treatment of stoicism, natural religion and revealed religion at length
in chapter six, chapter seven examined Drysdale's sermons in greater detail.
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Chapter 6
The Deity and Providential Order: Smith's Image ofNatural Theology and
His Interest in Stoicism
After the publication of The Wealth ofNations (1776), Adam Smith came to be
remembered first as a political economist rather than as a moral philosopher.
However The Wealth ofNations was a component of a much larger investigation
of human society, and the complex motives that drive human action. Political
economy was one of a series of interlocking areas of human activity that
interested Smith, although it was in the economic realm that the strongest motives
for action were found, namely self-interest and the protection of one's dependents
and property. Smith's first published work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments
(TMS), addressed the highest motives for human activity, those senses of duty,
justice and virtue that lent a nobility and purpose to human action and the
mechanisms of commercial society.
Smith altered the text of TMS considerably during his life time. When the final
sixth edition of the book appeared shortly before Smith's death in 1790, he had
made substantial changes and additions to his work. Chief among the additions
were revised and new passages on stoicism, which reflected the profound
influence this ancient school had on Smith in his later years. This influence was
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especially pronounced in his reflections on duty and the character of virtue, most
notably the virtues ofprudence, beneficence and self-command.410
The relatively new investigations into Smith's stoicism centre around key themes,
which include his advocacy of virtue and justice, and a built-in concept of
providence that lent itself both to stoic cosmology and to the Christian notion of a
retributive God as a key motivator for acting morally. Smith treated these
matters very strictly in the sixth edition of TMS, and in successive editions until
1790 when he veered away from making connections between his stoic
preferences and corresponding themes in natural theology or revealed religion.
This did not prevent the Moderates from approving of Smith's moral theory, or
indeed from continuing to rely on common themes in natural and revealed
religion and stoicism to promote their moral agenda. Although Drysdale died
two years before the 1790 edition of TMS was published, he seemed to find
Smith's earlier stoicism broadly compatible with Christian principles, as did
Blair. Whether Drysdale and Blair were correct in their assessment is not the
immediate concern of this section. Rather it asks how the Moderates might have
reached the conclusion that Smith left sufficient room for Christian principles in
his moral theory despite the fact that he became increasingly disenchanted with
the institutions of organised religion? In order to do this, it is necessary to
engage in a limited piece of theoretical history to supply "... fact by
410 Smith expanded the previous references he made to stoicism in earlier editions of TMS in Part
VII of the sixth edition. His revised discussion of the sense of duty appeared in Part III, and a
new Part VI treated the character of virtue with its emphasis on self-command.
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conjecture"411 by deconstructing and reconstructing Smith in an attempt to find a
place for Christianity in his work.
i
Organised Religion and the Appeal of Natural Theology
Smith's objections to organised religion rested primarily in his view that
throughout history the institutions ofChristianity abused their power in society,
and clouded them minds of believers with gratuitous ritual and perverse
superstition. In Wealth ofNations (WN), he attacked the political power of large
ecclesiastical institutions, particularly those that engaged in priestcraft or
promoted enthusiasm. Established churches tended to breed intolerance for other
religious sects, which in turn fostered social division and unrest.
The teachers of the great sects lacked the "candour and moderation"412 desired of
religious leaders in polite society, and they tended to manipulate civil authorities
to their own advantage. If, however, a great number of small sects operated in
society, none:
"... could be considerable enough to disturb the publick tranquility. ... The
teachers of each little sect, ..., would be obliged to respect those of almost every
other sect, and the concessions which they would mutually find it... convenient
and agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine
of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every
mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages
411
Dugald Stewart's description of theoretical history quoted in the general introduction by D.D.
Raphael and A.S. Skinner to Smith, Adam, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, (eds) Wightman,
W.P.D. and Bryce, J.C. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), p. 3.
412 Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature ofCauses of the Wealth ofNations, (eds) Campbell,
R.H. and Skinner, A.S. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981), Vol. II, p. 793.
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of the world wished to see established; but such as positive law has perhaps never
yet established, ... ,"413
While no form of ecclesiastical government was conducive to the cultivation of a
'philosophical good temper', sects that promoted virtuous behaviour operating
within very loose organisational structures, like the Quakers, contributed to the
civil society by encouraging moderation in "... every sort of religious
principle."414 A large number of smaller churches operating in society reduced
the possibility of one larger church exercising undue influence within a political
establishment. However smaller churches tended to be susceptible to faction, and
they often interpreted morality in such rigourous terms that members of their
congregation became fanatical. For Smith this was as unacceptable as the
domination of a larger ecclesiastical institution:
"Of all the corrupters ofmoral sentiments ... faction and fanaticism have always
been by far the greatest."415
To counter the 'unsociable' effects of organised religions in society, Smith
appealed to the state to diffuse tension among small sects; to restrain the power of
established churches; and most importantly, to promote the study of science and
philosophy among members of the middling ranks from which society drew its
leaders. Ultimately it fell to them to promote Smith's pure rational religion, and
to restrain the forces of enthusiasm in society:




"Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and
where all the superior ranks of people were secured in it, the inferior ranks could
not be much exposed to it."416
Throughout his discussion of ecclesiastical institutions in WN, Smith displayed a
profound understanding of the complex relationship between civil and
ecclesiastical authorities in commercial society. He strengthened his analysis by
placing it within a historical context, highlighting the particularly damaging
effects popery had throughout Europe before the eighteenth century. The
superstition ofRome counteracted the church's positive role as an educational
institution, although Smith continued to acknowledge that religion played a
useful role in society by sanctioning and propagating the general rules ofmoral
conduct."417 He contrasted the Roman Catholic example with the more measured
contributions of the Church of Scotland (a smaller sect), which in terms of
education produced "... as good effects as Rome with less money."418 Smith also
displayed an extensive knowledge of the Church of Scotland's patronage
controversies and discussed Presbytery selection in detail.419
Smith's critique of organised religion was powerful in its specificity, and because
Smith was careful to distinguish the harmful effects of organised faith from the
broader benefits of natural religion. These included a sense of duty and
415 Ibid., p. 796.
4.6 Ibid.
4.7 In TMS Smith commented that"... religion, even in its rudest form, gave sanction to the rules
ofmorality, long before the age of artificial reasoning and philosophy. That the terrors of religion
should thus enforce the natural sense of duty, was of too much importance to the happiness of
mankind, for nature to leave it dependent upon the slowness and uncertainty of philosophical
researches." (See Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. III.5.4, p. 164).
418 Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth ofNations. Vol. II, p. 813.
419 See Ibid., pp. 808-15.
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responsibility to self and society, and a sense of God operating through nature
free from the distractions of superstition.
The Supreme Being of TMS bears a distinctive resemblance to the Deity found in
Bishop Butler's discussion of natural religion, a Deity who required no mediator
to conduct a useful relationship with humanity and whose authority underscored
the providential order.420 While Smith's image of the Author ofNature, and
indeed of the correct tone for religious activity, became increasingly stoic in the
sixth edition of TMS, it is important to bear in mind earlier references to these
dimensions of religious life given that the Moderates had access to the texts.
In his examination of the relationship between human morality and a Divine
Author in Part II of the last edition of TMS, Smith made numerous references to
the Deity, most ofwhich present a somewhat benign image ofGod. Smith's
Author ofNature lies at the head of the Providential system, whose original
intention for humanity was (and remained) the pursuit of happiness:
"No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity which
we necessarily ascribe to him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the
abstract consideration of his infinite perfections, is still more confirmed by the
420 See chapter 3 for a summary of Butler's interest in the relationship between natural and
revealed religion. Butler's natural religion was a composite of the naive faith ofGenesis and a
religion that prescribed the soul's moral constitution from the time of creation. He guaranteed the
exercise of free will within this system; it is guided by a moral sense governed by providential
reason. These wide perimeters encompassed all humanity, believers and non-believers alike, in
that all were creations ofDivine intelligence. See also Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral
Sentiments, p. 170: "And wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the
factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal; wherever the first duty which it requires, is to
fulfil all the obligations ofmorality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous observances,
as more immediate duties of religion, than acts ofjustice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by
sacrifices, and ceremonies, and vain supplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, ...,
the world undoubtedly judges right in this respect, and justly places a double confidence in the
rectitude of the religious man's behaviour."
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examination of the works of nature, which seem all intended to promote
happiness, and to guard against misery. But by acting according to the dictates of
our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for
promoting the happiness ofmankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense,
to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of
Providence."421
Smith's Deity operated through the laws of nature, in a realm similar to that of
First Causes outlined in the Westminster Confession of Faith. Within the realm
of First Causes, God officiated through a fore-knowledge of time and history.422
However, it was the impartial spectator, the 'man within the breast', that
regulated behaviour in the external world by determining whether or not actions
were worthy of the approval of one's neighbours. Furthermore:
"The all-wise Author ofNature has, in this manner, taught man to respect the
sentiments and judgements of his brethren; to be more or less pleased when they
approve of his conduct, and to be more or less hurt when they disapprove of it.
He has made man, ..., the immediate judge ofmankind; and has, in this respect,
as in many others, created him after his own image, and appointed him viceregent
upon earth, to superintend the behaviour of his brethren." 2
Because the impartial spectator determined the merit of action based upon a fixed
set ofmoral distinctions rather than upon the judgements of neighbours, it acted
421 Ibid., p. 166.
422 Carruthers, S.W. (ed.), The Westminster Confession of Faith (Glasgow: Free Presbyterian
Publications, 1978. Reprint of 1646 edition by Cornelius Burges). See chapter V, p. 7: "God the
Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things,
from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy providence, according to His
infallible fore-knowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of His own will, to the praise of the
glory ofHis wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy. ... Although, in relation to the fore¬
knowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly;
yet, by the same providence, He ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second
causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently. God, in his ordinary providence, maketh use of
means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at His pleasure."
423 Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, pp. 128-30.
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as a steady arbiter of conduct in daily life.424 The spectator was a constructed
entity, derived from one's first moral standards, and as such was considered
separately from conscience. Like Calvin, Smith considered conscience an
unreliable moral guide although it reflected a kind of positive impulse ofGod in
the human mind. The conscience was susceptible to the effects of habit and
experience in the mind of individuals, which introduced an unacceptable degree
ofpartiality into its operations. Hence Smith's preference for the firm rules of
conduct under which the impartial spectator functioned. In the event that the
spectator became 'confounded' for any reason, i.e., when a weakness ofmind
caused one to act without recourse to general opinion, the spectator's only option
was to refer to:
"... that all-seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be deceived, and
whose judgements can never be perverted. A firm confidence in the unerring
rectitude of this great tribunal, before which his innocence is in due time
declared, and his virtue to be finally rewarded, can alone support him under the
weakness and despondency of his own mind, whom nature has set up as, in this
life, the great guardian, not only of his innocence, but of his tranquility."425
Turning to the tone of religious activity, John Dwyer has recently argued that in
Smith's discussion of the "consonance between human resentment and God's
wrath"426 in Part II of TMS, Smith discussed the "... proper tone for religious
belief'427 in a markedly Calvinist manner. While it must be pointed out that
Smith omitted the following material in his revisions to the sixth edition, it is
424 In a sense this implies that it was the spectator that governed conduct within the realm of
Second Causes rather than Christ, but Smith did not pursue this matter.
425 Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, pp. 131-32.
426
Dwyer, John, The Age of the Passions: An Interpretation of Adam Smith and Scottish
Enlightenment Culture (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1998), p. 30, see note 49.
427 Ibid.
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likely that the Moderates came across it in their reading of earlier editions. The
more traditional image of God put forward in this passage supports the
suggestion that through the fifth edition of TMS, there were remnants of a
Christian Deity in Smith's thought.
It is, therefore, worth quoting Smith at length when he discussed a person
appearing before the Deity for final judgement:
"... To such a being, he fears, that his littleness and weakness can scarce ever
appear the proper object, either of esteem or of rewards. But he can easily
conceive, how the numberless violations of duty, ofwhich he has been guilty,
should render him the proper object of aversion and punishment; and he thinks he
can see no reason why the divine indignation should not be let loose without any
restraint, upon so vile an insect, he imagines that he himselfmust appear to be. If
he would still hope for happiness, he suspects that he cannot demand it from the
justice, but that he must entreat it from the mercy of God. Repentance, sorrow,
humiliation, contrition at the thought of his past conduct, seem, upon this
account, the sentiments which become him, and to be the only means which he
has left for appeasing that wrath, which he knows, he has justly provoked. ..."
Should these fail to appease God, "... Some other intercession, ..., some other
atonement, he imagines, must be made for him, beyond what he himself is
capable ofmaking, before the purity of the divine justice can be reconciled to his
manifold offences. The doctrines of revelation coincide, in every respect, with
those original anticipations of nature; and, as they teach us how little we can
depend upon the imperfection of our own virtue, so they show us, ..., that the
most powerful intercession has been made, and that the most dreadful atonement
.... 498
has been paid for our manifold ... iniquities."
While it cannot be said that Smith necessarily held these views at the time of his
death, his comments displayed an understanding of the powers that ideas of
revelation and a retributive God could exercise on the mind that conformed with
traditional Christian interpretations of the same. This would have facilitated the
428 Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, see note to Part II.ii.3.12, pp. 91-92. [This
excerpt incorporates corrections Smith made in TMS editions 2-5.]
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Moderates' acceptance of Smith's morality, as did Smith's general reliance on
Providence to strengthen the social order,429 maintain private virtue and unite
human experience with the forces of time and history. Ultimately it seems Smith
followed Francis Hutcheson in thinking of religion as an extension ofmorality,
but a morality that could be taught to believers and non-believers alike. If it did
not follow that morality was a precursor to religion for Smith personally, this did
not detract from the space he left for the Deity in his moral framework.
ii
Further Consideration of Smith's Stoicism
As Smith revealed the full extent to which stoicism influenced his mature thought
in the sixth edition of TMS, a fuller picture emerged of his natural theology. It
was a natural theology that continued to rely upon the forces of Providence and
the wisdom of the Creator, but, as stated earlier, the Deity was referred to in
increasingly stoic rather than Christian terms.
Before looking at Smith's stoicism in detail, it is important to recall that the
philosophical foundation for Smith's stoicism, as for the Scots' overall treatment
of virtue and human action, was laid by Francis Hutcheson. Smith and the
Moderates benefited from Hutcheson's earlier replies to the egoistic philosophy
of Bernard Mandeville and Thomas Hobbes. Hutcheson's development of his
theory of a moral sense operating independently ofDivine wisdom laid the basis
for the Scots to investigate morality through exploring natural sentiments, ideas
429 The key element of which was the division of society into established ranks.
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and virtues. We saw in chapter 3 that Hutcheson's research into the nature of
morality involved several key features: the denial of humanity's inherent
sinfulness with the implication that morality could not be reduced to a matter of
reacting against sin; the rejection of the notion that moral actions are taken
through fear of Divine retribution; and, that the moral sense is actually completed
by theology, or Christianity, rather than proceeding from it.430
These points are important for the Moderates on numerous levels. In the case of
denying inherent sinfulness and insisting on the existence of a moral sense,
Hutcheson immediately shifted direct responsibility for moral action onto the
shoulders of individual citizens. The Moderates developed this theme by
emphasising the degree to which individuals as citizens are responsible for the
propagation of private and public virtue. This was particularly true for Blair and
Drysdale, who, as we shall see, stressed in their sermons the need for individuals
to assume direct responsibility for moral undertakings.
Hutcheson's reduction of the degree to which one could interpret moral action as
resulting from fear of Divine punishment seemed to diminish the extent to which
superstition influenced moral thinking. To suggest that religion or theology
completed rather than defined a moral sense implied that the moral sense was
universal, and that it was enhanced by faith. All human beings shared the
obligation to act in accordance with the moral sense, with the consequence that
each person was theoretically capable of virtuous action. That the Moderates
430 See Haakonssen, Knud, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, pp. 63-75.
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argued for virtue being accessible to all has been clearly demonstrated in earlier
chapters.
We have also seen that both Hutcheson and the Moderates invoked stoic
principles in their attempts to identify a philosophical via media between the
extremes ofmaterialism and virtuousness in commercial society. Whether
stoicism appealed to Smith for similar reasons, particularly the stoicism that
appears in the final revised edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, seems
unlikely. However it becomes apparent that more needs to be said about the
nature ofHutcheson's stoicism, the degree to which he influenced Smith on
stoicism, and the Moderates' indebtedness to both thinkers in the development of
Christian Stoicism.
Some scholars define Smithian ethics as "... a combination of Stoicism and
Hutcheson ... ."431 The key distinction between Moderate Christian Stoicism as
it has been described here and the kind of stoicism that evolves in Smith's
thought is that Christian Stoicism retains an element of charitable benevolence
apparent in Hutcheson, a type of caritas, that Smith rejected. The following
sections attempt to analyse these forms of stoicism further, and to trace the role of
benevolence in the Christian Stoic and Smithian orders.




A Review of Hutcheson's Interest in Stoicism and His Emphasis of
Benevolence
It is well established within Enlightenment historiography that Francis Hutcheson
was a practical moralist, who followed in the Ciceronian tradition by encouraging
his audience to exercise their moral capacities through the pursuit of the vita
activa. In his advocacy of civic virtue as a defining element of the political and
moral order, Hutcheson followed Cicero, Harrington and the civic humanists
closely. It is also accepted that Hutcheson owed significant intellectual debts to
the natural law tradition, which had antecedents in Greek and later Roman Stoic
philosophy.
Before the development of Grotius' and Pufendorf s theories, natural law
flourished under Zeno ofCitium, Chrysippus, Cato the Younger, Seneca and
Marcus Aurelius, who posited the well-known adage that the wise man lived in
harmony with nature through the cultivation of a certain detachment from
worldly affairs. In their legal thought, the Stoics placed supreme importance
upon a universal law of nations or peoples, the ius gentium, over individual
systems ofpublic or civil law. This anticipated the development of the Neostoic
notion that there existed among different peoples a set of universal values that
transcended problems of diversity or special interest. This set of values
encouraged the fundamental order of civilised societies and the equality of each
person before the law. Hutcheson received and endorsed these general precepts,
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and blended them with civic humanist priorities to form the context within which
he developed his moral theory.
Hutcheson's civic humanist credentials were enhanced by his recognition of the
powers of rhetoric, or persuasion, to disseminate classical values and encourage
Christian principles. Thomas Miller points out that it is in the introductions to
some of Hutcheson's works that one finds immediate references to the value
Hutcheson placed not only on the content ofGreek and Roman philosophy, but
also on the form and style in which the ancients presented their intellectual cases.
In Hutcheson's A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1747), the professor
called upon his students to embrace the challenges of the vita activa by looking to
'the inventors and improvers of all ingenious arts, the Greek and Roman writers',
who read with the Bible 'adorn your souls with every virtue, prepare yourselves
for every honourable office in life, and quench that manly and laudable thirst you
should have after knowledge'.432 The entire scheme of Hutcheson's moral
philosophy, Miller correctly argues, is stoic in tone for the weight it gives to
living in accordance with 'right reason', and for the value it assigns to practical
over speculative experience:
"As all other arts have in view some good to be obtained, as their proper end,
Moral Philosophy, which is the art of regulating the whole of life, must have in
view the noblest end; since it undertakes, as far as human reason can go, to lead
us into that course of life which is most according to the intention of nature, and
most happy, to which end whatever we can obtain by other arts should be
432 Hutcheson quoted in Miller, Thomas P., 'Francis Hutcheson and the Civic Humanist Tradition'
in Hook, Andrew and Sher, Richard B. (eds), The Glasgow Enlightenment (East Linton: Tuckwell
Press, 1995), p. 46.
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subservient. Moral Philosophy therefore must be one of these commanding arts
which directs how far the other arts are to be pursued. And since all
Philosophers, even of the most opposite schemes, agree in words at least that
'Happiness either consists in virtue or virtuous offices, or it is to be obtained and
secured by them:' The chief points to be enquired into in Morals must be, what
course of life is according to the intention of nature? wherein consists happiness?
and what is virtue"433
It is Hutcheson's advocacy of virtue that lies at the heart of his stoicism, and it is
significant that his ideas about virtue, ethics and rights proceeded from this
theory of the moral sense. While ethics governed action in society for
Hutcheson, the moral sense governed individual action. The moral sense, by its
nature, was designed for regulating human powers, and its 'dignity' was found in
virtue. Virtue "... does not lye in the mere sentiment of approbation of certain
affections and actions, but in acting agreeably to it, ...": consequently, "... the
soul ofman, ... bears a resemblance ofDivine Intelligence in its rational
faculties, but also of the Divine disinterested benignity in its social and public
affections: and thus too our internal constitution ... ."434 In Hutcheson's view,
virtue was sought for its own sake, arising from the belief that the products of
moral sense were ideas that stemmed from benevolent actions based on original
perceptions. The ties between virtue, benevolence and perceptions were intended
by God.435
Following the civic humanist model, Hutcheson placed the pursuit of virtue at the
heart of private and public life, linking personal and social obligations within the
433 Ibid.
4j4
Hutcheson, Francis, A System of Moral Philosophy (1755), Preface, p. xix.
435 The moral sense, virtue, benevolence and perception all functioned under the jurisdiction of
Divine benevolence, suggesting that at the heart of Hutcheson's system is a world governed
272
context of contemporary citizenship. Moral philosophical obligations became
institutionalised through the political structures of society, which set a significant
precedent for the Scots' subsequent treatment of the relationship between
morality and civic duty. Following Cicero further, who took his lead from
Polybius the Stoic, Hutcheson implied that civil society existed for the moral
improvement of its members.
It is important to note, however, that Hutcheson's admiration for the Stoics was
not unconditional. Throughout chapter IV, part vi, ofA System ofMoral
Philosophy. Hutcheson referred to the combined wisdom of the Greek Stoic,
Sextus Empiricus, the Roman orator, Cicero, and the Emperor, Marcus
Aurelius.436 He admired Cicero's assertion that man has a natural tendency to
gain knowledge, and that the "... chief beauties of countenance arise from
morally estimable abilities."437 In chapter VII, Hutcheson objected to the Stoic
imposition of limitations on human understanding. Unlike the Stoics, he
distinguished between virtue and decency. There was a place in Hutcheson's
thought for meritorious activity that did not necessarily promote virtue. Virtue
was synonymous with true valour, while decency drew upon lesser qualities:
4^8
patience, practical wisdom and sound business sense. According to
Hutcheson, virtuous action was ultimately the product of good will, which pitted
him against Marcus Aurelius, who acknowledged the value of action motivated
through charity rather than strict utility. This provides one example ofHutcheson's stoicism
being limited by his ultimate commitment to Christian principles.
436 While Hutcheson refers to Cicero as a Stoic in this instance, there is always a problem in so
doing.
437
Hutcheson, Francis, A System of Moral Philosophy (1755) Preface, p. 87.
438
Ibid., p. 64. ~
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by self-interest. Hutcheson was also critical of the Stoic view that the
relationship between God and man was disjointed.
One begins to see that the traditional civic humanist characterisation of
Hutcheson's stoicism remains valid in terms of defining the fabric of civil
society. The deep connection Hutcheson made between morality and public
action reflected the Ciceronian imperative that citizenship involved contributing
to the greater good of the community over time. Ultimately, however, a
productive life in Hutcheson's world was one characterised by learning,
judgement, correct moral action and faith, all of which served to illustrate the best
aspects of human identity. As Hutcheson developed his moral theories, and by
extension his treatment of natural theology and religion, his civic humanism gave
way to a Neostoic emphasis upon transcendent universal truths that lent itself to
the moral spirit he wished to engender. Furthermore, while Hutcheson
challenged his fellow citizens to exercise their faculties of reason and sense for
the benefit of civil society he added to the equation by suggesting that the
primary force driving action and improvement was benevolence.
For Hutcheson benevolence was "... a distinct perception of beauty or excellence
in the kind affections of rational agents; whence we are determined to admire and
love such characters and persons."439 Benevolence prompted one to act solely for
the betterment of society without regard for personal gain. The benevolent
impulse stemmed from the deepest recesses ofmoral sense, and constituted the
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alternative form of human motivation to self-love or self-interest. Hutcheson was
fully aware of the seductive power of self-interest, but he went to great lengths to
prove that it fostered an inferior type of social action devoid of any virtuous
elements:
"As to the love of benevolence, the very name excludes self-interest. We never
call that man benevolent, who is in fact useful to others, but at the same time only
intends his own interest, without any ultimate desire for the good of others. If
there be any real good-will or kindness at all, it must be disinterested; for the
most useful action imaginable loses all appearance of benevolence, as soon as we
discern that it only flowed from self-love, or interest."
Furthermore,
"To raise benevolence, no more is required than calmly to consider any sensitive
nature not pernicious to others. Gratitude arises from benefits conferred from
good-will on ourselves, or those we love; complacence is a perception of the
moral sense. Gratitude includes some complacence, and complacence still raises
a stronger good-will than that we have towards indifferent characters, where this
is no opposition of interests."440
Hutcheson also appreciated that the benevolent impulse could be corrupted by
self-interest, just as he acknowledged that deficiencies arose within the operations
of the moral sense. Human morality was fallible despite the natural strength of
benevolence. Therefore Hutcheson distinguished between the motives and
operations of the moral sense and moral distinctions arising from it, and a
separate natural sense of good and evil that regulated conduct other than that
439 Hutcheson, Francis, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, printed
from 4th edition of 1738, Glasgow, 1772, Treatise I, Introduction, section I, part 1 as quoted in
Brodie, Alexander (ed.) The Scottish Enlightenment An Anthology, p. 122.
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undertaken for the public good. Action prompted by the moral sense from a
benevolent impulse retained its superior place in Hutcheson's scheme as it
directly referred to the motivations of 'right reason':
"And yet, as soon as any action is represented to us as flowing from love,
humanity, gratitude, compassion, a study of the good in others, and an ultimate
desire of their happiness, although it were in the most distant part of the world, or
in some past age, we feel joy within us, admire the lovely action, and praise its
author. And on the contrary, every action represented as flowing from ill will,
desire of the misery of others without view to any prevalent good to the public,
..., raises abhorrence and aversion."441
The combined efforts of the moral sense and the natural sense of good and evil
served useful purposes in that both contributed to the maintenance of order and
the cultivation of virtue. Although individual judgement might be clouded by
self-interest, one's 'sentiment' or 'perception' of virtue's inherent 'beauty' could
not be 'counterbalanced' by self-interest.442 Even giving virtue its due, this
approach was not sufficient for Hume and Smith, who questioned whether
individuals were truly capable ofmaintaining such a pure and objective
benevolence. They were also sceptical about the degree to which Hutcheson's
benevolence provided a comprehensive reply to the epistemological problem
concerning how much one could genuinely know about another person's motives
for action.443
440
Hutcheson, Francis, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue, printed
from 4th edition of 1738, Glasgow 1772, Treatise I, Introduction, section II, part 3 as quoted in
ibid., pp. 131-32.
441 Hutcheson, Francis, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, printed
from 4th edition of 1738, Glasgow, 1772, Treatise 1, Introduction, section I, part 2. As quoted in
ibid., p. 123.
442 These are Hutcheson's phrases.
443 1 am indebted here to Knud Haakonssen's discussion of Hutcheson's moral philosophy in
Haakonssen, Knud, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, especially chapter 2.
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The blending of civic humanism with Neostoic themes also suggests that there
was a moment of transition in Hutcheson's thought towards a broader
interpretation for the role of virtue in society. Miller argues persuasively that by
the time Hutcheson was preparing a draft of the System ofMoral Philosophy, the
philosopher's writing extended beyond the propagation of active citizenship to
emphasise the attainment of happiness as the true purpose of life.444 This shift of
emphasis seems to illustrate Hutcheson's acknowledgement of the
complementary nature of the relationship between the natural law school and
civic humanism. He referred to this synthesis when describing the full character
of his moral philosophy:
"The Intention ofMoral Philosophy is to direct men to that course of action
which tends most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection;
as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the
constitution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation; these maxims
or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the system or
collection of them is called the LAW ofNATURE."445
The intrinsic beauty of Hutcheson's law of nature lay in the fact that it reflected
the Providentially-ordained order of the world that underscored and united all the
elements of Hutcheson's moral and political systems. The final purpose of any
inquiry into the nature of virtue or morality was to enhance one's appreciation of
Divine order, the first intimations ofwhich were received through natural
444 It is the intention to achieve happiness, rather than happiness as an end in itself, that concerns
Hutcheson most. It is important to note that from the seventeenth century all systems of natural
law had stoic or quasi-stoic dimensions, in the sense that all stoicism presupposed the existence of
a system of natural law.
445 Hutcheson quoted in Miller, Thomas P., 'Francis Hutcheson and the Civic Humanist Tradition'
in Hook, Andrew and Sher, Richard B. (eds), The Glasgow Enlightenment, p. 47.
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theology. Hutcheson's characterisation of virtue as a 'beauty of the soul'
proceeded from these priorities, as did his belief that individual inquiry fostered
greater degrees of self-control, which in turn contributed to the tranquility of
society. The thrust and tone of Hutcheson's stoicism had moved closer to the
realms ofMarcus Aurelius and Epictetus, a conclusion recently supported by
M.A. Stewart.
Steward points out that Hutcheson's mature philosophy shows an increasing
reliance upon Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, which suggests that Hutcheson
found their Stoicism "... sufficiently congenial to the moderate Calvinist mind
that they could be used to satisfy the pedagogical requirement that secular
writings must not jeopardize the faith."446 Hutcheson's stoicism was built upon
recognition of the obvious compatibility between Stoic and Christian themes.
But Stewart also suggests that Hutcheson's review of religious persecution under
Marcus Aurelius illustrated another dimension to the philosopher's stoicism: the
encouragement of a 'passionate toleration' to which Hutcheson had been
committed since his days as a member ofMolesworth's circle in the 1720s 447
It is from Hutcheson's later stoicism, with its tolerant and universal overtones,
that Blair, Robertson and Drysdale took their lead in developing their own
understanding of Christian Stoicism. Changes in emphasis or nuance continued,
but the Moderates never strayed far from the rule Hutcheson gave his students.
446
Stewart, M.A., 'The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish Enlightenment', in Osier, Margaret (ed.)
Atoms, pneuma. and tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 291.
447 And perhaps earlier, as toleration was fundamental to Whiggery.
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"Let not philosophy rest in speculation, let it be a medicine for the disorders of
the soul, freeing the heart from anxious solicitudes and turbulent desires; and
dispelling its fears: let your manners, your tempers, and conduct be such as right
reason requires. Look not upon this part ofphilosophy as matter for ostentation,
or shew of knowledge, but as the most sacred law of life and conduct, which none
can despise with impunity, or without impiety toward God."448
iv
Pressing the Boundaries: Smith's Stoicism and His Distinctive Form of
Benevolence
If Francis Hutcheson's stoicism may be interpreted as a progress from a
traditional form of civic humanism to an increasingly fluid form ofNeostoicism,
the task of categorising the stoicism of his student, Adam Smith, is more
complex. Intellectual historians present Smith, like Hutcheson, as a practical
moralist and social theorist,449 dedicated to the encouragement of virtue and the
promotion of duty in society. Smith shared Hutcheson's deep concern about
propriety in moral behaviour, and as we have seen, followed Hutcheson's
example by rooting his ethics in a study of moral philosophy that focussed on the
operations ofman's moral faculty.
448 Hutcheson, Francis, Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria, 2nd ed. (Glasgow: Foulis,
1745), p. v; from the anonymous and posthumous English translation, A Short Introduction to
Moral Philosophy (Glasgow: Foulis, 1747) as quoted in Stewart, M.A., 'The Stoic legacy in the
early Scottish Enlightenment', in Osier, Margaret (ed.), Atoms, pneuma. and tranquility:
Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, pp. 290-91.
449 See among many others Phillipson, Nicholas, 'Adam Smith as a civic moralist' in Hont, Istvan
and Ignatieff, Michael (eds), Wealth and Virtue. The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish
Enlightenment, pp. 179-202; Lindgren, J. Ralph, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); Robertson, John, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia
Issue. (Edinburgh, 1985) and Robertson's 'Scottish Political Economy Beyond the Civic
Tradition: Government and Economic Development in The Wealth ofNations', History of
Political Thought, IV, 3, pp. 451-82.
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This faculty, however, was distinct from Hutcheson's moral sense. It was not an
innate entity but an independently operating faculty of the mind that judged all
lesser human faculties and social action. The source of this moral faculty was a
type of reason modified by one's natural moral instinct and the principle of life
gained through experience. All matters or taste and beauty, which were defined
by one's sentiments or feelings, were determined by the degree to which they
were agreeable to the moral faculty. The unity of all the various elements of
morality co-operated under Divine power to fulfil the dictates ofProvidence.450
Smith's admiration for the Stoics' sober and 'manly' virtue is now firmly
established within the Enlightenment canon. His early encounters with The
Discourses ofEpictetus set in motion a life-long exploration of stoicism that
provided a foundation for his moral philosophy and ethical theory. Smith's first
formal acknowledgements to Stoic philosophers appeared in the earliest editions
of TMS, where he made particular references to Epictetus, Cicero and Marcus
Aurelius. The fact that at the end of his life, Smith reworked central passages of
TMS to emphasise more forcefully the Stoic influences he valued, particularly
those concerning duty, self-command and the character of virtue, testifies to the
strength of his commitment to the ancient philosophers.
450 See Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, pp. 165-66. Smith wrote: "Since these,
therefore, were plainly intended to be the governing principles of human nature, the rules which
they prescribe are to be regarded as the commands and laws of the Deity, promulgated by those
viceregents ... which he has thus set up within us. All general rules are commonly denominated
laws: this the general rules which bodies observe in the communication of motion, are called the
laws of motion. ... Moral laws may much more justly be considered so."
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It is suggested here that the challenge of categorising Smith's stoicism lies in its
multifaceted nature. While it is helpful to think of Smith's ethics as a
combination of stoicism and Hutcheson, as D.D. Raphael suggested, the aesthetic
elements of Smith's thought reflect additional influences, not least those of La
Bruyere and the Neostoic French moralists cited in the Lectures on Rhetoric and
Belles Lettres.4^1 Smith's investigations ofpolitical economy and justice draw
significantly from the civic humanism of Cicero. Although Hume was more
critical of the Stoics than Smith, Hume highlighted the unity of the Stoics'
rooting an expansion of traditional secular morality in social virtues.
In terms of understanding the influence of Smith's stoicism on the Moderates, it
is also necessary to recall that Smith's broader discussion of stoicism, natural
religion and the impartial spectator assisted Blair, Robertson and Drysdale in
developing more precise criteria by which to interpret forms of religion. We
know that throughout the TMS Smith carefully distinguished between the
disruptive effects organised religion could have on a culture, and the wider
benefits received through natural religion.
The parallels between Smith's stoicism and natural theology cause many scholars
to conclude that Smith replaced interest in revealed religion with stoicism by the
time he was preparing the sixth edition of TMS. Whether or not Smith privately
abandoned all vestiges of his Calvinist heritage will remain an open question
given the loss of his Glasgow lecture notes on natural theology and the
451 See Smith, Adam, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics,
1985), pp. 80-82. See also the earlier discussion of La Bruyere in chapter 3.
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destruction (on Smith's orders) ofmany of his personal papers. If Smith
developed an appreciation of Stoic cosmology that hinted at spiritual rather than
intellectual needs, it does not seem to follow necessarily that Smith ended his
days as a deist, as one body of historiographical consensus suggests.
Ultimately in TMS Smith was concerned with developing a moral philosophy that
underscored a qualified endorsement of the competitive individualism inherent in
commercial society. By replacing Hutcheson's moral sense with his own original
theory of sympathy and a more limited form of benevolence, Smith reshaped the
manner in which ethics had to be considered by all of the Scottish literati.
Smith followed Hutcheson in exploring moral principles within the context of
social realities. He shared Hutcheson's view that the moral worth of action was
dependent upon the motives and intentions of the agent. But in his preference for
a moral instinct based on a sense of propriety and duty, rather than a moral
instinct specifically contingent upon the guidance of the Christian Church, Smith
placed the Scots in a unique position to reply to sceptics who questioned
religion's role in the moral order.452 They key point for our purposes is that
Stoicism provided a very useful common ground through which disparate
philosophical emphases could be accommodated.
452 As we have seen Smith gives religion a very specific place in the moral order as an extension
ofmorality in society. He goes out of his way to say that fear of divine retribution provides a
profound motive for virtuous behaviour. It is evident to him from the observance of common life
that many believe and act on this motive, and believe in its consequences. What this suggests
about Christianity is, however, another matter.
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We know that Blair incorporated Smithian language into his sermons, and will
see shortly that Drysdale followed Blair's example. It is also understood that
Robertson shared Smith's interest in the roles virtue and natural religion played
in primitive societies. They led Moderate approval of Smith's theory of
sympathy to counter the selfish impulse in society, and by extension seem to have
relied on the coherence of Smith's moral philosophy to enhance the philosophical
form of Christian Stoicism. To determine the credibility of this suggestion, it is
necessary to return to the stoic principles which Smith and the Moderates
universally recommended, virtue, duty and self-command. Parallel attention will
be paid to the kind of stoicism Smith endorsed as he developed his theories.
v
Virtue, Duty and Self-Command
In his revised sixth edition of TMS, Smith presented a new section, "Of the
Character ofVirtue, Consisting of Three Sections," in which virtue took on a
tripartite form to include benevolence and justice; prudence; and self-command.
These existed in earlier editions of TMS but Smith developed further his
explanation of their interrelated nature. 'Virtuous man' was recast in a stoic light
as 'prudent man', whose concerns centred around those "... objects upon which
his comfort and happiness in this life are supposed to principally to depend, ...":
health, fortune, rank and reputation.453
453 Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, p. 213.
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The prudent person was well-educated, frugal, sincere and modest, fully aware of
the value of cultivated manners and speech. He was somewhat detached from the
world in that he did not appear 'in society' frequently, and was 'reserved' in his
opinions and comments about those in his immediate circle. Insofar as his duty
permitted, the prudent person attended to his own affairs without interfering in
those of his neighbours. The prudent person was 'not always distinguished by
the most exquisite sensibility', but was honest and cautious. He avoided causing
offence unless the truth or an extreme situation demanded it, and made an
excellent and reliable friend. His steadiness recommended him to society, and he
was "... always both supported and rewarded by the entire approbation of the
impartial spectator."454 Prudence in this form "... commands a certain cold
esteem, but seems not entitled to any very ardent love or admiration."455
When prudence is exercised for purposes beyond the realm of caring for
individual needs, it derives a nobler character that Smith evaluates warmly. Here
he talks:
"... of the prudence of the great general, ..., of the great legislator. Prudence is,
in all these cases, combined with many greater and more splendid virtues, with
valour, with extensive and strong benevolence, with a sacred regard to the rules
of justice, and all these supported by a proper degree of self-command. This
superior prudence, when carried to the highest degree of perfection, necessarily
supposes the art,..., and the habit or disposition of acting with the most perfect
propriety in every possible circumstance and situation. It necessarily supposes
the utmost perfection of all the intellectual and of all the moral virtues. ... It is the
most perfect wisdom combined with the most perfect virtue. It constitutes very
454 Ibid., p. 215.
455 Ibid., p. 216.
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nearly the character of the Academical or Peripatetic456 sage, as the inferior
prudence does that of the Epicurean."457
The want of either form of prudence in society must be the 'object of
compassion' unless it is combined with vice for malevolent purposes. Only
'knaves' or fools acted from such premises, and their imprudence formed the
'vilest' character.
The Stoics themselves recommended that every individual is charged first with
his or her own care, and then with that of those around them. Smith's 'prudent
man' attempts to fulfil both objectives to the best of his ability, however that
higher form of prudence, i.e., service to the larger community, remains available
to a limited few. The degree to which people 'distribute their good offices' in
society was directly proportional to their individual strength of character and
'very limited powers of beneficence'. This is analogous to Hutcheson's and the
Moderates' acceptance of the fact that while every human being was capable of
virtue, only a select few achieved its highest manifestations.
The virtue of beneficence in these passages refers not to a form of charitable
benevolence, but to the physical means one may have at one's disposal to assist
another member of society. Beneficence is also distinguished from the self-
interested form of benevolence Smith defined to refute Hutcheson's
independently operating form of benevolence in society. Smith's benevolence
456 [Smith's note: Platonic or Aristotelian].
457 Ibid., p. 216.
458 In other words, there is a direct corollary between Hutcheson's virtue and what Smith calls
superior prudence.
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and motives for beneficence both derived from sociability, which underscored all
social interaction. While prudence was the primary means by which one
addressed one's own concerns, the virtues of beneficence and justice assisted one
in contributing to the good of civil society.
On a higher plain of human endeavour, it is the virtue of propriety that Smith
recommended to his audience. Propriety, in turn, operating through the
'sentiments' or dictates of the impartial spectator, recommended self-command
above other virtues to restrain those passions that cloud judgement and disturb
tranquility. The master of self-command enjoys real 'constancy and firmness' at
all times, 'whether in solitude or society', and acts with constant reference to the
'man within the breast'.459 Smith explains the pre-eminence of self-command:
"To act according to the dictates of prudence, ofjustice, and proper beneficence,
seems to have no great merit where there is no temptation to do otherwise. But to
act with cool deliberation in the midst of the greatest dangers and difficulties; to
observe religiously the sacred rules of justice in spite both of the greatest interests
which might tempt, ...; never to suffer the benevolence of our temper to be
damped or discouraged by the malignity and ingratitude of the individuals
towards whom it may have been exercised, is the character of the most exalted
wisdom and virtue. Self-command is not only itself a great virtue, but from it all
the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre."460
It is the person enjoying the greatest degree of self command who meets fully his
or her social obligations and moral duties.
459 See Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 146 for a complete description of the
character of one who has mastered self-command.
460 Ibid., p. 241.
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Humanity's natural regard for the general rules ofmorality forms one's sense of
duty, which is directly linked through the impartial spectator to one's conscience.
Duty is a . principle of the greatest consequence in human life."461 Its
fulfillment provides 'the bulk ofmankind' with a focus for action. Smith argued
that a reverence for duty extends across all social ranks, regardless of
sophistication in education and training. This reverence was first impressed upon
the mind by nature, as demonstrated by the ascribing of virtuous characteristics to
superior beings in pagan superstition. The rules of duty and conduct ensure that
one acts in accordance with moral laws, and this in turn corrects
'misrepresentations of self-love' or excessive self-interest.
The intriguing aspect of Smith's moral scheme as it emerges from these
observations is the deep coherence among its constituent elements. The lesser
virtues ofprudence, justice and beneficence underscore a regularity of conduct
that promotes the public virtue the Moderates so admired. Smith wrote:
"The virtues of prudence, justice, and beneficence, have no tendency to produce
any but the most agreeable effects. Regard to those effects, as it originally
recommends them to the actor, so does it afterwards to the impartial spectator. In
our approbation of the character of the prudent man, we feel, ... the security
which he must enjoy while he walks under the safeguard of that sedate and
deliberate virtue. In our approbation of the character of the just man, we feel,...
the security which all those connected with him, whether in neighborhood,
society, or business, must derive from his scrupulous anxiety never either to hurt
or offend. In our approbation of the character of the beneficent man, we enter
into the gratitude of those who are within the sphere of his good offices, and
conceive with them the highest sense ofhis merit. ..."
In these,
461 Ibid., p. 162.
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"... and in all the other virtues of self-command, the splendid and dazzling
quality seems always to be the greatness, and steadiness of the exertion, and the
strong sense of propriety which is necessary ... to make that exertion."462
The higher virtue self-command focusses attention on the fulfillment ofmoral
duties, which transcend the minutiae of daily life. It is a 'sacred regard' to a
combination of all of these rules of propriety and self-command that determines
the dependability and integrity of any individual. Smith's 'prudent man' is very
much a person of the world, who happily engages in social transactions with a
general regard for the principles of propriety, morality and duty. But it is the
person who embodies the deeper spirit of self-command who provides the ideal
stoic model to which Smith's readers should aspire.
vi
Stoicism and Resentment
We know that the central task for the ancient Stoics was to overcome any passion
that distracted one from the proper focus of life: that is, the achievement of
virtue. As John Dwyer has recently reminded readers, Smith and the
Enlightenment literati adopted this stoic directive into their moral thought by re¬
investigating the precise role the passions played within the individual mind and
within the context of 'group harmony'. The ultimate restraint on the passions
462 Ibid., p. 264.
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came from sociability and sympathy, which together encompassed the positive
moral and ethical norms of civil society.463
Smith went to considerable lengths to describe how the passions affected every
dimension of human thought and behavior. His analysis of sympathy, which
underscored the power of the impartial spectator, was made through a description
of all the 'social' or 'unsocial' passions that influenced whether or not one
approved of the actions of one's neighbour. A certain 'property of passions' was
essential to maintain constancy in thought and deed.
The relationship between 'social' and 'unsocial' passions was complex. The
'social' passions, generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, served to motivate
those 'benevolent' affections that fostered respect and approbation within the
human breast. Mutual regard for these passions facilitated all social interaction
and established a positive sense of community among individuals. The 'unsocial'
passions, mean-spiritedness, insensitivity, envy, were an undesirable but'...
necessary part of the character of human nature"464 The selfish passions, if taken
to extremes, could trigger a disintegration of the benefits gained through the
'social' passions. They could also disrupt one's sense and civic responsibility to
an alarming degree.
Chief among the 'unsocial' passions was resentment, the opposite of gratitude,
the primary 'social' passion. While the immediate effects of resentment tended
463
Dwyer, John, The Age of the Passions, see introduction, pp. 1-13.
464 Smith, Adam, the Theory ofMoral Sentiments, p. 34.
289
to manifest themselves in ill feeling between people, resentment could, on
occasion, be useful. For example, if the immediate effect of an action triggered
resentment on the part of the receiver of the action, it followed that a by-stander
would share that resentment because he disapproved of the action taken against a
fellow human being. If, however, the motive for the malevolent action triggered
no feeling of disapprobation on the part of the by-stander, it became difficult to
feel a sympathetic resentment with the victim. Out of a feeling ofmagnanimity,
the by-stander might 'rise above' a base feeling of resentment, in which case the
perpetrator did the by-stander a service by contributing to the process of
overcoming passions.
This example belies the larger role Smith ascribed to resentment as a 'functioning
passion' in society. It is, for example, resentment operating in conjunction with
the need for justice that prompted society to punish criminals. It is a weakness of
the human condition that resentment fuels as many kinds of action as gratitude
does. However the key to understanding any positive consequence of resentment
rested in Smith's encouragement to control natural impulses to retaliate against
transgression. If resentment served to encourage restraint of emotions on an
individual or wider social level, it had a useful part to play in man's emotional
life. Smith again turned to the Stoics to give this concept added authority:
"The ancient stoics were of opinion, that as the world was governed by the all-
ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and good God, every single event ought to
be regarded, as making a necessary part of the plan of the universe, and as
tending to promote the general order and happiness of the whole: that the vices
and follies ofmankind, therefore, made as necessary a part of this plan as their
wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were
made to tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of
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nature. No speculation of this kind, however, ... could diminish our natural
abhorrence for vice, whose immediate effects are so destructive, and whose
remote ones are too distant to be traced by ... imagination."465
Smith's acknowledgement of the power of resentment would have caused the
Moderates obvious difficulties. As practising Christians, they could not condone
any action that stemmed from resentment, yet they accepted that some action
resulted from negative motives as a consequence ofhumanity's fall from grace.
This was the paradox that successive generations of Christians had faced since
Augustine's day. While on an intellectual level the Moderates may have
understood the logic of Smith's arguments, they could not actively endorse
resentment or self-interest as contributory to the cultivation of virtue. A
philosophical impasse was reached to which there was no clear solution, other
than to resort to the tried and tested method ofminimising sources of
philosophical tension for the sake of promoting those moral principles upon
which all agreed.
The implications of this impasse may be interpreted in different ways. For
example, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Smith's increasing reliance upon
the Stoics demonstrates a gradual abandonment of revealed religion on his part.
It is possible that the Moderates' inability to bridge the gap over self-interest and
resentment highlights a fundamental philosophical flaw in their intellectual
framework. Alternatively this gap might be a natural product of the permanent
tension between faith and reason.
465 Ibid., p. 36.
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For our purposes, it is the stoicism that Smith invokes in the quotation above that
is interesting. As he investigated the rules of nature in TMS that determined the
course of human existence, Smith seemed to hint at an understanding of a
stoicism that was derived neither from benevolence nor resentment. The aim of
this stoicism is not reconciliation of disparate elements, so much as
accommodation of them, and man's inevitable limitations, within an ordered
unity.466 Regardless of the direction in which his moral philosophy developed,
Smith still seemed to require a transcendent unifying principle for it in order to
safeguard its authority. If Smith was hinting at his own unique form of Scottish
Neostoicism here, he was doing so in his characteristically originally way.
vii
The Stoicism of the Revised Sections of TMS
In part VII of TMS, Smith returns to his consideration of the nature of virtue.
Virtue is recommended to individuals by an appropriately guarded type of self-
love and by reason modified by sympathy. Smith recalls that every system of
morality was founded on some element of natural principle: benevolence for
Hutcheson; within the context of external relationships for Samuel Clarke; and,
for others in the pursuit of happiness. These various perceptions of virtue gratify
the moral senses. A virtuous temperament did not depend on one's 'species of
affection', "... but in the proper government and direction of all our affections,
466 Furthermore, if Smith's stoicism provided a framework from within which problems of
resentment and benevolence could be mastered, it would have had profoundly important
consequences for civilisation.
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which may be either virtuous or vicious according to the objects which they
pursue, and the degree of vehemence with which they pursue them."467
Smith's comment was designed to show how different conceptions of virtue
could be weakened by inadequate theories of sociability, and he went about this
by recasting the tripartite nature of virtue to include propriety, prudence and
disinterested benevolence. These are then reviewed through the 'eyes' of
Aristotle and Zeno. Aristotle's vision of virtue is invoked to illustrate
connections between propriety and virtue, stressing Aristotle's preference for
Af.Q
'habits ofmoderation' over moderate affections. Smith suggests Aristotle
implied that virtue resulted from the quality of action and human character.
Action was born through a moderated reason's effect on affection; character
depended on the evolution of a habit of reasonable moderation. Zeno's concept
of virtue lay in another area: choosing wisely in action and thought to preserve
the self-love bestowed by nature to each individual. Here virtue is achieved
through consistent obedience to nature's authority.469 The virtuous man selected
health over strength; strength over agility; reputation over power; and, power
over riches. This natural scale embodied "... that perfect rectitude of conduct
which constituted the essence of virtue."470
467 Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, p. 266.
468
Ibid., p. 270: Aristotle's vision of virtue consisted "in the habit ofmediocrity according to right
reason. Every particular virtue, ..., lies in a kind ofmiddle between two opposite vices, of which
the one offends from being too much, the other from being too little affected by a particular
species of objects."
469 Ibid., p. 272: Zeno suggested "... every animal was by nature recommended to his own care,
and was endowed with the principle of self-love, that it might endeavour to preserve, not only its
existence, but all the different parts of its nature, ... ." Similarly the body and mind ofman
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Smith agrees that humanity's interest is best served within the context of 'the
whole', or society. Our final interests are determined in relation to 'the whole',
and the greatest degrees of prosperity are achieved as agents in society, or as part
of 'the whole'. But through detachment from society, we comprehend the
decisive factors of our behaviour and nature, as ifmaking a sacrifice for charity's
sake by withdrawing from external influences.
Smith brings Epictetus into his discussion, as a philosopher whose interpretation
of the nature of virtue and happiness depended on contemplation encouraged
through freedom from externalities.471 For Epictetus, Stoic happiness arose from
the acceptance of one's lot in life, and from fulfilling the duties and the affections
that fuel respect for authority.472 Divisions among philosophical schools aside,
Smith claimed both of his thinkers recommended a tolerant strong virtue as most
conducive to tranquility and the 'infallible road to happiness'.
Smith reminds readers of his admiration for the subsuming rectitude and
'manhood' of Stoic doctrines, and the degree of license it offers for self-creation.
He follows this with a curiously favourable discussion of suicide related to self-
creation. A certain contempt for life and death evolved in Epictetan Stoicism
based on an ultimate trust in the divine order of nature. This was not a negative
interact, with nature pointing out whatever was needed to sustain the existence as fit to be chosen.
The only poverty man suffered was "want of authority."
470 Ibid., p. 273.
471
[Reminding readers of both philosophers' notions ofman as spectator.]
472 Ibid., p. 276 for reference on Epictetus: "A wise man never complains of the destiny of
Providence, nor thinks the universe in confusion when he is out of order. He does not look upon
himself as a whole, separated and detached from every other part of nature, ... He regards himself
in the light in which he imagines the great genius of human nature, and of the world, regards him.
He enters ... into the sentiments of that divine Being, and considers himself as an atom, a particle,
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contempt, so much as a perfect detachment and obedience to the Providential
order.473 The model Stoic man wished to view the world (and himself) through
the eyes of the Creator, but was prevented from so doing by his desire to
comprehend the movements of Providence. Therefore attention had to focus on
the perennial quest for truth: the process of contemplation and improvement was
all.
It was neither desirable nor ultimately possible in Smith's view to acquire that
perfect detachment, or Stoic apathy, that Epictetus suggested was the end result
of the process of contemplation.474 Apathy consisted of an absence of passion or
feeling, which the Scots thought unproductive. From Smith's perspective, then,
the point was to permit an 'imperfect' virtuousness acting sympathetically in
agreement with our impartial spectator. This hinted at a moderated kind of
stoicism reflecting the more benign influence ofMarcus Aurelius, who delighted
"... in expressing his contentment with the ordinary course of things, and in
pointing out beauties even in those parts of it where vulgar observers are not apt
to see any."475
In a sense, sympathy seems to become as essential a component in Smith's later
interpretation of Stoicism as it was to his moral system. It was through unselfish
of an ... infinite system, which must and ought to be disposed of, according to the conveniency of
the whole."
473 Ibid., p. 288: Of suicide: "This contempt of life and death, however, and, at the same time, the
most entire submission to the order of Providence; the most complete contentment with every
event which the current of human affairs could possibly cast up, may be considered as the two
fundamental doctrines upon which rested the whole fabric of Stoical morality. The independent
and spirited, but often harsh Epictetus, may be considered as the great apostle of the first of those
doctrines: the mild, the humane, the benevolent Antoninus, of the second."
474 For Cicero, apathy was analogous to tranquility.
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sympathy that corresponding sentiments fostered virtuous understanding and
action. Sympathy enabled the impartial spectator to act as arbiter of action,
dependent itself upon imagination and reason for the discovery of the general
rules ofjustice that embody moral conduct. In this regard Smith acknowledged
that Hutcheson was correct to distinguish between reason and feelings as sources
ofmoral guidance, as was Cicero's emphasis of the value ofmanners that"...
inflame our natural love of virtue, ... ."476 In the end, we treat rules ofmorality
(and here consists ethics) as, "... a science which, though, like criticism, it does
not admit of the most accurate precision, is, however, both highly useful and
agreeable. It is of all others the most susceptible of the embellishment of
eloquence ... bestowing .. a new importance upon the smallest rules of duty."477
The final key element of Smith's thought that permeates his stoicism and his
morality is an over-riding emphasis on the power of Providence to underscore the
harmony of the Scots' world view. Smith's preference for the uncorrupted truths
of natural theology suggest that by the time he was revising the last edition of
TMS, his understanding of Providence referred to stoicism and natural religion
rather than to an organised form of Christianity. We know that this preference
was based on Smith's resentment of organised religion's abuse of authority.
If Smith's hesitation to accept the extremes of Epictetan stoicism demonstrated a
wish to recommend moderation and tolerance as central elements of his moral
legacy, one wonders if an analogy may be drawn from this for Smith's final view
475 Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 288.
476 Ibid., p. 329.
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of the role of religion and life? While Smith never strayed from his
condemnation of superstition, the fact remains that he left a place for the Deity,
the Author ofNature, in his thought.478
Despite the sophistication of Smith's understanding of natural religion and
stoicism, it is not entirely clear that his fundamental concept of the Deity
departed completely from the Calvinist tradition of his youth and early
adulthood.479 There is a rigourism in Smith's references to Providence and self-
command that mirrors Calvinist discipline. While readers must remain sensitive
to Smith's rejection of those 'whining' enthusiastic forms ofChristianity that
grated upon his sensibilities, the Moderates must have wondered what deeper
motivations prevented Smith from joining Hume as an avowed sceptic.480
It is suggested here that Smith was concerned with religious truth to the extent
that true faith promoted virtue and duty. Religion, like economics, was an area of
human endeavour that was part of a complex series ofmotives for action in
human life. If Smith was not concerned with religious truth, but purely with
religion's social function, the Moderates' misinterpreted Smith's image of the
Creator. If so, any reflection about the theological nature of Smith's Supreme
Being becomes academic, and Smith's stoicism served only to socialise religion
477 Ibid.
478 It is interesting to note that while Smith advocated a type of toleration in TMS, he was deeply
critical of non-Protestant sects in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. (See for example,
Smith, Adam, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. pp. 298-99; 435-37.)
479 See the earlier discussion of Calvinist overtones in Smith's description of the Deity in TMS
II.ii.3.12.
480 See Smith's comment on Stoic doctrines in TMS, p. 283: "The spirit and manhood of their
doctrines make a wonderful contrast with the desponding, plaintive, and whining tone of some
modern systems." Cf. 'whining and melancholy moralists', TMS III.3.9. See also Smith's letter
297
by altering people's perceptions ofjust how religion contributes to culture. This
seems to belie both the intricacy and subtlety of Smith's moral thought, and an
ultimate connection he made between virtuous man and God.
"The wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interest
should be sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular order or society.
... He should, therefore, be equally willing that all those inferior interests should
be sacrificed to the greater interest of the universe, to the interest of that great
society ofall sensible and intelligent beings, ofwhich God himself is the
immediate administrator and director. If he is deeply impressed with the habitual
and thorough conviction that this benevolent and all-wise Being can admit into
the system of his government, no partial evil which is not necessary for the
universal good, he must consider all ... misfortunes ..., as necessary for the
prosperity of the universe, and therefore ..., not only to submit to with
resignation, but as what he himself, if he had known all the connexions and
dependencies of things, ought sincerely and devoutly to have wished for. Nor
does this magnanimous resignation to the will of the great Director of the
universe, seem in any respect beyond the reach of human nature."481
The 'connexions' referred to in the passage above remind readers of the extent to
which Smith searched for moral certainty by investigating ties between truth,
ideas and wonder, all of which were treated in his essays, 'The History of
Astronomy' and 'The History of the Ancient Physics'. In these essays Smith
discussed the 'principles of connection' between 'successions of ideas' that
formed knowledge. As knowledge increased in civilised societies, so a greater
need for division and classification of species and social categories developed.482
The great problem, which Smith and the Moderates shared with the Stoics, was to
overcome an ultimate Tack ofuniformity' in nature by redefining an order
to Alexander Wedderburn contrasting David Hume's courage during his last illness with the weak
resignation of a 'Whining Christian', 14 August 1776, in Smith, Adam, Correspondence, p. 203.
481 Smith, Adam, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, pp. 235-36.
482 This has clear parallels with Smith's positive endorsement of a division of ranks in society.
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through which all dimensions of human experience were linked by an invisible
chain. Smith described the Stoic's impression of this connecting force:
"That some chain subsists betwixt all her [Nature's] seemingly disjointed
phaenomena, they [the Stoics] are necessarily led to conceive; and that
magnanimity, and cheerfulness, which all generous natures acquire who are bred
in civilised societies, where they have so few occasions to feel their weakness,
and so many to be conscious of their strength and security, renders them less
disposed to employ, for this connecting chain, those invisible beings whom the
fear and ignorance of their rude forefathers had engendered."483
483
Smith, Adam, 'The History ofAstronomy' in Smith, Adam, Essays on Philosophical Subjects,
(eds) Wightman, W.P.D. and Bryce, J.C. [Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982], p. 50. See
editor's note 7 on same page: "[For Smith's views on the relation between scientific and religious
explanation, cf. WN V.i.f.24: 'Superstition first attempted to satisfy this curiousity by referring all
those wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards
endeavoured to account for them, from more familiar causes ...' But also Ancient Physics, 9
below: 'as ignorance begot superstition, science gave birth to the first theism that arose among
those nations, who were not enlightened by divine Revelation.']" {The precise reference for the
Ancient Physics quote appears on p. 114 ofWightman/Bryce edition.}
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Chapter 7
Smith's Influence on John Drysdale, or Virtue Through Faith
and Self-Command
While Moderate ministers were united in their commitment to Christian stoic
principles as the foundation of social ethics, they contributed to the propagation
of virtue in various ways. It has been shown that William Robertson and Hugh
Blair enjoy a unique place among Moderate ranks as great thinkers, whose
innovative investigations of faith and morality provided a bedrock of polite
religious and social thought. By contrast John Drysdale represents another kind
of Moderate minister, one who was not so much a great thinker as a formidable
ecclesiastical figure. His career revolved around the consistent exercise of virtue
through fulfilling his pastoral duty rather than scholarly speculation. He was
deeply interested in the workings or morality in society, following the example of
his lifelong friend, Adam Smith.484 Yet it was through service to his parishes and
to the General Assembly that his Christian Stoicism manifested itself.
The intricacies of Moderate ecclesiastical politics were of somewhat lesser
interest in the discussions of Blair and Robertson given the degrees to which they
combined their careers in the Church with academic interests. Both men,
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however, were passionately committed to fostering Moderate influence within the
General Assembly. From 1751-2 when he emerged as the Moderates'
spokesman there, Robertson's voice was dominant in Church debate. His
authority was consolidated and strengthened upon his appointment as Principal of
Edinburgh University, giving his critics among the Evangelical wing of the
Church all the more reason to watch for hints of favouritism. By the time
Robertson withdrew from public life, he had proved himself to be as consummate
a tactician in Church affairs as he was in matters concerning the university or
politics.
The Evangelical ministers' concerns about the lengths to which senior Moderates
went to secure positions for their colleagues were reasonable. By the summer of
1764, Moderate candidates were successfully placed in the more prominent
pulpits ofEdinburgh and in substantial university positions. 'Dr. Robertson's
administration', as Dugald Stewart called it, was firmly established.486
Robertson's personal ambition was recognised by his friends, most notably
Aon
m
Alexander Carlyle, but his authority rested on their widespread support.
Tensions arose among Moderates' ranks but their common commitment to
identifying the full nature of 'polite Prebyterianism' superseded occasional ill-
484 Smith and Drysdale formed a close friendship during their school days in Kirkcaldy, where
they were taught together by David Miller. Their lasting friendship will be discussed further in
the next section.
485 This time frame is taken form 1751, when Robertson first entered the Assembly, to 1752, when
Robertson (et al.) published 'Reasons for Dissent', their first major declaration ofModerate
priorities.
86 See Stewart, Dugald, Account of the Life and Writings ofWilliam Robertson. P.P.. Late
Principal of the University of Edinburgh and Historiographer to His Majesty for Scotland. Read
before the Royal Society of Edinburgh. 1796. in The Adam Smith Library, Biographical Memoir
of Adam Smith, pp. 99-202.
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feeling.488 The Moderates' professional ties were sometimes complemented by
private bonds through marriage, etc. This was the case with John Drysdale, who
married the third daughter ofWilliam Adam,489 the architect, who was one of
Robertson's cousins.
Despite the fact that Drysdale is best remembered as a Church administrator, he
demonstrated a keen interest in tracing links between matters of faith, doctrine
and morality throughout his professional life. Two surviving volumes of
published sermons form the core of his intellectual and spiritual legacy, and it is
through an examination of these that this section will explore Drysdale's
understanding of Christian Stoicism and his intellectual debts to Adam Smith.
The section will open with a review of Drysdale's early education, his entry into
the ministry and his career in the Church. It will the consider Drysdale's
profound belief in the roles Providence and public virtue play in society, arguing
that both elements contextualize his advocacy ofChristian Stoicism. Following
Blair's model, Drysdale used sermons as social tools to encourage the many
advantages of Christian virtue among his audience. He is concerned above all
with an active form of virtue, one which contributes to the improvement of the
commonweal over private considerations. However public and private virtue are
never completely disassociated in Drysdale's mind. He seems to follow Smith in
encouraging public virtue through the cultivation of individual self-command.
487 See Carlyle's comments in Carlyle, Alexander, The Autobiography ofDr. Alexander Carlvle
of Inveresk. (ed.) Burton, John Hill (London & Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1910, pp. 299-305,
reprinted by Thoemmes Antiquarian Press, 1990.
488 See Sher, Richard B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment, chapters 2 and 3
continue to provide the definitive discussion of the Moderates' ascendancy.
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For Drysdale, like Blair and Robertson, the maintenance of order lies at the heart
of public and private fulfillment.
In his sermon, 'On the Doctrines ofChristianity', Drysdale tied a love of virtue
with adherence to doctrine to form an interesting response to critics who accused
the Moderates of avoiding doctrinal issues. He fully explored the nature of the
Trinity, the need for atonement and belief in final judgement and a future state.
The completion of virtue by grace is central to his understanding ofChristian life,
and the tie between the two seems to reflect the fundamental link he makes
between private and public virtue. The section concludes with a detailed
discussion ofDrysdale's most ambitious sermon, 'On the Distinction of Ranks,'
which illustrates his adoption ofmany of the themes that John Millar and Adam
Smith endorsed concerning the need for a division of labour and duty in society.
i
The Making of a Moderate Clergyman
John Drysdale was born on 29 April 1718 in Kirkcaldy to Rev. John Drysdale
and Anne Ferguson, daughter of the Provost of the city. The young Drysdale was
placed in a local parish school under the tutelage of David Miller, who had
developed a sound reputation locally for preparing young men for university.
Drysdale and Smith studied together under Miller, and despite Drysdale being
five year's Smith's senior, the two forged a friendship that lasted until Drysdale's
489 The Adam family had connections of its own in Kirkcaldy, and thus with Smith and Drysdale.
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death.490 According to his biographer, his son-in-law Andrew Dalzel,491 Drysdale
showed early promise as a classical scholar. He entered Edinburgh University in
1732 to follow the usual course of studies in languages, philosophy and divinity.
He excelled at Greek and was singled out by the Professor of Greek, Colin
Drummond, as a scholar of great promise.
However Drysdale's ambition at university was to prepare for the ministry. To
this end he served as assistant to Rev. James Bannatyne, minister to the
University, who encouraged Drysdale to develop the skills of oratory essential for
a polite clergyman. He was licensed to preach by the Presbytery of Kirkcaldy in
1740, but immediately ran into difficulty in securing his first parish as a result of
the changing fortunes of some of his patrons. It was not until 1748 that he was
successfully presented as minister to the parish in Kirkliston on the
recommendation of John, Earl ofHopetoun.
Drysdale's reputation as a preacher owed less to his eloquence than to his
enthusiasm for his faith. According to Dalzel, Drysdale was a 'natural and
unaffected' preacher, whose 'argumentative and rational' style provoked some
initial discontent among the people of Kirkliston. It was suggested that he was
merely interested in encouraging moral doctrine over specific Christian values,
but he soon won his parishioners over by continually drawing their attention to
the inseparable relationship between the two. He gained widespread approval for
490
Primary evidence of Drysdale's firm friendship with Smith came from Drysdale's brother,
George, who was interviewed by Dugald Stewart when Stewart prepared his Account of the Life
and Writings of Adam Smith. L.L.D.
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taking an active interest in the lives of his parishioners, and enjoyed a reputation
as a committed family man. These qualities commended him to the locals, so
much so that the Drysdale family remained in Kirkliston for fifteen years.
The relative tranquility of Drysdale's early years was disrupted between 1762-4
by a patronage controversy that pitted municipal and church authorities against
each other. In 1763 the pulpit of Lady Yester's in Edinburgh fell vacant, and the
Town Council sought to place Drysdale in the position. Controversy arose
between the Church Courts, the traditional body that placed ministers in parishes,
and the Town Council over which had the right to appoint ministers to burgh
charges. The Council claimed sole right to do so over the strenuous objections of
the Church Courts.
The Moderates took the unpopular step ofpublicly endorsing the Town Council's
authority in the General Assembly. The Evangelical Assembly members, also
now known as the Popular Party, contested the Council's authority in the General
Kirk Sessions of the city. The ensuing battles between town and church, and
Moderate and Popular interests, came to be known as the Drysdale Bustle and
formed some of the most divisive episodes in eighteenth-century ecclesiastical
politics. Ultimately the General Assembly of 1764 upheld the Town Council's
claims, resulting in Drysdale's formal translation to Lady Yester's.492
491 It is interesting to note that Smith was also close to Dalzel and went to some trouble to assist
the younger man with his career. [See, for example, Smith's letter to Edward Gibbon, 19 June
1783, in Smith, Adam, Correspondence, p. 267 and note.]
492 See 'Case on the part of the Magistrates & Town Council of Edinburgh and ... callers ofMr. J.
Drysdale presentee to be one of the ministers ofEdinburgh (Edinburgh, 1764) and Minutes of the
General Kirk Sessions of Edinburgh at their several Sederunts (Edinburgh. 1763). For a detailed
discussion of the Drysdale Bustle, see Sher, Richard B., 'Moderates, Managers and Popular
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Although conflicts between the Popular Party and the Moderates continued, the
Moderates' dominance of the General Assembly was secure by the time the
Drysdale affair was settled. It is important to note, however, that there were areas
of co-operation between Moderate and Popular ministers, particularly at junior
levels.
Younger Moderate ministers shared the Popular Party concerns that by
sanctioning the authority of the Town Council in matters of patronage, the
Assembly risked alienated congregations that could perceive a threat to order
through a politicisation ofChurch authority. Taken to an extreme, a breakdown
of authority could have threatened the unity of the Church, which was to be
avoided at all costs. Furthermore, Popular ministers supported Drysdale's
translation to Lady Yester's because of his personal merits. Moments of such
agreement were rare but they testify to a common commitment among younger
ministers to maintain the Church's integrity as a religious and social institution.
From 1764 Drysdale's fortunes in the Church improved rapidly. He assumed an
increasingly large role in the management of ecclesiastical matters, becoming one
of Robertson's key assistants in overseeing the affairs of the General Assembly.
In recognition of Drysdale's efforts, he was made a doctor of divinity by
Marischal College in Aberdeen in 1765. Upon the death ofRev. John Jardine in
Politics in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Edinburgh: The Drysdale 'Bustle' of the 1760s', in Dwyer,
John, Mason, Roger and Murdoch, Alexander (eds) New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture
of Early Modern Scotland (Edinburgh. 1982), pp. 179-209. For a discussion of Robertson's role
in these affairs, see Cater, J., 'The Making of Principal Robertson in 1762 ...', in Scottish
Historical Review 49 (1970), pp. 64-84.
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1766, Drysdale was translated to the more prominent Tron Church in Edinburgh.
He shared duties there with Rev. George Wishart,493 Principal Clerk to the
Church. That same year upon Robertson's urging, Lord Rockingham, the Prime
Minister, recommended Drysdale to George III, who subsequently named him
one of His Majesty's Chaplains in Scotland.
Drysdale served as Moderator of the General Assembly in 1773 and was elected
joint Principal Clerk with Wishart in 1778, a position Drysdale occupied until his
death. After Robertson withdrew from public life, Drysdale's voice became pre¬
eminent in Moderate circles and reputation for pacifying discontent within the
Assembly was well established:
"There was something so cheerful, so unassuming, so benign, and, at the same
time, so upright and decided in his manner, that he gained the esteem and good
will of all who had any connection with him, without ever exciting the least
degree of envy. Even such as were of different sentiments in Church affairs
esteemed the man; and with several of these he maintained a very friendly
intercourse. As his turn of thinking on all subjects was clear, acute and judicious,
he was very expert in the method of conducting affairs."494
493 As we saw in chapter 4, George Wishart, his father, William (1660-1729), and his brother
William, formed one of the more prominent families involved in the service of the Church of
Scotland. All three were ministers, with William (the elder) serving as Moderator of the General
Assembly on five occasions. William (the younger) preceded Robertson as Principal of
Edinburgh University from 1737-53 and served as Moderator himself in 1745. He was known as
one of the few Moderate ministers who actively explored theological issues while teaching at the
University. He stressed the importance of placing Divine benevolence at the heart of
understanding the role of God as 'Universal Governor' of the world. George, who served as
Moderator in 1748, rejected the degree to which Robertson permitted patronage in the Church, but
remained a loyal Moderate until his death.
494
Dalzel, Andrew, 'An Account of the Life and Character of John Drysdale, D.D. read before the
Royal Society of Edinburgh, December 17, 1792' in Drysdale, John, Sermons, to which is
prefixed an account of the author's life and character. 2 Vols. (Edinburgh: A. Strahan and T.
Cadell, London; and E. Balfour, Edinburgh, 1793), Vol. I, p. xxix.
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The respect of his colleagues was confirmed when they asked him to serve as
Moderator for the second time in 1784. Despite failing health, he reluctantly
agreed to their request.
"In the year 1784, it was apprehended that the choice of a Moderator of the
General Assembly might occasion a dispute betwixt the two great parties in the
Church. After deliberation, the leaders on the moderate side, pitched upon Dr.
Drysdale as their candidate; thinking that, of all others, he was most likely to
defeat the views of their antagonists. But they found great difficulty in prevailing
on him to comply with their wishes. His modesty disposed him to decline the
honour ...; and he was afraid that his constitution, which never was robust, ...,
might not be equal to the fatigues in which he would necessarily be involved."495
Given the quality of Drysdale's published sermons, there is reason to believe that
his abilities as a preacher were improved and enhanced by his lengthy service at
Lady Yester's and the Tron Church. Dalzel confirms that Drysdale continued to
preach from note cards, as Robertson did, which did not always permit as smooth
a delivery of a sermon as one desired. But Drysdale enjoyed increasing
popularity among his parishioners for his skilful analysis of Biblical texts, and
applying the Bible's moral themes to the trials of daily life. Underscoring
Drysdale's perception of his own duty as a minister and his idea ofwhat society
ought to be was his firm belief in the workings of Providence and his advocacy of
public virtue. His commitment to both remained the characteristic element in his





The Workings of Providence, Virtue and Doctrine in Society
In Drysdale's mind Christian life revolved around 'improvement and the
confirmation of virtue', both in individual lives and on a wider social level. He
recommended the cultivation of personal virtue as a means for securing social
tranquility. Like Blair, Drysdale addressed matters of personal virtue
assiduously, but his overriding concern with the maintenance of order in society
highlighted his preference for encouraging constancy in the exercise of public
duty.496
Like Robertson, Drysdale seems not to have defined public virtue directly.
Rather than historicizing it as Robertson did, Drysdale 'socialises' public virtue
in the sense that his understanding of it rests primarily in a social context. Public
virtue involves the traditional elements of obedience to the established
ecclesiastical and political order, and places the good of society above personal
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Throughout the following discussion, Drysdale's emphasis of self-improvement through self-
command seems to suggest that he was more comfortable about trusting in the powers of the
conscience to determine virtuous behavior than Calvinists were traditionally. While Drysdale
followed the traditional Moderate view in focussing on the cultivation of virtue, and he permitted
a degree of reliance upon the conscience to achieve virtue, the theological tone of his sermons
sometimes takes on almost Pelagian dimensions. The matter deserves more exploration than can
be given in our context. Briefly, however, Pelagius, against whom St. Augustine argued
vehemently, posited that a pure human nature could exist, fuelled by individual will capable of
achieving perfection in this world. At the heart of Pelagian teaching was the "... belief that, when
God created man in his own image, he endowed him with an innate capacity to choose between
good and evil according to the promptings of his conscience ..., an innate capacity to make our
own free choice between good and evil that we inherit from Adam, not the tainted legacy of
original sin, and the sole effect of Adam's first sin upon us is that we habitually imitate him: it is
not Adam's concupiscence (in the Augustinian sense) but his example in disobeying God's
command which turns us away from good to evil. ... Thus it is theoretically possible for a man to
become perfect by avoiding sin ... ." [See Pelagius, The Letters of Pelagius to His Followers
(Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1991), p. 7.]
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gain. Yet the maintenance of public virtue relies heavily upon the cultivation of
personal virtue on the part of each citizen.
In his sermons, Drysdale seems to use the terms of social order and public virtue
synonymously. Thematic development takes place within the realm ofpublic
virtue for it is in the world that action is judged by Providence. The private
virtues of charity, humility and diligence, for example, find their most complete
manifestations through social action rather than private reflection, although
Drysdale recommends the latter as essential to forming character. Religion is
treated as a 'Providentially sanctioned' principle of virtue, a pillar of social
justice and authority. And Heaven, Drysdale suggests, is a "... better country
.. .",497 "... a society the members ofwhich live in perfect harmony and
The prominence of public virtue in Drysdale's thought is further strengthened by
his belief that service to civil society fulfils the imperatives of Providence. To
this end the Author of the Universe approves of the development of private
virtue, which in turn fosters greater benevolence in society. (It is not clear
whether or not Drysdale thought this fostering was due to the Invisible Hand.)
Drysdale does not offer his readers a new understanding of Providence, but
Providence for Drysdale does play an unusually direct and active role in the
world. It is the role of Providence providing order to the universe that Drysdale
497
Drysdale, John, 'On Hope ofHeaven', in his Sermons. Vol. II, p. 403.
498 Ibid., pp. 403-4.
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seems to admire most, and its transcendent authority gives human life its ultimate
meaning.
Throughout his sermons, the manner in which Drysdale discusses the cultivation
of all forms of virtue and the maintenance of order is distinctly stoic in tone. His
Christian faith seems to be invigorated by his appeal to stoic themes. In naming
'improvement and the confirmation of virtue' as the 'chief objects' of Christian
life, Drysdale set himself up for criticism for being too rational in his approach to
faith and morality. By describing methods for achieving virtue in stoic terms, he
was further criticised for a lack of 'warmth of feeling' in his religious thought.
However, an examination of his sermons shows that Drysdale blended faith and
stoicism effectively. He diligently reminded his audience that worldly virtue was
completed by grace, and only by 'communing with one's own heart' could one
find the wisdom that led to discernment of the Divine will.499 On a secondary
level, self-reflection and self-command regulated conduct through the exercise of
conscience. This in turn countered vice. All served to assist the individual
believer in the formation of a 'right mind', detached from worldly concerns, that
preserved virtue, rejected arrogance and protected on from the false piety that
tainted genuine devotion.
Given that Christ was the only being capable of perfect virtue, Drysdale warned
his listeners that their quest for moral improvement was limited by the Fall of
499 Drysdale, John, 'On Self-Examination', in his Sermons. Vol. II, pp. 29-35.
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Adam. He assured them, however, that the Gospel promised recognition of their
efforts:
"The ultimate end of the Gospel is the happiness ofmen; its immediate end is
their purity and virtue, which are necessary in order to their happiness." Christ
came to, "... establish, extend, and render every way full and complete, the great
laws of righteousness." And his laws formed, "... the rule of life and duty, the
standard of virtue, ... entire and perfect, as an object that men may aspire after,
and a motive to unwearied diligence in the attempt."500
Drysdale's sermon, 'On the Uses of Affliction', is particularly useful in tying
together Christian and stoic tenets. Affliction, he suggests, promotes virtue by
forcing a 'sedate and thoughtful disposition' upon the sufferer, who must
consider the situation in which he finds himself. This process calms the passions
to 'reasonable bounds', which "... strengthens our minds with fortitude and
constancy." Following Adam Smith, this sedateness encourages human beings to
look upon their neighbours with the sympathy they wish to receive themselves.
Reflection must be continual, and is dependent upon suffering to a certain degree
in that"... nothing is found from experience so hostile to reflection as
uninterrupted prosperity."501 Drysdale's Christian Stoicism provides one with a
type of 'foresight' or, "... an anticipation of evil, that [is] the best provision
500
Drysdale, John, 'On the Doctrines ofChristianity', in his Sermons. Vol. II, pp. 2-3.
501 Reference for this paragraph, Drysdale, John, 'On the Uses ofAffliction', in his Sermons. Vol.
II, pp. 285-86.
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against it, the best preparation for supporting it with constancy and fortitude, and
the surest means of diminishing its force."502 Ultimately:
"The man who disciplines his mind by making his thoughts familiar with
affliction, while yet at a distance, is in the proper posture of defence, and in little
danger of being disconcerted by it when it actually comes. But of this discipline
the thoughtless and giddy are utterly incapable."5 3
It has been noted that for Drysdale the benefits of private virtue like humility,
self-command, fortitude and constancy extend into the public sphere as humans
interact. The social tranquility he sought was underscored by each citizen
exercising these qualities. Ifwe turn to Drysdale's discussion ofChristian
doctrine, his reliance upon grace completing earthly virtue becomes clearer.
The sermon opens with Drysdale's description of the Gospel's purpose to secure
human happiness and encourage the acceptance of Christ as the world's chief
guardian. Drysdale expands upon these points by examining the laws, doctrines
and positive institutions of the Christian Church. The rigours of Christian
discipline, he argues, check vice. Doctrine serves to inspire a love of virtue
untainted by worldly considerations, most particularly the doctrine of the Trinity;
that of atonement; and the doctrine of final judgement and a future life.
The subtleties involved in understanding the Trinity are too complex for any
human mind to comprehend fully. Yet if the Trinity's separate entities are
considered in isolation, Drysdale suggests, readers may better appreciate their
502 Ibid., pp. 299-300.
503 Ibid., p. 300.
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direct relationship to virtue. God the Father, "... banishes that superstition to
which the unenlightened minds ofmen are so prone, and which is the bane of all
true virtue and happiness."504 He eradicates fear through his defeat of
superstition, clearing a path for the cultivation of virtue among believers. While
some argue that God's actions have little reference to the minutiae of daily life,
Drysdale argues the contrary. It is precisely in his attention to the details of
human affairs that God provides us with intimations of his will. Interestingly,
Drysdale suggests that it is the 'moral character' of God that provides us with the
clearest example of the kind of lives we should lead:
"But our ideas of the moral character ofGod, our opinions concerning his
goodness and wisdom, must make a strong impression on our own sense of
goodness, and consequently on our affections and conduct."505
Christ as redeemer is the embodiment of pure virtue.506 He is the purifier, whose
character forms a unity of virtues form which his authority proceeds:
"His example brings all his precepts into one point of view, and presents us at
once with the full and comprehensive idea of Christian perfection to guide our
• S07
conduct in every step."
The Holy Spirit serves to aid believers during times of struggle and weakness. It
is the 'Supporter' of virtue and faith, engendering diligence and activity among
504
Drysdale, John, 'On the Doctrines ofChristianity', in his Sermons. Vol. II, p. 7.
505 Ibid., p. 10.
506 It is interesting to note that here Drysdale's emphasis is on the incarnation ofChrist rather than
the atonement, or in other words, Christ the example of the perfect life; rather than the Christ who
died that sinful, imperfect people might be justified and saved, despite their sin (as in Evangelical
Calvinism).
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Drysdale, John, 'On the Doctrines ofChristianity', in his Sermons. Vol. II, p. 13.
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the faithful. It shares a profound bond with the human mind that underscores
virtue:
"Such is the nature of the human mind, and so intimate its sense of relation to the
Father of Spirits, the supreme and ruling Mind of the Universe, that when
persuaded of his Divine preference and aid, it exerts itself with irresistible
force."508
For all of the reassurances that key doctrines give believers, they must remain
sensitive to the fact that many deliberately misinterpret the security offered
through the Trinity for permissive ends. Under no circumstances does Drysdale
permit reliance upon faith to diminish individual responsibility. He admonishes
against complacency on the part of the faithful. The deliberate masking of
personal wishes behind veil of false understanding ofDivine will is the ultimate
perversion of virtue in his eyes:
"Because our weakness is confessedly such as to render Divine aid necessary to
enable us to perform our duty, it is concluded by some that we can do nothing,
not so much as use the means of obtaining that aid. Thus this encouraging
doctrine has been unhappily made the occasion ofmeanness of spirit, indolence,
and despair. There cannot be conceived a perversion more monstrous, or ofmore
pernicious tendency. It weakens the native spring of our minds, and checks every
virtuous aspiration, every effort of the principle of goodness. ... But, scorning
this degeneracy of mind, let the assured presence and powerful aid of the Divine
Spirit banish sloth and despair, animate us with resolution, and brace our souls
with every fresh vigour to run the noble career of righteousness, ..., and to hold
steadily on in our course."509
The doctrine of atonement naturally involved the presence of sin in the world,
and the manner in which believers repent for transgressions committed. Drysdale
508 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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follows the Westminster Confession of Faith in his treatment of atonement. It
was Providential design that sin was introduced into the world, and the degrees to
which believers suffered misery in life were proportional to the "... progress of
vice in the mind of each individual."510 The punishment of Eden triggered a
historical process of self-examination and spiritual reflection that revealed to
humanity how much God deserved their constant veneration. The ultimate end of
Providential design was the restoration of humanity to its original perfection, a
process made possible only through the intervention of Christ. The key to
atonement, Drysdale continues, is purity of heart which, with regular application,
strengthens virtue:
"Perfect goodness is in its nature reasonable, not swayed by partial moves, not
directed to unfit objects, not wrought upon by flattery, or by mere supplication
and intreaty: And such is the goodness ofGod which this Doctrine teaches. It is
therefore altogether friendly to virtue, and to our instruction in righteousness."511
Drysdale concedes that reason alone offers 'feeble' proof of the doctrine of final
judgement and resurrection. Knowledge of a future state is impossible without
the Gospel, and it is faith alone that provides a foundation for accepting this
doctrine. For those who believe, knowledge of a future state immediately
induces righteous conduct in the sense that it returns believers 'to the
performance of their duty'. Here again, Drysdale follows the Reformed view of
future reward, but he seems to share a certain discomfort that other Moderates felt
with the exclusivity of Calvinist predestination. Stoic ideals return: the
509 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
510 Ibid., p. 18.
511 Ibid., p. 22.
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cultivation of virtue lies at the heart of proving oneselfworthy of salvation.
Righteousness is not necessarily limited to the members of a given denomination.
Above all virtuous action must stem from the self-motivated and genuine
intentions of believers.
Drysdale concludes the sermon by reminding readers that their lives are centred
around a progress from grace to grace, however much they may seem to involve
progress in virtuousness. The complementary nature of the relationship between
the Gospel and virtue is the best guarantee of rediscovering our place in paradise:
"... It [the Gospel] animates the soul with the love of God and goodness, softens
it into sympathy and the tenderest affections for our neighbours; it fills us with
abhorrence of vice, and the most ardent endeavours after instruction in
righteousness; and, to sum up all, ..., it bears the faithful Christian, ..., to the end
of his hopes, the perfection and salvation of his immortal soul."512
The direct manner in which Drysdale emphasises the role of grace in the
cultivation of virtue sets him slightly apart from Robertson and Blair. Blair
acknowledged the limitations of reason and the hollowness of virtue incompleted
by faith. Robertson stressed the need for the eradication of superstition through
grace to strengthen virtue to the same degree as ofDrysdale. In this sense,
Drysdale seems to confront in a unique way challengers who denounced the
Moderates for a lack of attention to doctrine.
With the importance of grace established, Drysdale later turns the attention of his
readers to the final defining element of virtue that bridges public and private
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worlds, charity. Blair relied upon charity as much as grace to inculcate virtue
among individual believers and Drysdale follows his example. Charity, as
Drysdale suggests, the foundation of benevolence and 'the vital force' of virtue,
both ofwhich find their purest expressions in the actions of 'disinterested hearts'.
More specifically, charity permeates daily life in that it is essential to the efficient
and fair operations of justice, civility, temperance and morality. Charity provides
justice with its impartiality; respect in civility; courage and resolution to fuel
temperance; and wisdom to adhere to moral standards. From these arise a sense
of contentment that sustains the individual:
"In the first place, as to the virtues of the individual, charity is justly said to be
the bond of perfection. It will appear to comprehend all the other virtues within
itself, and to be the principle whence they derive their greatest excellence, .... If
it [an action] be considered as flowing from interested motives, it must appear
quite destitute of everything amiable in a moral view, how useful soever at the
same time it may be in a political one.513 It is benevolence when it is the fair
form we admire, which alone communicates grace and beauty to every action we
call great, ..., or virtuous.514 But to be more particular. It is this quality that
gives to justice its chief value, renders it equal, impartial and uniform. ... What
but charity gives to courage and resolution their chief value? It argues strength of
mind, to be brave: ... [and], is indeed a ...heroic virtue. ... Farther: Charity
insinuates itself even into the private virtues, and exerts an influence on those
private duties which a man owes to himself. I mean those of temperance and
moderation in the enjoyments of life."515
Charity also gives fullest value to the 'intellectual virtues' of knowledge and
wisdom. Without charity, "... knowledge is nothing but idle speculation, and
wisdom itself appears in no better light than the cunning and shrewdness of a
512 Ibid., p. 27.
513 Here Drysdale departs from a Smithian toleration for self-interested behaviour.
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selfish spirit.516 Because charity also guarantees sincerity ofmotivation in social
interaction, its value as a stabilising force becomes clear. The benevolence
charity fosters underscores the positive laws ofjustice that define civilised
societies:
"... it is the power of charity alone which can produce that general good
understanding, and those vigourous efforts for public good, which are the real
sinews ofwar, and form all the stability and happiness of peace. Without this, a
nation can neither be strong abroad, nor safe at home; neither provided against
the alarms of foreign invasion, nor the fury of civil wars."517
Therefore in the absence of charity or benevolence the lives of individual citizens
and the operations of society would be reduced to suspicion, greed, deceit and
selfishness - a Mandevillean scenario Drysdale rejected. In an ideal world,
benevolence should serve as governing principle, an 'inward law', that prompts
charitable action. In such an ideal world, fair-mindedness would reign supreme.
Drysdale understands this is impossible, therefore it was the duty of each person
to absorb the lessons of benevolence insofar as they are able for the sake of social
unity and tranquility:
"It is necessary then that there be one public good, comprehending all private
interests, and which is itself founded on their preservation; otherwise universal
distrust must necessarily prevail, to which confusion and weakness and misery
must succeed of course. ... On the other hand, it is the power of charity alone
which can produce that general good understanding, and those vigourous efforts
for public good, which are the real sinews ofwar, and form all the stability and
514
Drysdale seems to have in mind here a more traditional Christian, or Hutchesonian, concept of
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happiness of peace. Without this, a nation can neither be strong abroad, nor safe
at home; ... ,"518
From the content and tone ofDrysdale's discussion of Providence, charity, grace
and doctrine, it seems evident that Drysdale is not as concerned with originality
in thought or pulpit eloquence as were Robertson and Blair. His primary calling
was as a preacher, although he showed signs ofmoving away from Calvinist
orthodoxy in his treatment of Christ. Because Drysdale did not have parallel
professional interests in history or rhetoric as his colleagues had, Drysdale's
methodology of connecting principles of doctrine with the pursuit of virtue is not
as sophisticated as it might have been. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this
section, that in making these connections, Drysdale provided his audience with
tangible examples of how to live a moral and virtuous life, which in turn,
contributed significantly to the propagation ofChristian Stoicism.
iii
Smithian Influence as a Context for Drysdale's Sermon on Social Ranks
Drysdale's sermon, 'On the Distinction of Ranks', provides readers with an
example of a minister as social conservative rather than moral arbiter or spiritual
guide. In it Drysdale leaves aside his more theological speculations for a defence
of the Scots' theory that the division of ranks provided the bedrock of social,
economic and political stability. For our purposes, Drysdale's arguments in
favour of a division of ranks are interesting for two reasons. As Richard Sher has
518 Ibid., pp. 16-17. Drysdale's rather curious references to war may demonstrate the extent to
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pointed out, the sermon provided the Moderates with their definitive treatment of
the subject.519 Second, Smithian undertones resonating through many of
Drysdale's sermons seem to be more pronounced here, permitting the suggestion
that Smith had a key influence upon his friend's intellectual deliberations,
particularly concerning the advantages of commercial culture.520
The importance of Smithian influences becomes more significant given the
scarcity of evidence about Drysdale's moral thought beyond the published
sermons. The purely pastoral nature ofDrysdale's career meant that there were
no formal demands made upon him to record his reflections about social theory
or morality. Unlike Blair or Robertson, he did not have lectures to give or
histories to write. A search for notes Drysdale may have left concerning theory
or philosophy proved fruitless. However viewing Drysdale's sermons as part of a
body of Moderate (and Enlightenment) thought allows one to suggest that he
accepted the general tenets of the literati's conjectural theory of history, and the
theory of Providence William Robertson built into it. Therefore the conjectural
which his loyalty to the established Hanoverian order went.
519 See Sher, Richard B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 180-81.
520 It is important here to distinguish between Smith's discussion about the division of ranks in
society as it pertains to property and the social order from the intricate psychology of
subordination that accompanied it. It is the latter that seems particularly relevant to Drysdale's
sermons. The purpose of both the practical and the psychological arguments in favour of ranks
was to highlight the set of interlocking institutions through which commercial society functioned.
The implications ofwhich included the development of a type of theory of subordination and
mutual dependency among individuals, who served their interests and those of their neighbors
either from self-interested (Smith) or benevolent motives (Drysdale). For further references to
Smith on ranks, see TMS l.iii.2.1-6, IV.1.10, VI.ii.1.20, VI.iii.30; for a discussion of
subordination necessary for civil government, see WN V.i.b.3 ff.; for references to the disorder
that arose in societies not operating through a system of ranks, see Smith's discussion ofGreece
in History of Astronomy III.4-5. For Millar on ranks, see Millar, John, The Origin of the
Distinction ofRanks (1779J. 3rd ed., reprinted in Lehmann, William C., John Millar ofGlasgow
(Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
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theory must contextualize Drysdale's advocacy of public virtue, despite his
emphasis on conveying moral messages in utilitarian rather than historical terms.
Drysdale's obedience to the established Hanoverian order testifies further to his
acceptance of the literati's conjectural theory in the sense that his sermons seem
to acknowledge the superiority of commercial society over earlier stages of
history. (His frequent criticism of superstition in more 'primitive ears' comes to
mind.) Drysdale generally endorsed the positive effects of commerce described
by Smith in WN: the spread of opulence, the advancement of liberty and the free
exercise of individual responsibility. In focussing upon the ethical merits of
virtue and order, Drysdale followed Smith's method, and the traditional Christian
Stoic path, of confronting the moral challenges of commercial society by
minimising sources of tension in it.
While the broad benefits of commerce were universally acknowledged, the Scots
were well aware that the fully unified voice they sought to promote their interests
eluded them. They differed in matters of degree or emphasis in intellectual
arguments. Adam Ferguson differed in his interpretation of civic virtue from
Robertson and Blair; Lord Karnes examined commerce with a more suspicious
eye than Smith; acceptance ofHume's key discussions on property and luxury
were tempered by concerns over his scepticism. Drysdale's own experience in
General Assembly politics made him equally sensitive to the need for
diminishing tensions between Church factions.
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It became all the more important for the literati to emphasise common areas of
agreement as the complexity of commercial society grew more apparent. The
tone ofDrysdale's sermons reflects a sensitivity to this fact, and he followed the
literati in measuring the benefits of the commercial era 'on balance' with those of
earlier times. The comparative nature of this investigative approach introduced a
permanent 'grey area' into the literati's search for a comprehensive evaluation of
modern society. Hence the deep significance ofpromoting those areas of
agreement that united the Moderates with their colleagues outside Church circles.
Assuming, then, that Smith's writings contributed significantly to Drysdale's
understanding of social ranks and commerce, it seems reasonable to suggest that
his influence did not end there. There are three key areas in which Drysdale's
ethical thought incorporates themes that appeared in earlier editions ofThe
S91
Theory ofMoral Sentiments : the placement of self-command at the centre of a
dutiful life; the importance of'impartial' reflection in restraining passions; and a
general appreciation for the role sympathy plays (and benevolence) in social
interaction.
The importance of self-command in cultivating virtue and forming character was
discussed previously. Drysdale recommended 'impartial' thought to his
parishioners on a number of occasions, most notably when he warned against
judging neighbours harshly and the dangers of sensual pleasures:
521 Drysdale was dead by the time the final edition of TMS appeared in 1790.
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"So hurtful to the worthiest dispositions of the human mind, is pride; and so
requisite on the other hand is an humble and moderate opinion of ourselves, for
preserving our judgement sufficiently cool to consider our neighbour's offensive
conduct with impartiality; by which means, on discovering that conduct to be far
less blamable than first appearances suggested, we shall be inspired with pity for
the weakness of human nature, ... ."522
And, in a reference apparently alluding to the impartial spectator:
"The very best among us, by an impartial attention to themselves, must be
sensible of inward corruption, and of propensions pushing them on to the
indulgence of vitious appetites."523
In many respects, the manner in which Drysdale described the function of
benevolence in the passages on doctrine mirrored the role sympathy played for
Smith, with the important distinctions that charity is essential in Drysdale's
paradigm, and that charity retains pious characteristics not found in Smithian
sympathy.524 Together charity and benevolence are the key facilitators of social
action for Drysdale as sympathy is for Smith. It was through a 'fellow feeling'
with other members of society that one judged the prudence of given actions. It
was through a similar thought process on the part of one's neighbours that one's
own actions were interpreted. However, as John Dwyer reminds readers, it is
important to remember that Smith rejected the notion of a Christian 'benevolent
principle' in human nature:
522
Drysdale, John, 'On Humility', in his Sermons. Vol. I., p. 277.
523 Drysdale, John, 'On the Miserable Consequences of Sensual Pleasures', in his Sermons. Vol.
II, p. 236.
524 This raises the question of where propriety fits in this instance into Drysdale's paradigm. He
does not raise that matter here, but propriety comes into his sermon on ranks concerning the role
ofpublic leaders.
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"... his [Smith's] treatment of sympathy and propriety rendered Christian
benevolence largely irrelevant to the ethical order. Whereas benevolence might
have been 'the sole principle of action in the Deity', it was only one of the 'many
other motives' which characterised the virtue of 'so imperfect a creature as
man'."
Indeed, "One ofAdam Smith's most significant achievements was to tease
ethical discourse away from the sanction of tradition and religious dogma."525
The implication of suggesting that Drysdale's ethical thought should be
interpreted within a purely Smithian context is that, in fact, Drysdale borrowed
heavily from his friend to outline the 'secular' dimensions of his moral
reflections. Drysdale was hardly alone in so doing. An examination of his
sermon on ranks will illustrate further aspects of Smith's influence upon his
friend, particularly as the sermon falls so clearly within the context of conjectural
history.
iv
'On the Distinction of Ranks'
The sermon, 'On the Distinction of Ranks', is essentially a polemic against those
who opposed the Moderates' endorsement of a hierarchical organisation of
society as the most effective means ofmeaning social order. The precise time
Drysdale delivered the sermon is not clear, it reached a wider audience when it
was published in the collected sermons in 1793.
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Robertson was particularly taken with Drysdale's sermons. He assisted in their
compilation and went to great lengths to promote their merits throughout
Britain despite the fact that by the time they appeared in print, Drysdale had
been dead five years. Robertson singled out the sermon on ranks for special
attention, in part most probably due to Drysdale's effective use ofChristian Stoic
themes to express himself. Robertson wrote:
"There is one Sermon, On the Distinction ofRanks, which seems if it had been
written with foresight of some of the wild tenets of the present day, and may be
considered as a very useful antidote against them."527
The sermon takes as its theme a passage from I Samuel ii.7, "The Lord maketh
poor, and maketh rich: He bringeth low, and lifteth up." It revolves around
two central messages. First, that the quality of life among lower ranks is not
necessarily improved by opposing a hierarchical structure in society. Second,
because divisions of ranks are Providentially ordained, opposition to the system
becomes a matter of blasphemy.
Drysdale opens the sermon with a reminder that any happiness humans find in
life involves resignation to the will of God and ultimate obedience to Providential
authority. The cultivation of self-command and tranquility ofmind assists one in
525
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526 See Robertson to Dalzel, 28 August 1792, in Dalzel, Andrew, History of the University of
Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1862), Vol. I, p. 96.
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achieving this resignation. Failure to appreciate these fundamental truths results
in a disquieting ofmind that triggers feelings of individual, and by extension
social, discontent. This, in turn, threatens to 'loosen' the 'bands of society'
naturally established by the division of ranks to the detriment of the poor and rich
alike.
Inherent in criticism of ranks, Drysdale argues, is the suggestion that God acted
in a 'partial' manner when he divided society into lower and upper orders, and
ordained a system ofElection among believers. (The basis of inequality and
subordination was property.) Since all are equal before the throne of heaven
(although clearly they were not vis-a-vis election), and since God provides for the
happiness of his people in equal measure according to their station, Drysdale
rejects the accusation of partiality out of hand. Furthermore, who are we,
Drysdale asks, to question Providential design? If one does question it, the only
rational conclusion one may reach is that divisions of rank among people "... are
necessary for their welfare ... ."
Drysdale then proceeds to illustrate the utility and necessity of different ranks and
social conditions. He compares the advantages and disadvantages of the rich and
poor, and attempts to show that happiness is equally attainable by both ranks.
Indeed the two ranks are 'nearly on a level' in this regard provided they behave
with propriety. The sermon concludes with the author's final reflections upon the
theme from Samuel.
528 Drysdale, John, "On the Distinction of Ranks', in his Sermons. Vol. I, p. 271.
529 Ibid., p. 274.
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The argument for utility begins with the suggestion that happiness depends upon
the 'proper exercise' of rational faculties and affections, and that this cannot be
done in isolation. Man is 'made for society' and any full expression of an
individual's faculties and talents occurs within the framework of society,
therefore the first requisite of social well-being is having a secure means of
subsistence. Providence 'kindly ordained' that man would not have subsistence:
"... without labour, and without the application of care and reflection, of skill and
industry, of patience and constancy ofmind. Thus God Almighty has so disposed
of all things, that while men are seeking only the necessary means ofpreserving
their lives, they unavoidably find enjoyment in the exercise of their activity."53
Drysdale suggests that all individuals have talents, and therefore some basic
means at their disposal, to work to provide themselves with material essentials.
This is not to say, however, that being able to work frees one completely from
external forces that may disrupt productivity, i.e., having adequate skills and
opportunities, avoiding illness, etc. Though by nature, then, individuals start
from a level playing field in terms of basic abilities, Drysdale acknowledges that
differences among them arise from changing standards of experience, judgement
and education. This directly affects the degrees to which people apply
themselves to their work and the rewards derived from it.
While critics argued that this disparity placed the poorer classes at a permanent
disadvantage in society, Drysdale continues to focus on the broader picture by
530 Ibid., p. 276.
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drawing attention to the second major area of universal opportunity extending
across social ranks, the protection of person and property under the law. Again,
following Smith and the literati's theory of property and justice, Drysdale
suggests that the secure environment required by all to conduct their affairs was
preserved through the universal rule of law. The necessity of law and the need
for reliable Taw-givers' were obvious, as was the need to avoid possible sources
of corruption by dividing responsibility for making laws from administering.
Hence the first concrete example of a division of labour, the distinction between
'Senators and Lawgivers'.
A series of further divisions of labour are reviewed, between magistrate and
subject, hereditary benefactor and commoner, all for the purpose of defending the
dangers of a deterioration of ranks, which revolves around the destabilization of
individual security. Drysdale follows the classic Moderate model in suggesting
that it is in the institutions of society that citizens must have faith to protect the
interests of civil society. Essentially institutions were founded to protect the
rights of citizens and to promote the fulfillment of duty to encourage order.
While individuals may fail to act with consistent righteousness from day to day,
the good purposes upon which institutions were built 'must prevail':
"It is not from any particular wrong application of any appointment, that we are
to form an opinion of its propriety; but from its spirit, manifest tendency and
common effect. Taking this rule for our guide then, we must be convinced that
the distinction of high and low, rich andpoor, among men, is not only very
useful, but absolutely requisite for the well-being of human society.531
531 Ibid., p. 282.
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With the primacy of law and the authority of institutions established, it falls to
national leaders to protect society from external threats:
"As members of the same community are liable to encroach on each others rights,
from interest, passion, and lust of power, so nations are, from similar motives,
induced to attack each other. No nation can be happy ... unless it have both good
government within itself, and force sufficient to repel assaults from without. For
this purpose, it is requisite that particular persons be raised to stations of
eminence, ..., for the public defence."532
The qualities required of national leaders form another strong proof for a need of
ranks in society in the sense that the 'wisdom, courage, and patience' necessary
to lead are enjoyed by a limited number of people of considerable experience and
virtue. The direct influence leaders have on the 'proper exertion' of citizens'
'rational faculties' is clear. However it is not sufficient to for national leaders to
fulfil their professional obligations passively. They have a duty to conduct
themselves in a manner that promotes personal and public improvement at all
times, a task which only the seasoned 'man of virtue' might achieve.
"This subject might be pursued to great length; and ifwe were to carry our
reflections beyond what relates to the support and peace of human society, and
extend them to the improvements ofwhich it is capable, a wide field would be
discovered for distinctions amongst men, according to the degrees of sound
knowledge, and useful art in which they excel."533
This lengthy section concludes Drysdale's efforts to prove directly the merits of
social divisions. The 'defensive' tone of the following section on the
532 Ibid., pp. 282-83.
533 Ibid., pp. 283-84.
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comparative advantages and disadvantages between rich and poor suggests that
Drysdale was sensitive about the degree to which his audience accepted the
proposition that all ranks enjoyed an equal 'possibility' of happiness. As stated
earlier, to argue that happiness must be measured within the circumscribed
framework of one's rank seemed to thwart positive ambition or improvement.
The tendency to equate wealth with happiness, however, was Drysdale's concern
here. He rejects the nai've view that the rich are always happy. If one reviewed
the 'constituent elements' of happiness, it is mostly likely that the poor fare
better:
"Sound health, freedom from disquieting passions, gratification ofjust desires,
and mutual kindness, joined to the practice ofpiety and virtue, may be considered
... the sum of human happiness in this world."534
With respect to health, it is likely that physical labour ensures the good health of
the worker over the less active man of affairs. Regular exercise releases the
passions and frees the labourer from most anxieties. If the labourer goes beyond
his allotted place in society, if his desires increase beyond those he is capable of
fulfilling, then he puts at risk the safety of a tranquil life. Desires increase in
proportion to one's means for achieving them, therefore the rich are at greater
risk of losing their self-command through envy. Drysdale suggests, however,
that these ideas do not contradict the positive encouragement of improvement. It
is simply that improvement, or envy, tends to operate within one's social
spectrum.
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By weaving some of the themes from his sermons on doctrine and charity into his
current discussion, Drysdale ends the sermon on ranks with the reminder that the
ultimate source of human happiness lies in the cultivation of virtue and practice
of piety. The absence of either leads to the deterioration ofChristian
fie
•
benevolence that strengthens the social bonds. The descent into a world of
Mandevillean self-conceit and self-delusion is only prevented by the giving of
genuine mutual aid based on respect among citizens. At the national level,
leaders must act with singular propriety lest they lose the support and obedience
of the public.
Drysdale's sermon on ranks provides an accessible defence of Moderate
priorities, while illustrating that there was a place for virtue and piety in the
commercial world. Given his loyalty to the Church of Scotland, it is likely that
he was as interested in reminding the merchants of Edinburgh of this fact, as he
was in promoting the values that protected the commercial way of life. Like
Blair and Robertson, Drysdale's Christian Stoicism was perhaps ultimately
concerned with the refutation of the notion that polite commercial values were
artificial and irreconcilable with Christianity.
534 Ibid., p. 285.
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V
Final Remarks on Drysdale
In a forthright manner, John Drysdale promoted the Christian Stoic agenda within
the Church of Scotland with a characteristic unsentimentality that distinguished
his sermons from those of his more eloquent peers. Drysdale was a pragmatist,
who focussed not upon the finer points of the Enlightenment's wider
philosophical debates, but on the means through which the literati's theories
about society could be applied to the lives of his parishioners. By remaining
attentive to the central tenets ofAdam Smith's system of ethics in his religious
reflections, Drysdale cast Christian Stoicism in a particularly lucid and accessible
light, making him highly popular in Edinburgh society. In this sense, Drysdale
might be considered a typical Moderate, i.e., a successful Moderate leader largely
because his shrewd and worldly common sense appealed to the rank and file
among the clergy as well as to private citizens.
It becomes clear from a reading ofDrysdale's sermons that while he was less
interested in the more intangible elements of theological reasoning, his dedication
to key Christian doctrine was complete. He defended this doctrine by drawing
parallels between the ideal Christian life and models of virtuous citizenship,
which confirmed a preoccupation with interpreting Christian Stoicism within the
context of civil society. Drysdale's Christian Stoicism is rigorous, active and
impatient, and seems to focus as much upon the 'end results' of life as it attaches
535 This should perhaps be distinguished from Smithian benevolence which relies more directly on
positive self-interested motivation.
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importance to progress and improvement. Through his endorsement of the utility
of self-command, Drysdale presents an interpretation of life as a careful
balancing of expectations with realistic means for achieving them.
Conclusion: the Moderates' Intellectual Debts to Smith with regard to
Christian Stoicism
We know that Blair, Drysdale and Robertson shared Hutcheson and Smith's
practical moral priorities, but their primary obligation as clergymen was to
promote a specifically Christian interpretation of virtue in society that was
accessible, tangible and compatible with the experiences of their congregations.
In this sense, as John Dwyer has pointed out, the Moderates were far more aware
than Smith needed to be of the difficulties of applying theory to daily life. For
the sake of conveying their message, Christian Stoicism at its most elementary
level simply highlighted the necessity of religious belief to the moral order, while
upholding (at times weakly) the unique authority of revelation.
While we have seen that Smith and the Moderates differed in their respective
accounts of the nature of religious belief, they acknowledged that from the point
of view of promoting virtue, religion had a useful role to play in civil society. J.
Ralph Lindgren has argued convincingly that this common ground permitted the
Moderates to capitalise on areas in which Smith thought religion was
'justifiable', most notably in moral education. Clergymen who embodied the
536
Dwyer, John, 'The Heavenly City of Eighteenth Century Moderate Divines', in Dwyer, John
and Sher, Richard B. (eds), Sociability and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, p. 315.
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virtuous spirit so essential to polite culture were helpful role models for the
community at large. Insofar as religious institutions supported clergymen in their
efforts, they provided a necessary service. But, Lindgren rightly suggests, Smith
insisted that the legitimacy or authority of religious institutions only proceeded
from the 'propriety ofpractices' deriving from the moral norms of civil
society.537
This should not, according to Dwyer, lead to the conclusion that Smith
considered religion a 'mirror image' ofmorality. On the contrary, the extent to
which Smith confronts the complexity of religion throughout his works suggests
his treatment of religion and faith was 'far more subtle than that'. The further
suggestion might be made that it was Smith's subtlety that so appealed to his
Moderate colleagues, for included within it was Smith's appreciation of the fact
that from a contemporary point of view, the 'moral integrity' of society was
incomplete without religion.
With these points in mind, it is possible to make a number of suggestions about
the compatibility between Christian Stoicism and Smith's moral theory. While
the Moderates recognised the need to reply to the challenges of their more
sceptical colleagues, they embraced the literati's interpretation ofmorality as an
active rather than reactive social force. Although they appreciated Smith's
objections to organised religion, Smith left a sufficiently significant space in his
moral philosophy for broad Christian principles: a space within which, it is
537
Lindgren, J. Ralph, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith, pp. 141-43.
538 These points and quoted phrases are Dwyer's.
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suggested, the Moderates thought Christian Stoicism operated. While it has been
frequently acknowledged that Smith did not deliberately set out to leave this
place for organised faith in his scheme, he did not seem to wish to define a
commercial culture devoid of God either. This left the Moderates an opportunity
to place their interpretation of Christian ethics within the philosophical
framework of the Scottish 'science ofman'. In other words, Smith's treatment of
morals and ethics not only lent itself to Christian Stoicism from a Moderate point
of view, but it was essential to its philosophical coherence.
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Conclusion
The motivations for economic activity in society have been a matter of central
concern to historians, moralists and theologians throughout early modern
European history. Tensions arising between self-interested and virtuous motives
for commercial activity in eighteenth century Scottish society have been the
primary concern of this thesis. Particular attention has been paid to the
contributions made by the Moderate Clergy to defining what the character of
'commercial man' ought to have been in an Enlightenment context.
The Moderates relied upon Christian Stoicism to make connections between the
polite social ethics of commercial society and the Christian principles to which
they were deeply committed. Christian Stoicism is often discussed by
Enlightenment historians as a system of practical moralising, or as a tool for the
promotion of obedience to the Hanoverian order in Scotland. It has been argued
here, however, that these interpretations of Christian Stoicism belie the depths to
which the Moderates considered matters of virtue, morality and faith in society,
and the degree to which they reflected upon the relationship of Christian Stoicism
to the Scots' 'science ofman'.
The thesis has attempted to advance our understanding of Enlightenment thought
by examining the role Christian Stoicism played in Hugh Blair and John
Drysdale's sermons, and in William Robertson's An Historical Disquisition
337
Concerning the Knowledge Which the Ancients Had of India. The image of
Christian Stoicism that emerges from these texts is that of a rather complex
construct that blended private and public virtue with Christian morality to
underscore a necessary connection between faith and social ethics in commercial
society.
There are philosophical imperfections within Christian Stoicism in terms of
describing fully the manner in which public and private virtue blended with
religious priorities; these imperfections reflect the traditionally problematic
relationship between faith and reason in history. Rather than focussing on
matters that were philosophically irreconcilable, the Moderates highlighted those
areas of compatibility between polite ethics and Christianity to promote the






Aurelius Antoninus, Marcus, The Mediations, translated by William Robertson,
21 January 1742, NLS MS 3955.
Blair, Hugh, letter to William Robertson, 24 May 1790, NLS MS 3944, f. 20
(Robertson-MacDonald Papers).
Robertson, William, letter to Bishop Douglas, 15 February 1793, British Library
MS 2182:78-79 (Egerton Papers); letter to Gilbert Elliot, 25 June 1761, NLS MS
11009; letter to Gilbert Elliot, 24 June 1758, NLS MS 11009, f. 58.
Printed Works
A Catalogue of the Library of the Faculty of Advocates, Edinburgh (Vol. I),
(Edinburgh: Printed by Thomas, Walter, and Thomas Ruddiman, 1742).
Addison, Joseph, The Freeholder, (ed.) Leheny, James (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979).
The Spectator, Various editions published in Bond, D.F. (ed.), Critical
Essays from The Spectator (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1970).
Addison, Joseph and Steele, Richard, The Spectator. Vols. 1-5, (ed.) Bond, D.F.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).
Aurelius Antoninus, Marcus, Meditations ... with notes and accounts of his life.
The first two books translated by James Moor, the rest by Francis Hutcheson
(Glasgow, 1742).
Blair, Hugh, De Fundamentis & Obligatione Legis Naturae (University of
Edinburgh M.A. thesis, 1739).
Essays on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Abridged Chiefly from Dr. Blair's
Lectures on that Science with Additions and Improvements [2nd edition]
(London: J. Murray, 1785).
339
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (London: T. Cadell et al.,, 1825)
14th edition.
'Review of Francis Hutcheson's A System ofMoral Philosophy',
Edinburgh Review, Vol. 1 (1755), p. 43.
Sermons, in 3 Vols. (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1819).
'The Wrath ofMan Praising God. A Sermon Preached in the High Church
ofEdinburgh, May 18, 1746' (Edinburgh: 1746).
Butler, Bishop Joseph, The Analogy ofReligion. Natural and Revealed (London:
Bell and Daldy, 1868).
Calvin, John, Commentary on Seneca's De Clementia, (trans, and annotated)
Battles, Ford Lewis and Hugo, Andre (Leiden: E.J. Brill for The Renaissance
Society of America, 1969).
The Institutes of the Christian Religion [1536 edition], (ed.) Battles, Ford
Lewis (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1995); and another
copy, The Institutes of the Christian Religion [1536 edition], (reprint, trans, and
annotated) Battles, Ford Lewis (London: Collins, 1986).
Letters of John Calvin (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1980).
Carlyle, Alexander, Autobiography, [ed.] Burton, John Hill (Bristol: Thoemmes
Antiquarian Books, Ltd., 1990).
Carmichael, Gerschom, Gerschom Carmichael on Samuel Pufendorf's De Officio
Hominis et Civis Justa Lesem Naturalem Libri Duo, (compiled) Lennart,
Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1985).
Chalmers, D.D., Thomas, On political economy, in connexion with the moral
state and moral prospects of society (New York: Daniel Appleton, Clinton-Hall,
1832).
Diderot, Denis and Alembert, Jean le Rond d', Encvclopedie, tome douzieme,
tome quinzieme (Neufchatel: Samuel Faulche & Compagnie, Libraires &
Imprimeurs, 1765).
Drysdale John, 'Case on the part of the Magistrates & Town Council of
Edinburgh ... and ... callers ofMr. J. Drysdale presentee to be one of the
ministers ofEdinburgh' (Edinburgh, 1764).
Sermons, to which is prefixed an account of the author's life and character
bv Andrew Dalzel, 2 Vols. (Edinburgh: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, London; and E.
Balfour, Edinburgh, 1793).
340
Du Vair, Guillaume, The Moral Philosophy of the Stoics, Schneewind, J.B.,
Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 202-215.
Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, (ed.) Oz-Salzberger,
Fania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Grotius, Hugo, True Religion (Amsterdam and New York: Da Capo Press, 1971)
[Facsimile of 1632 edition, published London].
Hume, David, Essays Moral, Political and Literary, (ed.) Miller, Eugene F.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987).
Hutcheson, Francis, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Glasgow: R&A
Foulis, 1755).
A System ofMoral Philosophy (Glasgow: R&A Foulis, 1755).
La Bruyere, Jean de, The Characters in The Morals and Manners of the
Seventeenth Century. Being the Characters of La Bruvere [trans.] Helen Stott
(London: David Stott, 1890).
Lipsius, Justus, Sixe Bookes of Politickes or Civil Doctrine, written in Latine: ...
which doe especially concerne Principalitie. Done into English by William Jones
Gentleman (facsimile of edition published London: Richard Field for William
Ponsonby, 1594) [Amsterdam & New York: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum Ltd. & Da
Capo Press, 1970].
Lothian, William, The History of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, from
the Death ofPhillip II, King of Spain, to the truce made with Albert and Isabella
(Dublin: Printed for Messers. W. and H. Whitestone, Walker, Jenkin, E. Cross,
White and Beatty, 1780).
Millar, John, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (1779), 3rd edition, reprinted
in Lehmann, William C., John Millar ofGlasgow (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960).
Minutes of the General Kirk Sessions of Edinburgh at their several Sederunts
(Edinburgh, 1763).
Montaigne, Michel de, "Apology in Raymond Sebond," in Schneewind, J.B.,
Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 38-45.
, "OfRepentance," in Schneewind, J.B., Moral Philosophy from Montaigne
to Kant, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 45-55.
341
Pufendorf, Samuel, On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law,
(ed.) James Tully (trans.) Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
Robertson, William, 'Essay on Historical Probability', in Smitten, Jeffrey (ed.),
The Collected Works ofWilliam Robertson, Vol. XI (London: Routledge /
Thoemmes, 1996), pp. 1-14.
The History ofAmerica, in 2 Vols., 2nd edition (London: W. Strahan & T.
Cadell, 1777).
An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge the Ancients Had
of India, 2nd edition, 1794), facsimile reprint in Smitten, Jeffrey, The Collected
Works ofWilliam Robertson, Vol. X (London: Routledge / Thoemmes, 1996).
A History of the Progress of Society in Europe in The History of the Reign
of the Emperor Charles V, 10th edition in 4 Vols. (Glasgow: Chapman and Lang,
1800).
''The Situation ofthe World at the Time ofChrist's Appearance, and its
Connection with the Success ofhis Religion, considered. A Sermon, Preached
Before the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, ... Monday
January 6, 1755' (Edinburgh: E. Balfour, 1791).
The Royal Society of Edinburgh. Transactions of The Royal Society of
Edinburgh, Vol. I, (Edinburgh: Printed for J. Dickson. Sold in London by T.
Cadell, 1788).
The Scotch Preacher: or, A Collection of Sermons (Edinburgh: Printed for J.
Dickson, 1773).
Seneca, Dialogues and Letters, (ed.) Costa, C.D.N. (London: Penguin Classics),
1997).
Letters from a Stoic (London: Penguin Classics, 1985).
Moral and Political Essays, (eds) Cooper, John M. and Procope, J.F.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth ofNations, 2
Vols., (eds) Campbell, R.H. and Skinner, A.S. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics,
1981).
Correspondence, (eds) Mossner, E.C. and Ross, I.S. (Indianapolis: Liberty
Classics, 1987).
Essays on Philosophical Subjects, (eds) Wightman, W.P.D. and Bryce,
J.C. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982).
342
Lectures on Jurisprudence, (eds) Meek, R.L., Raphael, D.D., and Stein, P.
Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982).
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, (ed.) Bryce, J.C. (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1985).
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (eds) Raphael, D.D. and Macfie, A.L.
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982).
Temple, Sir William, Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands,
(introduction) Clark, G.N. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).
Wodrow, Robert, Analecta: Or Materials for a History of Remarkable
Providences, Vol. 4 (Edinburgh, 1842-43).
Secondary Sources
Aarsleff, Hans, From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and
Intellectual History (London: Althlone Press, 1982).
The Study of Language in England. 1780-1860 (London: Althlone Press &
Minneapolis: The University ofMinnesota Press, 1983).
Allan, David, Virtue. Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1993).
Andrews, K.R., Trade. Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the
Genesis of the British Empire. 1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984).
Appleby, Joyce O., Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century
England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
Barbour, Reid, English Epicures and Stoics: Ancient Legacies in Early Stuart
Culture (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
Battles, Ford Lewis, 'The Sources ofCalvin's Seneca commentary', in Battles,
Ford Lewis et ah, John Calvin (Courtenay Studies in Reformation Theology)
[Abingdon, 1966], pp. 38-66.
Berry, Christopher, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
Bieler, Andre, La Pensee Economique et Sociale de Calvin (Geneve: Librairie de
l'Universite, Goerg & Cie S.A., 1959).
343
Bloom, Edward A. and Lillian D. Bloom, Joseph Addison's Social Animal in the
market place, on the Hustings, in the pulpit (Providence: Brown University Press,
1971).
Bock, G., Skinner Q. and Varoli, M. (eds), Machiavelli and Republicanism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Boughner, Daniel, "Jonson's Use of Lipsius in Sejanus," Modern Language
Notes 73 (1958), pp. 247-255.
Bouwsma, William J., John Calvin. A Sixteenth Century Portrait (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988).
Bradley, James, Religion, Revolution, and English Radicalism - Nonconformists
in Eighteenth-Century Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
Bretonneau, Gisele, Stoicisme et Valeurs Chez J.-J. Rouseau (Paris: Societe d'
Edition d'Enseignement Superieur, 1977).
Brodie, Alexander (ed.), The Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology (Edinburgh:
Canongate Classics, 1997).
Brown, Callum G., The Social History ofReligion in Scotland (London and New
York: Methuen, 1987).
Brown, Stewart, J., Thomas Chalmers and the Godly Commonwealth in Scotland
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
(ed.), William Robertson and the expansion of empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Buckle, Stephen, Natural Law and the Theory of Property, Grotius to Hume
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
Camic, Charles, Experience and Enlightenment: Socialization for Cultural
Change in Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1983).
Campbell, R.H. and Skinner, A.S. (eds), The Origins and Nature of the Scottish
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1982).
Carnall, Geoffrey, 'Robertson and contemporary images of India', in Brown,
Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the expansion of empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 210-230.
Carruthers, S.W. (ed.), The Westminster Confession of Faith (Glasgow: Free
Presbyterian Publications, 1978, reprint of 1646 edition by Cornelius Burges).
344
Cater, J., 'The Making of Principal Robertson in 1762 in Scottish Historical
Review 49 (1970), pp. 60-84.
Cerny, Gerald, Theology, politics and letters at the crossroads of European
civilisation. Jacques Basnage and the Baylean Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch
Republic (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987).
Champion, J.A.I., The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
Clark, I.D.L., Moderatism and the Moderate Party in the Church of Scotland,
1752-1805, (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1964).
Clark, J.C.D., Revolution and Rebellion - State and Society in England in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986).
Copenhaver, Brian and Schmitt, Charles (eds), Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
Croll, Morris, W., Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm, (ed.) J. Mac Patrick (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966).
Cunningham, William, Historical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1870).
Dalzel, Andrew, History of the University of Edinburgh from its foundation, 2
Vols. (Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1862).
Dickinson, H.T., Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century
Britain (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. University Paperback, 1979).
Dunlop, A. Ian, William Carstares and the Kirk by Law Established (Edinburgh:
The St. Andrew Press, 1967).
Dwyer, John, The Age of the Passions: An Interpretation ofAdam Smith and
Scottish Enlightenment Culture (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1998).
'Clio and ethics: Practical morality in enlightened Scotland', The
Eighteenth-Century, 30 (1989).
'The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Moderate Divines', in
Dwyer, John (ed.), New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture ofEarly Modern
Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1982).
with Richard B. Sher (eds), Sociability and Society in Eighteenth-Century
Scotland (Edinburgh: The Mercat Press, 1993).
Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-
Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987).
345
Edwards, Charles S., Hugo Grotius, The Miracle of Holland. A Study in Political
and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981).
Elias, Norbet, The Civilising Process: The History ofManners and State
Formation and Civilisation, (trans.) Jephcott, E. (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, Ltd.,
1994) [new imprint of 1978 text].
Emerson, Roger, 'Natural philosophy and the problem of the Scottish
Enlighenment', Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 242 (1986), pp.
243-291.
'Science and the origins and concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment',
History ofScience, 26 (1988), pp. 333-366.
Erskine, John, 'The Agency ofGod in Human Greatness: Appendix', in Erskine
John, Discourses Preached on Several Occasions, (ed.) Wellwood, Sir H.M., 2
Vols. (Edinburgh, 1818).
Evans, Robert C., Jonson, Lipsius and The Politics of Renaissance Stoicism
(Durango, Colorado: Longwood Academic and Hollowbrook Publishers, 1992).
Fix, Andrew C., Prophecy and Reason: the Dutch Collegiants in the Early
Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
Fowler, Thomas, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (London: Sampson Low, Marston,
Searle, & Rivington, 1882).
France, Peter, Politeness and its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
Fratt, Steven D., Scottish Theological Trends in the Eighteenth Century, Tensions
between "Head" and "Heart", PhD thesis, University of California, Santa
Barbara, 1988 (Ann Arbor: UMI Microfilm, 1988).
Gamble, Richard C. (ed.). Calvinism in France, the Netherlands. Scotland, and
England (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992).
Gerrish, B.A. with Benedetto, Roberts (eds), Reformatio perennis essays on
Calvin and the Reformation in honor of F.L. Battles (Pittsburgh: The Pickwick
Press, 1981).
Haakonssen, Knud, Natural Law and the Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the
Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Haley, Kenneth H.D., An English Diplomat in the Low Countries - Sir William
Temple and John De Witt. 1665-1672 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
346
Hill, John, An Account of the Life and Writings of Hugh Blair. P.P.. F.R.S.E.
(Edinburgh: Printed by J. Bannatyne & Co. for T. Cadell and W. Davies, Strand,
London and William Creech, and Manners and Miller, Edinburgh, 1807).
Hirschman, A.O., The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977).
Holmes George, The Florentine Enlightenment, 1400-1450 [2nd edition] (Oxford
Clarendon Press, 1992).
Hope, V.M., Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy ofHutcheson. Hume
and Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
Hopfl, Harro, 'From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish
Enlightenment', Journal ofBritish Studies, 17, (1978), pp. 19-40.
The Christian Polity of John Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982).
Howell, Wilbur Samuel, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
Huizinga, Johan, Dutch Civilisation in the Seventeenth-Century (London:
Fontana Collins, Reprint 1968).
Hundert, E.J.. The Enlightenment Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery
of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Israel, Jonathan. The Dutch Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
Jacob, Margaret C., The Newtonians and the English Revolution. 1689-1720
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).
Jamieson, Ruth Kirby, Marivaux: A Study in Sensibility (New York: Octagon
Books, 1969).
Johnson, Samuel, A Dictionary of the English Language (London: Times Books,
1979).
Jones Peter and Skinner Andrew, Adam Smith Reviewed (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1992).
Jones, Peter, Hume's Sentiments (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982).
Kidd, Colin, Subverting Scotland's Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993).
347
'The ideological significance of the History of Scotland', in Brown,
Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 122-144.
Klein, Lawrence, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Laursen, John C., The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume,
and Kant (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992).
Selected Politics in Hume and Kant: Letters on Philosophy, and the
Language ofPolitics (PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1985).
Leeb, Leonard, The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).
Levi, Anthony, French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions, 1585-1649
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
Liggio, Leonard P., preface editorial to Veatch, Henry B., 'Natural Law: Dead or
Alive', in Literature ofLiberty, October / December, 1978).
Lincoln, Bruce, Religion, Rebellion, Revolution (London: The MacMillan Press,
1985).
Lindgren, J. Ralph, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973).
MacFie, A.L., 'The Invisible Hand of Jupiter' in the Journal ofthe History of
Ideas, vol. XXXII, 1971, pp. 595-99.
Maclntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London:
Duckworth, 1981).
Mackenney, Richard, Sixteenth Century Europe: Expansion and Conflict
(London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1993).
McGrath, Alister, A Life of John Calvin (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd.,
1997).
Mcintosh, J., The Popular Party in the Church of Scotland, 1740-1800, (PhD
thesis, University of Glasgow, 1989)
McNeil, John T., The History and Character of Calvinism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1954).
Marivaux, Pierre Carlet de Chamblain de, Le Spectateur Francais (Paris: Editions
Bossard, 1921).
348
Marshall, Gordon, Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of
Capitalism in Scotland, 1560-1707 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
Reprint, 1992).
Melitz, Jacques and Winch, Donald, Religious Thought and Economic Society.
Four Chapters of an Unfinished Work by Jacob Viner (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1978).
Miller, David (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia ofPolitical Thought (Oxford:
Basic Blackwell Ltd., 1987).
Miller, Peter, N., Defining the Common Good: Empire, religion and philosophy
in the Eighteenth-century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994).
Miller, Thomas P., 'Francis Hutcheson and the Civic Humanist Tradition', in
Hook, Andrew and Sher, Richard B., The Glasgow Enlightenment (East Linton:
Tuckwell Press, 1995).
Mizuta, Hiroshi, Adam Smith's Library: A Supplement to Bonar's Catalogue
with a Checklist of the Whole Library (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
for the Royal Economic Society, 1967).
Moore, James and Silverthorne, Michael, "Gerschom Carmichael and natural
jurisprudence', in Hont, Istvan and Ignatieff, Michael (eds), Wealth and Virtue:
The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 171-197.
Monter, E.W., Calvin's Geneva (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1967).
Studies in Genevan Government (1536-1605) [Geneve: Librarie Droz,
1964],
Morford, Mark, Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
Moriarty, Michael, Taste and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century France
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Mourgues, Odette de, The French Moralists La Rochefoucauld & La Bruyere
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
Mulier, Eco Haitsma, 'The language of seventeenth-century republicanism in the
United Provinces: Dutch or European?' in Pagden, Anthony (ed.). The Languages
ofPolitical Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), pp. 179-195.
349
Mullan, John, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
Murakoshi, Yoshio, Adam Smith's Natural Theology and the Framework of
Economics [PhD thesis, University ofNotre Dame, USA, 1988] Ann Arbor:
University ofMichigan microfilm).
Oestreich, Gerhard, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Osier, Margaret J.. Atoms, pneuma and tranquility: Stoic Themes in European
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Pagden, Anthony, The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modem Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Pelagius, The Letters of Pelagius to His Followers (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The
Bydell press, 1991).
Phillipson, Nicholas T., 'Adam Smith as civil moralist' in Hont, Istvan and
IgnatieffMichael (eds), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in
the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.
179-202.
'Providence and progress, an introduction to the historical thought of
William Robertson', in Brown, Stewart J. (ed.), William Robertson and the
expansion of empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 55-73).
Plutarch, Life of Cicero, (trans. & introduction) Moles, J.L. (Warminster,
Wiltshire: Aris & Phillips, Ltc., 1988).
Pocock, J.G.A. 'Cambridge paradigms and Scotch Philosophers' in Hont, Istvan
and Ignatieff, Michael (eds), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985).
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
Virtue. Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985).
Porter, Roy (ed.), The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge & London:
Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Potts. Timothy, C., Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980).
350
Price, J.L., Holland the Dutch Republic in the 17th Century - The Politics of
Particularism (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1994).
Primer, Irwin (ed.), Mandeville Studies (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1975).
Reardon, Bernard, Religious Thought in the Reformation [2nd edition] (London
and New York: Longman, 1995).
Rendall, Jane, The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment (London: MacMillan
Press, Ltd., 1978).
Riggs, David, Ben Jonson: A Life (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
Robertson, John, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh:
John Donald, 1985).
'Scottish Political Economy Beyond the Civic Tradition: Government and
Economic Development in The Wealth ofNationsHistory ofPolitical Thought,
IV, 3.
Robbins, Caroline, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1959).
Rist, John M., Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
Robertson, John (ed.), A Union for Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995).
Rutherford, R.B., The Meditations ofMarcus Aurelius (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989).
Sandbach, F.H., The Stoics, [2nd edition] (Bristol: The Bristol Press, 1989).
Scamell, G.V., The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion, 1450-
1715 (London: Unwin, 1989).
Schaefer, D.L., "Montaigne's intention and his rhetoric," Interpretation: a
Journal ofPolitical Philosophy 5 (1975), pp. 57-90.
Schmidtz, Robert, M., Hugh Blair (Morningside Heights, New York: King's
Crown Press, 1948).
Schneewind, J.B., Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: An Anthology,
Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Sefton, Henry, The Early Development ofModeration in the Church of Scotland.
(PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1962).
351
"Neu-lights and Preachers Legall': Some Observations on the Beginning
ofMeratism in the Church of Scotland," in Church Politics and Society. Scotland
1408-1929. (ed.) MacDougall, N. (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983), pp. 186-196.
Sher, Richard, B., Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The
Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985).
'Moderates, Managers and Popular Politics in Mid-Eighteenth-Century
Edinburgh: The Drysdale "Bustle" of the 1760s', in Dwyer, John (ed.), New
Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland (Edinburgh:
John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1982), pp. 179-209.
Smitten, Jeffrey, 'The Shaping of Moderation: William Robertson and
Arminianism' in Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture, Vol. 22 (1992), pp. 281 -
300.
Steuart of Pardovan, Walter, Compendium of the Laws of the Church of Scotland
or Collections and Observations concerning the Worship. Discipline, and
Government of the Church of Scotland. Vols. I and II (Edinburgh: Robert
Buchanan, 1830).
Stewart, Dugald, Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith. LL.D., William
Robertson. P.P., Thomas Reid, P.P. (ed.) Hamilton. Bart.. SirWilliam to which
is Prefixed A Memoir ofDugald Stewart, with selections from his
correspondence by John Veitch, M.A. [Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co.
and London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co., 1858, in Reprints of Economic Classics
(New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966)].
Stewart, M.A. and Wright, J.P. (eds.), Hume and Hume's Connexions
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994).
Stewart, M.A., 'The Stoic legacy in the early Scottish Enlightenment', in Osier,
Margaret (ed.), Atoms, pneuma. and tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in
European Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
(ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990).
Tawney, R.H., Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study (London:
Penguin Books, Reprint, 1990).
Trimpi, Wesley, Ben Jonson's Poems: A Study of the Plain Style (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1962).
Tuck, Richard, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979).
Philosophy and Government. 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
352
Viner, Jacob, Essays on the Intellectual History of Economics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press., 1991).
Religious Thought and Economic Society, (eds) Melitz, J. and Winch, D.
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1978).
The Role of Providence in the Social Order: An Essay in Intellectual
History, Jayne Lectures for 1966 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society,
1972).
Walker, James, The Theology and Theologians of Scotland, 1560-1750
(Edinburgh: Knox, 1982).
Walzer, Michael, The Revolution of the Saints (London: Weidenfield and
Nicholson, 1966).
Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism (trans.) Parsons,
Talcott (New York: Charles Scribner's & Sons and London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1952).
Williamson, George, The Senecan Amble (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951).
Wilson, Rev. John, Index to the Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly
of the Church of Scotland and the Revolution to the Present Time (Edinburgh &
London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1863).
Wood, P.B., 'The Natural History ofMan in the Scottish Enlightenment', History
of Science 28 (1989), pp. 89-123.
Wright, David F., Lachman, David C., Meek, Donald E., Cameron, Nigel M. de
S. (eds) The Dictionary of Scottish Church History and Theology (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1993).
Zachman, Randall, The Assurance of Faith and Conscience in the Theology of
Martin Luther and John Calvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).
353
